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1.01  Abstract 
 
Globalization has become one of the defining features of the contemporary world, and is, 
no doubt, having some impact on human rights. In examining the nature of the impact 
with particular reference to Africa, this Thesis challenges the conventional scholarship 
which has so far concentrated on the impact of globalization on human rights, ignoring 
the possible impact of human rights on processes of globalization, and argues that in 
order to obtain a holistic view of the relationship between globalization and human rights, 
sufficient attention must equally be given to the corresponding impact of human rights 
norms  on  processes  of  globalization.  In  support  of  this  formulation,  three  levels  of 
analysis are adopted in the Thesis, namely; international, regional and national systems.  
It is argued that at the international level, the impact of human rights norms on processes 
of globalization is evidenced by the fact that international economic institutions such as 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which initially ignored human rights norms in their policies, programmes and operations, 
have now embraced such norms. At the regional level, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, embodying human rights norms attentive to the African condition, has 
been used to constrain processes of globalization. Finally, using three African countries, 
namely, South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya as case studies, it is demonstrated that at the 
national levels, human rights norms are also impacting on processes of globalization, as 
the  activities  of  transnational  corporations,  and  those  of  governments  based  on  the 
dictates of  economic  globalization, are being  challenged by human rights  NGOs and 
other social movements. 
It is on this score that the ‘Mutual Impact thesis’ is formulated, the contention being that 
for a proper understanding of whether the impact of globalization on human rights is 
positive  or  negative,  a  debate  that  has  engaged  the  attention  of  some  writers,  the 
preliminary issue of the corresponding impact of human rights on globalization must also 
be taken into account.    3 
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Part One  
 
Globalization and Human Rights: General Theoretical 
Framework 
 
This part of the thesis seeks to examine the general theoretical issues involved in this 
discussion of the relationship between globalization and human rights. It examines the 
problematic issue of the definition of globalization and the controversy that has trailed 
the human rights corpus over the years, examining these issues and controversies within 
the three historical phases of African history, namely, pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial  periods.  The  views of  writers  concerning the impact  of  globalization on the 
promotion and protection of human rights are also discussed as ideal-typical positions, 
and appraised. The central argument of the thesis is also presented in this part, namely, 
that  the  relationship  between  globalization  and human  rights  is  not  a  linear  one,  but 
evidences a mutual impact between the two.  
     This formulation sets the scene for the discussion carried out in the subsequent 
chapters.    15 
 
 
1.07  Introduction 
 
The world is undergoing tremendous social, economic and technological transformation. 
Relations between states are being re-defined and restructured to accord with changing 
social and economic realities. Such changes are not necessarily novel and, to some extent, 
can be said to have historical parallels. At a particular point in history the changes were 
driven by the desire for territorial expansion, with some states acquiring and dominating 
other territories and implanting their cultural norms and values on those societies.
1 In the 
ancient world, nations explored other territories for the purposes of enhanced trade and 
commerce. Thus, in earlier processes of social and economic change, developments in 
some ways similar to what has come to be regarded as globalization can be identified. 
Nevertheless, the material nature of contemporary globalization is distinct from the 
previous phases of globalization and it is these distinct features that have accentuated the 
impact  of  globalization  on  human  rights,  and,  as  I   will  argue  in  this  thesis,  the 
corresponding impact of human rights on the globalization process. As Alison Brysk has 
aptly noted: 
The  current  wave  of  globalization  does  surpass  previous  eras  in  the  breadth, 
scope,  and  intensity  of  the  combination  of  connection,  cosmopolitanism, 
commodification, and communication. It is this combination of norms, flows, 
institutions,  and  markets  that  has particular political  consequences  for  human 
rights.
2  
     Africa was not immune to these developments. Indeed, the continent was the object of 
acquisition and control by other regions of the world, notably Europe. Such changes were 
largely fuelled by economic and technological considerations and the need for hegemonic 
control  of those territories.  As  Immanuel  Wallerstein  has  shown in  his  world  system 
                                                 
1 D.J. Bederman, 2008, Globalization and International Law, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.4-5. 
2 A.  Brysk,  2002,  ‘Transnational  Threats  and  Opportunities’,  A.  Brysk,  ed.  Globalization  and  Human 
Rights, California: University of California Press, pp.1-16 at 6.   16 
theory,
3  such  developments  represent  a  phase  in  the  processes  of  globalization. 
Significantly, the changes are also affecting some of the established organizing principles 
of  state  relations  such  as  state  sovereignty.  Thus,  the  Westphalian  conception  of 
sovereignty  which  accorded  untrammelled  regulatory  power  to  the  state  has  been 
considerably attenuated by the emergence of other actors  on the international scene.
4 
Although this has not led to the end of the nation state as predicted by Kenichi Ohmae,
5 it 
has nevertheless resulted in a significant re -conceptualization of the role of the state in 
national  and  international  relations,  described  as  the  ‘relative  miniaturization  of  the 
state’.
6 In a way, this development is related to the weak state consensus which sees the 
state as an inherently oppressive institution which must therefore be weakened as a pre-
condition of the strengthening of civil society.
7 But as Boaventura de Sousa Santos has 
observed,  ‘this  liberal  consensus  is  plagued  by  a  dilemma:  since  only  the  state  can 
produce its own weakness, it takes a strong state to produce it efficiently and sustain it 
coherently’.
8 However,  whether  the  state  is  implicated  in  the  production  of  its  own 
weakness or is merely responding to external forces, the reality is that these pressures 
have  impacted  greatly  on  state  sovereignty.  Indeed,  Heinz  Klug  has  succinctly 
summarised the three sets of pressures being mounted on state sovereignty by the process 
of globalization.
9  
First,  the  very  nature,  scope  and  capacity  of  the  sovereign  state  is[sic]being 
changed  from  above  by  processes  of  economic,  political,  legal  and  military 
interconnectedness. Second, the nation-state is being challenged from below by 
local  groups,  movements  and  nationalisms  questioning  its  status  as  a 
representative and accountable power system; and third, the nature and dynamics 
of national political systems are being reshaped by the ‘claims of interlocking 
                                                 
3 I. M. Wallerstein, 2000, The Essential Wallerstein, New York: The New Press, pp.71-102. 
4 S. Strange, 1996, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.3-7. 
5 K. Ohmae, 1995, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, New York: The Free 
Press, pp.11-13. His argument concerning the emergence of a ‘borderless world’ has however proven to 
be hugely valid.  
6 B. de Sousa Santos, 2002, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation, 
London: Butherworths LexisNexis, p.489. 
7 Ibid., p.315. 
8 Ibid.   
9 H. Klug, 2000, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.52.   17 
political  decisions  and  outcomes  among  states  and  their  citizens’,  created  by 
global interconnectedness.   
The result of these pressures is that the sovereignty of the state as the sole subject of 
international  law  has  been  severely  fragmented  with  international  organizations,  non-
governmental  organizations,  transnational  corporations  and  movements,  as  well  as 
individuals playing some roles in the international system and the nation-state providing 
the  ‘locus  for  constant  renegotiation,  realignment  and  reassignment  of  jurisdictional 
powers’.
10  
     Admittedly, these developments have had tremendous impact not only on the ability of 
states to exercise their sovereign rights, but also their capacity to protect human rights. 
This is particularly problematic since the assumption in the liberal conception of rights is 
that the state is the classic duty bearer and the major agency for the protection of human 
rights.
11 It follows that any development that displaces the role of the state in the exercise 
of its sovereign power is bound to affect its fulfilment of these assigned roles. 
    Perhaps even more fundamental is the fact that the effect of such developments on the 
sovereignty of states is usually une ven. Thus the impact of contemporary processes of 
globalization on the advanced Western s tates has been significantly different from the 
impact on Third World countries, in particular, African countries. While several reasons 
can be given for this uneven impact, it seems obvious that in the normal current of events, 
some states are strategically positioned to cushion the effects or even influence the 
direction of such developments in ways that minimize the negative impacts in their 
territories. On the other hand, other less privileged stat es – and this is where African 
states unfortunately belong – are unable to influence the direction of such processes and 
are  therefore  more  vulnerable  to  them.
12  This  is  the  conventional,  non -critical 
interpretation of contemporary developments and explanation for the devastating effect of 
globalization on African states including its impact on the enjoyment of human rights in 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p.55. 
11  This  assumption  has,  however,  been  severely  criticized.  See  for  example,   B.  Rajagopal,  2003, 
International  Law  from  Below:  Development,  Social  Movements,  and  Third  World  Resistance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.186-189; U. Baxi, 2006, The Future of Human Rights, 2
nd 
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.246-248.  
12 This conventional narration is embodied for example, in paragraph 5 of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration adopted at the 55
th Session of the General Assembly on 18 September 2000, as well as the 
Algiers Declaration of the African Heads of State at the 35
th Summit of the Organization of African 
Unity, predecessor of the African Union.   18 
these  countries.  While  I  recognize  the  validity  of  some  of  these  conclusions  –  even 
though  their  premises  may  be  debateable  –  the  central  focus  of  my  thesis  is  on  the 
corresponding impact of human rights on the globalization process. This is because it is 
too  often  assumed  that  the  relationship  between  globalization  and  human  rights  is 
necessarily a linear one with globalization impacting on human rights and the latter not 
having any corresponding effect on the former.  
     Accordingly, I seek to demonstrate that the analytical framework underpinning this 
assumption is inadequate, and contend that in order to properly analyze the relationship 
between  globalization  and  human  rights,  the  conventional  wisdom  that  informs  that 
position ought to be jettisoned. I have sought to do this using three levels of analysis; 
namely, through locating the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights within the 
context  of  globalization;  examining  the  relationship  between  international  economic 
institutions  and  human  rights;  and  through  exploring  the  national  dimensions  of  the 
relationship in some selected African countries. This approach entails reliance on the 
growing awareness of, and deployment of, human rights norms by international economic 
institutions in their policies and practices at the international level, while at the national 
levels, I will also show that human rights norms have been used to influence the nature 
and direction of the globalization process in important respects. In this connection, my 
argument  is  that  theorists  seem  to  have  ignored  this  hugely  insightful  development 
because the form of human rights often deployed to carry out this assignment is the 
hegemonic version which focuses more on formal constitutional structures rather than the 
substantive counter-hegemonic version. It is the malleability of the human rights corpus, 
especially in its institutionalized form, which makes it susceptible to being used to serve 
either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes.
13 
     The contention that the relationship between globalization  and human rights is not a 
uni- directional dynamic is buttressed by the fact that the history of human rights reveals 
its deep involvement with, and impact on the processes of globalization.
14 As I will show 
in discussing the dimensions of globalization, political, social and cultural aspects of 
globalization embody, and are facilitated by, human rights norms. Thus the contemporary 
                                                 
13 N. Stammers, 2009, Human Rights and Social Movements, London: Pluto Press, pp.102-130.  
14 M. R. Ishay, 2008,  The History of Human Rights from the Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, 
California: University of California Press, pp.118-144; N. Stammers, 2009, note 13, pp.193-201.   19 
export of fundamental human rights, which are included in the constitutions of newly 
independent states and those emerging from authoritarian regimes, is also a manifestation 
of  processes  of  globalization.  This  is  obvious  from  the  constitutions  and  judicial 
interpretations of such provisions in Canada and several African states such as Nigeria, 
South Africa and the recently adopted Kenyan Constitution, 2010. Gavin Anderson put 
this  point  succinctly  when  he  stated  that  ‘…the  successful  export  of  a  judicially 
administered  charter  of  fundamental  rights  is  itself  a  high  profile  example  of 
globalization’.
15  
     An  analogy  for  the  mutual  impact  thesis  here  advanced  can  be  found  in  human 
relations.  When  two  persons  come  together  either  as  husband  and  wife,  partners,  or 
friends, each will have an impact on the behaviour, worldview and activities of the other 
as  the  relationship  blossoms.  It  cannot  always  be  a  uni-directional  flow.  However, 
whether the impact of one on the other will be positive or negative depends on a number 
of factors, and it is only after this mutual impact has been taken into account that we can 
fully and properly determine whether the impact is positive or negative. Interposing this 
to  the  relationship  between  the  processes  of  globalization  and  human  rights,  my 
contention is that a preliminary inquiry about the mutual impact is a condition precedent 
for determining whether the impact of the one on the other is positive or negative. I argue 
that  this  preliminary  enquiry,  which  is  generally  absent  in  the  conventional  analysis, 
holds the key to a proper exploration of the relationship between globalization and human 
rights. It is this (observed) lacuna in the existing literature that this thesis seeks to address 
in order to provide a more solid foundation for exploring the relationship between the two 
terms. 
 
1.07.1   Methodology 
This research mainly adopts the socio-legal approach in understanding the relationship 
between globalization and human rights. The adoption of this approach is informed by 
the  conviction  that  the  interdisciplinary  perspective  it  offers  will  facilitate  proper 
understanding of the political, economic, and ideological dimensions underpinning the 
relationship  between  globalization  and  human  rights.  It  enables  us  to  transcend  the 
                                                 
15 G. W. Anderson, 2005, Constitutional Rights after Globalization, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p.4.   20 
doctrinal  analysis  of  legal  texts  and  apply  theoretical  perspectives  from  other  social 
sciences in order to buttress the central argument of the thesis. Specifically, I have gone 
beyond the examination of the law as contained in international conventions, law reports, 
statutes and other texts to examine the rationale for such legal rules and how the rules 
have been used by human rights activists and social movements to catalyze progressive 
developments in Africa.  
     I have also  used relevant  primary  and secondary sources  of law applicable to  the 
relationship between globalization and human rights. The primary sources used include 
the International Bill of Rights, comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1948,  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  1966,  and  the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  1966.  In  addition, 
regional and sub-regional treaties such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 1981, and the Treaty of Economic Community of West African States, 1975 have 
been  used.  I  have  equally  made  reference  to  relevant  provisions  of  the  Articles  of 
Agreement of the  IMF, World  Bank as  well as the Marakesh  Treaty establishing the 
World Trade Organization. Other primary sources include the constitutions of states such 
as the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, and the Kenyan 
Constitution, 2010.  
     The secondary materials used include Communications presented and determined by 
the  African  Commission  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights,  cases  decided  by  the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Nigerian Supreme Court and the West African 
Community Court of Justice. Some of these Communications and decisions have either 
established or elaborated fundamental principles of human rights and how these have 
impacted on the globalization process in the continent. The existing academic literature 
on the subject has also been used to provide the foundation for the arguments advanced in 
the thesis. 
     Finally,  I  have  used  three  sub-Saharan  African  countries,  namely,  South  Africa, 
Nigeria, and Kenya as case studies to show the impact of human rights norms on the 
globalization process. The choice of these states is based on their strategic importance in 
their respective regions in Africa and their central role in developments in the continent.   21 
The insights revealed from the case studies have been used in support of the argument 
advanced in this thesis. 
 
 
1.07.2  Structure of the Thesis 
In order to develop the argument of this thesis, the work is organized in three parts. Part 
one containing Chapters 1 and 2, deals with the theoretical and conceptual perspectives of 
the relationship between globalization and human rights. Chapter 1 commences with an 
examination of the nature of globalization and explores the difficulties inherent in its 
definition. It is contended that the difficulty in defining globalization is traceable, in large 
part, to the multidimensional and contradictory nature of the process. Thus, while there 
are globalizing tendencies, very often we also find processes of localization which seem 
to attenuate or limit the extent of the globalization process. This gives importance to the 
distinction  drawn  between  globalized  localism  and  localized  globalism  by  Professor 
Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos.
16 On the relationship between globalization and human 
rights, I have classified the conventional modes of analysis of the subject into three. The 
first category consists of writers who  see globalization as having a positive impact on 
human rights while the  second;  a diametrically opposed view is that the impact is 
necessarily negative. The third category, eclectic in its approach, contends that the impact 
of globalization is not necessarily positive or negative, but that whether it will entail any 
of the aforementioned consequences depends on how it is used in any particular set of 
circumstances. The problems inherent in this instrumental interpretation of globalization 
have been highlighted, alongside those of the other two categories.  
     This is followed by a formulation   of the central argument of my thesis that the 
relationship between globalization and human rights is not a uni-directional dynamic, but 
a mutual, two-way relationship. In support of this contention, I argue that human rights 
norms have been used to influence the nature of globalization in particular contexts. The 
recent embrace of human rights by internationa l economic institutions was   used  in 
support of this  argument  together with the  role of human rights NGOs and social 
movements in actualising important changes in the international economic system. 
                                                 
16 B. de Sousa Santos, 2002, note 6, p.179.    22 
Chapter 2 focuses on the place of Africa in the process of globalization. It examines the 
three periods of the continent’s history; namely, pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
periods. In the pre-colonial era, the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world 
was initially predicated on ordinary trade relations, but the sad aspect of this period was 
the entry into that relationship of the slave trade. This entailed massive deployment of 
young Africans from the continent to the ‘New World’ to work in the plantations. African 
rulers of the period acted as agents for the procurement of able-bodied Africans for sale 
to  European  traders  for  a  pittance,  a  situation  that  I  argue,  parallels  the  activities  of 
contemporary African leaders who dispose of the resources of their countries and stock 
the  proceeds  in  foreign  banks  for  their  own  personal  benefits  while  crippling  the 
economies of their countries. 
     During  the  colonial  period  and  especially  after  its  formalization  at  the  Berlin 
Conference  of  1884-85,  African  territories  were  partitioned  among  European  powers 
namely,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  Portugal.  Incidentally,  no 
participants or delegates represented any of the territories to be partitioned. The result 
was that some ethnic groups were shared into two or more states, a phenomenon that 
largely accounts for the internecine civil wars and conflicts in several African countries 
today. The post-colonial period saw the expectations of Africans for improvement in their 
living conditions upon the attainment of political independence by their countries dashed 
by the predatory and selfish inclinations of African political leaders leading to the current 
state  of  underdevelopment  of  the  continent.  This  underdevelopment  is  manifested  in 
several dimensions, including the gross violations of human rights. This is not for lack of 
institutional programmes by African states.  
     Starting  from  the  period  of  their  attainment  of  independence,  African  states  had 
formulated some economic development programmes in order to be integrated into the 
international economy. This has meant the adoption of the prescriptions of international 
economic institutions such as IMF, World Bank, and WTO. However, these institutions, 
which have been described as constituting an ‘unholy trinity’ by Richard Peet, 
17 played a 
major role in emasculating the economies of African states under the banner of structural 
adjustment programmes. Rather than assist in the development of the economies of these 
                                                 
17 R. Peet, 2009, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO, 2
nd ed. London: Zed Books.   23 
states, the economic policies engineered by these institutions, especially the IMF and 
World Bank, greatly led to gross impoverishment resulting in some African states being 
classified  today  as  ‘failed  states’.
18 Expectedly,  this  has  also  led  to  extensive  human 
rights  violations.  Consequently,  initiatives  such  as  New  Partnership  for  Africa’s 
Development  (NEPAD)  and  African  Peer  Review  Mechanism  (APRM)  have  been 
constituted  to  catalyze  the  economic  development  of  Africa  and  promote  good 
governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. 
     Having  set  the  context  for  the  study  and  located  Africa  within  the  globalization 
framework, I commence buttressing the main argument of the thesis in Part Two, which 
consists of chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 examines the connection between the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the processes of globalization. The argument 
here  is  that  the  adoption  of  the  Charter  itself  was  influenced  by  international 
developments  and  pressures,  and  that  African  states  have  also  used  some  of  the 
provisions of the Charter to underscore their position in the globalization process. Using 
three particular human rights norms embodied in the African Charter; namely, right to 
self-determination,  right  to  disposal  of  natural  wealth  and  resources  and  the  right  to 
development, I argue that these rights have had a significant impact on the globalization 
process in Africa, in the same way that the nature and texture of the rights have been 
impacted  upon  by  the  processes  of  globalization.  The  implication  of  this  is  that  the 
impact of globalization on human rights at the national levels has also been influenced by 
local  practices  and  attitudes  about  human  rights  which  give  shape  and  context  to 
globalization. The attendant contestation has been manifested in a number of response 
measures by African states. I try to show, for example, that although African states fought 
for,  and  secured  the  adoption  of,  some  Resolutions  of  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly on the economic sovereignty of states in the 1970s, they have, ironically, and 
perhaps in deference to the challenges and demands of globalization, entered into several 
bilateral agreements with Western countries that impede their exercise of those sovereign 
rights. 
                                                 
18 See the 2011 Failed States Index, which indicates that twenty-seven African states are among the first 
fifty failed states in the world. Available at: www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011 last accessed 
13 December 2011.   24 
     Chapter 4 advances the argument about the mutual impact of globalization and human 
rights by looking at the role of human rights in the policies and programmes of the three 
key international economic institutions, the World Bank, IMF and WTO. The argument 
presented is that while initially these institutions distanced themselves from human rights 
by insisting on a technocratic interpretation of their mandates, over the years they have 
now begun to integrate human rights norms in their policies, programmes and operational 
procedures.  In  support  of  this  argument,  reference  has  been  made  to  the  operational 
guidelines of the World Bank in respect of development projects involving indigenous 
peoples, and the displacement of such persons in the course of Bank-funded projects. For 
the  IMF,  its  recent  adoption  of  the  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Papers  (PRSPs)  is 
highlighted as indicative of a willingness and commitment to the integration of human 
rights principles in its operations. The World Trade Organization has also begun to shed 
its  lack  of  interest  for  human  rights,  and  now  accepts  the  involvement  of  non-
governmental organizations in its operations. I argue however, that these modest attempts 
at invoking human rights norms in their operations have not had much impact because of 
the nature of human rights adopted by the institutions. The contention is that they have 
merely adopted the hegemonic version of human rights rather than a counter-hegemonic 
version,  the  former  being  more  concerned  with  reliance  on  formal  constitutional 
structures and processes. 
     In the third and final part of the thesis containing chapters 5, 6 and 7 I take a step 
further by looking at the nature of the relationship between globalization and human 
rights in respect of three key African states; namely, South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya (in 
that order). Chapter 5 examines, with a focus on South Africa, the global pressures that 
led to the adoption of the South African Constitution and the role of globalization in the 
kind of rights eventually inserted in that constitution.  I also examine the adoption of the 
broad-based  Black  Economic  Empowerment  programme  by  the  South  African 
government  to  redress  the  injustices  perpetrated  against  the  black  majority  under 
apartheid. The constraints that bedevil this neo-liberal scheme are also examined. The 
adoption of bilateral investment treaties with several states is also discussed within the 
framework of the present analysis as a measure that has highlighted the mutual impact of 
globalization and human rights.    25 
     Chapter  6  on  the  Nigerian  perspective  examines  the  resistance  to  the  deleterious 
effects of globalization on human rights by NGOs and other social movements in the 
country.  The  protests  by  the  Nigerian  Labour  Congress  against  the  government’s 
increases in the price of petroleum products as dictated by the IMF and World Bank is 
examined alongside those of women from the oil producing Niger Delta region of the 
country against the marginalization of human rights by the transnational corporations in 
their  area.  I  categorize  these  protests  as  emanations  of  ‘globalization  from  below’ 
challenging ‘globalization from above’. The oppressed women of the Niger Delta were 
able to rise up to challenge the continued denial of their social and economic rights by the 
transnational  corporations  operating  in  their  areas.  Chapter  7  examines  the  Kenyan 
perspective  especially  the  response  to  the  December  2007  post-election  crisis  which 
eventually led to the adoption of the 2010 Constitution. I situate the adoption of the 
constitution within the context of the impact of globalization, as some of its provisions, 
especially those on the enforceability of social and economic rights draw significantly on 
the South African Constitution.  The struggle of the Endorois people in Kenya for the 
recognition of their rights, which eventually materialized through a recent decision of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, is also considered as indicative of 
the triumph of human rights over (oppressive) hegemonic forces. In the same vein, the 
deployment  of  human  rights  norms  by  a  coalition  of  national  and  international  civil 
society organizations facilitated the recognition of workers’ rights and their human rights 
by a transnational corporation, Del Monte in Kenya. 
     Finally,  I  conclude  the  thesis  by  underscoring  the  need  for  a  new  approach  to 
understanding the relationship between globalization and human rights. The conventional 
narration of this relationship shields us from critically examining the possible impact of 
human rights norms on the globalization process, and it is only when we begin to look at 
the relationship as one of mutual impact that human rights norms can become a more 
effective tool for an emancipatory project so badly needed in Africa.    26 
 
                                                              Chapter 1 




1.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the theoretical underpinnings of the nature, forms and dimensions 
of globalization and human rights, and the relationship between them. While as separate 
subjects, globalization and human rights have attracted considerable academic and other 
general analysis, the mutuality of the relationship between them, and how the same can 
be deployed to enhance human progress, has largely remained unclarified.
1 This is more 
worrisome in Africa where proper analysis of this relationship can be of great relevance 
to  current  efforts  to  promote  economic  development  of  the  continent,  since  no 
development  can  be  meaningful  without  adequate  consideration  of  its  human  rights 
components.
2 This lack of sufficient elaboration has accentuated the misunderstanding 
that exists regarding the proper relationship between globalization and human rights. 
Since the central focus of  this thesis is  upon the impact of the interaction between 
globalization and human rights in Africa, this chapter essentially sets the stage for further 
exploration of the dynamics involved in that relationship. It does so by looking at the 
nature of globalization, human rights and the key issues that explicate their understanding. 
This entails discussion of the forms of globalization, and the arguments that have trailed 
                                                 
1 This is perhaps not totally surprising since according to Adamantia Pollis  ‘…only recently has scholarly 
analyses  concerned  itself  with  the  relationship  between  globalization  and  rights’,  A.  Pollis,  ‘Human 
Rights and Globalization’, 2004, 3 Journal of Human Rights, pp.343-358 at 344; J.L. Dunoff, 1999, 
‘Does Globalization Advance Human Rights? 25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 125-139 at 125 
also makes the same point. 
2The relationship between development and human rights has been sufficiently articulated in international 
instruments wherein development is seen as an integral part of fundamental human rights. Thus Article 1 
of the UN Declaration on th e  Right  to  Development  states  that:  ‘The  right  to  development  is  an 
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  can  be  fully  realized’.  The  Copenhagen  Declaration  on  Social 
Development, 1995 is also to the same effect. 
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the evolution, relevance and application of human rights, particularly within the African 
context. The foundational analysis also prefaces some of the key arguments that will be 
canvassed in this work by highlighting the problematic issues involved in the discourse. It 
is driven by the belief that an understanding of these preliminary issues is crucial to 
appreciation of the contours of the relationship between globalization and human rights. 
Drawing from three interrelated developments that underpin the relationship, I conclude 
the chapter by underscoring the central argument that in Africa, not only is globalization 
affecting human rights, but the theory and practice of human rights are also having some 
impact on the globalization process.  
 
1.2      Nature of Globalization 
Globalization  is  one  of  the  most  pervasive,  but  deeply  contested  processes  and 
developments in contemporary society. This is evident in the avalanche of writings and 
essays focusing on particular aspects of the process.
3 Writers have thus disagreed not only 
on its actual definition, but also its nature, historical origins, relevance and impact in 
society. Indeed, David Held and Anthony McGrew have described debates about it as 
‘one of the most fundamental debates of our time.’
4 Although in a sense, globalization 
can  be  said  to  be  a  new  term  for  an  age-old  process  of  social  and  economic 
transformation,  the  extensive  scope  of  its  operation  has  led  to  its  present  dominant 
position in contemporary discourse. It is this pervasiveness of globalization that has led 
one writer to argue, perhaps unreflectively, that it is a new human right.
5 This explains 
why so many socio -economic and even political developments are attributed either 
directly or indirectly to globalization.  Not   only has this broadened the scope of its 
                                                 
3 According  to  Alex  MacGillivray,  as  at  December  2004  there  were  over  5,000  titles  in  print  on 
globalization,  and  he  asserts  that  writings  on  globalization  have  become  ‘a  crowded  field’.  A. 
MacGillivray, 2006, A Brief History of Globalization: The Untold Story of our Shrinking Planet, London: 
Constable and Robinson, p.1. The number has, of course, increased in the last seven years with the 
growing awareness of the salience of the process.  
4 D. Held and A. McGrew, 2002,  Globalization and Anti-Globalization, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.ix.  
Gavin Anderson on his part identifies the present period as ‘a time of globalization’, G. Anderson, 2005, 
Constitutional Rights after Globalization, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, p.1. 
 
5 M.D. Pendleton, 1999, ‘A New Human Right – The Right to Globalization’, 22 Fordham International   
Law Journal,  pp.2052-2095.   28 
coverage, it has done so in a manner that makes concise analysis of the term increasingly 
difficult as the following definitional problems show.  
1.2.1  Definitional Problems 
As with many important social and economic phenomena, the definition of globalization 
has  been  inherently  problematic.  This  is  partly  because  as  a  multi-faceted  process, 
perhaps  in  the  mould  of  the  proverbial  elephant  touched  by  seven  blind  men,  it  is 
perceived  by  writers  from  different  perspectives.  While  some  have  emphasized  the 
economic  aspect  of  the  process,  others  focus  on  its  political,  cultural  or  even 
technological dimensions.
6 
Allied to this multi-dimensional nature is the problem of how to construct a definition 
that will be acceptable to the various disciplines implicated in the globalization process. 
How can one effectively define a process that has become an important expository 
principle for fields as diverse as sociology, economics, politics, science, technology, law, 
among others? Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a common thread running through 
the various interpretations of the process and these commonalities should be constitutive 
elements of any meaningful definition. 
Emphasizing the time-space compression and the stretching of  social relations in the 
modern era, Anthony Giddens defines globalization as ‘the intensification of worldwide 
social  relations  which  link  distant  localities  in  such  a  way  that  local  happenings  are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’.
7 He recognizes the fact that 
this entails a dialectical process since such local happenings may move in an opposite 
direction from those that shape them. However, in addition to its brevity, this definition 
does  not  help  us  to  distinguish  between  globalization  and  such  other  concepts  as 
internationalization,  liberalization,  universalization,  and  Westernization.  Taking 
cognizance of this inadequacy, Jan Scholte 
8 contends that an important new insight is 
                                                 
6 Some writers have seen the economic dimension as the driving force and most fundamental aspect of the 
process. However, such positions very often exaggerate the importance of this aspect of globalization 
since technological or even cultural aspects could, in some circumstances, be more influential.  
7 A. Giddens, 1990, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.64. 
  
8 J.A. Scholte, 2003, ‘What is Global about Globalization’, D. Held and A. McGrew, eds.,  The Global 
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2
nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
pp. 84-97 at 84.     29 
provided when globalization is identified as deterritorialization or as the growth of supra-
territorial  relations  between  people.  According  to  him,  a  fundamental  quality  of 
supraterritoriality is that it describes circumstances where territorial space is transcended 
in contrast to the other four terms that are to some extent explainable by reference to 
territorial relations.  
While  admitting  that  ‘globalization  is  very  hard  to  define,’
9 Boaventura  de  Sousa 
Santos  prefers a definition that is  more sensitive to  the social, political, and  cultural 
dimensions of contemporary society. For him, globalization is ‘the process by which a 
given local condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by 
doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as local’
10 
He draws attention to two significant aspects of this definition:  
 i) That in the conditions of the Western capitalist world system there is no genuine 
globalization because what we call ‘globalization’ is always the successful globalization 
of a given localism. His explanation for this is that there is no global condition for which 
we cannot find a local root, a specific source of cultural embeddedness. 
ii) Globalization entails localization, and we live in a world of localization as much as 
we live in a world of globalization. He illustrates this with the globalization of English 
Language as the lingua franca which has entailed the localization of other potentially 
global languages, such as French.
11 Similarly, the globalization of the Hollywood star 
system has  entailed the ethnicization of the Hindu star system or other actors. He 
therefore  submits  that  the  full  meaning  and  explanation  of  any  given  process  of 
globalization can only be identified if we equally consider the adjacent processes of re -
localization occurring in tandem and intertwined with it.  From this analysis, he makes 
the controversial formulation that there is strictly no single entity called globalization, but 
rather ‘globalizations’ and, suggests that we should always use the term in this plural 
sense.
12  He argues that what we call globalization consists of sets of social relations 
which inevitably change, and, since ‘globalizations’ are bundles of social relations; these 
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2
nd ed. London: Butterworths, LexisNexis, p.178.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.   30 
are bound to involve conflicts resulting in the emergence of winners and losers.
13 It may 
be  said  that  Santos’s  description  of  globalization  in  these  terms  underlines  his 
interpretation of its impact on human rights, as will be shown later. 
      His  general  definition  and  description  of  the  globalization  process  has  close 
similarities  with  that  proffered  by  Roland  Robertson  who  states  that  ‘we  may  best 
consider  contemporary  globalization  in  its  most  general  sense  as  a  form  of 
institutionalization of the two-fold process involving the universalization of particularism 
and the particularization of universalism.’
14 
There  is  some  force  in  the  last  two  definitions  particularly  when  globalization  is 
viewed  from  an  ideological  perspective.  This  is  because  the  actual  nature  and  social 
impact of globalization has been shielded by venerated attempts to cast it in an entirely 
economic, non-political and non-ideological garb. It is projected as the best economic and 
social value for humankind that must be embraced by all states and individuals. Yet, a 
close  analysis  of  the  main  pillars  of  globalization  and  how  these  have  been  used  in 
contemporary society shows that it is a process strewn with, and deeply enmeshed in, 
ideological contexts with far-reaching implications for its relationship with human rights.  
Nevertheless, there are formidable difficulties in defining globalization with the use of 
such social and economic correlates. As they stand, the definitions do not immediately 
draw attention to the constituent elements of the process and how they have come either 
to  be  universalized  or  particularized,  as  the  case  may  be.  Moreover,  they  are  not 
sufficiently comprehensive and represent particular interpretations of the globalization 
process thus further limiting our understanding of the process.   
It is perhaps in recognition of these difficulties that  Robert Holton has argued that a 
useful  definition  of  globalization  must  emphasize  three  key  aspects,  namely;  a)  the 
intensified  movement  of  goods,  money,  technology,  information,  people,  ideas  and 
cultural  practices  across  political  and  cultural  boundaries;  b)  the  inter-dependence  of 
social  processes  across  the  globe,  such  that  all  social  activities  are  profoundly 
interconnected rather than separated off into different national and cultural spaces; c) 
consciousness of and identification with the world as a single place, as informs  
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 R. Robertson, 1992, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London: Sage, p.102.    31 
cosmopolitanism, religion or earth-focused environmentalism.
15 
This comprehensive approach to the definition of globalization is also adopted by 
David Held, et al who defines it as:
16 
A process (or a set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organization  of  social  relations  and  transactions  -  assessed  in  terms  of  their 
extensity,  intensity,  velocity  and  impact  -  generating  transcontinental  or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.  
According  to  them,  this  inclusion  of  the  four  spatio-temporal  dimensions  of 
globalization  namely;  the  extensity  of  global  networks,  the  intensity  of  global 
interconnectedness,  the  velocity of  global flows, and the impact  propensity of  global 
interconnectedness  helps  to  differentiate  globalization  from  more  spatially  delimited 
processes such as localization, nationalization, regionalization and internationalization. It 
also  provides a framework and basis for  a quantitative and qualitative assessment of 
historical patterns of globalization.
17 More importantly, such a comprehensive approach 
draws attention to the multi -dimensional nature of  globalization and the  interactions 
between the various dimensions of the process. Equally signal, is the fact that the various 
interpretations of globalization emphasize its deeply contested nature. It is therefore not 
surprising that John Wiseman has described it in the following words:
18  
Globalisation is the most slippery, dangerous and important buzzword of the late 
twentieth century. It is slippery because it can have many meanings and be used 
in many ways. It is dangerous because too often it is used as a powerful and 
simplistic  justification  for  the  endless  expansion  of  unregulated  capitalist 
relations  into  every  part  of  life  in  every  corner  of  the  globe.  It  is  important 
because debates about globalisation can illuminate a world in which time and 
space have been so dramatically compressed that distant actions in one corner of 
the globe have rapid and significant repercussions on people and places far away.  
                                                 
15 R. Holton, 2005, Making Globalization, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.15.  
16 D.  Held,  et  al,  2003,  ‘Rethinking  Globalization’,  D.  Held  and  A.  McGrew,  (eds.)  The  Global 
Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2
nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
p.68 hereafter ‘Transformations Reader’. The same definition is given in D. Held, et al,1999, Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.16-17 hereafter ‘Global 
Transformations’.  
17 D. Held, et al, 2003, ‘Transformations Reader’, note 16, p.69.  
18J.R. Wiseman, 1998,  Global Nation? Australia and the Politics of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p.1. 
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Nevertheless,  taken  together,  the  afore-mentioned  definitions  highlight  various 
dimensions of contemporary globalization which are considered next. 
 
1.2.2   Dimensions of Globalization 
While there is wide-ranging debate about the definition of globalization, there does seem 
to be some modicum of consensus that it is a multifaceted phenomenon with several, 
including  economic,  political,  social  and  technological,  dimensions.  The  contestation 
inherent in debates about globalization is equally evident in discussions of the various 
dimensions  of  the  phenomenon,  a  situation  that  presents  peculiar  challenges  for  the 
development of a generally acceptable conception of the process. This will be buttressed 
by a brief examination of some of the dimensions of globalization.    
1.2.2.1  Economic Globalization 
This is one of the key dimensions of globalization. It refers to the worldwide spread of 
industrial production and new technologies promoted by unrestricted mobility of capital 
and unfettered freedom of trade as well as the various interactions that take place between 
states  inter  se  and  between  them  and  other  non-state  actors  engaged  in  international 
economic transactions. Specifically, it has been said to refer to the ‘long-distance flows of 
goods, services, and capital, as well as the information and perceptions that accompany 
market exchange and the organization of the processes linked to these flows’.
19   
Although there has been noticeable increase in the volume of international trade over 
the years, it is instructive to bear in mind the cautionary words of Paul Hirst et al before 
categorizing  such  developments  as  economic  globalization.  According  to  them,  ‘the 
increasing salience of foreign trade and considerable and growing international flows of 
capital are not per se evidence of a new and distinct phenomenon called globalization’.
20 
This is because similar changes had been features of the international economy before 
1914.  Thus,  as  pervasive  as  the  economic  globalization  buzzword  is,  it  has  received 
critical assessment by writers. In particular, from the African perspective, its fundamental 
principles have generated intense debate because of the nature of the global division of 
                                                 
19R.O. Keohame and J. S. Nye, Jr. 2003, ‘Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?)’, D. 
Held and A. McGrew, (eds.) ‘Transformations Reader’, note 16, pp.75-83 at 76.    
20 P. Hirst, et al, 2009, Globalization in Question, 3
rd ed., Cambridge: Polity Press, p.19.   33 
labour and the unequal exchanges it promotes.
21   Two main developments account for 
this state of affairs. First, under the current neo -liberal economic system, and following 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory,
22 the core, and to some extent, the semi-
peripheral states produce manufactured goods while the peripheral states produce raw 
materials, agricultural products, minerals, and oils. Within this framework, the pricing 
system ensures that manufactured goods cost more than products from the peripheral 
states resulting in perpetual terms of trade deficits for these states and their consequent 
underdevelopment.
23 
Second, the current international economic system accords  a prominent role to the 
market and its capacity to efficiently allocate resources in a rational manner. This neo -
liberal philosophy privileges investors and compels states to take legal and institutional 
measures to promote and protect private property rights. As Stephen Gill points out, in 
order to attract foreign investment, often given as the panacea for economic development, 
states, particularly those in the developing world, are constrained to adopt policies that 
encourage  investors  even  when  such measures  run contrary  to  their  social  welfare 
imperatives.
24Allied to this, is the adoption of the ‘Washington Consensus’
25prescriptions 
of  a  liberal  economy  with  its  emphasis  on  limited  government,  privatization,  import 
liberalization, market-driven economic policies, removal of subsidies etc. The end result 
of such measures is a minimalist state less involved in the provision of basic welfare 
services  for its  citizens with  far-reaching implications  on the capacity of the state to 
protect human rights particularly in dependent African economies. 
 
                                                 
21 G.K. Kieh, Jr., 2008, ‘The New Globalization: Scope, Nature and Dimensions’, G.K. Kieh, Jr., ed. Africa 
and the New Globalization, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.17-19.    
22 I. Wallerstein, 2000,  The Essential Wallerstein, New York: The New Press, pp.89-90; T.R. Shannon, 
1996, An Introduction to the World-System Perspective, Colorado: Westview Press, pp.85-125 provides a 
lucid description of the role of these three components in the inter-state system. 
23 G.K. Kieh,Jr. 2008, note 21,p.18.  
24S. Gill, 2000, ‘The Constitution of Global Capitalism’, Paper presented to a Panel: The Capitalist World, 
Past  and  Present  at  the  International  Studies  Association  Annual  Convention,  Los  Angeles,  2000 
available www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/010gipdffll. accessed October,18, 2008.  
25This is partly a reference to the location of the headquarters of these institutions in Washington D.C. 
Even more importantly, it is also used with reference to the fact that these institutions venerate market-
based  economic  policies  and  prescriptions  reflecting  largely  the  economic  and  political  scripts  of 
Western countries led by the United States of America. Except otherwise stated, reference to the term in 
this work implies this latter interpretation. 
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1.2.2.2   Technological Dimension 
Advancement  in  technology  has  also  been  an  important  dimension  of  contemporary 
globalization. To a large extent, it determines the nature and scope of some of the other 
dimensions  of  globalization.  Modern  technology  has  resulted  in  unprecedented 
communication worldwide, in the same way that its use in markets enables people from 
different countries to strike financial deals within minutes, often without seeing each 
other. Moreover, the use of modern technology has facilitated social interaction through 
the mass media via television, radio, newspapers and now, the Internet. Indeed, as will be 
shown later, the  Internet  is  one of the products of technology  which  has  become an 
invaluable  instrument  for  mobilizing  and  building  network  of  opposition  against 
globalization.
26  
     While some of these technological innovations have led to improvements in social and 
economic life worldwide, they have also generated tremendous challenges, particularly 
on how the fall -outs of technological advancement can be husbanded in the overall 
interest of humankind. In this connection, referen ce may be made to the environmental 
problems associated with contemporary globalization. In particular, the issue of global 
warming is one that has attracted considerable international concern in recent times. It 
has been shown that a necessary connection  exists between the unusual increases in the 
temperatures of various bodies of water such as oceans, seas, rivers and lakes arising 
from industrial and economic activities, and the various disasters such as typhoons, 
tsunami, wild fires, and flooding being  witnessed by several states in recent times.
27    
Equally disturbing is the increase in air, land and water pollution which often come 
through the use of pesticides, inappropriate disposal of toxic wastes and oil d rilling 
activities. Sadly, extant international regulatory mechanisms have not kept pace with 
these developments, and even the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol
28  has not led to any 
noticeable  reduction  of  greenhouse  gases,  with  the  United  States’  refusal  to  sign  the 
Protocol posing a major challenge to its international enforcement.  
                                                 
26 A. Pollis, 2004, note 1, p.352. 
27  J. Larson, 2004, ‘Toward Global Meltdown?’ The Globalist, February 16, pp.1-5; The imperative of 
international  regulation  of  these  environmental  problems  is  examined  in  B.R.  Doos,  1991, 
‘Environmental  Issues  Requiring  International  Action’,  W.  Lang,(ed.)  Environmental  Protection  and 
International Law, London: Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, pp.1-58. 
28 United Nations Convention on Climate Change which came into force in 2005.   35 
 
1.2.2.3   Social Globalization 
This aspect of globalization consists of a broad range of issues such as health, education, 
basic amenities such as water and other services. In relation to health, it can be said that 
globalization has led to the spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, the avian bird 
flu  and,  very  recently,  the  swine  flu.  The  spread  of  these  diseases  often  takes  place 
through movement of people from one place to another which has been greatly facilitated 
by  the  increase  in  communication  and  the  dramatic  shrinking  of  the  world  by 
technology.
29  In  addition,  the  adoption  of  the  neo -liberal  conception  of  economic 
relations has meant reduction of public expenditure on health facilities thus incapacitating 
states  in  dealing  with  the  problems  associated  with  these  diseases.
30 Similarly,  the 
implementation of the neo-liberal ideology within the educational sector has led to the 
increased commodification of education, and, in some countries, the corporate take -over 
of the sector. Indeed, the increasing emphasis on efficiency by educational institutions 
has resulted in a situation where education, which is an essentially non-market and social 
welfare issue,  is converted into an area of commercial activity.
31 The impact of these 
measures is even more debilitating in Africa where the state ought to play a major role in 
social  and  economic  development  initiatives  considering  the  continent’s  level  of 
underdevelopment.  
The  new  revolution  in  communications  have  also  enabled  information  to  be 
transmitted to the most remote parts of the world instantaneously as the events are taking 
place. Conversely, information from such remote parts of the globe is readily transmitted 
to other parts at the same speed, with the result that developments in one region of the 
world often have profound consequences for individuals, communities and states in other 
regions. However, due to the structural imbalance and unequal access to these facilities 
among the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral states, the social and cultural impacts of 
                                                 
29D.  Fidler,  1996,  ‘Globalization,  International  Law,  and  Emerging  Infectious  Diseases’  2  Emerging 
Infectious Diseases,  pp.77-84 at 78.  
30 Ibid. 
31G.K. Kieh,Jr. 2008, note 21, p.24.     36 
such  communications  and  developments  have  been  enormous,  leading  to  growing 
concerns about cultural imperialism.
32  
 Equally noteworthy is the consumerist economy manifested in McDonaldization or 
Americanization synonymous with the globalization process. This partly accounts for the 
increased level of resistance against the process in recent years as aptly captured in 
Benjamin Barber’s analogy of a ‘Jihad versus McWorld.
’33     
 
1.2.2.4  Political Globalization 
One of the most important areas where the impact of globalization has been manifested in 
the political arena is in relation to the concept of sovereignty. To be sure, the concept as 
envisioned  under  the  Westphalian  system  and  elaborated  by  theorists  has  been 
dramatically  transformed.
34  While  the  non -interference  principle  was  regarded  as 
sacrosanct and given ample recognition as one of the fundamental tenets of the United 
Nations Charter, as well as those of other regional and sub -regional organizations, states 
are today either vol untarily and expressly or tacitly  and implicitly  losing substantial 
aspects of their sovereignty to inter-governmental organizations and even transnational 
corporations in deference to the emergence of a ‘borderless world’.
35 It has therefore been 
said  that  globalization  has  introduced  the  notion  and  practice  of  ‘multiple 
sovereignties’.
36 Accordingly, it can be said that while the concept of sovereignty has by 
no  means  been  rendered  redundant,  state  sovereignty  today  jostles  for  recognition 
alongside novel forms of political power and sites of authority.
37 
Within the ambit of political globalization, it is fitting to recognize the growing 
influence and importance of the United Nations Organization in the international scene . 
Notwithstanding its inadequacies, the organization has become an important instrument 
                                                 
32 J. Tomlinson, 1991, Cultural Imperialism, London: Pinters Publishers, p.36; J. Oloka-Onyango, 2005, 
‘Who is Watching Big Brother? Globalization and the Protection of cultural rights in present-day Africa’, 
5 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp.1-26 at 3.  
33 B. Barber, 2004, ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’, F.J Lechner and J. Boli (eds.) The Globalization Reader, 2
nd ed. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp.29-35. 
34 E.N. V. Kleffens, 1953, ‘Sovereignty in International Law’ 82 Hague Recueil Des Cours, pp.5-130 at 
117-126. 
35 K. Ohmae, 1990, The Borderless World, London and New York: Collins.   
36 G.K. Kieh, Jr. 2008, note 21, p.22. 
37 D. Held, et al, 1999, note 16, p.86.    37 
for  securing  international  peace  and  security.
38 It plays an important role in peace -
keeping during civil conflicts, and peace-building in post-conflict states. Other regional 
and sub-regional organizations have also taken a cue from the visibility of the United 
Nations in this regard. Thus the African Union (AU) is at present playing a crucial role in 
peace keeping in several African countries, notably, Sudan, Somalia, and Democratic 
Republic  of  Congo.  Simi larly,  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States 
(ECOWAS) intervened in the Liberian crisis in 1991 without the consent of the then 
Liberian government under Samuel Doe, and is still playing an active role in the current 
political crisis in Niger and Guinea Bissau. 
One  disturbing  aspect  of  contemporary  political  globalization,  however,  is  the 
emergence, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, of the United States as the singular 
super-power in the international system and its predilections to dictate wh at happens 
worldwide, while other states either have to toe its line or be coerced into accepting their 
position. The enormous problems that such a posture creates for the international system 
are  highlighted  by  the  dilemma  confronting  America  and  its  alli es  regarding  their 
continued presence in Afghanistan and Iraq due to the growing opposition to these 
measures in their states.
39 
 
1.2.2.5  Legal Dimension 
Closely related to, but no less significant than political globalization, is the legal aspect of 
the phenomenon. Legal globalization which has taken various forms can be traced to the 
spread  of  Roman  law  in  medieval  times.  The  lex  mercatoria  that  attended  increased 
commercial  activities  in  the  ancient  world  can  be  said  to  be  the  progenitor  of 
contemporary  globalization  of  the  legal  field.
40  Legal  globalization  according  to 
                                                 
38 This is the primary function of the organization as specified in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. 
For an assessment of its performance of this duty, see, P. Sands and P. Klein,(eds.) 2001, Bowett’s Law 
of International Institutions, London: pp.53-55. 
39The dilemma involved in this situation is aptly captured in S. Veitch, 2007, ‘Not in Our Name? On 
Responsibility and its Disavowal’ 16 Social and Legal Studies, pp.281-300 at 281-282; while the extent 
of the attendant harm caused to the innocent ones in this campaign is examined in T. Pogge, 2008, 
‘Making  War  on  Terrorists:  Reflections  on  Harming  the  Innocent’,  16  The  Journal  of  Political 
Philosophy, pp.1-25 at 22-23. 
40 In the words of Santos, it ‘is probably the oldest form of globalization of the legal field’, B. de Sousa 
Santos, 2002, note 9, p. 209.     38 
Professor de Sousa Santos refers to a situation where ‘… the change in the state law of a 
given  country  have  been  decisively  influenced  by  formal  or  informal  international 
pressures  by  other  states,  international  agencies  or  other  transnational  actors’
41 As 
indicated, such processes are not new and in relation to the regulation of the economy and 
commercial life, reference may be made to the various projects for the unification and 
restatement of law on these subjects such as the International Institute for the Unification 
of  Private  Law  (UNIDROIT)  and  Convention  on  the  International  Sale  of  Goods 
(CISC,1980)  
However, the use of legal rules under the contemporary phase of globalization has 
been unique in the sense that even international financial institutions have appropriated 
the concept and become ardent missionary agents by stressing the immense benefits of 
good  governance  and  rule  of  law  particularly  in  Third  World  and  other  transitional 
economies. The rule of law with its imperial dimension of low-intensity democracy is 
now  being  promoted  as  the  panacea  to  the  social,  economic  and  political  problems 
bedevelling these states.
42 Since the circumstances that gave rise to this advocacy and the 
prospects of such projects within the human rights framework will  be discussed later, it 
suffices here to mention that in actualization of the ‘Washington Consensus’ prescriptions, 
legal rules have been used to structure, formalize, and legitimize the main features of the 
current global financial and trade regime driven by the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The 
quest for the globalization of human rights also raises a number of problematic questions 
as would be shown later. What is clear, however, is that the hegemonic forces recognize 
the  emancipatory  capacities  of  law  and  human  rights  and  seek  to  appropriate  their 
language  to  achieve  their  purposes.  Consequently,  one  of  the  challenges  confronting 
human rights theorists and activists is how to disentangle them from this appropriation 
and recuperate their emancipatory potentials in the overall interest of humankind.  
 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 194. 
42 T. Carothers, 1998, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, 77 Foreign Affairs, March/April, pp.95-106 at 95 where 
he cautions that ‘…this sudden elevation of rule of law as panacea for the ills of countries in transition 
from dictatorships or statist economies should make both patients and prescribers wary’. An even more 
scathing analysis of the global rule of law rhetoric is contained in U. Mattei and L. Nader, 2008, Plunder: 
When the Rule of Law is Illegal, Oxford and New York: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp.196-202.   39 
1.2.2.6   Historical Dimension of Globalization 
In respect of the historical dimension of globalization, the crucial issue has been how to 
locate the phenomenon in historical context. In other words, the question may be asked, 
is globalization new? Or is it a new form of an old phenomenon? If the answer is the 
latter, what point in history can it be traced to? 
Even as we attempt to examine the various positions on this historical dimension of 
globalization, it is necessary to bear in mind the cautionary words of Stephen Mennell 
that ‘any attempt to pinpoint the exact beginning of a major social transformation such as 
globalization is likely to prove misleading.’
43 He argues that in a sense, this is because 
‘some of the processes which in this century have made the human world one have been 
at work in human societies as long as the species homo sapiens has existed.’
44  
This caution appears to have been validated by the disagreement concerning the exact 
historical  dimension  of  globalization.  While  some  writers  have  contended  that 
globalization is a unique process unprecedented in human history, others have sought to 
locate the phenomenon in particular periods of human history. Anthony Giddens argues 
that ‘the first phase of globalization was plainly governed primarily by the expansion of 
the West,’
45whereas Wallerstein’s focus on expansive cross-border processes of agrarian 
and mercantile capitalism traces it to the 15
th century. On their part, Held and McGrew 
contend that globalization can be traced back to the 19
th and 20
th century when writers 
such as Saint-Simon and Karl Marx recognized how modernity was integrating the world, 
but that the term ‘globalization’ began to be used only in the 1960s and early 1970s.
46 
However, the contention that globalization is a new development is stoutly resisted by 
David Bederman who argues that although some of the manifestations of globalization 
may be novel, that does not make contemporary  globalization legally unprecedented.
47 
He contends that history has seen at least three extraordinary epochs of globalization 
before this contemporary period. The first of these phases was in classical antiquity 
which ended around 500CE, while the second g reat era of globalization began around 
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Theory’,  M.  Featherstone,(ed.)  Global  Culture:  Nationalism,  Globalization  and  Modernity,  London: 
Sage Publications, pp.359-371 at 359. 
44 Ibid. 
45 A. Giddens, 1990, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
46 D. Held and A. McGrew, 2002, note 4,  p.1. 
47 D. Bederman, 2008, Globalization and International Law, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.x.   40 
1450CE and is the period generally referred to as the ‘age of exploration’. The third 
phase of globalization which he describes as ‘the true age of empire’ subsisted between 
1850 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and it featured striking economic 
and financial interdependence around the world.
48   
 Equally signal is the fact that Bederman identifies several phases or episodes of  ‘de-
globalization’  in  human  history,  a  point  that  will  have  resonance  in  our  subsequent 
consideration of the human agency involved in the globalization process. These were in 
the second century BCE, the later Middle Ages, the Long Depression of 1873-1896 and 
the Great Depression of the 1930s.
49    
It must be mentioned, however, that while this periodization of the historical trajectory 
of  globalization may  be appropriate for analytical  purposes, due  recognition  must be 
given to the permeation of each period by the preceding phase, since, in reality, social and 
economic relations can hardly be compartmentalized in pigeon-holes. Nevertheless, it is 
recognition of the relevance of the historical context of the globalization process that has 
compelled David Held  et al to have a re-think and now place emphasis on a spatio-
temporal  approach  to  globalization  as  a  way  of  identifying  the  unique  and  peculiar 
features of each phase of the process.
50 
 
1.2.3  The Myth or Reality of Globalization 
Closely  related  to  the  historical  analysis  of  globalization  is  the  question  whether 
globalization is  actually a myth  or  a real  phenomenon in  contemporary  society. Two 
groups of writers have emerged espousing these positions. While the globalists hold that 
it is a real phenomenon, the sceptics seem to rely partly on the historical trajectory of 
societal  development  to  argue  that  there  is  nothing  spectacular  about  contemporary 
developments  to  justify  the  emphasis  placed  on  it  and  its  categorization  as 
‘globalization.’ 
For the sceptics, according to Held and McGrew, a more valid conceptualization of 
current trends is captured by the terms internationalization, and regionalization. Their 
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argument  is  that  from  the  historical  perspective,  current  global  changes,  though 
significant  and  distinctive,  are  not  necessarily  unprecedented  and  only  evidence 
heightened levels of internationalization compared to previous periods. Drawing from ‘an 
ideal-typical conception of a globalized economic system,’ Paul Hirst et al, for instance, 
argue that the extent of social and economic changes in contemporary society has been 
exaggerated.
51   Other sceptics identify globalization as nothing more than an ideological 
construction, indeed, a myth, which is used to justify and legitimize the neo-liberal global 
project designed to consolidate Anglo -American  capitalism  within  the  world’s  major 
regions.
52 This argument is buttressed by the fact that the globalization buzzword became 
widespread  when  the  economic  philosophy  of  deregulation,  privatization,  structural 
adjustment, and limited government became the sing-song of global financial institutions 
such as International Monetary Fund
53 and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
54 In tandem with this line of critique is the Marxist position which sees 
globalization  as  essentially  the  promotion  of  Western  capitalism  writ  large.  It  is 
contended that even the multilateral economic institutions are nothing but new forms of 
imperialism at the services of Western capitalist states.
55 
While the globalists do not deny that globalization may well serve the interest of 
powerful Western states, they disagree that it is an ideological construction or a symbol of 
Western imperialism. Although they recognize the important role of economic forces in 
constituting globalization, their contention is that globalization is itself a reflection of real 
structural changes in the scale of modern social organization, and in doing so they give 
equal  status  to  other  dimensions  of  social  change,  through  a  multi -dimensional 
conception of globalization. The globalists argue that to reduce globalization to its purely 
economic or technological dimensions is inappropriate since the forces that shape modern 
societies are more complex and cut across several fields. They posit that globalization is 
driven by a confluence of forces and embodies dynamic tensions. These tension s are 
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manifest  embodiments  of  globalization  which  pull  and  push  societies  in  different 
directions,  thus  engendering  contradictory  developments  such  as:  co-operation  and 
conflict,  integration  and  fragmentation,  inclusion  and  exclusion,  convergence  and 
divergence, order and disorder.
56 
The globalists stress the significant re -configuration of the organizing principles of 
social life and world order as a result of globalization evident in the transformation of 
dominant  patterns  of  socio -economic  organization,  t he  territorial  principle  and  the 
question of power. Also within the globalist strand are the transformationalists who 
highlight the tremendous impact of globalization on state sovereignty. Their contention is 
that the enormous powers of the state as envisa ged under the Westphalian model have 
been  greatly  eroded  and  most  of  these  powers  are  now  exercised  by  international 
institutions  and  transnational  corporations.
57 This  transformation  has  fundamental 
implications for human rights, since the current paradigm assigns primary responsibility 
for the protection of these rights to the state. Where the capacity of a state to perform the 
basic functions of statehood is greatly diminished - as is sadly the case with most African 
states - pithily described as ‘half-impotent sovereigns’
58 - it means that their capacity to 
protect human rights is equally put to question.  
However, one central thread which seems to run through the globalist literature is their 
acceptance of the process as one that is a necessary outcome of changes in the social and 
economic structure of society. Accordingly, all we can do is adapt our institutions and 
processes  to  meet  the  challenges  posed  by  this  development  which  is  already 
transforming the nature, structure and context of state institutions. 
It is my contention however, that this adoption of the inevitability of globalization and 
its irreversibility has impeded radical transformative changes in contemporary economic 
and social relations as it privileges the adaptive imperatives. The approach is not only 
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   43 
unprogressive, but hugely ahistorical as shown by the different phases of globalization 
and de-globalization mentioned earlier which evidence the role of human agency in the 
processes.  
 
1.2.4  Forms of Globalization 
There are two basic forms of globalization; usually presented as dialectical opposites. 
These are hegemonic or neo-liberal globalization and counter-hegemonic globalization.
59 
The same binary classification has also been designated as ‘globalization from above’ and 
‘globalization from below’.
60 
As is apparent, this classification underscores an ideological orientation, and like most 
issues relating to globalization, is not necessarily adopted by other writers on the subject. 
Indeed, while acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the process and its contradictory 
impact in society; most writers have not drawn the distinction between these forms of 
globalization.
61 It is however my contention that the categorization enables us to  have a 
clearer  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  process,  and  utilizing  the  ideological 
underpinnings of globalization provide the necessary lens for that assignment. Moreover, 
the classification will prove helpful in illuminating the central arguments of this thesis as 
it will be shown how counter -hegemonic globalization is being used to oppose the 
deleterious effects of hegemonic globalization on human rights. 
 
1.2.4.1   Neo-Liberal Globalization 
This is the form of globalization driven by the neo-liberal ideology of free markets, as 
determined by the dominant Western states, and it gives considerable prominence to the 
role of international economic institutions and multinational corporations. According to 
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Santos there are two forms of hegemonic globalization, namely, globalized localism, and 
localized globalism.
62 
He argues that globalized localism is a process whereby a given local phenomenon is 
successfully globalized, such as the worldwide operation of transnational corporations, 
the transformation of the English language into  lingua franca or even the worldwide 
adoption of American copyright laws on computer software.
63 In the context of this thesis, 
it relates to a situation whereby the European conception of human rights rooted in the 
liberal philosophical paradigm has been successfully projected as the global human rights 
regime.  On  the  other  hand,   localized  globalism,‘entails  the  specific  impact  of 
transnational  practices  and  imperatives  on  local  conditions  that  are  thereby  altered, 
restructured in order to respond to transnational imperatives.’
64 These include free trade 
enclaves  such  as  export-processing  zones  in  semi-peripheral  states,  deforestation  and 
massive depletion of natural resources to pay foreign debts etc. Santos argues that the 
core countries - the leading Western capitalist states - specialize in globalized localisms, 
while the peripheral countries - the dependent Third World states - are imposed with a 
choice of localized globalisms thus creating a web of localized globalisms and globalized 
localisms in the international system.  
1.2.4.2  Counter-hegemonic Globalization  
This is the alternative model of globalization and represents what has also been described 
as globalization from below. It is focused on the struggles against social exclusion and 
domination animated by unequal power relations.
65 This process is driven by the victims 
of neo-liberal globalization, the marginalized and their spokespersons.
66 Thus counter-
hegemonic globalization is basically a manifestation of discontent with the dominant neo-
liberal globalization and an attempt to construct and project alternatives to that paradigm. 
It relies on the role and potential of social movements, groups, human rights and other 
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Non-Governmental  Organizations  and  other  democratic  forces.  Santos  highlights  two 
forms of counter-hegemonic globalization, namely, subaltern cosmopolitanism and the 
common heritage of humankind. The former refers to a constellation of groups such as 
South-South dialogues, trade unions, human rights organizations and other transformative 
NGOs that network internationally with the objective of maximizing their emancipatory 
potentials, while the common heritage of humankind focuses on issues that relate to the 
sustainability of human life on earth, such as environmental concerns on the protection of 
the ozone layer, the Amazon, the Antarctica or the oceans. Perhaps it is recognition of the 
immense transformative potentials of these counter-hegemonic forces that they are not 
received with favour by the leading Western countries who either attempt to co-opt them 
or engineer divisive forces that militate against their effectiveness. 
 
1.2.5  Summation on Globalization  
To  sum  up, it  may  be  said  that  the  existing  controversies  concerning  the  nature  and 
relevance of globalization in contemporary society epitomize the complex nature of the 
phenomenon itself. The above analysis has thrown up three key elements involved in any 
discourse on globalization. First, it has underscored the fact that globalization is a multi-
dimensional  phenomenon  implicated  in  developments  in  several  fields  of  human 
endeavour;  economic,  technological,  social,  political,  etc.  which  makes  its  concise 
definition  problematic.  Moreover,  the  dimensions  of  globalization  are  also  contested 
terrains, thus adding to the magnitude of the problem. Some of these contestations centre 
around the descriptive or normative approach to the subject while others have focused on 
the ideological orientation. Thus, while cognizant of the ideological underpinnings of 
these disputations, I have adopted an approach which draws from the expository benefits 
of both the descriptive and normative aspects in so far as they assist in clarifying the main 
theme of this work. 
Second, the analysis of the forms of globalization presented has brought to the fore the 
inexorable  fact  that  while  the  hegemonic  conception  venerates  neo-liberal  economic 
policies and relations, counter-hegemonic globalization focuses on alternative strategies 
to that conception, and, with respect to human rights, seeks among others, to reinvent and 
deploy the emancipatory capacities of the human rights corpus in achieving that goal.   46 
This insight will prove invaluable in the discussions in subsequent chapters of this work. 
Finally, the determination as to whether globalization is novel, unprecedented, or, on the 
contrary,  a  myth  and  an  ideological  construct  raises  a  number  of  issues  that  have 
resonance for any meaningful discussion of its impact on human rights or the impact of 
the latter on it. Before proceeding to that analysis however, it is necessary to examine the 
nature of human rights and its emergence in contemporary society.  
 
1.3   Nature of Human Rights and their Deployment 
In order to explore and assess the mutual impact between globalization and human rights, 
it is important to have a clear understanding of what we mean by ‘human rights’. This 
preliminary inquiry is crucial because, over the years, human rights have been the subject 
of  a  multiplicity  of  discourses,  practices,  and  struggles  by  people  from  diverse 
backgrounds such as philosophers, theologians, lawyers, sociologists, politicians and civil 
society  activists  to  achieve  particular  objectives.
67 This ensemble of discourses and 
practices deploying human rights has made it difficult to formulate a unifying theoretical 
framework encompassing it. Conceptually, and emblematic of the various discourses and 
approaches, human rights have been perceived from different angles. For instance, from a 
philosophical  perspective,  it  has  been  said  to  be  ‘a  set  of  moral  principles  whose 
justification  lies  in  the  province  of  moral  philosophy’.
68 On  this  account,  they  are 
regarded as moral rights or claims by individuals, which may or may not have been 
recognized by a particular legal system. 
     For legal positivists, human rights are a set of claims by individuals which have been 
recognized and legitimized by any particular legal system. The notion of human rights 
therefore presupposes the existence of a legal relationship between the right-holder and 
the duty-bearer.
69 As will be shown later in this  work, the concept of ‘right’ and the 
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correlative ‘duty’ is one of the problematic issues within the human rights corpus, and is 
particularly acute in relation to solidarity rights such as the right to development. The 
bone of contention  is  whether the duty to  guarantee the right  to  development is  one 
vested on the international community or group of states, namely, the developed states; 
and if this is so, how is such a duty to be enforced? 
     Human rights have also been referred to as ‘a major strategy for resisting the dictates 
of  power  and  dissenting  from  the  intolerance  of  public  opinion’.
70 On  this  account, 
human  rights  are  imbued  with  an  emancipatory  potential  and  its  central  goal  from 
inception has been to resist public, and, to some extent, private domination. As Costas 
Douzinas points out, ‘human rights are part of a long and honourable tradition of dissent, 
resistance and rebellion against the oppression of power and the injustice of law’.
71 It is 
this conception of human rights and the insight it provides that is adopted in this work in 
assessing its mutual impact with processes of globalization.  
     Notwithstanding these diverse discourses, it can be said that, in general, human rights 
are  those  ‘rights  which  a  person  enjoys  by  virtue  of  being  human,  without  any 
supplementary  condition  being  required’.
72  They  are  held  by  all  human  beings 
irrespective of any other rights or duties that they may have in any other capacities, for 
example, as  workers, members of families  or associations.  Although theoretically, all 
human beings have these rights, not all enjoy all their human rights, nor are the rights 
enjoyed equally in different nations or even within a state.
73Traditionally, human rights 
have been classified into three broad categories, referred to as ‘generations’ of rights.
74 
On  this  score,  civil  and  political  rights  are  regarded  as  first  generation  rights,  with 
economic, social and cultural rights as second, while solidarity rights, such as right to 
development, right to ownership of the common heritage of humankind and right to a 
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safe environment are regarded as third generation rights.
75 The first generation rights are 
said to be negative rights in the sense that their respect requires the state to do nothing to 
interfere with individual liberties. On the other hand, the second generation rights are 
positive rights as they require the affirmative action of the state for their implementation. 
The third generation rights are regarded as solidarity rights as they focus on group and 
collective rights indicative of the increasing recognition of the salience of community life 
in  the  overall  benefit  of  humankind.  Although  this  classification,  with  the  attendant 
historical  periodization, may be useful  for analytical  purposes,  it does  not  reflect  the 
indivisibility, dynamism and interrelationships existing between the various rights.
76What 
is more, for present purposes, the mutual relationship between globalization and human 
rights is not limited to any identifiable ‘generation’ of rights, but encompasses the various 
categories. However, as I demonstrate later, the development crisis in Africa, growing 
realization of the need to make visible social and economic rights, and peoples’ rights, 
and how these are linked with the processes of globalization, compels more focus to be 
given to these sets of rights in this Thesis. 
     One other issue of crucial importance in human rights discourse is the role of the state 
in the promotion and protection of human rights. It must be acknowledged that one of the 
main features of contemporary society is the organization of the world system on the 
basis of sovereign states, with constitutional arrangements incorporating human rights 
norms. Needless to say there is also an international regime of human rights to which 
virtually all sovereign states have subscribed as a kind of international code of moral 
conduct.
77Flowing from this, in conventional human rights jurisprudence, the state is 
regarded as the primary duty-bearer. The rationale for the attachment of this duty on the 
state is that since its institutional structures are more likely to  result in human rights 
violations, responsibility for its redress should be vested on the state.  
     However, this approach has created three major challenges for the contemporary 
human rights system. First, it has led to an unnecessary restriction of the scope of entities 
that have duties for human rights violations. Thus transnational corporations and other 
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actors  in  the  international  scene  are  excluded  from  the  purview  of  duty-bearers, 
notwithstanding  for  instance,  the  global  dimension  and  detrimental  effects  of  their 
activities on human rights.
78 Yet, it is obvious that over the years, especially in this era of 
globalization, these other entities have been playing important roles in the international 
scene in ways that impact on the lives of people wor ldwide. This makes it imperative to 
challenge the monopoly of international legal subjectivity of states in order to make room 
for more actors as duty-bearers in relation to human rights.
79  
Second, it has created an ambivalent situation where the prime violators of human rights 
are also given the duty of protecting such rights. In a way, this is traceable to the history 
of human rights which is complex and contradictory.
80Although historically, human rights 
were conceived as a weapon against the state, to ke ep it under democratic control and 
prevent the violation of liberal rights, the fact that the rights against the state were granted 
by the state itself, resulted in the current ambivalence dogging the human rights corpus. 
This ambivalence is now more prono unced with the inclusion of social and economic 
rights  and  people’s  rights  within  the  scheme,  since  as  indicated  earlier,  the 
implementation of these rights depend on the positive action of the state.
81 Accordingly, 
human rights policies have been used to serve the economic and geo-political interests of 
the hegemonic capitalist states.
82 
Third, and related to the above, is the consequent appropriation of the language and 
practice of human rights by hegemonic states through their incorporation in national and  
international instruments. This incorporation, which institutionalizes human rights, puts it 
in a complex and ambiguous position in relation to power, facilitating their recasting and 
deployment by hegemonic states.
83Through this mechanism, hegemonic states operating 
within the framework of the current capitalist system have successfully colonized the 
terms of key components of human rights such as freedom and emancipation. For 
instance, freedom has been co -opted and recast as ‘market freedom’ and the attendant 
privatization, while the language of democracy has equally been co-opted and recast in its 
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‘low-intensity’  variety,  limiting  it  to  the  most  formal  political  transactions  of  regular 
elections.
84These re-invented neo-liberal terms, in their alluring arti culation, have been 
adopted  by  African  states  under  the  framework  of  the  New  Partnership  for  Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) as will be shown later in this work.  
 Notwithstanding the ambivalent role of the state in respect of human rights outlined 
above,  it  is  refreshing  to  observe  that  there  has,  simultaneously,  been  a  continuing 
struggle by human rights NGOs, all over the world in defence of oppressed social classes 
and groups, articulating more inclusive human rights protection mechanisms. In other 
words, a counter-hegemonic human rights discourse and practice has been developing 
side by side the hegemonic conception. In the words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos:  
In sum, alongside the dominant discourse and practice of human rights conceived 
as a globalized Western localism, a counter-hegemonic discourse and practice of 
human rights conceived as a cosmopolitan politics has been developing. The central 
task of emancipatory politics of our time, in this domain, consists in transforming 
the conceptualization and practice of human rights from a globalized localism into 
a cosmopolitan project.
85 
A counter-hegemonic politics of human rights will facilitate the recuperation of the 
emancipatory potential and the utopian character of human rights and rid human rights of 
its imperial context which ‘brutalizes both the victim and the victimizer’.
86  
Since states continue to be both the major violators and guarantors of human rights, it is 
natural that the focus of human rights struggles would revolve around them. Nevertheless, 
given that the conditions underlying both violations and guarantees of human rights seem 
to  be  increasingly  beyond  the  reach  of  the  nation-state,  coupled  with  recent 
transformations in the world system, the adoption of a new approach to human rights to 
confront the new globally organized violations through global struggles against them has 
become imperative.
87  
Additionally, the relative incapacity of states to counteract human rights violations, 
especially those arising from the operations of the global economy, due to the impact of 
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localized globalisms and globalized localisms, suggests the deployment of other forms of 
global advocacy for the promotion and protection of human rights.
88These should include, 
broadening the scope of existing positive obliga tions on states to protect human rights, 
whether or not these were infringed by state or non -state actors,
89 and extending the 
notion of rights-bearers to include entities incapable of bearing duties, namely nature and 
future generations.
90 This will transcend the Western conception of rights which venerates 
the binary relationship between right-holders and duty-bearers, in whose terms only those 
susceptible of being duty-bearers are entitled to be right-holders. This is where the role of 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) becomes important as vehicles for articulating 
and advocating for social change. Although human rights NGOs are heterogeneous, 
politically and socially,
91 it can be said that, in general, their increased advocacy, both 
nationally  and  globally,  have  contributed  to  the  emergence  of  a  cosmopolitan 
consciousness  on  human  rights.
92While the use of legal actions may sometimes be 
productive, human rights NGOs can be more effective if they operate as grassroots 
movements through a process of coaliti on building and political mobilization of the 
oppressed and marginalized members of society.
93 Such political strategies must resist 
being reducible to, or co-optable by the order they seek to resist.
94  
     The need to resist the growing inequality and soc ial injustice in the world system 
gives salience to the agitation for, and relevance of the right to development, within the 
context of this work. Initially formulated by Keba M’Baye, the right to development was 
enshrined  in  the  African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights,  and  subsequently 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the Declaration on the Right 
to Development. As a globalized localism, therefore, it has become an important source 
for a normative framework relating to development. The central merit of the right to 
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development is its comprehensive conception of development as an effective strategy for 
the realization of human rights.
95 On this account, since developing countries are not in a 
position to guarantee compliance with economic and social rights, because of their level 
of  underdevelopment,  the  international  community  should  play  a  role  in  their 
development to enhance the protection of these rights. This linkage between development 
and human rights projects the right to development as both an individual and a collective 
right. In this connection, Article 1 of the Declaration states: 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social,  cultural  and  political  development,  in  which  all  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.
96 
However, its non-specific identification of right-holders or duty bearers, weak conceptual 
foundations,  and  state-centred  focus  has  been  the  object  of  criticism  from  both  the 
hegemonic and radical discourses on human rights.
97The crucial question is whether, as 
presently conceived, the right to development both under the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the Declaration, provides a useful platform for struggles from 
below  for  the  promotion  of  social  and  economic  rights  and  interests  of  the  ordinary 
people in Africa, an issue that will be examined later in this work.  
In expressing faith in the potentials of counter-hegemonic conception of human rights, 
one is not unmindful of the problematic nature of the concept of rights, especially when 
combined with the word ‘human’ in the term ‘human rights’ which are next discussed. 
1.4   Historical and Normative Dimensions of Human Rights 
The  concept  of  rights  has  a  long  lineage  in  legal  and  philosophical  thought  and  has 
impacted greatly on the growth of ideas and the direction of societal development. Yet, its 
nature  and  scope  remains  largely  contested.  This  difficulty  becomes  all  the  more 
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prominent when it is coupled with the word ‘human’ in the phrase ‘human rights’. Indeed, 
it can be said that the concept of human rights raises inscrutable normative problems that 
have far-reaching implications on its application in contemporary society. First, the word 
‘rights’ attached to ‘human’ deriving as it does, from the philosophical conception of 
rights developed and embellished by the natural law school has carried with it, perhaps 
unwittingly, the burdens associated with the term under that philosophical paradigm.
98 
These include the contentious issues relating to inalienability of rights, their inherent 
nature, and enforcement in relation to the state. It bears mentioning that these issues 
continue to influence the direction of discourse on human rights today. 
Second, the word ‘human’ in the term is also deeply problematic. Its use immediately 
raises the question of ascertaining what entities falling within the category of ‘human’ are 
beneficiaries of rights. While at first glance this may seem obvious, a critical lens will 
reveal how difficult its resolution can be, particularly when account is taken of issues 
relating  to  the  commencement  of  human  life.  The  concept  of  personhood  itself  has 
generated  intense  controversy  in  legal  discourse.
99 When does a foetus in the womb 
commence existence as a human being? Is it when she becomes viable in the womb or 
upon birth? What happens if, while in the womb, she is injured by the act of a third party 
in a manner that affects her basic rights upon birth? A related issue, but at the other end of 
the spectrum, concerns the difficulty in determining when human life actually comes to 
an end. This has acquired tremendous relevance in recent times with the advancement in 
medical technologies that has enabled organ and tissue transplants to be carried out. If a 
brain from a ‘dead’ body is transferred to another ‘living’ body whose brain is dead, how 
do we deal with issues of human rights that arise with this change in human being? 
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99 N. MacCormick, 2007, Institutions of Law: An  Essay in Legal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p.79.  
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Perhaps even more dilemmatic is the issue of human cloning and how to categorize the 
resulting entity in terms of rights entitlement.
100 
Another normative problem with ‘human rights’ is whether its present framing is not 
necessarily restrictive of the entities that ought to be beneficiaries of rights. As indicated 
earlier, this is more acute now with the increased vertical and horizontal expansion of the 
frontiers of international law resulting in entities other than states playing important roles 
in the international system. Specifically, the increasing role of transnational corporations 
requires that they be included in the category of beneficiaries of rights, and not restricted 
only as duty bearers as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seems to suggest.
101  
These theoretical issues emphasize the need for a reconstruction of the human rights 
discourse not only to make it more holistic and inclusive, but to adequately respond to 
changes in socio-economic realities. 
The fourth problem with human rights is one that has been the subject of considerable 
controversy among jurists over the last few decades. It is the question of determining the 
normative basis of ‘human rights’. Are they rights that have been certified as universal or 
do they have their origin in particular cultural backgrounds? If the first proposition holds 
sway,  which countries  performed the certification? Were all the regions of the world 
represented in the process? If it is the latter position, what is the justification for seeking 
to promote or project it as a template to be applied in other cultural environments? This is 
by no means a simple question as will be seen later in this work, and it is one that will 
continue to dog the contemporary human rights corpus if it is not sufficiently addressed 
in a manner that recognizes the input of other cultures to the human rights project.
102 
Perhaps these normative problems can best be understood against the background of 
the  transition  from  a  concentration  on  the  ‘rights’  discourse  to  its  re-christening  and 
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elaboration as ‘human rights’ in the second half of the 20
th century. To be sure, although 
there  had  been  earlier  enunciations  in  this  regard  by  medieval  philosophers,  rights 
discourse assumed greater prominence in late 18
th century liberal political philosophy 
which emphasized the right of an individual to his or her liberty, property, freedom of 
speech  and  other  rights,  and  the  fact  that  these  rights  are  inalienable.  Within  this 
conception, the primary function of the state, deriving from the social contract theory, is 
to protect these rights.
103 It was  under this atmosphere,  that those seminal documents 
such as the American Declaration of Independence, 1776, and the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789 were adopted, and they  have remained 
fundamental referents of political thinking in contemporary liberal discourse.
104 The 
natural law remains the basic foundation for this analysis which postulates that all human 
beings have rights by virtue of their common humanity  - and these rights are universal. 
From such theoretical formulations, it was therefore a short distance to the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 soon after the establishment of the 
United Nations in 1945. This Declaration,  which is now regar ded  as  the  ‘spiritual 
parent’
105 or ‘grundnorm’ of international human rights, represented an attempt to view 
human  rights  issues  from  an  international  perspective.  This  is  because  prior  to  its 
adoption, expressions  of concern about  human rights  were limited to the confines  of 
national territories.
106 
Flowing from the UDHR, we now also have the two covenants, namely, International 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  ICCPR  and  the  International  Covenant  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  ICESCR  adopted   in  1966,  which  together 
constitute the international human rights regime. These instruments ,  as well as other 
international human rights conventions, have been ratified by a large number of states as 
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a testament of their respect for, and concern about, the protection of human rights. It is 
this  ‘universal’  recognition  and  acceptance  that  has  led  Louis  Henkin  to  make  the 
celebratory declaration that:
107 
 Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is[sic] the idea of our time, the only 
politico-moral  idea  that  has  received  universal  acceptance.  The  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1948, has been approved by virtually all governments representing all societies. 
Human rights are enshrined in the constitutions of virtually every one of today’s 
170  states  -  old  states  and  new;  religious,  secular,  and  atheist;  Western  and 
Eastern; democratic, authoritarian; market economy, socialist, and mixed; rich 
and poor, developed, developing, and less developed. Human rights is[sic] the 
subject  of  numerous  international  agreements,  the  daily  grist  of  the  mills  of 
international politics, and a bone of continuing contention among super powers. 
While such celebration may, to some extent, be justifiable in relation to the adoption of 
international  human  rights  instruments,
108 the  same  cannot  be  said  about  the  actual 
practice of human rights. This is because human rights violations are still so common 
world-wide  that  the  temptation  is  strong  to  say  that  it  has  assumed  the  colour  of 
international recognition and acceptance; even in the advanced Western countries where, 
in  Upendra  Baxi’s  terms,  the  politics  of  human  rights  appears  to  be  the  current 
phenomenon in contradistinction to the politics for human rights.
109 It is a depressing 
reality that rather than genuine concern for the promotion and protection of human rights, 
the language of human rights is being increasingly appropriated by some states , groups 
and institutions to serve particular political and ideological purposes. If doubts   exist 
about this contention, one only needs to cast one’s eyes on the numerous violations of 
human rights, on both sides, in the current war of terror and war on terror which has 
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resulted in immeasurable human suffering.
110 More worrisome is the fact that legal rules 
and institutions are frequently organized to legitimize human suffering as the United 
Nations’ sanction on Iraq and the previous apartheid policy in South Africa showed.
111 
Add to this the ambivalence and hypocrisy of Western powers, particularly the United 
States of America, to questions of human rights world-wide - in preaching one thing for 
other states - and doing something different, especially when its allies are involved, and 
the picture is complete. 
If the practice of human rights is suffering this fate in Western countries, the situation 
is not only precarious but extremely ignoble in Third World countries, especially, Africa 
with the highest number of failed, failing and fragile states.
112 Without doubt, Africa has 
witnessed extensive violations of human rights from pre-colonial, through colonial, to the 
present post-colonial era. Even the adoption in 1981 of the African Charter on Human 
and  Peoples’  Rights  and  other  subsequent  international  instruments,  commendable  as 
these steps are, has not significantly changed the situation. The Liberian, Sierra Leonean, 
and  Rwandan  pogroms  vividly  attest  to  this  fact,  in  the  same  way  that  the  current 
situation  in  Somalia,  Sudan,  and  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  remain  epic 
embarrassments  to  the  continent.  In  light  of  this,  the  adoption  of  such  international 
human  rights  instruments  by  states  may  therefore  be  no  more  than  public  relations 
gimmicks to show that they belong to the ‘human rights club’, a design to cover up 
massive human rights abuses in their countries. In their contrived ingenuity to dilute the 
force of the human rights system, some African leaders and their academic apologists 
have sought refuge in the argument about the inapplicability of similar human rights 
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norms in different environments under the rubric of relativism. It is to that issue, and its 
counterpart universalism, that I now turn. 
 
1.5  Universalism versus Relativism 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted in 1948 represents a 
landmark development  in international  human rights  jurisprudence.  Influenced by the 
devastating  effects  of  the  Second  World  War,  and  the  need  to  move  away  from  the 
massive human suffering that it engendered, the Declaration states in its preamble that 
‘disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind.’
113 It notes further that:  
…the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in 
the  equal  rights  of  men  and  women  and  have  determined  to  promote  social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
114  
The Declaration is thus proclaimed as ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and  all  nations…’
115 This  proclamation  of  a  universal  standard  and  projection  of 
international  consensus  on  the  contents  of  human  rights  has  however  generated 
controversy over the years.  
The criticism can be classified into the process argument and the substance argument. 
The  process  argument  contends  that  the  procedure  that  led  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Declaration cannot be said to be universal as it did not encompass all regions of the world. 
It draws its strength, first, from the fact that at the time of adoption of the Declaration in 
1948, several African and Asian countries were still under one form of colonial rule or the 
other and so did not participate in the adoption of the Declaration. It may be mentioned 
that it was only in the 1960’s that most African states gained independence from their 
colonial masters and became ‘sovereign’
116 states. Their views were therefore not taken 
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into  consideration  in  the  adoption  of  those  ‘universal’  standards.  Second,  even  the 
composition of the drafters of the Declaration did not adequately represent the interests of 
all regions  of the world with  the result that the Western influence and dominance is 
prominent.
117 Considering the configuration of political power at that time, it is however 
doubtful if their participation would have mattered most, but the   fact of such non -
participation has  created  a  serious  legitimacy deficit that has dogged the Declaration 
leading to persistent calls for Asian, African or other conceptions of human rights. 
Drawing from this procedural incompleteness, the substance argument insists that the 
current human rights corpus is not universal and it would therefore be wrong to seek to 
impose it on the rest of the world. It would seem that the tone for this relativist position 
was set early enough by the submission of the American Anthropological Association to 
the Drafting Committee of the Declaration in 1947 when it declared inter alia:
118 
Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that 
any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of 
one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration 
of Human Rights to mankind as a whole.   
It is argued that to project a system that is evidently Western in origin to the rest of the 
world as a template is wrong. Their argument is that since values are culture-specific, 
reflecting the  cultural  norms,  values and religious  beliefs of particular  societies,  it is 
wrong to impose the current human rights corpus, which is evidently Euro-centric, on the 
rest of the world. In the words of Chris Brown, ‘it is implausible to think that rights can 
be  extracted  from  liberal  polities,  de-contextualized  and  applied  as  a  package 
worldwide.’
119 This is even more objectionable when it is cast in ‘civilizing’ missionary 
garb.
120 
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Although there is some merit to the views about the cultural specificity of human 
rights values, which makes the wholesale use of the contemporary human rights corpus as 
a template inappropriate, we must not lose sight of the fact that extreme relativism can 
very often be an instrument for dictatorial regimes to rely on in committing all kinds of 
human  rights  abuses  in  their  countries.  Moreover,  relativism  makes  it  impossible  for 
human rights violations in particular countries or cultures to be condemned by outsiders 
as the affected practices may be legitimately acceptable in such cultural settings. Thus 
some  cultures  may  permit  torture,  violence  against  women,  amputation,  etc.  It  is  in 
consideration of these issues that the legitimacy crisis can be resolved only through cross-
cultural  dialogue  to  generate  a  more  universally  acceptable  architecture  of  human 
rights.
121 This is predicated on the understanding that no culture is complete , and both 
Western and other cultural enunciations of human rights have a lot t o benefit from such 
cross-cultural approach.
122 Taking cognizance of this, it will be shown that the African 
Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  is  peculiarly  distinctive  by  recognizing  the 
cultural  circumstances  that  embellish  rights  and  duties  in  Africa,
123 an approach that 
could serve as a veritable reference point for further elaboration world-wide. 
 
1.6  Relationship between Globalization and Human Rights 
 
As indicated earlier, globalization is today one of the most pervasive social and economic 
phenomena in contemporary society. It directly or indirectly affects all aspects of our 
lives - either positively or negatively. When we make local and international calls from 
our mobile telephones, book air travels through the Internet, buy McDonald’s cake in 
Ghana or South Africa, or buy Kenyan foods from African shops in London or Glasgow, 
we  are  imperceptibly  participating  in  the  globalization  process.  Similarly,  young 
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Cameroonian and Nigerian girls who ‘agree’ to be transported from their homes to Italy 
and other European countries with the promise of better jobs, are only responding to the 
imperatives of increased commodification of social and economic relations embodied in 
globalization. It is axiomatic that such opportunities and interactions have far-reaching 
implications on the social and economic conditions of individuals world-wide. From this 
perspective, it is generally accepted that globalization has tremendous impact on human 
rights. However, it is in the area of ascertaining the nature and extent of the impact that 
we  find  wide  divergences  between  various  theorists.  A  close  analysis  of  the  views 
advanced by theorists on this subject yields three categories of writers - those who focus 
on the beneficial aspects  of the relationship  between  globalization and human  rights, 
those who highlight the deleterious aspects, and those who take a more eclectic position, 
predicating their view on the premise that if properly husbanded, globalization can be 
conducive to the promotion of human rights.   
 It  is  my  contention  that  these  positions  represent  a  conventional,  uni-dimensional 
mode of analysis of the relationship between globalization and human rights. In focusing 
exclusively on whether globalization impacts positively or negatively on human rights, 
they ignore the possibility of human rights also having some impact on the globalization 
process. Their analysis presumes the existence of an independent-dependent relationship 
in which globalization is cast as the independent variable and human rights the dependent 
variable. I argue that this is an inherently limited conception, and only a holistic approach 
which acknowledges the mutual impact of both globalization and human rights on each 
other will provide a proper understanding of the contours of the relationship between 
them. In this regard, I will show that not only does globalization impact on human rights, 
as is generally accepted, but that human rights norms are also affecting and reshaping the 
nature and context of the globalization process. This argument is based on three main 
pillars.  
First, as indicated earlier, historically, human rights were conceived of, and emerged as 
an emancipatory weapon against the state to keep the latter under control and prevent 
authoritarianism,  and  this  conception  is  being  increasingly  deployed  to  constrain  and 
reshape the dimensions of the globalization process. Second, it will also be shown that 
there has been a dramatic change in language and orientation by international economic   62 
institutions - the key agents of contemporary globalization - whose development mantra 
now includes good governance, transparency, and rule of law, all of which incorporate 
human rights norms. This transformation is a clear departure from their previous modus 
operandi which had no consideration for human rights in their policies and programmes. 
Third, the growing influence, activities and immense potentials of human rights NGOs 
and  other  social  movements  have  equally  generated  fundamental  impacts  on  the 
globalization process. Accordingly, it is only when we begin to look at the relationship 
between  globalization  and  human  rights  from  the  mutual  impact  perspective  that 
humanity  can  effectively  reconstruct  and  restructure  the  globalization  process  for  the 
benefit of all. Before elaborating this argument however, it is necessary to say more about 
the three schools of thought on the relationship between globalization and human rights 
previously mentioned.  
 
1.6.1  Perspectives on the relationship 
Deriving  from  the  general  recognition  of  the  pervasive  and  intrusive  nature  of 
globalization, it is accepted that it also has some effect on human rights. This is because it 
necessarily engenders social, political, economic and even cultural transformations. The 
transformation being precipitated by globalization is often compared to that inflicted on 
European states by capitalism in the 18
th century which transformed the social structure 
of Western societies to the present atomized, individualized societies.
124 Not surprisingly, 
it has been described as the ‘Second Great Transformation’ by Professor Rhoda Howard-
Hassmann.
125The impact of such transformation on the social and economic conditions of 
people can be said to be more critical in Africa due to the traditional and communal mode 
of social organization. While most theorists accept this transformation as a universal truth, 
the same cannot be said of their positions on the nature and extent of the impact. Thus as 
indicated, some writers argue that it is a progressive development creating numerous 
opportunities for people world-wide. Others hold that its effects are negative while a third 
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category adopts an eclectic position. These positions and their supporting arguments will 
now be examined in some detail before outlining my own theoretical construct. 
 
1.6.2   Beneficial Impact of Globalization on human rights 
It is clear that globalization has led to the tremendous transformation of society. Starting 
from its early origins to the contemporary phase, it is indisputable that globalization has 
wrought fundamental changes in the nature and structure of society. Relying on economic 
interpretations of social reality, some writers have regarded such changes as progressive. 
This  school  of  thought  maintains  that  over  the  years  there  has  been  tremendous 
improvement  in  living  conditions  world-wide  with  a  consequent  positive  impact  on 
human  rights.  In  a  book  appropriately  titled:  In  Defense  of  Globalization
126 Jagdish 
Bhagwati, picking on particular aspects of social and economic life such as democracy, 
poverty, women, and environment contends that globalization has had a significant and 
beneficial effect  on society. According to  him,  it has  a human  face  and ought to  be 
extolled and further promoted. Put simply, the argument is that trade enhances growth 
which  reduces  poverty  and  this  in  turn  impacts  positively  on  human  rights.  Thus 
globalization does not perpetuate human rights violations but has rather greatly decreased 
the prevalence of such violations.
127    
One other feature of this paradigm of thinking is the equation of contemporary market 
economy with globalization which possesses the capacity ultimately to enhance human 
rights. On this score, the market is projected as one of the most sophisticated products of 
civilization,  and  the only  arrangement  capable  of  generating  sustained  increases  in 
prosperity,  guaranteeing  liberal  democracies  and  enhancing  individual  welfare.
128 
Accordingly, only further intensification of the globalization process can reduce the 
present inequality and persistent poverty in the world. We are therefore urged to ignore 
the ‘siren voices’
129 of those opposed to globalization principally because it is the absence 
of  globalization,  if  anything,  that  contributes  to  the  maintenance  or  increase  in  the 
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disparities between countries.
130 From this perspective, globalization is necessarily seen 
as a good thing because it promotes allocative and productive efficiency, which in turn 
increases overall social and economic welfare.
131 
Support  for  this  position  is  sometimes  located  in  historical  context  through  a 
comparison between the present economic situation and conditions several years back: 
    
There is extensive evidence that the global economy has brought prosperity to 
many different areas of the globe. Pervasive poverty dominated the world a few 
centuries ago; there were only a few rare pockets of affluence. In overcoming 
that penury, extensive economic interrelations and modern technology have been 
and remain influential. What has happened in Europe, America, Japan, and East 
Asia has important messages for all other regions, and we cannot go very far into 
understanding the nature of globalization today without first acknowledging the 
positive fruits of global economic contacts.
132 
 However, Amartya Sen acknowledges the existence of gross inequality today both 
international and intra-national and posits that the central question is how best to share 
the  potential  gains  of  globalization  between  the  rich  and  poor  countries  and  among 
different  groups  within  a  country,  and  therefore  advocates  institutional  reform  as  the 
panacea.
133  
For  Rhoda  Howard -Hassmann,  contemporary  globalization ,  which  represents  the 
second great transformation, is impacting on human rights and will ultimately lead to the 
latter’s advancement.
134 Adopting a temporal approach, she argues that although in the 
short-run globalization could have a negative impact on human rights, in the medium and 
long- run, ‘globalization may well create a world of increased prosperity, democracy, and 
the protection of human rights.’
135 Accordingly, since globalization is inevitable and is 
changing societies in the fashion that capitalism did in Europe from the end of the 18
th 
century, the obvious negative short-term effects must be endured. In response to Howard-
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Hassmann’s formulation, I am compelled to adopt one of Karl Marx’s classic criticisms 
of economists such as Adam Smith and Ricardo who focused on how wealth is acquired 
and who, according to Marx, saw poverty as ‘the pang which accompanies every child 
birth.’
136 Specifically,  Howard-Hassmann’s  prescription  that  we  endure  the  temporary 
pains of globalization now hoping for a brighter tomorrow is even more problematic as it 
rules out the possibility of the globalization process being reshaped or restructured in the 
short  term  in  order  to  enhance  human  rights.  This  paints  the  picture  of  human 
helplessness regarding the globalization process.  Moreover, the indeterminacy embedded 
in her temporal analysis makes it extremely difficult to ascertain how long we have to 
wait before receiving the proclaimed benefits of globalization on human rights. These and 
other  inadequacies  of  this  school  of  thought  will  become  more  manifest  when  we 
examine the other positions on the relationship between globalization and human rights.  
 
1.6.3  Negative Impact 
In the same way that some writers have extolled the globalization process, others have in 
equal measure deplored the deleterious aspects of the process on human rights. It would 
seem  however  that  an  increasing  number  of  recent  writings  on  the  subject  have 
highlighted  the  negative  effects  of  globalization  on  human  rights.
137 Theorists  who 
belong to this group can be classified into two; namely, those who look at it from an 
ideological  perspective,  and  those  who  appraise  the  process  within  the  neo -liberal 
paradigm.  
 Those who adopt an ideological approach regard globalization as an imperial project 
of Western capitalism that can never yield any positive fruits.
138 Their central argument is 
that  since  globalization  is  a  neo -liberal  project  with  pre -determined  political  and 
economic  objectives,  it  cannot  promote,  but  rather  only  undermi ne  human  rights. 
Accordingly, it is impossible to reconcile the need for the promotion of human rights with 
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neo-liberal globalization since the latter is inherently inimical to the protection of human 
rights.
139  Moreover,  the  ‘magic  of  laissez-faire’  which  underpins  the  neo-liberal 
globalization project has failed in terms of its announced goals as the period has been 
characterized  by  substantially  increased  gaps  of  material  welfare  within  and  between 
countries,  and  increased  marginalization  especially  of  the  least  fortunate  elements  in 
society.
140 It is said that globalization has led to  the  widening of existing social and 
economic inequities as the poor are getting poorer at a faster and harsher rate.
141 To be 
sure, while the globalization process is universal,   its negative impact is felt   more in 
developing countries, because of the dependent nature of their economies, their lack of 
domestic economic capacity and weak social infrastructure.
142  
Highlighting  the  unequal  exchanges  that  constitute  the  present  capitali st  world 
economy, and situating it within a radical ideological orientation, Santos argues that this 
has led to the emergence of ‘a new global social apartheid’ between rich countries and 
poor  countries,  and,  within  the  national  societies,  between  the  rich  and  the 
poor.
143Attributing this to hegemonic globalization, he states evocatively: ‘People are not 
poor, they are impoverished; they do not starve, they are starved; they are not marginal, 
they  are  marginalized;  they  are  not  victims,  they  are  victimized.’
144 This  viewpoint 
underscores  the need for interrogating the  globalization  process  and the extent of its 
complicity in the imposition of this level of human suffering and how an alternative 
approach can be adopted to eliminate these negative consequences. 
The  second  category  of  writers  who  have  identified  the  negative  effects  of 
globalization are those who use the mirror of the existing neo-liberal paradigm to find 
globalization deficient in important respects. One key aspect of their formulation is the 
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140 Ibid, p.491. 
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concern for a restructuring of the process under the present paradigm in such a way as to 
deal with the unpleasant aspects of the process. A leading voice in this group is Joseph 
Stiglitz.  According to him, it is now increasingly clear to all that globalization has failed 
to live up to the expectations of its advocates. This is because not only has it not resulted 
in economic growth in some cases, but even where this has occurred, it has not brought 
benefits  to  all,  the  net  effect  being  that  only  the  few  well-off  have  benefitted  at  the 
expense of many who are poor.
145He adds that there is now an understanding that many 
of the problems with globalization are of our own making, as a result of the way 
globalization has been managed, and he consequently calls for a reform of globalization: 
Globalization can be reshaped, and when it is, when it is properly, fairly run, with 
all countries having a voice in policies affecting them, there is a possibility that it 
will  help  create  a  new  global  economy  in  which  growth  is  not  only  more 
sustainable  and  less  volatile  but  the  fruits  of  this  growth  are  more  equitably 
shared.
146  
This concern for restructuring the global system derives from the conviction that it is 
the  emphasis  on  market  fundamentalism  or  the  imperatives  of  the  ‘Washington 
Consensus’ underpinning the globalization process, and the consequent inequality this 
has  engendered,  that  has  made  it  a  threat  to  open  society.
147 Concerted efforts must 
therefore be made to deal with these deleterious effects to guarantee the sustenance of the 
present neo-liberal paradigm in the overall interest of all. 
 
1.6.4   Eclectic Position 
The third school of thought consists of writers who have taken a middle course in the 
debate about the impact of globalization on human rights. One common thread running 
through the arguments of theorists in this category is that they see globalization as having 
both positive and negative impacts. The implication of this is that whether the beneficial 
or negative aspects will dominate in any given situation depends on how the process is 
applied. In other words, to them, globalization is an instrument that can be used to attain 
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either a beneficial or negative end like every other human phenomenon. Although this 
position comes close to the neo-liberal strand of the negative model discussed above, it is 
distinguishable from the latter in not taking a definite stand on whether the impact of 
globalization  on  human  rights  is  beneficial  or  negative.  Thus  in  their  comprehensive 
analysis, Robert McCorquodale and Richard Fairbrother, while not taking a stand either 
way,  contend  that  it  is  important  to  be  aware  of  the  opportunities  and  dangers  of 
globalization for the protection of human rights, and that through such awareness we can 
‘seek to ensure that the dangers are diminished and the opportunities are taken.’
148 
 This perspective sees human rights as often carried by a variety of winds on both 
sides of globalization’s borders or divides, so making it an open question as to which side 
human  rights  will  ultimately  be  secured.  Accordingly,  emphasis  is  placed  on  the 
relevance of contingency in the analysis of the effects of globalization on human rights 
since,  in  their  view,  globalization  is  neither  inherently  a  friend  nor  a  foe  of  human 
rights.
149 This is a non-essentialist, non-committal interpretation of globalization which 
emphasizes the fact that its effect on human rights will depend on how it is used.  
 
1.6.5  Critique  
It  is  my  contention  that  these  perspectives  represent  a  conventional  approach  to  the 
subject - an approach that has greatly impeded full understanding of the true relationship 
between globalization and human rights. Not only do they accentuate particular aspects 
of  the  relationship,  they  ignore  the  dynamics  of  social  change  underpinning  human 
existence.  In the first  place, it seems  patently simplistic and reductionist to  view the 
relationship  between  globalization  and  human  rights  as  a  linear,  uni-directional 
correlation wherein the former is seen as the independent variable and the latter, the 
dependent variable. As is well-known, the nature of such a relationship presumes that the 
dependent variable is always static and taken as a ‘given’ while the independent one is 
dynamic.  
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However, contrary to such assumptions, human rights are not static, but dynamic and 
always reflective of changes in societal norms and values. To take one example, the right 
to property was one of the leading rights that provoked the emergence of rights discourse 
and was said to be so fundamental that no government was allowed to interfere with it.
150 
Today, that domineering picture of the right to property has been considerably attenuated, 
and it is now accepted that property rights can be interfered with by the state, the only 
condition being the payment of compensation in appropriate cases.
151 Indeed, one of the 
key criticisms of contemporary globalization is that it seeks to re-invent the pre-eminence 
of this right which arose from  the liberal paradigm, and secure  the  same largely for 
transnational corporations, often seen as the main drivers of the globalization machine.  
Moreover, the globalization process itself – if it is to be meaningful and beneficial to 
humankind, to any degree, ought to have embedded in it some basic tenets or elements of 
human  considerations.  In  other  words,  it  should  be  influenced,  shaped,  and  even 
structured in some ways, by the overwhelming imperative of human rights considerations. 
It is only in this context that one can properly situate, for example, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right to Development which recognizes that development is a holistic 
concept embodying considerations of human rights.
152 To move away from the problems 
inherent in the conventional interpretations of the relationship, it is suggested that a 
paradigmatic shift in the focus of analysis is required to enable sufficient consideration of 
the corresponding and countervailing influence of both concepts on each other and enrich 
the discourse. 
An even more fundamental problem with the dominant bene ficial perspective of the 
relationship is the direct or implicit acceptance of the inevitability, and irreversibility, of 
the globalization process.  It is said that since social and economic relations evolve with 
inevitable changes in society, the globalization process cannot be stopped or impeded. 
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Informed by this understanding, the argument has been either that the process should 
continue as it is and be expanded,
153 or that we should endure it and seek to adapt our 
institutions and systems to this all-powerful phenomenon.
154  
It is, however, my contention that far from being an uncontrollable phenomenon, the 
globalization process can actually be reshaped and restructured for the overall benefit of 
humankind.  From  a  historical  analysis  of  the  process,  where  earlier  phases  of 
globalizations and de-globalizations can be identified, it is clear that conscious human 
actions have played a leading role in the nature, scope and extent of globalization. To 
buttress this, reference may be made first, to the fact that in the specific case of Africa, 
globalization can be traced to the contact with Europeans in the 15
th century. This contact, 
which was initially predicated on ordinary trade relations, eventually transformed into the 
inglorious slave trade. It also led to colonialism which justified, and in several instances, 
made invisible, the massive human rights abuses that took place during that period. These 
processes were evidently carried out and planned by human agency. Second, the First 
World War, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War were periods 
when the globalization process was at its lowest ebb and had to be kick-started later by 
conscious human efforts. In the same vein, in contemporary times, international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which are today key agents of globalization 
were consciously created by humans while their present policies are being designed and 
‘ably’  driven    by  human  economic  and  political  experts.  It  is  thus  obvious  that 
contemporary globalization is not an uncontrollable phenomenon and can be restructured 
through  human  institutions.  Drawing  from  this  analysis,  I  argue  that  the  impact  of 
globalization on human rights in Africa is reflective of this leading role of human actions 
and agencies whether from the economic philosophy and imperatives of capitalism which 
necessitated  the  colonial  project  in  the  first  place,  or  through  the  operations  of 
international economic institutions.  
A related issue inherent in the conventional narrative is the view that there are no 
alternatives to globalization. However, as the increasing level of social and economic 
activism in this area has shown, an alternative to globalization could be, and is indeed 
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possible.  It  is  the central  argument of  Santos  and other activists  in the World Social 
Forum
155 that a more beneficial and holistic alternative to globalization can actually be 
constructed, rather than the present neo -liberal globalization that marginalizes a large 
proportion of humankind.   
The instrumentalist interpretation of globalization explicit in the eclectic position, and 
assumed in the neo-liberal strand of the negative paradigm, is also inherently problematic. 
This interpretation  perceives  globalization  as  ‘something’  that  can  be  applied  to  any 
phenomenon to produce particular outcomes, instead of seeing it as a process of social 
change.
 156  
The conventional narrative also fails to take account of the fact that the relationship 
between  globalization  and  human  rights  has  paradigmatic  and  sub-paradigmatic 
dimensions. Thus even from their own premises, it is easy to notice that the impact of 
globalization on a particular human right may be positive from a paradigmatic reading 
but negative in a sub-paradigmatic dimension. This is manifest for instance, in the case of 
a cultural right such as the use of ancestral shrines by a particular community affected by 
the siting of an economic project in the area. The impact of the action may be seen as 
negative  in  preventing  the  community  from  staging  their  cultural  festival  at  the 
designated area, but positive when that project prevents the sacrifice of human beings 
associated with the cultural festival. 
 It is submitted that these difficulties compel us to reconstruct the existing discourse on 
the relationship between globalization and human rights through the adoption of new 
strategies  using  a  tool  of  analysis  that  takes  cognizance  of  the  reverse  side  of  the 
relationship. That tool of analysis is provided by the ‘Mutual Impact Thesis’, which is 
next considered. 
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1.7  Constructing a New Relationship: The Mutual Impact Thesis 
The central argument of this thesis is that not only does globalization affect human rights 
as reflected in conventional literature, but that, human rights are also impacting on the 
globalization process. This is a manifestation of the important role of human rights as an 
instrument of progressive politics and resistance - a development that has a long-standing 
pedigree. However, before proceeding to buttress that argument, it is necessary to deal 
with an important preliminary issue that has resonance to the main argument. From the 
above  analysis,  it  is  clear  that  the  globalization  process  is  not  only  contested  but 
inherently contradictory in nature. I argue that this contradictory nature is also manifested 
in  its  impact  on  human  rights  especially  in  Africa.  Thus  while  in  some  areas  it  has 
facilitated the positive identification, adoption and application of certain human rights 
norms, it has correspondingly also had serious negative effects on some other rights in 
Africa. For instance, the use of stool slaves and the killing of twins in some African 
societies  have  been  abolished  with  the  advent  of  globalization.
157 However, the neo-
liberal concept of individual autonomy embodied in globalization has also introduced 
some fundamental objectionable changes in the cultura l norms and values of African 
societies. Mention may be made here of the recent ‘Big Brother’ Television reality show 
that  caused  a  lot  of  discontent  in  several  African  countries,
158 as it was seen as a 
perversion of the treasured African cultural value that abhors public display of amorous 
relationships.  
Having set the stage, we now consider what different approaches  should inform a 
theoretical understanding of the relationship between globalization and human rights. To 
do so, we now turn to a fuller consideration of the three pillars underpinning the Mutual 
Impact Thesis. 
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1.7.1  Emergence of Human Rights as an Emancipatory Script 
The  emergence  of  human  rights  has  contributed  immensely  to  the  realization  of 
progressive social, economic and political changes in society and has also impacted on 
the globalization process. In advancing this argument, I am not unmindful of the fact that 
the language of rights can, and has often been appropriated to serve hegemonic purposes 
or  been  transformed  into  a  market-friendly  conception.
159 However,  these  uses  of  the 
human  rights  corpus  have  usually  come  as  a  later  development  after  their 
institutionalization and not at the initial point of emergence which had always been in the 
context of an emancipatory goal. It is this historical trajectory of the human rights corpus 
and the insight it offers to contemporary developments that animates my argument.  
It is my contention that the form of rights discourse which gained prominence in the 
late 17
th century arose as a result of the need to ensure that governmental powers were 
not used in an oppressive manner. The Lockean conception of rights was designed to 
check authoritarianism by ensuring that the rights of citizens were adequately protected 
by the state. This is indeed the rationale for the existence of the state. In the words of 
John Locke: 
…The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; 
and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws 
made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of 
the society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and 
member of the society.
160 
 The  deployment  of  this  emancipatory  potential  became  more  pronounced  in  the 
Virginia Declaration and American Declaration of Independence, 1776 and subsequently, 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789. The famous and often 
quoted phrase from the American Declaration is instructive:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men [sic] are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to secure these rights, 
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Governments are instituted among Men, [sic] deriving their just powers from the 
consent  of  the  governed,-  That  whenever  any  Form  of  Government  becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and 
to  institute  new  Government,  laying  its  foundation  on  such  principles  and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect 
their Safety and Happiness.
161  
Moving  from  this  period  to  the  internationalization  of  the  human  rights  struggle 
especially after the Second World  War, one notices  the obvious re-christening of the 
struggle in the label of ‘human rights’. Thus the UN Charter underscores the need to stem 
the kind of state arbitrariness and authoritarianism that led to the Second World War. It is 
on this score that one of the purposes of the United Nations is the promotion of respect 
for human rights.  The epitome of this was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which proclaimed in its preamble that ‘… disregard and contempt for human rights have 
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind…
’162  
Within the African context, this recognition of the emancipatory potential of human 
rights was brought into sharper focus during the struggles for political independence by 
African peoples. Although primarily organizations established to actualize the attainment 
of  political  independence  for  these  territories,  the  nationalist  movements  played  an 
important role in shaping the relationship between the colonial masters and their subjects. 
Reference may be made to the activities of the Mau Mau Movement in Kenya, National 
Youth Movement in Nigeria, Convention Peoples Party in Gold Coast, now Ghana, and 
the African National Congress in South Africa. These organizations were instrumental in 
containing to a large extent, the imperialistic orientations of the colonial governments 
which eventually led to the grant or extraction of independence to their peoples. It is 
significant  that  these  organizations  fought  for  such  rights  as  freedom  to  vote,  equal 
representation, equal pay, and political independence. These historical antecedents show 
that over the years, human rights norms and practices have been influential in ways that 
seek to curtail existing patterns of organized power, and so impacted on the globalization 
process. 
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1.7.2  Impact of Human Rights on International Economic Institutions 
The second area where the impact of human rights on globalization is evident is in the 
change in language and modus of operation by international economic institutions, such 
as IMF, World Bank and WTO. The recourse to the operations of these institutions is 
informed by three main considerations. First, the institutions constitute the engine room 
of the current globalization process as they set the economic agenda and provide  the 
institutional framework for state action in economic matters. Second, their policies and 
activities in Africa, and indeed the Third World, have over the years, transcended the 
purely economic or financial sectors and had a tremendous effect on all aspects of life in 
these countries such as economic, social, environmental and even cultural matters. Finally, 
and  deriving  from  the  above,  the  interactions  between  these  institutions  and  African 
countries have had fundamental implications not only for their operations, but also on the 
human rights of people in these countries.  
Moreover, the central role of these international economic institutions has a historic 
tapestry.  It  may  be  recalled  that  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  were  conceived  and 
established after the devastating effects of the Second World War on Europe and the 
world  as  a  whole  and  they  were  essentially  to  assist  in  promoting  exchange  control 
stability,  and  the  economic  development  of  states  respectively.  Together  with  the 
relatively new WTO, 
163these institutions have come to represent the locomotive driving 
the globalization machine. However, the Bretton Woods twins - the IMF and World Bank 
at the initial stages of their operations , particularly in their relations with Third World 
countries,  appeared  to  have  focused  exclusively  on  economic  conside rations  to  the 
neglect of the attendant human implications of their policy prescriptions. This resulted in 
massive  impoverishment  and  social  discontent  in  countries  that  sought  financial 
assistance from the institutions and they began to be seen as veritab le instruments in the 
hands of Western capitalist states to perpetuate the underdevelopment of African states. 
This precipitated widespread agitations resulting in a change in their way  of operating. 
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But what interpretation do we have of this dramatic change in approach? The standard 
narrative  is  that  these  institutions  on  their  own  later  began  to  adopt  a  more  liberal 
interpretation of their constitutive instruments - their mandate - without reference to the 
social  and  political  circumstances  that  necessitated  the  change  in  strategy.
164  My 
contention is that contrary to this narrative, these institutions were constrained to adopt a 
more liberal interpretation of their mandates under the Articles of Agreement because of 
the increased human rights and social activism of the period. It must be noted that arising 
from the failure of African states to meet the ‘rising expectations’ of their peoples that 
attended political independence, and recognition that this is attributable, in some measure, 
to the policies of these Bretton Woods institutions, a groundswell of opposition to the 
activities of these institutions sprung up, from human rights activists, women groups, 
environmentalists and peasants. The institutions had to respond to these pressures. In 
situating this issue within the broader context of the Third World, Balakrishnan Rajagopal 
aptly makes the point:
165 
…the BWIs [Bretton Woods Institutions] did not come to occupy the positions 
that they do today either as a result of a functionalist logic to solve ‘problems’ or 
as a result of a gradual learning process, but as a consequence of a historically 
contingent and complex interaction with popular resistance to ‘development’ in 
the Third World. It is in this interaction that these institutions have invented and 
reinvented themselves as apparatuses of the management of social reality in the 
Third World. 
 This is further buttressed by the fact that, in the case of the World Bank, when the 
literal interpretation of its Articles prevailed in the first two decades of its operations, the 
lending  focus  was  substantially  on  ‘developed’  countries  such  as  Japan,  Australia, 
Norway, Austria, Finland, France and Italy.
166 It was this increased agitation from Third 
World countries, coupled with the politics of ideological struggle be tween the West and 
East as to which group will secure the support of the Third World, that propelled Western 
states to facilitate the establishment of the International Development Agency (IDA) in 
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1961 with a specific focus on poverty alleviation - a mandate that dramatically expanded 
their area of coverage to include, education, health, rural development and agriculture.  
Although much still needs to be done towards ensuring that these institutions deepen 
integration of human rights considerations in their operations through the adoption of the 
counter-hegemonic version as will be argued later, it is appropriate to acknowledge the 
role of human rights in facilitating this new focus.  
 
1.7.3   Impact of Human Rights NGOs and Social Movements  
The third pillar of my argument about the impact of human rights on the globalization 
process  relates to  the  role of human rights  organizations  and social  movements.  The 
potential  of  human  rights  in  catalyzing  social  change  is  manifest  here.  It  must  be 
mentioned  that  human  rights  NGOs  now  play  an  increasingly  important  role  in  the 
struggle  to  influence  national  and  international  policies  especially  those  that  have 
relevance to the enjoyment of human rights. Very often, such organizations operate as 
counter-hegemonic  movements.  Drawing  from  the  emancipatory  capacity  of  human 
rights as indicated earlier, human rights NGOs have catalyzed a number of changes in the 
international system. They have been able to do this through the creation of transnational 
networks and alliances, often facilitated by the Internet. If the suffering, consequent upon 
human rights violations within national states motivates human rights NGOs to act - as 
they  often  do  -  in  defence  of  such  rights,  the  increased  level  of  inequality  between 
Western and Third World states as a result of hegemonic globalization has compelled 
transnational opposition in order to redress the situation.  
While  the  number,  diversity  and  operations  of  these  organizations  can  raise 
problematic  issues,
167 within the scope of this work, it  can be said that they have 
generally acted in a manner that has impacted greatly on the gl obalization process. We 
can identify four key areas where these organizations have actively promoted changes in 
the international economic system. 
                                                 
167 One of the most challenging issues is that some human rights NGOs have become veritable agents and 
instruments of hegemonic capitalist forces on whom they rely for their funding and operations. A critique 
of human rights NGOs is given in U. Baxi, 2006, note 109, pp.216-233; I. Shivji, 1989, note 97, p.61.     78 
a) United Nations agencies and other international economic institutions now accept 
the imperative of adopting human rights norms in developmental strategies due to the 
persistent pressure from human rights NGOs. Although it is arguable whether this serves 
a hegemonic or counter-hegemonic agenda – an issue to be taken up later - the point 
remains that there is now general acceptance of the imperative of applying a rights-based 
approach and ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights in development projects. 
b)  The  vigorous  campaigns  by  human  rights  NGOs  and  other  anti-globalization 
activists against the deleterious effects of hegemonic globalization effectively prevented 
the adoption of the OECD’s proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI).  
c) Sensitization of the masses to the grave effects of globalization on their economic 
conditions, an awareness that has led to the resistance of certain policies and projects 
designed  to  further  hegemonic  globalization.  The  various  anti-structural  adjustment 
programme (SAP) riots in countries such as Nigeria, and Zambia, as well as opposition to 
the construction of some dams and similar anti-people projects across the continent are 
clear testaments of the impact and effectiveness of such protests. 
d) Transnational corporations, through the prompting of human rights NGOs, have 
adopted  a  number  of  voluntary  mechanisms  for  integrating  human  rights  impact 
assessment in their operations. Mention may be made of the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights and the Global Sullivan Principles adopted by some states, 
transnational corporations and a number of NGOs. Although as voluntary mechanisms, 
the effectiveness of such measures is necessarily limited, they nevertheless underscore 
the relevance of human rights NGOs and their activities in constraining the operations of 
these corporations. 
It  is  thus  apparent  that  human rights  have had, and continue to  have,  tremendous 
impact on the globalization process. However, it remains an open question whether this 
will  ultimately  lead  to  the  replacement  of  the  current  paradigm  or  be  limited  to 
humanizing the globalization process. 
 
1.8  Conclusion 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to highlight the foundational issues that define 
the central argument of this thesis. The issues discussed, I argue, provide the necessary   79 
context and barometer for validation of the argument advanced. In this respect, attention 
has been drawn to the nature of globalization and the attendant problem of appropriately 
defining it. It has been shown that this difficulty is largely attributable to the fact that the 
globalization  process  necessarily  implicates  several  disciplines  of  inquiry  such  as 
economics,  sociology,  science  and  technology,  and  law  among  others.  From  the 
definitional problems, I proceeded to the various dimensions of globalization as well as 
the crucial issue of whether globalization is a myth or reality, a new phenomenon, or one 
that has resonance in historical analysis. In order to provide an appropriate platform for 
the subsequent discussion of the relationship between globalization and human rights, I 
also  highlighted  the  nature  of  human  rights  and  the  normative  problems  that  have 
characterized  its  development  over  the  years.  In  particular,  attention  focused  on  the 
internationalization  of  human  rights  discourse  through  the  adoption  of  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  in  1948.  This  Declaration,  which  gave  rise  to  the 
elaboration and adoption of subsequent international instruments, also fuelled its own 
controversy principally on account of the dichotomy between universalism and relativism. 
I  have  argued  in  support  of  the  view  that  the  solution  to  this  controversy  does  not 
necessarily lie in acceptance of either of these positions but the use of a cross-cultural 
dialogue  based  on  the  understanding  that  through  this  mechanism,  an  international 
consensus on universally acceptable constellation of rights can emerge.  
The central  argument informing this  thesis  was also  presented:  that not  only does 
globalization impact on human rights as conventional opinion has it, but human rights are 
also impacting on the globalization process in significant ways. It is only when we take 
account  of  this  process  that  we  can  have  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the 
relationship  between  globalization  and  human  rights.  In  support  of  this  contention, 
reference  was  made  to  three  main  areas  where  the  impact  of  human  rights  on 
contemporary  globalization  is  discernible:  the  emergence  of  human  rights  as  an 
emancipatory  script,  human  rights  impact  on  the  activities  of  international  economic 
institutions, and the role of human rights organizations in contemporary society. These 
points, which will be elaborated in subsequent chapters, show that we need to have a new 
approach to interpreting the relationship between globalization and human rights - not a 
linear  one,  where  globalization  impacts  on  human  rights,  but  instead  from  a  mutual   80 
impact perspective. The foundational issues discussed in this chapter will have greater 
relevance when we examine the African historical experience with globalization since 
this has continued to determine the direction of social and economic development in the 
continent with far-reaching implications for human rights. That is the subject of the next 
chapter.    81 
 
Chapter 2: Globalization and Human Rights in 
Africa: Setting the Context 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This  chapter  seeks  to  locate  Africa  within  the  globalization  matrix  by  exploring  the 
dynamics  underpinning  the  interaction  between  globalization  and  human  rights. 
Accounting  for  over  one-tenth  of  the  world’s  population,  Africa  remains  the  least 
developed of all the regions of the world with the largest number of persons living below 
the poverty level of less than one dollar a day.
1 It also has the sad record of having the 
highest number of ethnic and political conflicts
2 in recent
  times  with  the  attendant 
violations  of  human  rights.  These  unenviable  statistics  raise  fundamental  issues 
concerning the place of Africa in the globalization process and the role of human rights 
norms in that development.  In order to unpack the issues, it is expedient to examine, first, 
the involvement of Africa with the earlier phases of the globalization process, and then 
the  contemporary  phase  of  the  process.  Using  a  human  rights  lens,  the  inquiry  asks 
whether there is a historical link between the travails of African countries today and their 
past, particularly through the contact with Europe and other parts of the world.  
     In  this  connection,  the  analysis  will  be  undertaken  through  the  prism  of  the  pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. This will, however, not involve any detailed 
historical excursion into these periods as the searchlight will be limited to those features 
that demonstrate the interaction between globalization and human rights and how such 
developments have influenced, and been influenced by, contemporary events. In order to 
properly factor in the human rights discourse within this compass, the chapter will also 
                                                 
1 According to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),‘in Africa, 340 million people, or 
half the population, live on less than US$1 per day’, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
adopted in Abuja, Nigeria, October, 2001, paragraph 4. 
2 The current situation in Somalia, Sudan, and DRC epitomize the enormity of this problem, in the same 
way that the Sierra Leonean and Liberian crises engaged international attention in the 1990s. Somalia, for 
instance, has not had an effective central government since the overthrow of Moha mmed Siad Barre in 
1991. J. Gettleman, 2009, ‘The Most Dangerous Place in the World’, 171 Foreign Policy, March/April, 
pp.60-69 at 62-64.    82 
examine the question whether human rights are entirely alien concepts or pre-existing 
notions in Africa. The contemporary conception and relevance of human rights in the 
continent and the fundamental impact of its norms on development initiatives such as the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development will also be examined as manifestations of the 
mutual  impact  between  human  rights  and  globalization.  The  analysis  of  these 
developments lead to the conclusion that although Africa’s past has some connection with 
the enormous challenges facing the continent, the growing salience of human rights in the 
development process is indicative of the emergence of a new form of relationship with 
the processes of globalization.  
 
2.2  Africa and the International System: Historical Perspective 
 
There is no doubt that the pervasive influence of the globalization process is not limited 
to contemporary times nor is it spatially limited. Africa, like other regions of the world, 
has  not  escaped the pervading  effects  of  globalization.  Indeed, it can be said  that in 
several respects, the impact of globalization on the continent has been, and continues to 
be, momentous.
3 It is my contention that a meaningful understanding of this impact can 
only be obtained through historical analysis of the nature, contours and circumstances 
that gave rise to, and have sustained, the involvement of Africa  with the globalization 
process. Such analysis will enable us to place in context the nature of the relationship 
between globalization and human rights in the continent. It will also provide a basis for 
assessment of the role of internal and external factors and institutions in the development 
or underdevelopment of the continent.  
     As a prelude, it is necessary to bear in mind that the incorporation of Africa into the 
globalization framework took three main forms. The first  was through ordinary trade 
relations, between Africans and Europeans which later transformed into the slave trade, 
followed by direct colonization of Africa by European states, and lastly, the contemporary 
post-colonial period sometimes referred to as ‘neo-colonialism’.
4 To a large extent, these 
                                                 
3 N. J. Udombana, 2002, ‘How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development’, 20 Boston University International Law Journal, pp.293-354 at 302-319.  
4 K. Nkrumah, 1965, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, London: Thomas Nelson & Sons 
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correspond to the three main periods in the conventional periodization of African history, 
namely; pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.
5 I will take them in turn. 
  
2.2.1  Pre-Colonial Period 
 Drawing from the historical dimension of globalization established earlier, it can be said 
that the involvement of Africa with the earlier phase of globalization can be traced to the 
contact between Africans and Europeans in the 15
th century. This period, often described 
as the ‘age of exploration’
6 in Europe, witnessed expeditions by Portuguese, English and 
Spanish explorers to open trade and colonial opportunities in Africa, among other areas. 
The epochal nature of that contact and the attendant interactions generated thereby has 
left an indelible mark on the present condition of Africa in the international system.
7 
From its very inception, the relationship was primarily based on trade between Africans 
and European agents especially the Portuguese, but this later developed, sadly, into the 
trade in  human beings as Europeans realized the abundant human capital available in 
Africa which would be very useful for the then dominant agricultural mode of production 
that required physical labour.
8  
     The  discovery  of  the  ‘New  World’  by  Christopher  Columbus  in  1492  added  new 
impetus  to  this  demand  for  labour.  This  development  marked  the  beginning  of  the 
triangular  trade  between  Africa,  Europe  and  the  New  World  whereby  Africans  were 
captured and sold to European merchants who sent them either to the West Indies or the 
‘New World’ to work in the plantations.
9 It is pertinent to mention that African rulers and 
traders  were  used  as  middlemen  to  procure  the  slaves.  The  slave  trade  was  a  very 
profitable ‘business’ for both European slave buyers and their African suppliers hence 
                                                 
5 As analyzed for instance, in  P. Curtin, et al, 1995, African History: From earliest times to Independence, 
2
nd ed. Essex: Longman Group Limited. 
6  D.J  Bederman,  2008,  Globalization  and  International  Law,  New  York  and  Hampshire:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, p.7. 
7 Recognizing the debilitating impact of this contact, Walter Rodney has argued in h is seminal book that 
‘African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist 
system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries’. 
W. Rodney,1990, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, p.7. 
8 G.K. Kieh, Jr.,2008, ‘Introduction: From the Old to the New Globalization’, G.K. Kieh, Jr. ed. Africa and 
the New Globalization, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp.1-11 at 4. 
9 T. Obadina,  2008,  ‘Slave  trade:  a  root  of  contemporary  African  Crisis’,  African  Economic  Analysis, 
available:  www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/38/1/Slave-trade-a-root-contempor…  accessed  13 
May 2009.   84 
there was opposition to its abolition, and the trade continued in many parts of Africa 
several decades after its formal abolition by Britain in 1807.
10  
It can therefore be said that the role played by African rulers and traders in the slave trade 
era largely parallels the role being played today by African political leaders ever willing 
to subjugate and mortgage the interests of their fellow citizens and nations for personal 
gains. The pauperization of the continent through corrupt leadership and the stashing 
away  of  public  funds  into  private  foreign  bank  accounts,  are  manifest  examples  
reminiscent of the activities of earlier rulers under slave trade. As Tunde Obadina has 
pithily remarked: 
‘The role of slave-trading African ruling classes in this market [triangular slave 
trade market] is not radically different from the position of the African elite in 
today’s global economy. They both traded the resources of their people for their 
own  gratification  and  prosperity.  In  the  process  they  helped  to  weaken  their 
nations and dim their prospects for economic and social development’
11 
     To be sure, the slave trade had a profound impact on the economic, social, cultural and 
psychological  life  of  African  societies  and  peoples.  Apart  from  the  de-population  of 
African societies and the grave human rights violations and suffering it engendered, it 
arrested  and  distorted  the  cultural  and  economic  development  of  Africa.  It  promoted 
inter-communal  wars which were waged to  procure slaves  with  the  attendant  loss  of 
human lives. Western industrialization through the emergent capitalism also benefited 
immensely from the slave trade. Ironically, while Europe invested the profits from slave 
trade in laying the foundation of a powerful economic empire, African rulers and traders 
were contented with consumption items that did not in any way aid the industrialization 
of the continent. It has thus been said that ‘the slave trade drew African societies into the 
international economy but as fodder for Western economic development’.
12  
 
                                                 
10 Britain outlawed the African slave trade through the Slave Trade Act, 1807. However, since this Act 
merely contained penalties of £100 per slave for British violators and forfeiture of ships used for the 
exercise, it did not comprehensively deal with the matter. Consequently, in 1833 the Slavery Abolition 
Act which applied throughout the British Empire was enacted. Significantly, these statutory measures 
were the result of the untiring efforts of several British Anti-Slavery activists who focused on the dignity 
of human beings and regarded slavery as dehumanizing to humankind. 
11 T. Obadina, 2008, note 9, p.4. 
12 Ibid.   85 
More importantly, the fact that Africans could be bought at such low prices as happened 
during the slave trade,  significantly promoted the belief about  white superiority  over 
blacks. As the centuries passed and this inglorious trade and its consequences played out, 
this white superiority theory was further strengthened. According to Mueni wa Muiu, this 
theory received great impetus during the Enlightenment period when philosophers such 
as David Hume and Georg Hegel argued that Africans were naturally inferior to white 
people and had not contributed to culture and world history. 
13 Indeed, as would be shown 
in the next sub -section, this superiority theory was one of the driving forces for the 
colonization of Africa in the second half of the 19
th century.  
     The overwhelming imperatives of the emerging capitalism also reinforced the need for 
the acquisition of colonies. Cecil Rhodes underscored the moving spirit of the period 
when he rationalized the adventure in the following words: ‘we must find new lands, 
from which we can easily obtain raw materials and at the same time exploit the cheap 
slave labour that is available from the natives of the colonies. The colonies [will] also 
provide a dumping ground for the surplus goods produced in our factories.’
14 In addition, 
the  profitability  of  the  unequal  trade  relations  established  between  Africans  and 
Europeans  and  the  benefits  of  the  slave  trade  led  to  considerable  interest  shown  by 
European powers to colonize territories in Africa culminating in the infamous scramble 
for Africa - a scramble that reached its crescendo and had to be mediated by the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-85.
15  
2.2.2   Colonial Period 
 
In discussing the colonial period and the experience of Africans during that period within 
the framework of this work, it is instructive to bear in mind the following essential points. 
First, the experience of colonialism by African peoples was not the same throughout the 
continent  since  the  colonial  powers  adopted  different  methods  in  dealing  with  their 
                                                 
13 M. Muiu, 2008, ‘Civilization on Trial: The Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa’, XXV Journal of 
Third World Studies, pp.73-93 at 76. 
14 R.I. Rotberg, 1988, The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power, New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.94. It is significant that Cecil Rhodes is the founder of what came to be known as 
Rhodesia, the present day Zimbabwe. 
15 The imperial and economic dynamics of the Berlin Conference are examined in A. Anghie, 2004, 
‘Imperialism,  Sovereignty  and  the  Making  of  International  Law,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press, pp.90-97.   86 
acquired territories based on their overall colonial policies. Thus whereas Britain adopted 
the indirect rule approach in its territories as expounded by Lord Lugard,
16 France applied 
the assimilation principle wherein its colonies were regarded as extensions of  French 
territories, and, to some extent, accorded similar opportunities as in France. For instance, 
the few educated Africans in French colonies were given the opportunity to be elected 
into the French Parliament.
17 The different approaches adopted by the  colonial powers 
also influenced to a large extent, the form and nature of the anti -colonial struggles that 
ensued in those territories.
18 Second, in terms of composition, Africa is not a homogenous 
entity but a continent of diverse peoples and cultures. Nevertheless, some general features 
and commonalities are discernible in the colonial rule in Africa and the response to this 
alien domination and control. It is those common features that are emphasized in this 
analysis. 
     Colonial rule basically meant the formal partition of Africa and its direct occupation 
by European powers, resulting in the exclusive use of African resources for Europe’s 
development.
19 This process which was formalized by the Berlin Conference saw Africa 
divided between Belgium, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain without 
any  consideration  whatsoever  for  the  rights  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  territories  so 
partitioned. Having carved out territories, the colonial powers set up administrative 
structures to guarantee effective occupation of those territories in tandem with extant 
rules of international law.
20 Moreover, in order to realize the economic objectives of 
colonization, development projects executed in the colonies were tailored to suit the 
economic interests of the co lonial powers.
21 The belief about white superiority over 
                                                 
16 F.D.  Lugard,  1929,  The  Dual  Mandate  in  British  Tropical  Africa,  4
th  ed.,  Edinburgh  and  London: 
Blackwood and Sons Ltd, pp.193-229. The policy entailed using existing traditional institutions such as 
Chiefs and Emirs to perform the basic functions of governance in their territories under the surveillance 
of colonial officials. 
17 It was on this score that Leopold Sedar Senghor who later became the President of Senegal was elected 
as a Deputy to the French Parliament representing Dakar. Portugal also had a policy in several respects 
close to the French approach.   
18 Thus in general, while the struggle for independence took a violent turn in former French colonies such 
as Algeria, Morocco, Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, it was largely peaceful and 
dialogic in British colonial territories such as Nigeria, Ghana. 
19 M. Muiu, 2008, note 13, p.74.  
20 This rule of international law which emphasized effective occupation as validating title to territories is 
exemplified in the famous Eastern Greenland Case, (1933), PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No.53. 
21 M.L. McNulty, 1995, ‘The Contemporary Map of Africa’, P.M. Martin and P. O’Meara, eds.  Africa, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, pp.10-45, at 43.   87 
blacks as a pillar of the colonial project was reflected in the policies implemented in the 
colonial territories. According to Mahmood Mamdani, the colonial policies were based 
on a distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’.
22 While white settlers were accorded full 
rights of citizenship, the indigenous peoples were classified as ‘subjects’ with different 
rules applicable to them - rules that in large measure dehumanized and treated them as 
sub-humans.  
     Deriving  from  the  superiority  theory,  it  was  thus  necessary  to  take  measures  to 
‘civilize’ Africans. This gave rise to what came to be known as the ‘civilizing mission’ 
based on the construction of Africans as the ‘other’ who, either by a mix of persuasive or 
coercive  means,  needed  to  receive  the  ‘gift’  of  human  rights.
23 This  construction 
presented Africans as ‘uncivilized’ and irrational people ruled by emotion; a belief that 
shaped the imperial policies of the European countries.
24 In relation to human rights, this 
belief had two main components. First, it was used to justify some of the atrocities and 
human rights violations perpetrated against African peoples in the process of colonialism 
such as denial of basic rights, and all forms of discriminatory practices. Second, it served 
as the rationale for the desecration and demonization of African cultural practices in 
favour of those of Europe. Indeed, the civilizing mission was a complete package, as it 
entailed invalidating ‘repugnant’
25 customs and traditional practices, introduction of new 
conception  of  rights  based  on  individualism,  and  above  all,  new  mechanisms  of 
governance patterned along European models. Yet, as Mueni wa Muiu points out, the 




                                                 
22 M.  Mamdani,  1996,  Citizen  and  Subject:  Contemporary  Africa  and  the  legacy  of  late  Colonialism, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.17. 
23 M. Muiu, 2008, note 13, pp.75-76, U. Baxi, 2006, The Future of Human Rights, 2
nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.39. 
24 M. Muiu, 2008, note 13, p.77. 
25 Thus provisions were inserted in e nactments receiving English laws in British colonial territories that 
customary laws in those colonies could only be enforced by the courts  if they were ‘not repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience’, as in S.19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, No.4 of 1876 in 
the case of Nigeria, or ‘not repugnant to justice and morality‘ the phrase used in the East African Order 
in  Council,  1902,  and  S.20  of  East  Africa  Native  Courts  Amendment  Ordinance,  No.  31  of  1902 
applicable in Kenya and Uganda. 
26 M. Muiu, 2008, note 13, p.80.   88 
The missionaries proved to be very useful agents of this project as they prepared the 
minds  of Africans  to  accept  colonial  rule and their inferior status  by urging them to 
discard  their  traditional  ways,  religions  and  cultural  practices  in  favour  of  European 
norms and beliefs. While some of the traditional practices were no doubt reprehensible,
27 
that should not have justified the kind of wholesale rejection of African traditional 
practices that colonialism entailed, as culture is a veritable index of a peoples’ identity. 
Companies  incorporated  in  the  metropolitan  countries  also  acted  as  agents  of  the 
civilizing  mission.  Thus  the  Royal  Niger  Company  was  instrumental  to  the  British 
occupation of the area now known as Nigeria, while the British East Africa Company laid 
the groundwork for the annexation of Kenya and Uganda.
28  
     One of the most disturbing aspects of colonialism in Africa was that it led to the 
partition of the continent in a manner that  did not take cognizance of the historical and 
cultural affinities of the people.
29 Taslim Elias encapsulates this point as follows: 
In  1884-1885,  the  European  imperial  powers  met  in  Berlin  and  without  the 
consent  or  participation  of  the  African  people,  demarcated  the  Continent  of 
Africa into colonies or spheres of influence. In many cases, kingdoms or tribes 
were  split  with  such  reckless  abandon  that  they  came  under  two  or  three 
European  imperial  powers.  This  event  was  the  genesis  of  many  present-day 
conflicts and virtually insoluble problems in the African Continent.
30  
The result is that today people of the same ethnic group are scattered in two or even three 
States. Thus the Tutsis and the Hutus are to be found in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Uganda. Many Hausas are in Nigeria, a former British colony, while others 
are found in former French-controlled Niger. Similarly, the Yorubas are found in Nigeria 
as well as in Benin Republic, while the kingdom of Congo was divided between the 
Belgians, the French and the Portuguese.
31  
                                                 
27 For instance, the practice of killing twin children in some parts of Nigeria or that of burying kings with 
slaves or those captured in wartime. O.C. Eze, 1984, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems, 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Macmillan Publishers Ltd, pp.12-13. 
28 J.T. Gathii, 2007, ‘Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law‘, 54 Buffalo Law Review, pp.1013-
1066 at 1019. 
29 A comprehensive analysis of the various ethnic groups that suffered this  partition in Africa is contained 
in  A.  I.  Asiwaju,  ed.  1984,  Partitioned  Africans:  Ethnic  Relations  Across  Africa’s  International 
Boundaries 1884-1984, Lagos: Lagos University Press. 
30 T.O. Elias, 1990, Africa and the Development of International Law, 2
nd ed. Brill Academic Publishers, 
p.viii. 
31 M. Muiu, 2008, note 13, pp.82-83.   89 
 
     One  other  bitter  legacy  of  colonialism  which  has  resonance  for  the  present 
development crisis in the continent is that it brought with it the concept of the state with 
attendant governance structures that are in many respects alien to the African conception 
of governance.
32As the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) framework 
document notes in Paragraph 21, ‘colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, 
institutions and values or made them subservient to the economic and political needs of 
the imperial powers’. The result is that the Westernized elites who eventually took over 
the reins of power upon the attainment of political independence were unable to integrate 
such notions with the African conception of governance.  
     One must not, however, completely discountenance colonialism as it also engendered 
some  important  social  and  economic  changes  in  African  countries  through  the 
introduction of improved medical services, increase in the variety and yield of food crops, 
improved  forms  of  sanitation,  etc.
33 Nevertheless, on the whole, the balance is that 
colonialism impeded the development of the continent and made it difficult for the 
succeeding leaders to adequately grapple with the dynamics of integrat ing the imported 
Western ideas with traditional modes of governance as the post -colonial trajectory has 
shown. 
 
2.2.3  Post-Colonial Africa 
The implementation of the aforesaid colonial policies in Africa precipitated intense and 
sustained  agitations  by  Africans  which  culminated  in  the  grant  or  extraction  of 
independence, with Gold Coast (now Ghana) leading the pack in 1957. Subsequently, 
several  other  African  countries  gained  independence  in  the  1960s.
34 However,  the 
attainment  of  this  ‘flag  independence’
35  did  not  really  translate  to  economic 
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independence for  African states as a number of endogenous and exogenous factors have 
conspired to emasculate them and rendered the notion of sovereignty as applicable to 
these states even more problematic than in general international law.
36 
     In this connection, it may be mentioned that African leaders have been unable to 
fashion and implement economic policies designed to utilize the abundant human and 
natural resources available in their countries to promote economic devel opment. On the 
contrary, they have largely adopted policies that tied their countries to the apron -strings 
of the former colonial masters, while using their political positions as avenues for 
personal enrichment at the expense of their countries.
37 It was under such circumstances 
that soon after the wave of political independence, the continent witnessed a deluge of 
military coups that brought the military into governance in most African countries usually 
under the pretence of wanting to sanitize the polity from corrupt politicians. Regrettably, 
soon after such messianic posturing, the military on their part utilized the opportunity 
thus presented by amassing wealth especially as there were no constitutional or political 
checks on them, except perhaps, the fear of possible overthrow.
38 Although there is a new 
wave of democratic regeneration in the continent, as military rule is now treated with 
disfavour,
 39 the crucial issue is  how to  internalize transparency  and accountability in 
governance  and  reduce  the  high  level  of  corruption  militating  against  the  economic 
development of the continent.
40  
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     Apart from these internal failings, the involvement of independent African states in the 
globalization  process  has  not  produced  the  desired  results  in  terms  of  economic 
development. To be sure, a substantial part of that engagement since independence has 
been through transactions with international financial institutions, especially the Bretton 
Woods  duo  of  IMF  and  World  Bank.  Sadly,  the  prescriptions  and  conditionalities 
stipulated by these institutions for states that sought financial support from them have had 
negative  effects  on  the  economic  conditions  of  such  states,  with  the  result  that  the 
institutions  are  now  seen  -  rightly  or  wrongly  -  as  Western  stratagems  for  the 
underdevelopment of African countries.
41 This view derives support from the fact that the 
implementation  by  African  states  of  structural  adjustment  programmes  (‘SAP’s) 
recommended by these institutions had in many cases worsened, rather than improved the 
conditions  of  the  masses  in  these  countries.  Consequently,  according  to  Nsongurua 
Udombana, ‘SAPs have turned out to be bitter herbs of poverty, as the unholy wedlock 
between  African  States  and  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions  brought  about  some 
irreparable damages to African economies’.
42  
     The great expectations that attended political independence have thus given way to 
cynicism and alienated the state from the citizenry. The defunct Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) boldly acknowledged this grim reality when it admitted that ‘we have noted, 
at the close of the 20
th century, that of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed the 
most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed and the most 
vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are concerned.’
43 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
corrosive effect on efforts to improve governance, yet improved governance is essential to reduce the 
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42 N. J. Udombana, 2002, note 3, p. 313. 
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     More telling is the fact that Africa has the lowest life expectancy, the highest infant 
mortality and illiteracy rates and lowest GDP, in short, the lowest human development 
indicator.
44 It has therefore been said that with such ‘pothole and gully indexes, Africa is 
chewing the cud of underdevelopment in fact and in figure’.
45 In addition to the predatory 
activities of the African ruling elite, the re-configuration of the ‘state’ in compliance with 
the  imperatives  of  neo-liberal  globalization  has  also  been  a  key  factor  in  the 
underdevelopment of the continent. To be sure, one of the major pillars of economic 
globalization is veneration of the market economy whose benefits are usually unevenly 
distributed.
46 Accordingly,  the  emphasis  on  market  forces  as  defining  political  and 
economic relations has enhanced the prebendalist tendencies of the ruling elite who use 
the instruments of the state to serve their own economic interests.   
     Moreover, the policies of internation al financial institutions largely  controlled by 
advanced Western states manifest a considerable measure of inconsistency and double 
standards in relation to Third World countries. For example, while the institutions and 
Western countries advocate the opening up of the economies of African states to enable 
them to participate and reap the presumed fruits of globalization, Western countries on 
their part maintain protectionist economic policies
47 - policies that have, in conjunction 
with  those  of  the  internati onal  financial  institutions,  impacted  negative ly  on  the 
economies of African states which now constitute the majority of states in the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) group.
48   
     Accordingly, the reality in Africa today is that the confluence of  these factors has 
conspired to prevent the state from meeting the basic needs of its citizens as the adoption 
of  the  prescriptions  based  on  the  ‘Washington  Consensus’  has  entailed  questionable 
withdrawal of the state from the provision of some basic social services.
49 The result is 
that in the name of privatization, for instance, national enterprises and institutions are 
sold to multinational corporations in alliance with local compradors who are often 
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government officials and their agents.
50 These developments have cumulatively led to the 
high level of poverty and inequality in Africa with far -reaching implications for the 
realization of human rights. This explains the increasing discontent with contemporary 
globalization and the demands by some human rights  NGOs and social movements for 
the reshaping of the process to eliminate its negative aspects. Specifically, the various 
anti-SAP riots that took place in several African countries in the 1980s and 1990s were 
efforts to collectively oppose the deleterious effects of this hegemonic globalization.
51  
     As will be shown later, through these movements and other similar developments, the 
human rights corpus has been impacting on the globalization process as the international 
financial  institutions  now  accept  th e  imperative  of  integrating  human  rights 
considerations not only in their policies and programmes, but as vital components of the 
development process.
52 While there is much to be said in support of the view that these 
new strategies are necessarily cosmetic  and superficial, even designed to secure neo-
liberal globalization, a point  further elaborated later, it is equally important to see it as 
representing recognition by the institutions and their prime movers of the transformative 
potential of human rights  in catalyzing changes to the globalization process. This takes 
me to an examination of the human rights corpus in Africa as it affects the theme of this 
work.  
2.3  Human Rights in Africa 
 
The theory and practice of human rights have had a chequered history in Africa. This is 
because human rights norms have not only received varying levels of recognition and 
denunciation during the various periods of the continent’s history, but have also been the 
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subject of intense controversy in recent years.
53 A useful starting point in exploring this 
historical  trajectory  is  to  examine  the controversy  as  to  whether  human rights  are 
exclusively Western concepts or values that are equally applicable in other societies. 
While some writers have argued that human rights are unknown  in Africa, others reject 
this contention and argue that African societies have conceptions of human rights.  
     Putting the case forcefully for the first school of thought, Jack Donnelly contends that 
‘most non-Western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human 
rights but the very concept. As a matter of historical fact, the concept of human rights is 
an artifact of modern Western civilization’.
54 This position clearly mirrors the view that 
human  rights  evolved  from  the  West,  and  is  not  applicable  in  other  societies  unless 
expressly exported by the West. According to Professor Upendra Baxi, this contention 
embodies three main claims. These are the evangelical claims, the historical claim and the 
impossibility thesis.
55 He argues that the evangelical claim is predicated on the notion 
that ‘subordinated/colonized peoples lack qualities that make them recognizably human’, 
a situation that imposes a burden on the West to transform the ‘savages’ into recognizable 
human beings.  The historical claim simply rests on the view that human rights traditions 
‘originated’ in the West, and reference is thus  made to the emergence of the idea of 
natural  rights.  Finally,  the  impossibility  thesis  implies  that  ‘human  rights  traditions 
remain impossible of origin outside the ‘West’.
56  
     For the second school of thought, Dunstan Wai has argued, equally valiantly, that 
traditional African societies supported and practised human rights.
57 According to him, 
traditional African attitudes, beliefs, institutions, and experiences sustained the view that 
certain rights should be upheld for the orderly functioning of society. There was freedom 
of expression, the right to participate in democratic governance through the selection and 
deposition of rulers, while methods and mechanisms for resolving issues affecting their 
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societies  existed  under  the  traditional  system.  He  contends  that  it  is,  in  fact,  the 
authoritarian institutions and structures imposed on the continent through colonialism that 
has contributed to the pervasive violations of human rights in Africa.
58  
     Perhaps the gulf separating these positions is not really as wide as is often represented. 
It is my contention that a close examination of both positions show that they raise two 
fundamental  issues  relating  to  the  naming  of  a  thing  or  concept  and  the  issue  of 
essentialism.  From  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  linguistic  confusions  can  arise 
concerning the naming of a thing, and it has   been demonstrated that some of the 
confusions or misunderstandings that pervade contemporary discourse have their roots in 
the different uses of language.
59Applying this insight to the issue of human rights in 
Africa, the problem may really be that of identifying what is named as ‘human rights’ by 
both schools. This is because what is categorized as ‘human rights’ by the Africanists 
may not necessarily fit into what the other school of thought classifies as ‘human rights’. 
Indeed,  it  can  hardly  be  disputed  by  both  groups  that  every  society  has  its  own 
conceptions  of  right  and  wrong  conduct,  and  ways  of  treating  individuals  in  society. 
These  relate  to  questions  of  human  dignity  and  the  priority  that  a  particular  society 
accords to these notions in the organization of its affairs.  
     Be that as it may, it must be admitted that the current human rights system has strong 
marks of Western conceptions of rights which are significantly different from African 
notion of rights. To a large extent, this is traceable to the liberal origins of the Western 
conception.
60  On  the  other  hand ,  African  societies  are  organized  on  their  own 
understanding and interpretation of human rights which have been a fundamental feature 
of  the  functioning  of  their  societies.  This  draws  attention  to  the  philosophical 
underpinnings of these values and how they are reflected in the various notions of human 
rights. In general, the Western conception of human rights is predicated on individual 
autonomy, while the African conception gives prominence to the communitarian principle 
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which locates the individual as a member of the society with rights and duties bound up 
with those of the society.
61  
     It can therefore be said that it is the attempt to conflate both conceptions of human 
rights without taking sufficient cognizance of the underlying cultural norms and values 
and the linguistic and philosophical confusions generated thereby, that has rendered the 
discussion problematic. In the first place, whatever the objective may be in attempting to 
universalize particular human rights norms, in practice, such human rights transplants can 
hardly  take  root  in  a  new  environment  if  they  ignore  the  cultural  norms  of  those 
societies.
62 In other words, to be effective in a new environment and consistent with the 
mutual impact thesis here advanced, such foreign norms and values  must equally be 
impacted upon in the process of transplantation. Consequently, there is always tension 
between foreign and local norms and values in the absence of the requisite mutual impact. 
This explains one of the major problems with the human rights  corpus in Africa as the 
Western  concepts  of  individual  rights  introduced  into  African  societies  through 
colonialism has not been sufficiently integrated into the peoples’ largely communitarian 
mode of social organization through the failure of African political leadership.  
     The import of the present divergence may be illustrated by reference to the nature and 
structure of traditional African societies which give rise to particular notions of human 
rights. The concept of a nuclear family, for instance, is unknown in Africa because the 
family in the African context includes the immediate family in the Western sense, plus 
relations of both spouses, their uncles, cousins, nieces and nephews.
63 Within this web of 
relations, each member of the family has speci fic duties and responsibilities towards 
other members, and he or she can also lay claim to certain rights and privileges in 
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return.
64 In this scheme, respect for senior members is regarded as a  norm whose 
violation could attract social sanction or reproach.
65  
     The second aspect of this communitarian mode of social organization in Africa is that 
the care of the aged in the family is normally accepted as a joint responsibility, in the 
same way that child  care is regarded as a communal affair. This communit arianism is 
even   premised on the existence of a relationship between the dead ancestors and the 
living members of a family. Josiah Cobbah’s description aptly captures this point:  
The African worldview places the individual within the continuum of the dead, 
the living, and the yet unborn. It is a worldview of group solidarity and collective 
responsibility. In effect, in the same way that people in other cultures are brought 
up  to  assert  their  independence  from  their  community,  the  average  African’s 
worldview is one that places the individual within his community.
66 
     It is thus clear that with these variations in modes of social organization, the concept 
of rights will differ between Western and African states. It must however, be admitted that, 
with the advent of colonialism and the attendant acculturation and socialization processes, 
a  number  of  social,  economic  and  institutional  changes  have  been  introduced  in  the 
continent, and these  have greatly affected the traditional mode of social organization. As 
indicated earlier, it is the inability of African political leaders to sufficiently integrate the 
inherited  institutions  of  the  state  with  the  existing  African  conceptions  of  rights  and 
governance that has given rise to the present development crisis in the continent.
67 This 
gives importance to the point made by Kwasi Wiredu that ‘how to devise a system of 
politics  that,  while  being  responsive  to  the  developments  of  the  modern  world,  will 
reflect the best traditional thinking about human rights (and other values) is one of the 
profoundest challenges facing modern Africans’.
68  
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     Does the solution lie in going back to the African traditional conception of rights as 
some writers have suggested, or redrawing the map of Africa along pre-colonial empires? 
According to Lakshman Marasinghe, ‘the best guarantees of human rights in Africa are to 
be found by preserving conceptions of human rights recognized by each society’s law and 
custom’,  because  ‘there  is  a  greater  possibility  of  success  in  enforcing  human  rights 
violations  in  traditional  societies  than  in  non-traditional  societies’.
69 This  formulation 
with its undue romanticization of the traditional mode of organization in African societies 
fails to take cognizance of the fact that even the traditional mode of social organization 
entailed grave violations  of human rights  under various guises.
70 For instance, slaves 
dedicated to some chieftaincy stools were common features in some African societies 
such as Asante of Ghana, while women were treated as sub -humans and objects of 
inheritance in some societies. Moreover, the contemporary African society has undergone 
such tremendous transformation – thanks to the pervasiveness of globalization in all its 
dimensions - that any attempt to recreate the pristine traditional society will prove to be 
hugely unrealistic.  
     In relation to Makau Mutua’s suggestion for re-drawing the map of Africa in line with 
the pre-colonial boundaries,
71 it may be said that such a measure cannot be the panacea 
for the enormous challenges fac ing the continent, as it is even capable of generating 
unmanageable crisis in the continent in relation to issues such as who draws the map, and 
where the boundaries are to be fixed. It is my contention that the critical consideration 
should be how to construct a conception of rights that, while recognizing the identified 
philosophical and cultural differences,  strives to use them to build a more inclusive 
notion of human rights. This highlights the importance of adopting the call for a cross -
cultural dialogue that will facilitate the emergence of a new architecture of rights.   
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2.3.1  Post-Colonial Conception of Human Rights 
One of the major challenges facing post-colonial Africa is how to ensure that human 
rights assume their deserved central position in the efforts to promote the social and 
economic  development  of  the  continent.  The  centrality  of  this  issue  is  all  the  more 
important because in Africa, governments which are supposed to be the prime protectors 
and enforcers of human rights, are often manipulated by those in control of the machinery 
of governance and become the most flagrant violators of the basic rights of citizens.
72  
      In attempting to deal with this apparent dilemma, African leaders latched onto the  
dichotomy  between  civil  and  political  rights   and  social  and  economic  rights,  and 
precipitated a controversy on the issue of prioritization of the rights to be enforced at any 
given point in time. Prior to the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in 1981, the debate centred around the choice between social and economic rights 
on the one hand, and civil and political rights - the assumed paragon of Western human 
rights corpus - on the other hand. Some African leaders argued that it is only when a 
person has economic and social rights that civil and political rights can be meaningful to 
him  or  her.  Proceeding  from  such  an  admirably  high  moral  plateau  and  concern  for 
human welfare, this argument, characterized as the ‘full-belly thesis’
73 by Rhoda Howard, 
suggested  a  preference  for  economic  and  social  rights  over  civil  and  political  rights. 
Julius Nyerere’s classic formulation captures this position: 
What freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a bare living from the 
soil provided the rains do not fail; his children work at his side without schooling, 
medical care, or even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to vote and to 
speak  as  he  wishes.  But  these  freedoms  are  much  less  real  to  him  than  his 
freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will his existing political 
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freedom become properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a 
fact of human dignity.
74  
     Apparently  supporting  this  thesis,  the  then  military  ruler  of  Ghana,  Colonel 
Acheampong, contended that ‘one man, one vote is meaningless unless accompanied by 
the principle of ‘one man, one bread.’
75 Another variant of this prioritization of human 
rights relates to arguments of trade-offs, where it is argued that in order to accelerate the 
rate of economic development, certain human rights violations, particularly those of a 
civil and political character, are inevitable and have to be endured. This approach which 
has been described as the ‘ideology of developmentalism,
76argues that in view of the 
material conditions of underdevelopment in the continent, African states can ill-afford the 
‘luxury’ of giving prominence to civil and political rights and that development had to 
take priority over everything else.  
     Placing  these  arguments  in  their  historical  context,  it  is  evident  that  they  were 
essentially  regime-protective  stratagems  in  a  fashion  symptomatic  of  post-colonial 
African  governance. The strategy  was to  de-emphasize the citizen’s  involvement  and 
interrogation  of  the  political  process  that  had  become  so  effectively  manipulated  by 
African  leaders  and  rendered  the  citizen’s  basic  voting  rights  irrelevant.  It  is  a  sad 
commentary that in this 21
st century, the views of the electorate hardly matter in the 
electoral process in many African countries. The aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan elections 
and  that  of  Zimbabwe  in  2008  speak  volumes  about  this,  in  the  same  way  that 
independent reports on the April 2007 Nigerian elections showed that it was characterized 
by massive rigging and other forms of irregularities.
77   
                                                 
74 J. Nyerere, 1969, ‘Stability and Change in Africa’, (An Address to the University of Toronto) printed in 
Africa Contemporary Record 2(1969-70) C.30-31, quoted in R. Howard, 1983, note 73, p.467. It has 
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A further indication of the rhetorical nature of the preference for social and economic 
rights over civil and political rights by the political leaders is found in the fact that even 
the former set of rights did not fare any better in those countries whose leaders were 
strong  advocates  of  such  rights.  In  reality,  such  leaders  either  took  cover  under  the 
progressive nature of the rights as they were then formulated, insisting that their goal was 
the enforcement of such rights as the resources became available, or were clearly not 
committed  to  their  enforcement.  This  gives  further  importance  to  Professor  Upendra 
Baxi’s analysis of the politics of, and for human rights prevalent in contemporary human 
rights praxis.
78 Under those circumstances, advocacy  for economic and social rights by 
such leaders was therefore mere political posturing especially in the context of the then 
ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism each favouring a particular set of 
rights. 
     Against this background, it is thus a welcome development (as would be shown  later) 
that  the  African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  has  taken  the  bold  step  of 
formalizing  the  issue  of  indivisibility  of  rights  in  the  continent  and  this  approach  is 
reflected in a number of development initiatives adopted in Africa. 
2.4  Globalization, Human Rights and Development Initiatives in 
Africa 
The intersection between globalization and human rights and, in particular, the impact of 
human rights norms on economic development efforts in Africa has been manifested in a 
number of initiatives in the continent. Although the results of the deployment of human 
rights norms in such mechanisms have not necessarily been impressive, partly because of 
the underpinning political and economic philosophies, they represent significant steps 
that nevertheless demonstrate the mutuality of the relations between human rights and 
globalization. In this connection, it is intended to examine how the New Partnership for 
Africa’s  Development  has  sought  to  integrate  human  rights  norms  in  development 
initiatives in the continent. 
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2.4.1  New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
 
Since the central focus  of this work is on the relationship between globalization and 
human rights, my analysis of NEPAD will be limited to those aspects of the document 
that  have  sufficient  bearing  to  this  overarching  objective.  The  New  Partnership  for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is one of the most important initiatives adopted in recent 
times by African countries to deal with the continent’s developmental challenges in this 
era of globalization. Although the idea of having an institutional framework for the co-
ordination  of  economic  policies  across  the  continent  is  not  necessarily  new, 
79the 
adoption of the NEPAD mechanism in October 2001 represents a fundamental departure 
from previous efforts in this direction.  
     It was pioneered by Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, Hosni Mubarak, the then 
Presidents  of  South  Africa,  Nigeria,  and  Egypt  respectively,  Abdoulaye  Wade,  and 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika current Presidents of Senegal and Algeria; leaders who  in their 
national policies pay  great homage to the neo -liberal philosophy as the organizing 
principle for social and economic relations.
80 NEPAD was established as an attempt by 
African  leaders  to  show  that  there  is  a  dramatic  break  with  the  past  through  th e 
emergence of a new approach to dealing with the problems of the continent. It was 
equally meant to send a signal to the world that African leaders had learnt the lessons of 
misrule, realized the need for governments to be accountable to the people, and accepted 
the dominant creed that development can best be achieved using market-based economic 
policies.
81 NEPAD was endorsed in October 2001 at the inaugural meeting of the African 
Union which replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU).  
                                                 
79 There had been previous efforts such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the African Economic Community 
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2.4.1.1  Normative Framework 
One significant feature of NEPAD which marks it out as different from previous efforts in 
the continent is that it is neither framed as a treaty nor a charter, but is simply referred to 
as a ‘framework’ document.
82 It basically x-rays the problems of the continent, identifies 
their causes and prescribes curative measures in a programmatic fashion. The normative 
content, focus and direction of NEPAD are underscored by Paragraph 1 of the document 
which states that: 
This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African leaders, 
based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a 
pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually 
and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the 
same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The 
Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves 
and  the  continent  from  the  malaise  of  underdevelopment  and  exclusion  in  a 
globalizing world. 
     In order to justify its emphasis on the development of the continent and the urgent 
need  for  concerted  efforts  in  this  direction,  it  makes  an  assessment  of  the  African 
condition  in  comparison  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  by  declaring  pointedly  that  ‘the 
poverty  and  backwardness  of  Africa  stand  in  stark  contrast  to  the  prosperity  of  the 
developed world. The continued marginalization of Africa from the globalization process 
and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its peoples constitute a serious threat to 
global security’.
83 This statement by NEPAD is perhaps informed by the understanding 
that  extreme  poverty  and  underdevelopment  in  Africa  also  poses  enormous  global 
security challenges as buttressed by the current international concern over the frequent 
hijacking of vessels by pirates in troubled Somalia. The lingering crisis in the Niger Delta 
region  of  Nigeria  resulting  in  frequent  kidnapping  of  Nigerians  and  foreigners  also 
belongs to the same category. NEPAD acknowledges the problems created by the legacy 
of colonialism, pervasive corruption and mismanagement of resources in the continent 
but contends that, such challenges notwithstanding, ‘if the continent’s enormous natural 
and human resources are properly harnessed and utilized, it could lead to equitable and 
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sustainable growth, and enhance Africa’s rapid integration into the world economy’.
84 It 
is  on this  score that African leaders make  an  appeal  to  the people  ‘to  recognize the 
seriousness of the situation and the need to mobilize themselves in order to put an end to 
further marginalization of the continent and to ensure its development by bridging the gap 
between Africa and the developed countries’.
85  
     This formal commitment of African leaders to a new mode of association with their 
citizens  is  one  of  the  more  significant  features  of  NEPAD.  However,  it  raises  the 
fundamental  question  of  the  extent  to  which  ordinary  Africans  are  involved  in  the 
formulation, monitoring and implementation of development programmes, and allowed 
to  effectively  participate  in  the  democratic  process.  Have  African  leaders  begun  to 
demonstrate  accountability  in  the  democratic  processes?  While  the  examples  of 
democracy setbacks and relapses in sub-Saharan African countries such as Equatorial 
Guinea, Kenya, Niger, and Zimbabwe are worrisome, the recent Arab uprisings in North 
Africa can be said to be hugely momentous and give cause for optimism on the prospects 
of deploying human rights discourse to effect democratic changes in the continent. The 
mass protests in that region, which started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, led to the 
overthrow  of  the  country’s  President,  Zine  El  Abidine  Ben  Ali,  resignation  of  the 
Egyptian  President  Hosni  Mubarak,  and  the  overthrow,  and  subsequent  killing,  of 
Muamar Gadaffi of Libya.
86 Although it is too early to assess these developments, it can 
be said that they represent the successful deployment of counter -hegemonic pressures 
against authoritarian and undemocratic leaders. 
     With specific reference to the relevance of human rights in the development process, 
NEPAD  states  that  ‘the  new  phase  of  globalization  coincided  with  the  reshaping  of 
international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War’, and that ‘democracy and state 
legitimacy have been redefined to include accountable government, a culture of human 
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rights and popular participation as central elements’.
87  This recognition of the salience of 
human rights in the development process is the propelling force for the agreement of 
African leaders to take joint responsibility, among others, for ‘promoting and protecting 
democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing 
clear  standards  of  accountability,  transparency  and  participatory  governance  at  the 
national and sub-national levels’.
88 Moreover, ‘African leaders have learned from their 
own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and 
sound  economic  management  are  conditions  for  sustainable  development.  They  are 
making a pledge to work, both individually and collectively, to promote these principles 
in  their  countries  and  sub-regions  and  on  the  continent’.
89These  principles  are  to  be 
realized within the parameters of a Peace and Security Initiative, Democracy and Political 
Governance Initiative, and the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative.  
     Under the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, for instance, it states in 
Paragraph 79 that:  
It is generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence of 
true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. With the 
New  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development,  Africa  undertakes  to  respect  the 
global standards of democracy, the core components of which include political 
pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers’ 
unions, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organized to enable 
people to choose their leaders freely.  
The purpose of the Initiative is to strengthen the political and administrative framework 
of  African  countries,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  democracy,  transparency, 
accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law, which 
would, in conjunction with the Economic Governance Initiative, enhance development in 
the continent.  
     A further demonstration of the importance attached to democracy and human rights in 
the development process by NEPAD is the declaration that ‘one of its foundations is the 
expansion of democratic frontiers and the deepening of the culture of human rights’ and 
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the assurance that ‘a democratic Africa will become one of the pillars of world democracy, 
human rights and tolerance.
90  
     Deriving from its central objective of promoting African development, NEPAD argues 
that the appropriate focus now s hould be on the complete integration of contemporary 
African  economies  into  the  global  system,  notably  through  the  drumbeat  of  neo -
liberalism.  One  way  of  actualizing  this  is  to  ensure  the  diversification  of  African 
economies from raw materials to industrialization.
 91  This will deal with the problem of 
the overwhelming dependence of African states on one or two primary products whose 
prices are determined by foreign demand with the attendant vulnerability. While this is no 
doubt  a  laudable  objective,  it  is  the  suggested  path  to  achieving  it  that  is  hugely 
problematic as will be shown shortly.    
     Furthermore, it outlines the sectoral priorities and the identified measures necessary to 
actualize such goals through a programme of action between its adoption in 2001 and 
2015. Its areas of coverage include infrastructural development, ICT, energy transport, 
water and sanitation, human resources, including measures to reverse the brain drain, 
education, health, agriculture, environment, culture, science and technology and how to 
mobilize and utilize the resources for the development of the continent. This holistic 
approach to development is in tandem with the prevailing view that development should 
not be limited to economic growth alone.
92 
     One crucial feature of the NEPAD document is that it venerates the neo -liberal 
development paradigm as the key solution to the myriad problems co nfronting Africa. It 
gives prominence to the neo-liberal consensus on the obligation of governments to create 
and  nurture  a  hos pitable  environment  for  foreign  investment.  It  also  stresses  the 
imperative  of  ‘good  governance’  as  a  requirement  for  capital  flows,  and  the  need  to 
‘address investors’ perception of Africa as a ‘high-risk’ continent, especially with regard 
to  security  of  property  rights,  regulatory  frameworks  and  markets’.
93 Accordingly,  it 
places  emphasis  on  ensuring  transparency  in  regulation,  functioning  and  reasonably 
efficient administrative and judicial systems, an attentive bureaucracy and, ultimately, an 
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accountable government.
94 As will be shown later in this work (Chapter 4), these are 
familiar principles emphasized by international financial institutions as embodying the 
‘good governance’ concept.   
     On  international  economic  co-operation,  NEPAD  advocates  the  establishment  of a 
new  relationship  between  African  states  and  the  industrialized  countries,  as  well  as 
multilateral organizations to promote the economic development of the continent. Thus, it 
declares  in  paragraph  184  that  ‘the  various  partnerships  between  Africa  and  the 
industrialized countries on the one hand, and multilateral institutions on the other, will be 
maintained. The partnerships in question include, among others, the UN’s New Agenda 
for the Development of Africa in the 1990s; the Africa-Europe Summit’s Cairo Plan of 
Action; the World Bank-led Partnership with Africa; the IMF-led PRSPs; the Japan-led 
Tokyo Agenda for Action; the AGOA of the United States; and the ECA-led Global 
Compact with Africa’. This indicates continued participation in the conditionality-driven 
programmes of the international institutions and other donors.  
     In return, NEPAD requests developed country governments and international financial 
institutions  to  support  peace-keeping  initiatives,  accelerate  debt  reduction,  increase 
official development assistance to at least 0.7 per cent of the gross domestic product of 
developed countries, make available on less stringent terms access to pharmaceuticals, 
negotiate ‘more equitable’ terms of trade within the World Trade Organization framework 
and encourage greater private investment in Africa’.
95 They are also urged ‘to ensure that 
the World  Bank and other multilateral  development finance institutions  participate as 
investors in the key economic infrastructure projects, in order to facilitate and secure 
private  sector  participation’,  ‘support  governance  reforms  of  multilateral  financial 
institutions to better cater for the needs and concerns of countries in Africa’.
96 In view of 
this neo-liberal posture, it does not come as a surprise that the United Nations General 
Assembly commended NEPAD as an innovative and important development.
97 
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In order to underscore the contractual nature of the ‘partnership’, NEPAD declares that 
‘through the Programme, African leaders are making a commitment to the African people 
and the world to work together in rebuilding the continent. It is a pledge to promote peace 
and stability, democracy, sound economic management and people-centred development, 
and  to  hold  each  other  accountable  in  terms  of  the  agreements  outlined  in  the 
Programme’.
98     
     It  is  noteworthy that institutionally, NEPAD is  not  an embodiment  of the kind  of 
elaborate  organizational  framework  common  with  international  economic  institutions. 
Beyond the Heads of State Implementation Committee composed of the five heads of 
state, who are promoters of NEPAD and ten others, two from each region of the continent, 
established in Paragraph 200 of the NEPAD document, it has no institutional structure. 
While this provision may have been informed by the need to keep alive the vision of the 
founding  members,  it  raises  serious  questions  on  the  democratic  content  of  the 
mechanism. This is more obvious in situations where the countries of the five permanent 
committee members are to be assessed, creating the possibility of a soft treatment for 
such countries.   
     In relation to the lack of institutional framework, it would seem that in attempting to 
move away from previous institutional arrangements that largely failed to deliver in terms 
of economic development of the continent, NEPAD falls into the error of assuming that a 
regional mechanism can function and achieve results without any organized structural 
framework. This is buttressed by the fact that in its operations, NEPAD has been forced 
to  rely  heavily  on  the  structures  and  even  personnel  provided  by  member  states,  a 
measure that invariably impedes its effectiveness and independence in important respects.  
 
2.4.1.2  Appraising the NEPAD framework from a human rights and 
development perspective 
One positive feature of NEPAD within the context of this work is that it embodies the 
unequivocal  commitment  of  African  states  to  the  imperative  of  a  rule-based 
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accountability for the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance as 
elements  of  the  development  process.
99 This is evident in its frequent references to 
principles  of  ‘good  governance’,  ‘democratic  accountability’,  ‘rule  of  law’,  and  the 
promotion of ‘human rights’ as key factors for African development.  
     However, considering the underpinning neo-liberal philosophy of the document, the 
invocation of such terms would seem to be no more than ritualized incantations designed 
to legitimize the programme. It also epitomizes the rule of law consensus and the low-
intensity democracy being promoted under the neo-liberal paradigm.
100 This has greatly 
diluted  the  effectiveness  of  the  deployment  of  such  terms  as  important  elements 
necessary for African development. Nevertheless, the fact that African governments are 
willing to commit to these principles in  a formal development programme is a clear 
departure from orthodox behaviour and one that can be a basis for a more progressive 
drive to promote genuine development in the continent.
101  
     Although NEPAD proclaims that it is ‘an African-owned and African-led development 
programme’,
102 it is evident that it is steeped in the neo-liberal economic ideology as it 
not only borrows extensively from the dominant language of the latter, but explicitly 
advocates the adoption of some of the fundamental prescriptions of international financial 
institutions based on the ‘Washington Consensus’.
103 For instance, rather than focus on 
measures to enhance indigenous capability and entrepreneurship, NEPAD’s emphasis is 
on the accumulation of wealth through foreign participation in African economies which 
is one of the neo-liberal dogmas underpinning foreign direct investment as a catalyst for 
economic development.
104   
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Moreover, a close examination of the NEPAD document reveals that it heavily adopts 
pre-packaged answers contained in the declarations of Washington-based international 
economic institutions such as IMF and the World Bank and their academic apologists. 
These  include  its  veneration  of  free  markets  as  efficient;  frequent  references  to 
‘democracy’, ‘good governance’ and the ‘rule of law’ in ways that evidence acceptance of 
only  the  minimalist  conceptions  of  these  terms.
105  In  significant  ways  therefore, 
NEPAD’s prescriptions seem to be a re-threading of the discredited structural adjustment 
programme  under  the  guise  of  an  African-led  initiative.  Symptomatic  of  their  ready 
acceptance of prevailing economic views and principles, African leaders seem to have 
been  co-opted,  through  NEPAD,  into  the  alluring  dominant  ideology  of  neo-liberal 
globalization.   
     Additionally, by putting much faith in the supposed miracle of the neo-liberal creed, 
NEPAD invariably ignores the devastating effects of such economic policies on the living 
conditions of the masses and the attendant human rights violations witnessed in Africa 
through the implementation of the prescriptions of international financial institutions.
106In 
this connection reference may be made to the empirical study on the impact of structural 
adjustment programmes on human rights in Africa. Using the Physical Quality of Life 
Index  (PQLI),  Rodwan  Abouharb  and  David  Cingranelli  have  shown  the  adverse 
consequences of these programmes on human rights.
107 
     Beyond hortatively stating the need for recognition of human rights as important 
elements of the development process, there is no   specific articulation in the NEPAD 
document of the form of human rights necessary to activate the required development of 
                                                                                                                                                 
sustainable  development.  J.  Gathii,  2003,  ‘A  Critical  Appraisal  of  the  NEPAD  Agenda  in  Light  of 
Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development’, 13 Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems, pp.179-210 at 180-181. 
105 The components of the minimalist and maximalist conceptions of these terms are examined in A.M.B. 
Mangu, 2007, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism and its impact on the 
promotion of democracy and good political governance’, 7 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp.354-
388 at 358. 
106 A. Anghie, 2004, note 15, p.260. 
107 M.R. Abouharb, and D. Cingranelli, 2007,  Human  Rights  and  Structural  Adjustment,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.149. The authors’ detailed conclusions on this point are discussed fully 
in Chapter 4 of this work.   111 
the  continent.
108 Indeed, its veneration and adoption of neo -liberal economic policies 
strongly suggest preference for the hegemonic ve rsion of human rights. This inference 
stems from its constant references to good governance, democracy and human rights 
which are over-worn but embraced phrases of international economic institutions. At a 
minimum,  the NEPAD  document  ought  to  have  made  ref erence  and  predicated  its 
prescriptions on the human rights-based approach to development which is now being 
increasingly adopted by international development agencies. Such an approach would 
have  guaranteed  a  more  inclusive  development  framework  with  a  hi gh  degree  of 
participation  by  representatives  of  affected  communities,  civil  society,  minorities,  
indigenous peoples, and women and tie in properly with NEPAD’s recognition of the 
importance of the ordinary African in the development process.
109  
     However,  notwithstanding  NEPAD’s  evidently  neo-liberal  slant,  a  number  of 
considerations give hope that the implementation of its prescribed development policies 
may lead to some improvements in the economic conditions of African countries. In the 
first  place,  the  fact  that  NEPAD  recognizes  the  role  of  the  ordinary  people  in  the 
development process and seeks to mobilize them to achieve this goal is significant. It is 
recognition of the relevance of the ‘bottom-up approach’ to development rather than the 
previous ‘top-down approach’ which ignores the involvement of the ordinary people in 
the formulation and implementation of development programmes. Secondly, its holistic 
approach  to  development  which  recognizes  the  interplay  of  various  elements  in  the 
process is also noteworthy. This ensures the incorporation of socio-political, economic, 
and  environmental  needs  and  concerns  in  the  development  process  in  line  with  the 
current conception of development.
110 Perhaps more than any other principle embodied in 
the NEPAD framework, the creation of the peer review mechanism is one innovation 
which marks it out beyond the traditional approaches by previous institutions. Although 
still in its infancy, since only three African countries have so far undertaken the peer 
review exercise, the African Peer Review Mechanism, if properly utilized, can lead to the 
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pp.144-171 at 157-164. 
109 B. Manby, 2004, ‘The African Union, NEPAD, and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda’, 26 Human 
Rights Quarterly, pp.983-1027 at 1003. 
110 See A. Sen, 1999, note 92, ibid.   112 
adoption of best practices by states in relation to issues of accountability, democratic 
governance and the promotion of human rights.
111   
 
2.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the involvement of Africa with the globalization process and 
the interaction of the latter with the human rights corpus. This has entailed discussion of 
the  three  historical  phases  of  African  development,  pre-colonial,  colonial  and  post-
colonial periods. One common, but disturbing trend from the analysis is that Africa has 
not fared better in any of these periods in terms of the interaction between globalization 
and human rights.  Endogenous and  exogenous  factors have  conspired to  entrench an 
unacceptable level of suffering and poverty in Africa and the poor human rights record.  
     Although there has been no lack of measures designed to redress these unfortunate 
developments, the reality is that the implementation and enforcement strategies have not 
matched the declaratory statements contained in the relevant instruments and mechanisms. 
Africa’s involvement with the globalization process has therefore been a bitter experience.  
If the situation during the pre-colonial and colonial periods can be explained - although 
arguably - by the lack of organized modern political structures and sovereignty to carry 
out independent development programmes, the same cannot be said of the situation since 
the  attainment  of  political  independence  by  African  states.  For  one  thing,  upon  the 
attainment of independence, African states had the opportunity to adopt and implement 
development programmes that could have moved the continent away from the current 
level of underdevelopment. Unfortunately, most African leaders opted to toe the path 
charted for them by the departing colonial rulers, and, facing economic difficulties, were 
compelled to seek the assistance of international financial institutions such as IMF and 
World  Bank  controlled  by  Western  countries.  The  implementation  of  the  economic 
policies of these institutions has had adverse effects on the living conditions of people in 
these countries and their human rights. The result has certainly not been palatable as the 
economic conditions of African states largely deteriorated over the years. 
 
                                                 
111 For an assessment of the mechanism, see A.M.B. Mangu, 2007, note 105, pp.363-385.    113 
 The above analysis has also underscored the dynamic relationship between globalization 
and human rights, as shown in the fact that African states have subsequently recognized 
the salience, and expressed their commitment to the deployment of human rights norms 
in developmental strategies. They have accordingly adopted a number of developmental 
models and initiatives embodying recognition of this dynamic connection.
112 In particular, 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) highlights the inevitability of 
this connection in order to promote the economic development of the continent. Although 
the extent of implementation of these laudable initiatives is still far from the target, it is 
important to recognize this acceptance as a commitment to paradigmatic change. 
     The  central  issue  then  is  how  this  latter-day  realization  by  African  states  of  the 
emancipatory  potential  of  human  rights  can  be  sustained  and  maximized  as  the 
underpinning  factor  guiding  the  globalization  process  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
development of the continent. I have argued that the seeds for this development have 
already been sown with the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
notwithstanding its evidently neo-liberal slant, as it represents a marked departure from 
the previous approaches by African leaders. It equally signals a radical break from the 
paralysis inherent in the undue emphasis on colonialism as the reason for the present 
development  crisis.  How  this  new  approach  plays  out  within  the  framework  of  the 











                                                 
112 In this respect, the pessimism by Nsongurua Udombana concerning the role of the African Union in the 
protection of human rights in the continent can be said to be somewhat presumptive. N.J. Udombana, 
2002, ‘Can the leopard change its spots? The African Union Treaty and human rights’, 17 American 
University International Law Review, pp.1177- 1261at 1183.   114 
Part Two 
 
Institutional dimensions of the relationship between 
Globalization and Human Rights 
 
This  part  of  the  Thesis  examines  the  interaction  between  human  rights  norms  and 
international  economic  institutions,  which  are  the  main  agents  of  the  globalization 
process. It does so, first by looking at the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and how some of its provisions have been used in this era of globalization. It is shown 
that these provisions have not only been impacted upon by the processes of globalization, 
but have also, in particular ways, also influenced key components of the globalization 
process. Second, in relation to the international economic institutions studied, namely, the 
World Bank, IMF and WTO, it is shown that initially the institutions were reluctant to 
accept  human  rights  norms  in  their  policies  and  programmes.  There  are  however 
remarkable changes in this direction as the institutions now adopt and promote these 
norms in their policies and programmes. Nevertheless, it is contended that they have only 
adopted the hegemonic version of human rights and the thesis advocates the adoption of 
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Chapter 3: Globalization and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This Chapter builds on the connection established previously between globalization and 
human  rights  in  Africa  by  focusing  on  how  that  mutual  relationship  influenced  the 
adoption of, and specific provisions within the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. It will also examine some particular aspects of the Charter implicated in this 
interaction  between  global  and  regional  norms  or,  to  use  Santos’  terms,  between 
‘localized globalism’ and ‘globalized localism’ indicative of the contradictory nature of 
globalization itself.
1 In the same vein, the centrality of two forms of globalization, namely, 
economic globalization and legal globalization which have been instrumental in defining 
the relationship between the provisions of the Charter and the overall globalization 
process will also be explored. While the adoption of the Charter in 1981 can be said to be 
a significant landmark in the effort to institutionalize human rights in Africa, it is 
important  to  underline  and  contextualize  the impact  this  has  had  on  contemporary 
developments in the continent.  
     Upon the attainment of indepen dence by a majority  of African states in the early 
1960s, African leaders seemed more concerned with the protection of the territorial 
integrity of their states and promotion of the economic development of their countries, 
and showed little interest in the protection of human  rights. To some extent, this was 
understandable, though not excusable, since African leaders were confronted with the 
stark realities of gross underdevelopment in their countries and the attendant challenges 
of responding to these concerns.  This meant th at human rights issues and the dynamic 
connection between them and economic development were given secondary position in 
the scheme of things.
2   
                                                 
1 B. de Sousa Santos, 2002, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation, 
London: Butterworths LexisNexis, p.179. 
2 F. Viljoen, 2007, International Human Rights Law in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.163. It is 
ironical that most of the nationalist leaders who had employed human rights norms such as right to self-
determination in their independence struggles jettisoned such norms upon ascension to political power.   116 
The assumed pre-occupation with the promotion of economic development informed the 
zeal with which African leaders clamoured for the integration of their national economies 
into the international system and the establishment of robust relations with international 
economic institutions. This in turn entailed acceptance of the rules and policy measures 
formulated by  these institutions  - policies that have largely impacted on the level of 
human rights protection in the continent. Moreover, incorporation into the global web of 
social, economic, and political relations which was increasingly paying homage to the 
human  rights  corpus  –  albeit  rhetorically  –  impelled  African  leaders  to  see  the 
institutionalization of human rights as a way of measuring up to that standard.  
     It is against this background that this chapter seeks to establish, first, that African 
leaders were compelled by internal and external developments to formulate and adopt the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and that they have used the framework of 
the Charter to articulate African historical experiences and infused the same into some of 
the  human  rights  norms  in  the  Charter.  Second,  it  will  also  be  shown  that  although 
African states used the human rights norms and principles embedded in the Charter as a 
springboard for advancing their economic and political goals within the context of the 
globalization process, the development has not been entirely linear, as there had been 
reverses in several areas, indicating the mutual relationship between globalization and 
human rights. In this connection, reference will be made to some specific human rights 
norms embodied in the Charter and how these have been deployed to define the position 
of the continent in the globalization process. 
3.2  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A 
Historical Overview 
 
The attainment of political independence by majority of African states in the early 1960s 
did not ipso facto translate to any considerable recognition of the salience of human 
rights. As indicated earlier, leaders of the newly independent African States gave more 
                                                                                                                                                 
Moreover, the precedent of poor human rights record of the departing colonial masters did not propel 
African leaders to accord prominence to human rights issues.    117 
prominence  to  maintaining  the  territorial  integrity  of  their  states  and  the  claimed 
adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.
3    
It therefore took well over twenty years for African states to take the issue of human 
rights seriously at the highest level of governance and agree on a concerted platform for 
dealing with such matters. This delay occurred, notwithstanding the early recognition of 
the need for a continental mechanism for handling human rights issues by scholars and 
activists.
4 It may  be mentioned that one of the  key  proposals  of the ‘Law of  Lagos’ 
adopted  at  the  end  of  the  African  Conference  on  the  Rule  of  Law  in  1961  was  the 
imperative of an African Convention on Human Rights and a Court. As the Conference 
put it: 
In order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
this  Conference  invites  the  African  Governments  to  study  the  possibility  of 
adopting an African Convention of Human Rights in such a manner that the 
conclusion of this Conference will be safeguarded by the creation of a court of 
appropriate  jurisdiction  and  that  recourse  thereto  be  made  available  for  all 
persons under the jurisdiction of the signatory States.
5  
     Although as it turned out, African states did not respond immediately to this call, the 
relevance and resilience of the human rights corpus could not be ignored for too long. 
Consequently, between 1967 and 1981 several efforts were made and conferences held to 
place  human  rights  in  their  deserved  position  in  the  continent.  These  included 
conferences in Dakar, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Monrovia, and Banjul, culminating in the 
decision by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African  Unity (OAU)  at  its  Ordinary Session in 1979 calling on the OAU Secretary 
General to convene a meeting of African experts to elaborate a draft of an African Charter 
                                                 
3 As contained in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter and Article 3 of the Charter of the now defunct 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is however, comforting that this principle of non-interference 
has been significantly mellowed down by the provision in Article 4(h) of the African Union Act which 
authorizes the Organization to intervene in the affairs of a member state in grave circumstances such as 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The implications of this new provision are examined 
in B. Kioko, 2003, ‘The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From non-
interference to non-intervention’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85 no. 852, pp.807-825. 
4 M. Evans and R. Murray, 2008, ‘The State Reporting Mechanism of the African Charter’, M. Evans and 
R. Murray, eds. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006, 
2
nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.49-75 at 49. 
5 Law of Lagos, 7 January 1961, Para. 4, reprinted in 3 Journal of Commission of Jurists 9 (1961).   118 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
6 The result of the work of this Expert Committee was the 
eventual emergence of the African Charter.  
     These efforts were driven by recognition of the need for a continent-wide framework 
for the protection of human rights. This change of focus by African leaders and their 
acceptance of human rights can be attributed to two main factors. First, the emphasis 
placed on the human rights  record of states  by the American government  during the 
tenure of President Jimmy Carter, and the decision to link aid to African countries to their 
human rights record, compelled African leaders to reconsider their level of support for 
human rights.
7 Although this American advocacy of human rights was more rhetorical 
than real, considering its selective application, it was nevertheless sufficient to make aid-
dependent African states fall in line and also proclaim adherence to human rights norms.
8 
Second, the emergence of a crop of tyrants in the continent and the negative image this 
was creating for the continent internationa lly also made African leaders   give serious 
thoughts to human rights issues. The atrocities committed by Idi Amin of Uganda, Jean 
Bedel Bokassa of Central African Empire, and Marcias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, in 
their countries constituted huge embarrassments for the continent.
9 These factors served 
as the impetus that compelled African states to eventually adopt the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981.
10 The adoption of the Charter can therefore be said 
to be a progressive development for a continent that had become notorious for human 
rights abuses. 
                                                 
6 Decision AHG/Dec.115 (XVI),Rev.1. The historical trajectory of the Charter is examined in G. Baricako, 
2008, ‘Introductory Preface’, M. Evans and R. Murray, eds. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006, 2
nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-19 at 
1-8;  R.Gittleman,1982,  ‘The African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights:  A  Legal  Analysis,  22 
Virginia Journal of International Law, pp.667-714 at 670-673. 
7 O. Ojo and A. Sesay, 1986, ‘The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond’, 8 
Human Rights Quarterly, pp.89-103 at 92.  
8 I.G. Shivji, 1989, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, London: CODESRIA Book Series, p.94. 
9 While Idi Amin was known to have consistently ordered the execution of opponents of his bizarre style of 
governance, Jean Bedel Bokassa ordered the shooting of school children demonstrating on a date that 
coincided with his birthday celebration killing over 100 children in the process. Happily, these tyrants 
were swept away in their various countries by the ‘people’s power’ in 1979 and they later died unsung in 
exile. 
10 Equally worthy of mention is the role played by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
through organizing seminars on human rights in Africa during which sessions the need for a  continental 
Charter on human rights were canvassed. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights itself was 
adopted on 28 June 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya. It entered into force on 21 October 1986 upon ratification by 
the majority of African states; OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5; reprinted in 21 ILM (1982) 59.   119 
 
3.3  Specific Charter provisions and their intersection with 
Globalization 
Although the African Charter contains provisions for the protection of the whole panoply 
of rights, for present purposes,
11 the central focus is on those provisions that are evidently 
reflective of the dynamic relationship between globalization and human rights. Th is 
approach will enable sufficient consideration to be given to the interaction between the 
identified provisions and the globalization process in furtherance of the main argument of 
the thesis. It may be mentioned that one of the distinctive features of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights is its recognition of the interdependence and indivisibility 
of human and peoples’ rights. It boldly declares in its preamble that ‘the satisfaction of 
economic, social, and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights’.  
     Coming at a time when the international community was embroiled in the contest 
between the West and East, with each bloc favouring either civil and political rights, or 
economic, social and cultural rights, and the values derived therefrom over the other, this 
recognition by the Charter of the interdependence of both sets of rights can be said to be 
hugely momentous on at least two important grounds. 
      First, on this subject, it can be said to be far ahead of other regional human rights 
instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights
12 and the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights which were already in force at the time .
13 Second, it also 
had a remarkable impact on the international development of human rights jurisprudence 
as it acted as a precursor to the United Nations Declaration in 1993 that human rights are 
interdependent and indivisible.
14 Although little attention is often given to this impact in 
the conventional narration of the historical trajectory of human rights, it is important to 
highlight this development as it meant that a regional conception of human rights was 
                                                 
11 Other aspects of the Charter especially those on social and economic rights will be considered in the 
latter part of this work (chapters 5, 6, and 7) in relation to the impact and response of African state 
systems to globalization. 
12 The Convention was adopted on 4 November 1950. However, the European Social Charter has now been 
used to reflect this in the European system. 
13 The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted on 22 November 1969. 
14 See the United Nations Conference on Human Rights, 1993.   120 
projected into, and eventually accepted in the global arena, in the same way that global 
human  rights  norms  have  b een  embedded  in  regional  systems.  Such  developments 
invariably  validate  Professor  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos’  analysis  of  the  interaction 
between globalized localism and localized globalism, as elements of the globalization 
process.  
     However, notwithstanding this recognition under the African Charter, there has been 
consistent marginalization of economic, social, and cultural rights and solidarity rights in 
the continent.
15 It is therefore intended in this section to focus on some of these rights 
which have a significant impact on contemporary developments in Africa. Moreover, the 
development crisis confronting African states today calls for closer examination of the 
relationship between the globalization process and economic, social and cultural rights as 
well  as  solidarity  rights.  This  inquiry  is  all  the  more  important  because economic 
globalization is frequently implicated in the current level of marginalization or non -
realization of these rights in the continent. Conversely, and in tandem with the mut ual 
impact thesis advanced in this work, it will be examined whether these rights in any way 
have a corresponding impact on the globalization process. It is my contention that the 
establishment of a mutual relationship between globalization and these right s and the 
potential benefits derivable from such a conceptualization could galvanize African states 
to pay greater attention to the enforcement of these rights, alongside civil and political 
rights, and improve the conditions of millions of oppressed and deprived Africans. 
     Furthermore,  deriving  from  the  increasing  holistic  interpretation  of  development 
discussed earlier, it seems appropriate to focus greater attention on those rights that have 
some direct connection with the development process. Africa , more than any region of 
the world, needs to play a greater role in recognizing the relevance and salience of these 
second  and  third  generation  rights,  because  of  its  current  economic  conditions, 
particularly as the enjoyment of these rights have been shown to be intricately connected 
with the processes of  economic  globalization. Accordingly, for the purpose of this 
                                                 
15 J.  Oloka-Onyango,  ‘Reinforcing  Marginalized  Rights  in  an  Age  of  Globalization:  International 
Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa’, 18 American University 
International  Law  Review,  pp.851-913  at  852-853;  S.C.  Agbakwa,  2000,  ‘Reclaiming  Humanity: 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights’, 5  Yale Human 
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analysis, attention will be focused on the right to self-determination, the right to disposal 
of natural wealth and resources, and the right to development, to be taken in that order.  
 
3.3.1  Self-Determination under the African Charter 
Self-determination is one of the fundamental, but contested principles of international law. 
It basically refers to the right of a people to freely determine their political, social and 
economic status in order to attain their developmental goals.
16 Although its origin can be 
traced  back  to  the  American  Declaration  of  Independence,  1776  and  the  French 
Declaration, 1789
17and through the postulations of Lenin and Woodrow Wi lson in the 
early 20
th century, it gained prominence after the Second World War and became a very 
useful weapon in the decolonization process.
18 In no region has its impact been more 
pronounced than in Africa where it was, and remains , an important reference point in 
human rights activism. It was recognition of this salience that led to the inclusion of a 
number of provisions in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights relating to 
self-determination. Thus Article 19 of the Charter proclaims that: ‘All peoples shall be 
equal, they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall 
justify the domination of a people by another’.
19 To fortify this, Article 20 states that ‘All 
peoples  shall  have  the  right  to  existence.  They  shall  have  the  unquestionable  and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen’.
20  
                                                 
16  See  Common  Article  2  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  1966  and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
17  A.  Cassese,  1995,  Self-determination  of  Peoples:  A  Legal  Reappraisal,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, p.11; It has also been argued that the revolt of black slaves in the French colony of 
Saint Dominque and eventual establishment of the Republic of Haiti in 1804 was equally indicative of 
the exercise of the right to self-determination, even though this significant struggle is often omitted in the 
standard histories of human rights. N. Stammers, 2009, Human Rights and Social Movements, London: 
Pluto Press, p.67. 
18 This was accomplished principally through the adoption of Resolution 1514 entitled: Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960, a year that witnessed the highest 
number of African states gaining political independence.  
19 This is to ensure the protection of minority groups in states. Unfortunately, the marginalization   of 
minority groups remains a common phenomenon in several African States. 
20 Article 20(1).   122 
These are, no doubt, important provisions relating to the exercise of the right of self -
determination. It may be noticed that Article 20 uses the adjectives ‘unquestionable’ and 
‘inalienable’ preceding the right to self-determination. Normatively, these words do not 
necessarily add to the nature and content of the right in question beyond expression of the 
perceived importance of the right and the strong desire to actualize it.  
     One problematic issue that has had, and continues to have, tremendous effect on the 
exercise  of  the  right  to  self-determination,  and,  concomitantly  on  the  globalization 
process in Africa, is the meaning of the word ‘peoples’ under the Charter. Although the 
Charter uses it in contrast to ‘State’, no definition of the word is provided therein, the 
prominence given to the term in the Charter notwithstanding.
21  It can therefore be said 
that the drafters of the Charter imported the inherent indeterminacy of the term in general 
international law into the African Charter when they could have used the opportunity 
presented to define and clarify the use of the term within the context of the Charter.     
Consequently, we have to   resort to the jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights to ascertain its interpretation of the word ‘people’.  
     The reliance on the Commission is informed by the fact that the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, which is now the main judicial organ under the African Union, 
only came into being in July 2008 as a merger between the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and the African Court of Justice established under the Constitutive Act 
of  African  Union.
22 However, even this does not give us any direct guidance as the 
Commission has given three different in terpretations of the term,  giving rise to the 
                                                 
21 It would seem from the drafting history that the concept was deliberately left undefined in order to avoid 
controversy. F. Viljoen, 2007, note 2, p.243. This feature is, unfortunately, also noticeable in the United 
Nations Charter. K. Henrard, 2000, ‘Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual 
Human  Rights,  Minority  Rights  and  the  Right  to  Self-Determination,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers, p.291; T.D. Musgrave, 2002, Self Determination and National Minorities, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.148-179. 
 
22 See the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. It was only on 15 
December, 2009 that it concluded  its first case since its inauguration; in the  matter of  Michelot 
Yagogombaye vs. Republic of Senegal, Application No. 001/2008. The structural problems of the Court 
and  attendant  challenges  have  recently  been  explored  by  a  former  Judge  of  the  Court;  G.W. 
Kanyeihamba, 2009, ‘Assessing Regional Approaches to the Protection of Human Rights: The Case of 
the Stillborn African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 15(2) East African Journal of Peace and 
Human Rights, pp.278-295.   123 
description of the word as a ‘chameleon-like term that varies in nature according to the 
right which is to be implemented’.
23  
     In  Sir  Dawda  K.  Jawara  v  The  Gambia, 
24 the  Commission  interpreted  the  word 
‘peoples’ to mean the entire people of a country as a collective when it found a violation 
of Article 20(1) on the right to freely determine their political status, as a result of a 
military coup in The Gambia. It held that the military coup was a grave violation of the 
right of Gambian people to freely choose their government as entrenched in Article 20(1) 
of the Charter. Similarly, in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Burundi, Rwanda 
and Uganda
25 the Commission made generous references to the right of the ‘people’ of 
Congo to self-determination, and to the disposal of their natural wealth and resources. 
     However, this interpretation which regards ‘peoples’ as corresponding to the whole 
collectivity in a state blurs the distinction between ‘the people’ and ‘the State’ as clearly 
indicated  in  the  African  Charter  and  other  international  conventions.  Although  it  is 
arguable  whether  the  distinction  ought  to  be  maintained,  the  point  remains  that  in 
contemporary Africa the dichotomy provides a useful avenue for making governments 
accountable to the people. This is because equating the people with the state emboldens 
African political leaders who often project their decisions and actions as those of the 
people, even when these are patently against the interests of the people. Additionally, it 
has also been contended that the Commission’s interpretation of the term in this mode 
seems to re-emphasize the statist orientation that was the hallmark of thinking at the 
inception of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU).
26 This is because it 
links the concept of ‘people’ to the inherited territorial demarcations in Africa without 
                                                 
23 F. Ouguerouz, 2003, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights:  A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p.211;  C. Baldwin 
and C. Morel, 2008, ‘Group Rights’, M. Evans and R. Murray, eds. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006, 2
nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.244-288 at 247-248; F. Viljoen, 2007, note 2, pp.243-244. Contrast, however, Solomon Dersso’s 
categorization of five possible interpretive modes for the word ‘peoples’ under the Charter. S.A. Dersso, 
2006, ‘The Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with respect to 
peoples’ rights’, 6 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp.358-381 at 360-363.  
24 (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR) (13
th Annual Activity Report) (Gambia Coup Case);   
25 Communication 227/1999, (2003) 20
th Annual Activity Report; contrast this general interpretation with 
the radical notion of ‘people’ in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples otherwise known as 
the ‘Algiers Declaration’ of 4 July 1976. 
26 Indeed, Frans Viljoen has described it as a ‘status quo-serving interpretation of the term’, note 2, p.243.    124 
being attentive to the cultural identities and affinities that define people who now find 
themselves in two or more countries. 
     The second interpretation of the term by the African Commission sees the word as a 
reference to  indigenous peoples, ‘oppressed people’, or the inhabitants of an African 
territory under colonial rule or alien domination. This draws from the express provision 
of Article 20(2) of the Charter which provides that ‘colonized or oppressed peoples shall 
have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means 
recognized  by  the  international  community’.  Such  people  also  have  the  right  to  the 
assistance  of  state  parties  to  the  Charter  in  their  liberation  struggle  against  foreign 
domination, be it political, economic or cultural.
27  
     According to Richard Kiwanuka, this is the ‘least problematic of the uses of the term 
‘people’,  under  current  international  law,  because  ‘political  self-determination  is 
generally equated with freedom from colonial-type rule.’
28 This interpretation certainly 
had relevance and topicality when some African territories were still under one form of 
colonial rule or the other, but with the attainment or grant of independence to virtually all 
of  African  territories,  it  will  decline  in  significance,  except  in  cases  of  ‘internal 
colonialism’  such  as  the  unending  case  of  Western  Sahara  still  struggling  under  the 
‘colonial’ claws of Morocco, and Southern Sudan which recently gained independence 
from the long-standing domination of the North.
29 It is on this score that there are strong 
beliefs in some African countries that though external colonialism has ended, it has been 
replaced by internal colonialism as some ethni c groups have perpetually dominated the 
political, and, consequently, the economic life of some countries to the detriment of other 
groups.
30 
     Thirdly, the Commission has also interpreted ‘people’ to mean distinct ethnic groups 
or a group of people within a state who see themselves as distinct such as the Katangese 
                                                 
27 Article 20(3). 
28 R.N.  Kiwanuka,  1988,  ‘The  Meaning  of  ‘‘People’’  in  the  African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’ 
Rights’, 82 American Journal of International Law, pp.80-101 at 88-89. 
29 An analysis of this domination is contained in F.M. Deng, 1995, War of Visions: Conflicts of Identities in 
the Sudan, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp.135-177. Significantly, South Sudan became 
an independent state on 9 July 2011 following a referendum on secession from the Republic of Sudan 
held in January of the same year. 
30 This was partly responsible for the Kenyan pogrom after the December 2007 elections.  It was also the 
moving force of the Eritrean struggle which culminated in their secession from Ethiopia in 1993.   125 
of Zaire, Ogoni of Nigeria, or Endorois of Kenya. Thus in  Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council vs. Kenya
31 the complainants who filed the case before the Commission 
on behalf of the Endorois community alleged a number of violations resulting from the 
eviction of the Endorois people from their ancestral lands by the Kenyan Government in 
order to establish a Game Reserve. One of the key issues that arose for determination was 
the question of who constitutes a ‘people’ for purposes of the Charter and whether the 
Endorois could be classified as such. The Commission set out the criteria that a group of 
individuals would have to satisfy in order to be considered as peoples. These are:  
a  common  historical tradition, racial  or  ethnic identity,  cultural  homogeneity, 
linguistic unity, religious and ideological affinities, territorial connection, and a 
common economic life or other bonds, identities and affinities they collectively 
enjoy especially rights enumerated under Articles 19-24 of the African Charter – 
or suffer collectively from the deprivation of such rights’.
32 
     Based on these criteria, the Commission held that the Endorois qualified as a people 
for the purposes of the Charter.
33 This interpretation, which is normatively inclusive and 
progressive, is however manifestly at variance with the international conception of the 
term which does not regard ethnic groups and minorities as peoples.
34 Nevertheless, the 
interpretation is recognition of the realities of marginalization and exclusion that many 
ethnic groups and minorities face in Africa and seeks to afford them legal protection. 
Enforcing the exercise of this right, especially in its external dimension, however raises 
enormous challenges. The major problem concerns the extent to which the rights can be 
exercised under the African Charter without jeopardizing the venerated sovereignty of a 
state. In particular, it may be asked, to what extent can the Ogoni people in Nigeria or the 
Bakassi,  now  in  Cameroon
35  exercise  their  right  to  political  and  economic  self-
determination?  
                                                 
31 Communication 276/2003. 
32 Paragraph 151. 
33 Paragraph 162. 
34 H. Quane, 1998, ‘The United Nations and the evolving right to Self-Determination’, 47 International and 
Comparative Quarterly, pp.537-572 at 571. 
35 Bakassi was part of Nigeria but ceded to Cameroon by virtue of the ICJ’s judgment in the case of Land 
and  Maritime  Boundary  between  Cameroon  and  Nigeria  (Cameroon  v.  Nigeria:  Equatorial  Guinea 
intervening),  ICJ  Reports  2002, p.303.  An  analysis  of  this  decision  is  contained  in  N.J.  Udombana,   126 
     The Commission seemed to have dealt with this issue in the earlier case of Katangese 
Peoples’ Congress v Zaire.
36  The complainant, the President of the Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress,  requested  the  African  Commission  to  recognize,  among  other  things,  the 
independence  of  Katanga  by  virtue  of  Article  20(1)  of  the  African  Charter.  The 
Commission however found that the claimants had not shown that they had made efforts 
to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with the constitutional options 
open to them such as confederation, regionalism, local government, or self-government. 
Moreover,  since  the  Commission  is  obliged  to  uphold  the  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty of Zaire, now (Democratic Republic of Congo), it found that the exercise of 
the right to self-determination must be done within the boundaries of the state.  
     It is my contention that the Commission’s central focus in this Communication was on 
the internal dimension of self-determination even when the demand of the Katangese 
people was evidently premised on the external dimension. According to Kristin Henrard, 
‘the right to self-determination in its external dimension refers to the international status 
of a people concentrated on a specific territory and the relations of that entity with the 
surrounding states’, while the internal dimension of the right is ‘concerned with the state 
structure  and  other  national  legal  regulations  designed  to  accommodate  in  a  (more) 
optimal way the separate identities of the various population groups present in a state’.
37    
In general, the exercise of the right to self-determination in its internal dimension does 
not  have  a  disruptive  potential  since  it  does  not  affect  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
existing state. This is because the right to internal self-determination can be exercised by 
ethnic groups and minorities in a state within the framework of such mechanisms as 
decentralization, regionalization or federalism.
38The basic explanation for this approach 
by the Commission is the general reluctance to articulate and legitimize the exercise of 
the  right  to  self -determination  in  it s  external  dimension  for  fear  of  the  attendant 
disintegrative consequences. This is not entirely surprising because self -determination 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004,‘The Ghost of Berlin still haunts Africa: The ICJ Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary 
Dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria’,10  African Yearbook of International Law, pp.13-61. 
36 (2000)  AHRLR 72, (ACHPR 1995) (8
th Annual Activity Report)  (Katangese Secession Case).   
37 K. Henrard, 2000, Devising an adequate system of minority protection: Individual human rights, minority 
rights and the right to self-determination, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
p.281. 
38 Ibid., p.307.   127 
had long been described as a phrase ‘loaded with dynamite’ and one that could be a 
source of political instability, domestic disorder, and a cause of rebellion.
39 Such fears are 
however often over-blown since the exercise of the right in its external dimension is also 
subject to a number of conditions and realities. It must be realized that the genuine desire 
and aspirations of a people can hardly be suppressed for too long, as the struggles by the 
Eritrean and Southern Sudanese peoples have clearly shown. Moreover, the decision puts 
the exercise of the right, even in its internal dimension, in a precarious situation where 
the  state has a constitutional structure that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
particular ethnic groups in the country to articulate and have their own models of 
governance accepted by the national governments. Worst still, where there is a deliberate 
policy skewed against identifiable ethnic groups, especially where the group is perceived 
to be opposed to the present national government.  
     Another major problem with the third interpretation of the term is the tension evident 
in the exercise of the right to disposal of natural wealth and resources contained in Article 
21  between  the  various  categories  covered  in  the  word  ‘people’.  For  instance,  the 
exercise of this right by an ethnic group in a country may conflict with the claim to the 
exercise of the same right by the ‘people’ of a state as a collectivity, and even with the 
state itself. This is more critical in the context of a resource-rich ethnic group within a 
state, as in the case of the Bakassi in Cameroon, or the Ogoni people in Nigeria. Will the 
ethnic group’s exercise of this right be overridden by the general right of the collectivity 
in the state to exercise such right? The African Commission was confronted with the 
challenge of making a decision on this point in the Endorois Case.
40 It held that the right 
to natural resources on traditional lands vests in the indigenous peoples and as such the 
Endorois  have  the  right  to  freely  dispose  of  their wealth  and  natural  resources  in 
consultation with the respondent State. The Commission even went further to hold that 
the fact that the government dispossessed the Endorois of their land and failed to provide 
adequate compensation or restitution, meant that the Kenyan government had violated 
                                                 
39 R. Lansing, 1921, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative, London: Constable and Co. Ltd, p.87. 
This notion continues to affect the attitude of the international community to issues concerning self-
determination today. A. Cassese, 1995, note 17, p.5. 
40 Note 31.   128 
Article 21(2) which provides that in cases of spoliation, the dispossessed are entitled to 
lawful recovery of property as well as adequate compensation.
41 
      The challenges of enforcement arising from this interpretation are better appreciated 
when placed alongside the Commission’s decision in the Katangese Case.
42  It would be 
recalled that in the latter case, the Commission ruled that the right to self-determination 
must be exercised within the context of the territorial sovereignty of the Zairean State. A 
corollary of this line of reasoning is that the assertion of the right to disposal of natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised within the framework of the right by the state 
collectivity to exercise the same right. This interpretation not only hollows out the right 
of ‘peoples’ under the label of an ethnic group, but renders it completely irrelevant in a 
situation where national legislation exists that vests ownership, control and disposal of 
particular natural resources in a country on the state. The Nigerian scenario provides a 
classic illustration of the problem with such interpretation as both the Petroleum Act,
43 
and the Land Use Act 
44 vest ownership of oil and land resources in the country in the 
Nigerian State, thus denying the ethnic groups where these resources are found any right 
to the disposal of same. Similarly, Article 4(2) of the 1977 Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe provides that, ‘the land and the natural resources of 
the soil and subsoil, in territorial waters and on the continental shelf of the islands, shall 
be the property of the State, which shall determine the conditions of their improvement 
and their use’.  
     Ordinarily, such provisions should not pose serious problems where the government 
utilizes the natural resources for the benefit of the whole people in the state, but they 
become  worrisome  in  a  country  where  political  leaders  plunder  the  resources  of  the 
country without regard for the interests of the people, least of all, the area where the 
resources are produced. It would seem that under these circumstances, an interpretation 
conducive to the exercise of this right without upsetting the applecart of state sovereignty 
will  be  one  that  subjects  the  national  legislation  to  recognition  of  the  interests  and 
                                                 
41 Note 31, paragraph 268. 
42 Note 36. 
43 Chapter P10, Laws of the Federation of  Nigeria, 2004, S.1. 
44 Chapter L5, Laws of the Federation of Nige ria, 2004, S.2 (1). The injustice inherent in the foregoing 
enactments for the oil bearing communities in Nigeria are examined in K.S.A. Ebeku, 2002, ‘Oil and the 
Niger Delta People: The Injustice of the Land Use Act’, 35 Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, pp.201-231 at 217-229.   129 
developmental aspirations of the natural resource-bearing groups in the country. This 
leads me to an examination of the role of states in the exercise of this right and how this 
has been impacted upon by the processes of globalization. 
 
3.3.2  African States and the right to disposal of natural wealth and 
resources 
The  tension  inherent  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  disposal  of  natural  wealth  and 
resources  by  peoples  and  States  is  traceable  to  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  on  the 
exercise of the right. To begin with, Article 21(1) of the Charter proclaims that:  
All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people 
be deprived of it.
45 
     However, perhaps as a counterpoise and looking to the external dimension, Article 
21(4) of the Charter provides that ‘State Parties to the present Charter shall individually 
and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources 
with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity’. Putting aside the consequential 
tension already discussed, it can be said that these provisions theoretically underscore the 
commitment  of  African  leaders  to  promote  economic  development  of  the  continent 
because  of  their  realization  that  political  independence  is  insufficient  to  guarantee 
economic development of their countries. To be sure, the state of underdevelopment of 
the continent in spite of the abundant natural resources has been a subject of considerable 
concern, and, emboldened by a number of United Nations Resolutions,
46 African states 
sought to use the framework of the Charter to articulate their desire for fundamental 
change and greater control over their natural resources. To complement these provisions, 
State  parties  undertake  to  ‘eliminate  all  forms  of  foreign  economic  exploitation 
particularly that practised by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to 
                                                 
45 Article 21(1). 
46 These include Res 1803(XVII) adopted by the General Assembly at its 1194
th  Plenary  Meeting  on 
December  14,  1962,  Res.1803(XVII)  UN  General  Assembly,  17
th  Sess.  Official  Records,  Supp. 
No.17(A/5217), p.15-Article 21(1) and Res 3281 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States It was 
adopted at the 2315
th Plenary Meeting, December 12, 1974, by a vote of 120 to 6 with 10 abstentions. An 
analysis of this Resolution and its implications for international law is contained in T.O. Elias, 1992, New 
Horizons in International Law, 2
nd rev. ed. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp.201-249.   130 
fully  benefit  from  the  advantages  derived  from  their  natural  resources’.
47It  is  in  this 
context that reference may be made to the Social and Economic Rights Case
48 where the 
African Commission referred to the rationale for the entrenchment of the provision. As 
the Commission put it: 
The  origin  of  this  provision  may  be  traced  to  colonialism,  during  which  the 
human and material resources of Africa were largely exploited for the benefit of 
outside powers, creating tragedy for Africans themselves, depriving them of their 
birthright  and  alienating  them  from  the  land.  The  aftermath  of  colonial 
exploitation has left Africa’s precious resources and people still vulnerable to 
foreign misappropriation. The drafters of the Charter obviously wanted to remind 
African governments of the continent’s painful legacy and restore co-operative 
development to its traditional place at the heart of African society.’
49  
      However, the inclusion of Article 21(1) and similar provisions in the Charter has 
proven to be more of political posturing than genuine commitment to development as 
African  states,  have,  in  response  to  the  imperatives  of  globalization,  adopted  policy 
measures and engagements diametrically at variance with such provisions. In this regard, 
they are ever willing to subjugate the human rights of their people in order to allow 
transnational  corporations  exploit  the  natural  resources  in  their  territories.  This  is  a 
manifestation of the negative impact  of the globalization process  on human rights  in 
Africa.  The  dynamics  of  rights  marginalization  by  African  states  in  response  to  the 
processes  of  globalization  were  brought  to  centre-stage  in  the  Social  and  Economic 
Rights Case 
50 which presented enormous challenges as it pertained to the exercise of 
                                                 
47 Article 21(5). 
48 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR2001) (15
th Annual Activity 
Report) hereafter ‘Ogoni Case’’.  
49 Ibid, paragraph 56. 
50 Note 48. The  various  ramifications  of  this  case  are  examined  in  J.C.  Nwobike,  2005,  ‘The  African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Demystification of Second and Third Generation 
Rights  under  the  African  Charter:  Social  and  Economic  Rights  Action  Center  and  the  Center  for 
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world, with special reference to Nigeria’, 8 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp.79-107; J. Oloka-
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various rights under the African Charter. It is therefore necessary to set out the facts of 
this Communication in some detail here. 
     The  Communication alleged that the military government of Nigeria was directly 
involved  in  oil  production  through  the  State  oil  company,  the  Nigerian  National 
Petroleum  Company  (NNPC),  the  majority  shareholder  in  a  consortium  with  Shell 
Petroleum  Development  Corporation  (SPDC),  and  that  these  operations  caused 
environmental degradation and health problems resulting from the contamination of the 
environment among the Ogoni People. 
      It was further alleged that the oil consortium exploited oil reserves in Ogoniland with 
no regard for the health or environment of the local communities, disposing toxic wastes 
into  the  environment  and  local  waterways  in  violation  of  applicable  international 
environmental standards. The consortium also neglected and/or failed to  maintain its 
facilities causing numerous avoidable spills in the proximity of villages resulting in the 
contamination of water, soil and air and attendant diseases and other health problems for 
the Ogoni people. It alleged that the Nigerian Government condoned and facilitated these 
violations by placing the legal and military powers of the State at the disposal of the oil 
companies.  
     It further alleged that the Government withheld from Ogoni Communities information 
on the dangers created by oil activities and did not involve them in decisions affecting the 
development of their area. The Government did not require oil companies or its own 
agencies to produce basic health and environmental impact studies regarding hazardous 
operations  and  materials  relating  to  oil  production,  despite  the  obvious  health  and 
environmental crisis in Ogoniland. The Government even refused to permit scientists and 
environmental organizations from entering Ogoniland to undertake such studies. The 
Government also ignored the concerns of Ogoni Communities regarding oil development, 
and responded to protests with massive violence and executions of Ogoni leaders. The 
Communication alleged that the Nigerian government does not require oil companies to 
consult  communities  before  beginning  operations,  even  if  the  operations  pose  direct 
threats to community or individual lands.  
     The Communication further stated that the Nigerian Government participated in this 
irresponsible oil development that has devastated much of the soil and water upon which   132 
Ogoni farming and fishing depended and that the destruction of farmlands, rivers, crops 
and animals has created malnutrition and starvation among certain Ogoni Communities. 
The Communication thus alleged violations of several Articles of the  African Charter; 
namely, Articles 2 (non-discrimination), 4 (right to life), 14 (right to property), 16 (right 
to health), 18 (right to family life), 21 (right to disposal of wealth and natural resources), 
and 24 (right to satisfactory environment favourable to development). 
      It is noteworthy that the Nigerian Government in response to these grave allegations 
submitted a Note Verbale admitting the gravamen of the complaints mentioned and only 
outlined the remedial measures being taken by the new civilian administration.
51  
In considering the admissibility of this complaint under the Charter, the Commission 
rightly took notice of the fact that the Nigerian military government had enacted various 
decrees ousting the jurisdiction of the courts for acts of g overnment that violate the 
fundamental  human  rights  of  Nigerians.
52  It  was  of  the  view  that  under  such 
circumstances  no  adequate  domestic  remedies  were  available  to  be  exhausted,  and  it 
therefore  declared  the  Communication  admissible.
53 On the merits of the  case, the 
Commission had no difficulty in holding that the Nigerian Government did not live up to 
the minimum expectations of the African Charter, and had violated the aforementioned 
articles of the Charter. In particular, in holding that Nigeria  had violated its obligations 
under Article 21 of the Charter, the African Commission declared: 
 In the present case, despite its obligation to protect persons against interferences 
in  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights,  the  Government  of  Nigeria  facilitated  the 
destruction of the Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter obligations and despite such 
internationally  established  principles,  the  Nigerian  Government  has  given  the 
green light to private actors, and the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly 
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53 The Commission had taken a similar position in  Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani 
Lekwot and six others) vs. Nigeria, Communication 87/93, Eighth Activity Report 1994-1995, Annex VI; 
and Civil Liberties Organisation vs. Nigeria, Communication 129/94, Ninth Activity Report 1995-1996, 
Annex VIII. It may be mentioned that a crucial condition for admissibility of complaints under Article 
56(5) of the Charter is that the complainants must have exhausted local remedies, where available, unless 
it is obvious that such procedure is unduly prolonged.   133 
affect the well-being of the Ogonis. By any measure of standards, its practice 
falls short of the minimum conduct expected of governments, and therefore, is in 
violation of Article 21 of the African Charter’.
54 
It must be stressed that this is not an isolated instance where an African state has ignored 
the human rights of her citizens to conform with the pressures of economic globalization. 
As already noted, the Kenyan Government’s action in relation to the Endorois people is 
equally  demonstrative of this  approach,  while the  Chad/Cameroon pipeline project  is 
another  example  where  the  human  rights  of  Africans  was  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of 
economic globalization. It may be mentioned that the execution of the pipeline project 
partly  funded  by  the  World  Bank  entailed  massive  human  rights  abuses  involving 
Chadian and Cameroonian nationals near the pipeline project.
55 Thus in general, while 
such projects may, arguably, have been designed to promote the social and economic 
development of the affected states, their execution was done without consideration for the 
human rights of the affected peoples and communities.   
     Moreover, notwithstanding the existence of these provisions under the African Charter, 
but in conformity with the requirements of neo-liberal globalization, African states have 
concluded several bilateral investment treaties
56with developed Western states containing 
stipulations that severely curtail their power to regulate economic activities in their 
territories and exercise sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Although the 
concept of economic sovereignty is necessarily relative, since no state is completely 
sovereign in the present interdependent world, international law recognizes the exercise 
of sovereign rights as one of the fundamental incidents of  statehood.
57 In other words, 
sovereignty is compromised in an atmosphere of domination, dependence and inequality, 
or where a state is not master of its resources.
58  
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57 I.A. Shearer, ed., 1995, Starke’s International Law, 11
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Applying these principles to the recent embrace of bilateral investment treaties in  their 
present forms by African states, it becomes obvious that their approach is a manifestation 
of performative contradiction. On the one hand, they had advocated, and succeeded in 
securing the adoption of international norms that authorize states to exercise s overeign 
rights over economic activities in their territories and even included this right in the 
African Charter, yet, on the other hand, they have ‘willingly’ signed bilateral investment 
treaties that seriously undermine the exercise of such powers.
59  
     In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  a  bilateral  investment  treaty  is  an  international 
agreement between a developed and a developing state with the objective of promoting 
and protecting the investments of nationals of the contracting parties in their respec tive 
states. In important respects,  bilateral investment treaties  can be said to be a form of 
constitutionalization  of  economic  globalization,  since  they  institutionalize  legal 
incapacity of states to act i n a variety of economic matters.
60 This is  because  they 
represent,  in  the  words  of  David  Schneiderman,  ‘a  form  of  constitutional  pre-
commitment  binding  across  generations  that  unreasonably  constrains  the  capacity  [of 
states] for self-government’.
61 Although the signing of these treaties is traceable to what 
has been described as the ‘race to the bottom’, where developing states are eager to enter 
into such agreements in order to attract foreign investment which might otherwise be 
channelled to other developing states, African states ought to have rejected treaties that 
fundamentally negate their sovereign rights and human rights commitments under the 
African Charter. This is more so since there is no credible and irrefutable evidence of a 
correlation  between  investment  treaties  and  foreign  investment  flows;  a  neo-liberal 
dogma that African states have been beguiled to accept. As Sornarajah points out, ‘the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sovereignty  over  Natural  Resources  and  Economic  Activities’,  M.  Bedjaoui,  ed.  International  Law: 
Achievements and Prospects, Paris and Dordrecht: UNESCO/ Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp.597-617 at 
601-604.  
59 As  Andrew  Guzman  points  out,  ‘these  bilateral  treaties  undermine  precisely  the  independence  and 
control that the countries have fought so hard to protect’. A.T. Guzman, 1998, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties 
that  Hurt  Them:  Explaining  the  Popularity  of  Bilateral  Investment  Treaties’,  38  Virginia  Journal  of 
International  Law,  pp.639-688  at  666;  D.  Schneiderman,  2008,  Constitutionalizing  Economic 
Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.27-28. 
60 D. Schneiderman, 2008, note 59, p.37. 
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loss  of  regulatory  control  that  the  treaties  entail  is  not  justified  by  the  unprovable 
hypothesis that such treaties lead to foreign investment flows’.
62 
     Furthermore, adherence to the bilateral investment treaties has led to the ‘resurrection’ 
of  the  ‘Hull  Rule’  on  the  treatment  of  foreign  property  in  cases  of  expropriation  or 
nationalization, a rule that also impinges on the exercise of state sovereignty, especially 
in its internal dimension.
63 It may be mentioned that Cordell Hull, the then American 
Secretary of State had, in articulating the American response to the Mexican agrarian 
expropriations of the early twentieth century stated: 
The Government of the United States merely adverts to a self-evident fact when 
it notes that the applicable precedents and recognized authorities on international 
law  support  its  declaration  that  under  every  rule  of  law  and  equity,  no 
government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, 
without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor’.
64  
This  rule  which  received  trenchant  opposition  from  developing  countries  was 
subsequently abandoned in favour of the ‘appropriate compensation’ standard embodied 
in  subsequent  United  Nations  Resolutions.
65 Ironically, through the process of legal 
globalization, most bilateral investment treaties contain clauses embodying this Hull rule. 
An  example is the treaty between the United States and the Re public of Congo.
66 It 
provides in Article 3(1) as follows: 
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66 It is entitled Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Congo Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed at 
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Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly 
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization (‘expropriation’) 
except for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of 
prompt,  adequate  and  effective  compensation;  and  in  accordance  with  due 
process of law and the general principles of treatment provided for in Article 
11(2).  Compensation  shall  be  equivalent  to  the  fair  market  value  of  the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken 
or  became  known;  be  paid  without  delay;  include  interest  at  a  commercially 
reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely 
transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation. 
     In significant ways, this provision seriously hinders the exercise of sovereignty, in 
particular,  the  right  to  nationalize  or  expropriate  foreign  investment  because  of  the 
inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, in complying with the specified conditions for 
nationalization or expropriation.
67 Very often, a consideration of the magnitude of these 
conditions prevents  African states from taking progressive actions and measures   that 
could promote the indigenization of their national wealth and resources. Moreover, 
although cast in the façade of mutual commitment, the obligations in the above treaty , 
like others, are, in practice, evidently one-sided in favour of American investments in the 
Republic of Congo, the latter having no tangible investors in the United States to benefit 
from such provisions.  
     In order to further situate the extent of contradiction between the adoption of bilateral 
investment treaties in their present forms by African states and their obligations under the 
African Charter in response to the processes of globalization, it is expedient to set out  the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which African 
states strove so hard to ensure its adoption by the international community and which was 
the inspiration for the provisions on this matter in the African Charter. Article 2(1) of the 
Charter provides as follows: ‘Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent 
                                                                                                                                                 
treaty between the United Kingdom and Mozambique 2007 Treaty Series No 15 also contains the Hull 
formula in Article 5.    
67 States desiring to embark on nationalization measures to meet their economic imperatives may not 
immediately have resources to pay for the  equivalent market value of the investment, effect immediate 
payment, or have the requisite foreign exchange to make the payment fully realizable and freely 
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sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources 
and economic activities.’ Article 2(2) goes on to declare that: 
‘Each State has the right: 
a)  To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction 
in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives 
and  priorities.  No  State  shall  be  compelled  to  grant  preferential  treatment  to  foreign 
investors; … 
c)  To  nationalize,  expropriate  or  transfer  ownership  of  foreign  property  in  which  case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking 
into  account  its  relevant  laws  and  regulations  and  all  circumstances  that  the  State 
considers  pertinent.  In  any  case  where  the  question  of  compensation  gives  rise  to  a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its 
tribunals,  unless  it  is  freely  and  mutually  agreed  by  all  States  concerned  that  other 
peaceful  means  be  sought  on  the  basis  of  the  sovereign  equality  of  States  and  in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means’. 
     In light of these provisions, the volte-face of African states in ‘agreeing’ to bilateral 
investment treaties that incapacitate their exercise of sovereign rights is thus theoretically 
inexplicable.  The  plausible  practical  explanation  is  that  in  trying  to  comply  with  the 
requirements of economic globalization, for example, liberalization of the economy, they 
have privileged the promotion and protection of foreign investment over and above their 
human  rights  obligations  under  the  African  Charter.  This  privileging  of  foreign 
investment over human rights is even reinforced by the existence of international legal 
rules that extol and sanctify contractual rights over the exercise of sovereign rights. The 
tensions  that  arise  from  this  state  of  affairs  were  brought  to  the  fore  in  the  Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company vs. The Government of 
the Libyan Arab Republic.
68 The dispute arose out of 14 Deeds of Concession concluded 
between the Libyan authorities and the oil companies on the exploitation of petroleum 
resources in Libya. Significantly, Clause 16 of the Agreement provided as follows:  
The  Government  of  Libya  will  take  all  steps  necessary  to  ensure  that  the 
Company  enjoys  all the  rights  conferred  by  this  Concession.  The  contractual 
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rights expressly created by this concession shall not be altered except by the 
mutual consent of the parties. 
However, the Libyan Government by Law No.66 of 1973 (Decree of Nationalization) 
nationalized 51% of all property, rights and assets of these companies relating to the 
Deeds  of  Concession  held  by  them,  and  under  Law  No.11  of  1974  (Decree  of 
Nationalization)  nationalized  all  the  properties  and  interests,  rights  and  assets  of  the 
companies. Article 2 of both Decrees provided for the payment of compensation by the 
State  the  amount  of  which  was  to  be  determined  by  a  Committee  appointed  by  the 
Minister of Petroleum. The companies were dissatisfied and declared a dispute with the 
government and nominated their Arbitrator. The Libyan Government rejected the request 
for arbitration and so did not appoint an Arbitrator. Based on a request by the Plaintiffs in 
accordance with the Concession Agreement, the President of the International Court of 
Justice  appointed  a  Sole  Arbitrator,  Professor  Rene-Jean  Dupuy.  In  its  Memorandum 
objecting  to  the  arbitration,  Libya  contended  that  the  disputes  were  not  subject  to 
arbitration because the nationalizations were acts of sovereignty and placed reliance on 
relevant United Nations resolutions.  
     After  reviewing  the  legal  effect  in  international  law  of  the  General  Assembly 
resolutions  concerning  permanent  sovereignty  over  natural  wealth  and  resources,  the 
Arbitrator concluded that the resolutions could not be used by the state to violate its 
contractual  obligations  in  commercial  transactions.  Relying  on  the  decision  in  the 
Aramco Case
69 that ‘nothing can prevent a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, from 
binding itself irrevocably by the provisions of a concession and from granting to the 
concessionaire irretrievable rights’, the Arbitrator concluded:  
The result is that a State cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments 
freely  undertaken  through  the  exercise  of  the  same  sovereignty  and  cannot, 
through measures belonging to its internal order, make null and void the rights of 
the  contracting  party  which  has  performed  its  various  obligations  under  the 
contract. 
70 
     Even more explicitly, he stated that ‘the recognition by international law of the right to 
nationalize is not sufficient ground to empower a State to disregard its commitments, 
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because the same law also recognizes the power of a State to commit itself internationally, 
especially by accepting the inclusion of stabilization clauses in a contract entered into 
with a foreign private party’.
71  
     Equally  worrisome  is  the  fact  that  the  conditions  for  expropriations  and 
nationalizations stipulated in BITs are usually far more onerous than the constitutional 
provisions or national laws of states on this subject, thus ensuring the grant of preferential 
treatment  to  foreign  investors  than  nationals  of  the  affected  states  in  cases  of 
expropriation or nationalization. Such nationals therefore have less protection from state 
interference with their investments than investors from countries with BIT Agreements 
with  their  countries.
72 For instance,  in  the case  of  South  Africa,  the constitutional 
provision on the payment of compensation in the event of a ‘taking’ as  contained in 
Article 25 of the 1996 Constitution is that it must be just and equitable, and reflect a 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, whereas in the BIT 
between Italy and South Africa which came into force on 16 March 1999, the required 
standard  is  that  of  ‘immediate,  full  and  effective  compensation’.  Moreover,  such 
compensation must be based on the ‘genuine value of the investment… payable from the 
date  of  expropriation  at  a  normal  commercial  rate  of  interest,  without  delay  and 
effectively  realizable  and  freely  transferable’.
73 This  ensures  that  Italian  investors  in 
South Africa are accorded treatment over the national treatment standard, a provision that 
recently gave rise to the case of Piero Foresti and 10 others v Republic of South Africa.
74  
The  limitations  on  the  exercise  of  sovereign  rights  through  conditions  attached  to 
expropriations  has  been  fortified  by  the  increasingly  expansive  interpretations  of 
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expropriation  over  the  years  –  interpretations  that  have  borrowed  heavily  from  the 
American constitutional experience relating to the taking of private property for public 
purposes.
75 The result is that today any action of the host state government that leads to 
interference with the right to property  – with property defined as a bundle of rights in 
classical jurisprudence - can be said to amount to expropriation. Indeed, as Sornarajah 
has  pithily  remarked,  under  such  circumstances,  ‘a  state’s  regulatory  powers  are  so 
marginalized that measures taken to protect the environment or those taken in response to 
financial crises are construed to be compensable expropriation making the protection of 
foreign investment trump even vital interests of the state’.
76  
     Finally, the right to disposal of natural wealth and resources has been used by the 
African ruling elite as a license to appropriate these resources in the name of the State, for 
their own benefit to the detriment of the people. It is indeed ironical that the resource 
endowment of most African countries has been turned into a ‘resource curse’ because of 
the  capture  of  state  apparatus  and  resources  by  the  ruling  elite.
77 Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Nigeria are classic examples where the natural resources of the countries 
have been deployed to serve the interests of the ruling cliques rather than being used for 
the development of the countries.  
     The problem created by the corrupt tendencies of the ruling group is exacerbated by 
the willingness  of  the international  community  to  accord  recognition  to  any  group 
controlling governmental powers in a country as the legitimate authority in dealing with 
the resources of the country regardless of how it came to power. This situation which has 
been described as the ‘resource privilege’ confers on the ruling group the powers and 
privileges  of  disposing  of  their  country’s  resources  without  question.
78 Again,  the 
examples are legion in Africa; Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now 
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DRC), Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, Nguema Mbasoga of Equatorial Guinea etc. 
Such developments call for a people-centred construction of the right to disposal of the 
natural wealth and resources to ensure that the natural resources are actually used by the 
people rather than being appropriated by the kleptocratic political leaders acting on behalf 
of  the  State.  This  gives  importance  to  the  recent  approach  adopted  by  the  African 
Commission in the Endorois Case
79 when it interpreted the right to the disposal of natural 
resources as one equally vested in the people who can exercise such rights. The decision 
must be seen as a progressive development in the efforts to ensure that African leaders do 
not  continue  to  dispose  of  the  state’s  natural  resources  in  ways  that  marginalize  the 
human rights of people where those resources are located.  It also gives impetus to the 
quest for deploying human rights norms to constrain the deleterious effects of economic 
globalization. 
 
3.3.3  Right to development 
One other area where the mutual impact between human rights and the globalization 
process is evident within the context of the African Charter is in relation to the right to 
development. Initially formulated by the Senegalese jurist, Keba M’baye in 1972
80, the 
right to development is now accepted by the international community as an important 
strategy in the efforts to promote the social and economic development of states. The 
recognition of this right did not come without objections and challenges concerning its 
normative status, including questions such as who has the right, and who owes the duty to 
the  enforcement  of  the  right?  Indeed,  one  of  the  foremost  critics  of  the  right  to 
development,  Jack  Donnelly,  had  described  it  as  ‘conceptually  and  practically 
misguided…  a  legally  and  morally  confused  notion  that  is  likely  to  be  positively 
detrimental to the realization of human rights’.
81 He also contended in the same context 
that, ‘the political consequences of recognizing such a right are highly undesirable from a 
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human  rights  perspective’.
82 Notwithstanding  such  objections,  the  international 
community  with  a  near -unanimous  voice  adopted  the  Declaration  on  the  Right  to 
Development
83in 1986 and expressly declared the right to development as a human right. 
The Declaration states in its preamble that ‘development is a comprehensive economic, 
social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
there from.’   
     It is also declared in Article 2(1) of the Declaration that the right to development is an 
inalienable  human  right  by  virtue  of  which  every  human  person  and  all  peoples  are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political 
development, in which all human rights  and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
It further declares that the human person is the central subject of development and should 
be  the  active  participant  and  beneficiary  of  the  right  to  development.
84 By  giving 
prominence to the ‘active, free and meaningful participation’ in the development process, 
the Declaration on the Right to Development deploys the rights-based approach which is 
now regarded as the central feature of the development process. 
     On the beneficiaries of the right, the Declaration refers to ‘every human person and all 
peoples’ as right holders. However, at the international level, individuals cannot assert the 
right alone and require the instrumentality of the state which becomes the conditional 
duty bearer and agent of the entire population and individuals in the state. 
     Although the Declaration on the Right to Development is not a treaty and so lacks the 
legal effects attributable to treaties, it has been recognized and referred to by subsequent 
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General Assembly resolutions and can be said to have political and legal ramifications.
85 
Indeed,  the  fundamental  importance  of  the  right  to  development  in  human  rights 
jurisprudence has been underscored by Mohammed Bedjaoui. According to him: 
86 
The  right  to  development  is  a  fundamental  right,  the  precondition  of  liberty, 
progress, justice and creativity. It is the alpha and omega of human rights, the 
first and last human right, the beginning and the end, the means and the goal of 
human rights, in short it is the core right from which all the others stem. 
The international community reiterated the significance of the right to development in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993. The Vienna Declaration concludes 
that,  ‘the  right  to  development,  as  established  in  the  Declaration  on  the  Right  to 
Development, is a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental 
human rights’.
87In significant respects, this is a reinforcement of Amartya Sen’s analysis 
of the instrumental and constitutive dimensions of human rights as important components 
of the development process.
88 
     A preliminary point which has relevance to the impact of the right to development on 
the  globalization  process  is  that  startin g  from  its  adoption  in  1986,  the  right  to 
development has remained a highly politicized one – a baggage that trails it to the present 
day. Its articulation and adoption was part of the anti-colonial sentiment of the 1970s 
derived  from  the  concern  by  newly  independent  states  to  promote  the  economic 
development of their states. They considered the international economic system to be 
inequitable and called for a new international economic order. This culminated in the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974. However, absent the 
support of developed Western states, implementation of the new economic order has not 
advanced beyond hortative declarations.
89 The developing states therefore used the right 
to development as another avenue for placing their developmental challenges squarely 
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before the international community. Through this approach, the right to development 
became a legal mechanism to promote the political and economic goals of developing 
states, while it also generated entrenched opposition from developed Western states. This 
political connotation surrounding the right to development has subsequently continued to 
dominate issues concerning its international  recognition  and enforcement.  As Daniel 
Aguirre points out: 
‘The politicization of the right to development was entrenched when the United 
States  cast  the  lone  dissenting  vote  against  the  Declaration  on  the  Right  to 
Development,  thereby  affirming  its  stance  against  the  political  goals  of  the 
developing  states.  Significantly,  this  influential  resistance  has  prevented  the 
advancement of the right to development both in terms of implementation and a 
source of binding legal obligations’.
 90 
     It  is  from  this  perspective  that  one  must  understand  the  ever-present  rhetoric 
concerning the right to development at the international arena as developed states often 
make  promises  and  commitments  concerning  it  which  are  easily  ignored  when  vital 
economic  interests  are  at  stake.  This  also  explains  the  limited  impact  the  right  to 
development has had on the globalization process as positive measures for its realization 
have  not  matched  the  pronouncements  of  support  for  it.    Western  opposition  to  the 
Declaration is predicated on two key points; namely, the alleged imprecise nature of the 
Declaration,  which  makes  it  vague  and  inconsistent,  and  the  view  that  the  right  to 
development is a national priority for which there should be no legal  obligations for 
members of the international community.
91 This position however ignores the fact that a 
corollary of the interdependence of states is the obligation for states to stand together and 
support those in difficulties to guarantee genuine world prosperity for the benefit of all – 
a recognition now reflected in the Millennium Development Goals.
92 
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Interestingly, developed Western states are now more willing to commit to the right to 
development because development is increasingly being seen within the prism of the neo-
liberal project and the previous radical and revolutionary tone of advocacy for the right to 
development has been considerably mellowed down. Most of the developing countries 
are  now  willing  to  accept  a  right  to  development  tied  to  the  neo -liberal  economic 
paradigm in their quest to attract foreign investment.
93 In this process, the human rights 
corpus has been given a secondary position in the scheme of things. 
     Nevertheless,  the  right  to  development  has  had  significant  impact  on  other 
developments in the international system. The increased international acceptance of the 
right  to  development  and  its  contemporary  impact  on  the  globalization  process  is 
evidenced by the fact that it is expressly referred to in the Millennium Development 
Goals. Thus in Article 11 of the Goals, the Heads of State and Governments declared that:  
We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from abject 
poverty and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a 
billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to making the right to 
development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from 
want’. 
     Moreover, in Article 24 the international community declared that it would ‘spare no 
effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all 
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to 
development’. However, with barely four years to the target of eradication of extreme 
poverty by the year 2015, the indicators do not point in a positive direction in terms of 
actualization  of  those  goals  especially  in  Africa.
94As  indicated  in  the  Millennium 
Development  Goals  Report  2010,  this  is  principally  because,  ‘unmet  commitments, 
inadequate  resources,  lack  of  focus  and  accountability,  and  insufficient  dedication  to 
sustainable  development  have  created  shortfalls  in  many  areas’.
95The  more  likely 
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scenario is that just before 2015, the goal post would be shifted further after a ritualized 
reiteration of the factors that prevented realization of the targets. 
     Although it is now impossible to deny the existence of the right to development, the 
crucial  challenge  remains  how  well  it  can  be  implemented  by  the  inte rnational 
community to make positive impact on the globalization process considering the absence 
of a binding legal instrument on it at the global level.  The importance  of a binding 
instrument leads to an examination of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
which is so far the only binding international mechanism that specifically includes the 
right to development. Thus Article 22 of the Charter provides as follows:  
1.  All  peoples  shall  have  the  right  to  their  economic,  social  and  cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of 
the right to development. 
     The  relevance  of  these  provisions  to  the  development  discourse  in  Africa  was 
demonstrated  in  the  first  inter-State  Communication  brought  before  the  African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda
96 the complaint of DRC was that the armed forces of the 
Respondent States had committed grave and massive violations of human and peoples’ 
rights in the Congolese provinces where there had been rebel activities since August 1998. 
DRC further stated in the Communication that the Ugandan and Rwandan governments 
had acknowledged the presence of their respective armed forces in the eastern provinces 
of DRC under the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The Communication chronicled 
instances of such grave violations that ranged from assassination of Congolese nationals, 
killing  of  innocent  civilians,  including  women  and  children,  rapes  and  even  the 
exploitation and looting of the natural resources of DRC .
97 The Commission came to the 
conclusion that the Respondent States had violated several Articles of the African Charter. 
                                                                                                                                                 
United Nations, 2010, World Economic and Social Survey 2010: Retooling Global Development, New 
York:  United  Nations,  p.183  which  calls  for  a  retooling  of  the  existing  aid,  trade  and  financial 
architectures  with  the  aim  of  overcoming  the  present  shortcomings.  E/2010/50/Rev.1;ST/ESA/330. 
Interestingly,  a  High  Level  Summit  of  World  Leaders  on  the  MDGs  held  in  September  2010  also 
highlighted these challenges. 
96 Note 25. 
97 Ibid, paragraphs 2-6.   147 
In particular, it found that the illegal exploitation and looting of the natural resources of 
the Complainant State was in contravention of Article 21 of the Charter. According to the 
Commission: 
The deprivation of the right of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in this case, to 
freely  dispose  of  their  wealth  and  natural  resources,  has  occasioned  another 
violation – their right to their economic, social and cultural development and of 
the general duty of States to individually or collectively ensure the exercise of the 
right to development, guaranteed under Article 22 of the African Charter.
98 
     Equally worthy of mention is the fact that the adoption of the African Charter in 1981 
when the Declaration on the Right to Development was still under consideration by the 
United  Nations  played  a  crucial  role  in  influencing  the  international  discourse  on 
development and encouraged the eventual adoption of the Declaration. The provisions of 
the  African  Charter  on  the  right  to  development  has  also  impacted  on  a  number  of 
initiatives adopted by the United Nations, development agencies and the policies and 
programmes  of  international  economic  institutions.  As  indicated  in  the  last  chapter, 
African  States  also  relied  on  these  provisions  in  the  Charter  to  formulate  some 
development  programmes  and  initiatives  such  as  the  New  Partnership  for  Africa’s 
Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism. These initiatives represent the 
commitment of African States to fast-track the development of the continent, even within 
the  parameters  of  the  neo-liberal  paradigm  in  order  to  address  the  gross 
underdevelopment  of  the  continent.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  impacts  of  the 
African Charter on the processes of economic globalization have been greatly impeded 
by the present international economic system, and the situation is likely to remain so for a 
long time unless there is a significant restructuring of the international economic order. 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the connection between the adoption of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the globalization process with specific focus on some 
human rights norms embodied in the Charter that have influenced, and been influenced 
by the dynamics  of that relationship.  It  has  been shown that, in  general,  the Charter 
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represents the desire by African states to deploy the human rights framework in the task 
of promoting economic development of the continent within the context of globalization. 
In this connection, the human rights corpus has been used as an instrument in their fight 
for international recognition of the continent’s developmental challenges and for a fairer 
international economic system. This has been done under the auspices of the right to 
political and economic self-determination of peoples. However, a number of problematic 
issues relating to the exercise of these rights were identified. These relate principally to 
the indeterminacy of the term ‘people’ as used in the relevant instruments and the various 
interpretations thereof. The inherent contradiction and conflict in the exercise of the right 
to disposal of natural wealth and resources between the state and the component units of 
the state under the umbrella of ethnic groups, minorities or even indigenous peoples were 
also highlighted.  
     The manifest contradiction between the advocacy for the exercise of sovereign rights 
and the practical response by African states to the imperatives of globalization which 
constrained them to take certain actions and adopt policy measures at variance with the 
rights  contained  in  the  African  Charter  was  also  explored.  This  was  shown  to  be 
indicative of the privileging of some components of the globalization process, such as 
foreign  investment  over  human  rights  by  African  states.  Nevertheless,  the  African 
Commission’s  elaboration  of  the  dynamics  involved  in  the  exercise  of  human  and 
peoples’ rights in the Social and Economic Rights Case
99 and its pronouncement in late 
2009 on the concept of ‘people’ under the Charter in the Endorois Case
100 represents a 
positive development capable of generating great impact on the exercise of the rights 
entrenched in the African Charter and their intersection with the globalization process.  
While  there  are  noticeable  deficiencies  in  the  enforcement  of  decisions  and 
recommendations  of  the  African  Commission,
101  the  fundamental  impact  of  such 
landmark decisions by the Commission must be acknowledged as representing modest 
harvests evidencing the impact of human rights norms on the globalization process. On 
this score, it is necessary to mention that the impacts of such decisions and developments 
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101  For  instance,  the  Nigerian  government  is  yet  to  fully  implement  the  recommendations  of  the  
Commission in the  Social  and  Economic  Rights  Case  relating  to  the  environmental  clean  -  up  of 
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cannot always be measured with precision as they often constitute vital components 
within a multi-causal framework. Nevertheless, they remain important testaments to the 
transformative potentials and catalyzing role of the human rights corpus.  
How this transformative role of the human rights corpus plays out in its interaction with 
international  economic  institutions  will  be  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter.   150 
 
 
4  Chapter 4: Human Rights Norms and International 
Economic Institutions 
 
4.1  Introduction  
The  central  focus  of  this  chapter  is  to  examine  how  human  rights  norms  came  to 
permeate the operations of international economic institutions and the impact this has had 
on the globalization process in Africa.
1 This inquiry is informed by the understanding that 
international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) not only play a crucial role in the present international economic system but 
constitute the engine room of globalization.
2  It follows that the impacts of human rights 
on their policies and programmes have a direct bearing on the globalization process. 
While  their  pre-eminent  role  in  economic  matters  is  generally  acknowledged,  the 
correlation between their operations and the quest for the protection of human rights is 
not  so  obvious.  This  explains  the  initial  reluctance  and  difficulty  encountered  in 
integrating  human  rights  norms  into  the  operations  of  these  institutions  since  it  was 
assumed that as economic institutions, human rights issues were outside the purview of 
their mandates. 
     However, given that their policies and programmes usually have a fundamental impact 
on the social and economic conditions of people in the affected states and the enjoyment 
of human rights, the institutions were compelled to realign the interpretation of  their 
mandates with these concerns. Moreover, as institutions involved in the promotion of 
economic development it became apparent that they had to take account of human rights 
                                                 
1 A substantial part of the research in this chapter has recently been published in N. S. Okogbule, 2011, 
‘Modest harvests: appraising the impact of human rights norms on international economic institutions in 
relation to Africa’, 15(5) International Journal of Human Rights, pp.728-748. 
2 A. Anghie, 2000, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the 
Third World’, New York University Journal of International Law and Policy, pp.243-290 at 247.  
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since  the  latter  are  constitutive  elements  of  the  development  process.
3  With  this 
realization,  the  crucial  challenge  has  been  how  to  formulate  and  legitimize  the 
consideration  of  human  rights  issues  by  these  institutions  since  their  institutional 
mandates do not expressly mention human rights. Flowing from this is the problematic 
issue of determining which conception of human rights has been, or should have been , 
adopted by these institutions since the human rights corpus is susceptible to being 
appropriated to serve  hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes. This is particularly 
acute when it is institutionalized. It is against this background that the inquiry pursued 
here assumes merited significance as the study examines the extent to which the policies 
and  operations  of  these  institutions  have  been  reshaped  and  constrained  by  the 
imperatives of human rights.  
    Specifically,  it  will  be  shown  that  initially  these  institutions  adopted  restrictive 
interpretations  of  their  mandates  which  prevented  them  from  taking  or  s upporting 
progressive  measures  to  promote  human  rights.  The  institutions  ensured  that  this 
understanding of their mandates prevailed for several decades. Indeed, it is argued, these 
institutions are typically founded on the ‘hegemony’ of the ideology of economic neo-
liberalism. This analysis relates to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ which he 
defined as the ‘spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group’.
4 According 
to  Gramsci,  ‘this  consent  is  ‘‘historically’’  caused  by  the  prestige  (and  consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the 
world of production’.
5 However, two parallel but complementary developments led to a 
dramatic change in this approach. First, there was a realization of the inadequacy of the 
restrictive interpretation of ‘development’ in some ways, the goal of these institutions, 
                                                 
3 Paragraph 2 of Preamble to the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development adopted as 
General  Assembly  Resolution  41/128  of  4  December  1986  expressly  recognizes  development  as  a 
comprehensive process embracing several social and economic values. 
4 A. Gramsci, 1971,  Selections  from  the  Prison  Notebooks,  Q.  Hoare  and  G.N.  Smith,  eds.  London: 
Lawrence &Wishart, p.12. Professor John Agnew has also defined hegemony as ‘the enrolment of others 
in the exercise of your power by convincing, cajoling, and coercing them that they should want what you 
want’, and that  ‘it represents the binding together of people, objects, and institutions  around cultural 
norms and standards that emanate over time and space from seats of power (that have discrete locations) 
occupied  by  authoritative  actors’.  J.A.  Agnew,  2005,  Hegemony:  The  New  Shape  of  Global  Power, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp.1-2. 
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and the need for a more holistic conception which includes human rights. Second, the 
growing agitation against the debilitating effects of the policies and prescriptions of these 
institutions on the social and economic conditions of Third World countries,  including 
Africa, championed by human rights NGOs and other social movements, made a change 
of approach inevitable, which compelled the institutions to broaden the interpretation of 
their mandates.  
The  second  development  enumerated  above  is  a  clear  demonstration  of  the 
transformative and emancipatory capacity of human rights, in contrast with a self-induced 
adoption of liberal interpretative approach by the institutions, as is often portrayed in the 
conventional narration of these changes.  To provide a foundation for this contention,  I 
will examine first, how the IMF, World Bank and the WTO began to deploy human rights 
norms in their policies and programmes, followed by an appraisal of the nature of human 
rights adopted by the institutions. It will be demonstrated that these changes buttress in 
significant ways, Gramsci’s ideas of ‘passive revolution’ and the emergence of counter-
hegemonic practices that challenge any existing order.
6 However, it will be contended 
that, though evident, the impact of  the utilization of the language of  human rights  by 
these institutions has not been significantly remarkable largely because the institutions 
have merely adopted the hegemonic version of human rights, with its emphasis on formal 
and constitutional provisions and structures, rather than substantive protection of these 
rights, which is the hallmark of the counter-hegemonic conception. I conclude the chapter 
by positing that only the adoption of a counter-hegemonic version of human rights will be 
able to catalyze the required paradigm shift in the direction of a desirable  globalization 
process. 
 
4.2  Theoretical Foundations 
As the name indicates, international economic institutions are supranational organizations 
whose functions revolve around the economic development of states. Although there are 
several such organizations, the attention of this chapter is limited to the IMF, World Bank 
and WTO because of the significant impact of their activities on the policies of African 
                                                 
6 A. Gramsci, 1971, note 4, p.46.   153 
states and the protection of human rights in the continent. While the mandate of each of 
these institutions as defined by its charter is unique, one common thread is the non-
specific mention of human rights in their Articles of Agreement. This has made the 
engagement of international economic institutions with issues of human rights a subject 
of considerable discussion in recent years.
7 In turn, such concerns are driven by the 
increasing realization of the mutually reinforcing relationship between human rights and 
the economic policies and processes associated with globalization such as liberalization, 
privatization, and deregulation promoted by these institutions.  Considerable interest has 
been generated in ascertaining whether or not these policies actually lead to the reduction 
of poverty and inequality in the world and their implications for human rights. Indee d, it 
has been asserted that the present global institutional order is associated with massive 
incidence of avoidable poverty and the imposition of the largest form of human rights 
violations ever committed in human history.
8  
     While  this  assertion  mer its  full  consideration  and  will  be  addressed  later,  it  is 
sufficient for the moment to mention that such concerns are heightened by the assumed 
disjuncture between human rights and the specific functions assigned to the institutions 
under  their  Articles  of   Agreement.  The  emphasis  on  the  specific  functions  of  the 
institutions is itself a reflection of the overbearing influence of the functionalist theory of 
international organizations which was the guiding principle in the formulation of the 
Articles of Agreements. It may be mentioned that the hallmark of the functionalist theory 
is its emphasis on the non -political character of international organizations which are 
expected to perform their functions with objectivity and expertise.
9 According to Bartram 
Brown: 
  Functionalism is a theory of international organization which holds that a world 
community  can  best be  achieved  not  by  attempts  at  the immediate political 
union  of  states,  but  by  the  creation  of  non-political  international  agencies 
dealing  with  specific  economic,  social,  technical,  or  humanitarian  functions. 
                                                 
7 H.V. Morals, 2001, ‘The Globalization of Human Rights Law and the Role of International Financial 
Institutions in Promoting Human Rights’, 33 George Washington International Law Review, pp.71-96 at 
88.   
8 T. Pogge, 2007, ‘Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation’, T. Pogge, ed. Freedom from Poverty as a 
Human Right: Who owes what to the very poor? Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.52. 
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Functionalists  assume  that  economic,  social  and  technical  problems  can  be 
separated from political problems and insulated from political pressures’ 
10  
In the case of the IMF and the World Bank, the notion that specialized, technocratic 
functions should be performed independent of politics is manifested in the provision, 
though  differently  couched,  in  their  Articles  of  Agreement  preventing  them  from 
interfering in the political affairs of their member states.
11  
     The second possible cause of disjuncture between the operations of these institutions 
and human rights is traceable to the fact that the institutions, especially IMF and World 
Bank, were established before the advent of contemporary international human rights law 
which explains why their Articles of Agreement are silent on issues of human rights. To 
be sure,  it was only after the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 and 
subsequently, Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,  that the centrality of 
human  rights  in  international  discourse  became  generally  accepted.  Although  the 
institutions have existed over these years the challenges raised by their lack of sufficient 
consideration  of  human  rights  norms  has  only  become  prominen t  because  of  the 
increasing recognition of development as a holistic concept that embraces human rights. 
These international economic institutions have therefore had to contend with a choice 
between religious adherence to the abstract wordings of their Articles of Agreement, and 
facing  the  challenges  associated with  changes  in  societal  expectations  and  realities 
including the growing salience of human rights.
12 This is more so since the universal 
acceptance of human rights has had significant impacts on all aspects of the globalization 
process  including,  the  policies  and  practices  of  international  economic  institutions. 
However, in order to properly situate the extent to which human rights issues have been 
integrated into the policies and practices of these i nstitutions, it is expedient, as a 
preliminary issue, to examine the legal status of the institutions in relation to international 
human rights law. 
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11 A. Anghie, 2000, note 2, p.266. 
12 It has even been asserted that these institutions have drifted away from the initial economic vision that 
informed their establishment. N. Woods, 2006, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their 
Borrowers, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp.1-2; A. Orford, 2001, ‘Globalization and the 
Right to Development’, P. Alston, ed. Peoples’ Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.127-184 at 
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4.2.1  International Legal Personality and Human Rights Obligations 
Perhaps there can be no better statement of principle concerning the legal personality of 
international institutions than the well-known formulation of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
Case.
13  As the Court put it:  
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their 
nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of 
the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has 
been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive 
increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of 
action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States. 
     It was based on this principle that the ICJ held that the United Nations Organization is 
a  subject  of  international  law  possessing  international  personality,  deriving  this 
conclusion from the guiding indicia formulated. This principle was re-emphasized by the 
Court in the Advisory Opinion in the WHO and Egypt Case 
14  wherein it declared that: 
International  organizations  are  subjects  of  international  law  and,  as  such,  are 
bound  by  any  obligations  incumbent  upon  them  under  general  rules  of 
international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to 
which they are parties’. 
It  can  therefore  be  said  that  as  subjects  of  international  law,  international  economic 
institutions have rights and duties, separate from, and in addition to those of their member 
states.
15 Since international human rights law is an important part of international law and 
is expressed in conventions, customary international law, peremptory norms, international 
obligations erga ormnes, and general principles, it follows that as a general proposition, 
the institutions also have obligations concerning the international law of human rights 
                                                 
13  ICJ Reports (1949) 174, at 178-179; Advisory Opinion concerning Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, ICJ Reports, (1996) 66 at 78-81, paragraphs 24-26. 
14  Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion of 
20 December 1980, 73 at 89-90; 1980 ICJ Reports. 
15  F. Mackay, 2002, ‘Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights and 
the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples’, 17 American University International 
Law  Review,  pp.527-624,  at  561.  In  the  case  of  the  IMF,  Joseph  Gold,  its  longest  serving  General 
Counsel,(1960-1979) had stated that ‘… the international juridical personality of the Fund is an objective 
fact in international law which goes beyond relations with members’. J. Gold, 1965, The International 
Monetary  Fund  and  International  Law:  An  Introduction,  Washington,  D.C.:  International  Monetary 
Fund, p.2.   156 
with regard to their internal and external activities.
16 The implication of this is that the 
institutions  are  obliged  to  ensure  that  their  policy  formulation  and   implementation 
account for, and respect the human rights obligations of their member states. Additionally, 
as specialized agencies of the United Nations,
17 the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  have 
obligations derived from the United Nations Charter, and are therefore required to act in 
conformity with the Charter’s provisions on human rights.
18  
     It  is  from  this  perspective  that  Professor  Daniel  Bradlow’s  distinction  between 
‘operational’ and ‘institutional’ human rights issues as they relate to the international 
financial institutions derives its salience. According to him, the operational issue ‘pertains 
to the human rights impact of the IFIs’[i.e. international financial institutions’] operations 
in their Member States’, and focuses ‘on the IFIs’ responsibilities for ensuring that the 
design and implementation of their projects, programs, policies and in-country activities 
are consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards’. The institutional 
human rights issue pertains to the internal rules and procedures of the IFIs and it focuses 
on ‘the responsibilities of the international financial institutions to ensure that their own 
internal  operating  rules  and  procedures  are  consistent  with  internationally  recognized 
human rights standards’.
19 It follows that on both scores, the institutions are obliged to 
take measures that enhance the promotion and protection of human rights.  
     Having established the international legal status and obligations of these institutions in 
respect  of  human  rights,  it  is  appropriate  to  ascertain  whether  their  operational  and 
institutional mechanisms have in any way been impacted upon by the growing salience of 
human rights. To carry out this inquiry, it is necessary to explore the insight provided by 
the fundamental transformation of the concept of development. 
                                                 
16  F. Mackay, 2002, note 15, p.562. 
17 By virtue of the relationship Agreement separately between them and the UN, namely: Agreement 
Between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, Article IV(2), 16 U.N.T .S 328, 332 
(1948); Agreement Between the United Nations and the Internat ional Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Article IV(2), 16 U.N.T.S. 346, 348 (1948). 
18 S.I. Skogly, 2004, ‘The Position of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the Human 
Rights Field’, R. Hanski and M. Suksi, eds. An Introduction to the International Protection of Human 
Rights: A Textbook, 2
nd ed., Turku/Abo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, pp.231-
250 at 244-245. 
19 D.  D.    Bradlow,  1996,  ‘The  World  Bank,  IMF  and  Human  Rights’,  6  Transnational  Law  and 
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4.2.2  Emergence of a new ‘Development’ paradigm 
 
The fact that the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO do not 
expressly mention human rights as one of the purposes posed a major challenge to the 
consideration  of  human  rights  by  these  institutions.    This  challenge  was,  however, 
overcome  through  a  broad  interpretation  of  the  term  ‘development’  which  is  instead 
mentioned in the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank and IMF, and the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO.
20 It may be mentioned that in classical econom ics, 
‘development’ was  seen as a process of economic growth premised on  the belief that 
high average growth rates of production would lead to reduced poverty either as a result 
of  a  ‘trickle-down’  effect  or  of  deliberate  government  policies.
21 According  to  Paul 
Streeten, under this paradigm ‘the goals of development were defined narrowly in terms 
of GNP and its growth, and other goals such as greater equality, eradication of poverty, 
meeting basic human needs, conservation of natural resources, abating pollution, and the 
enhancement of the environment, as well as non-material goals, were neglected or not 
emphasized  sufficiently’
22.  This  meant  that  emphasis  was  placed  more  on  economic 
growth than on human welfare.   
     One consequence of this pre-occupation with economic growth was that the forces of 
capitalism were seen as inherently inimical to democracy and human rights by destroying 
the society’s civic culture and sense of community. The traditional and communal mode 
of social organization with its emphasis on human solidarity was displaced in the process. 
This position is well represented by the analysis of Karl Polanyi who demonstrated how 
the  ‘Great  Transformation’  brought  about  by  capitalism  radically  altered  the  social 
structure of European societies especially England.
23  
                                                 
20 Articles 1(ii) of IMF Articles, Article 1(i) and (iii) of the Articles of Agreement of IBRD, and the 
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, mention development as part of the goals 
of these institutions. 
21 P. Streeten, 1981, Development Perspectives, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., p.123. 
22 Ibid, p.124.This approach is reflective of W.W. Rostow’s doctrine of stages of growth, the inadequacies 
of  which  are  examined  in  I.  Alechina,  1982,  ‘The  Contribution  of  the  United  Nations  system  to 
formulating development concepts’, UNESCO, Different Theories and Practices of Development, Paris: 
UNESCO, pp.9-68 at 18. 
23 K. Polanyi, 2001, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, Boston: 
Beacon  Press,  pp.42-44.  A  similar,  but  controversial  argument  has  been  advanced  in  respect  of  the 
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This restrictive conception of development was however jettisoned and replaced by a 
broader definition that sees human rights as an integral part of the development process. 
Pioneered by writers such as Amartya Sen, this movement underscored the fact that 
‘development’ is not simply an economic concept but one that takes cognizance of social, 
economic and even environmental issues. Thus Amartya Sen argues in his influential 
book  ‘Development  as  Freedom’  that  development  must  be  seen  as  a  ‘process  of 
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy’.
24 According to him, ‘focusing on human 
freedoms contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying development 
with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with 
industrialization,  or  with  technological  advance,  or  with  social  modernization’
25.  Sen 
therefore argues that ‘an adequate conception of development must go much beyond the 
accumulation  of  wealth  and  the  growth  of  gross  national  product  and  other  income-
related variables’
26, and be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead and the 
freedoms we enjoy.
27 
     This means that recognition must be given to such issues as  good health, literacy and 
education, the ability to participate in the life of the community, and the freedoms of 
expression and association. In other words, development covers the whole range of 
economic, cultural, social as well as civil and political r ights meaning that all human 
rights  are  part  and  parcel  of  development.  This  conception  also  emphasizes   the 
instrumental  linkage  between  human  rights  as  the  basic  freedoms  are  causally 
interdependent.
 28 For example, freedom of association allows people to  participate in 
decisions that affect their ability to benefit economically and socially from the process of 
development.  In  this  connection,  reference  may  be  made  to  the  United  Nations 
Declaration  on  the  Right  to  Development,  1986  which  expressly  recognizes  that 
‘development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which 
aims  at  the  constant  improvement  of  the  well-being  of  the  entire  population  and  of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Second  Great  Transformation:  Human  Rights  Leapfrogging  in  the  Era  of  Globalization’,  27  Human 
Rights Quarterly, pp.1-40 at 3-6.  
24 A. Sen, 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.3.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, p.14 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, pp.36-40.   159 
individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development 
and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting there from’.
29  
     This indicates the increased understanding that development represents a bundle of 
interlocking  concepts  embracing  a  broad  spectrum  of  issues  such  as  environmental, 
socio-economic, political and institutional matters which are intimately connected with 
human rights. It is this broad interpretation of development that has led to the acceptance 
of  a  human  rights-based  approach  to  development  which  requires  that  human  rights 
norms  and  methodologies  be  of  central  importance  at  all  stages  of  the  development 
process.  This  entails  ‘mainstreaming’  of  human  rights  policies  into  the  activities  of 
governmental, institutional and other actors. Indeed, it has been said that: 
A rights-based approach to development is one that explicitly ties development 
policies, objectives, projects, and outputs to international human rights standards 
requiring  that  development  be  directed  towards  fulfilling  human  rights. 
Conversely, it is a proactive strategy for converting rights into development goals 
and standards. For example, health, education, or land reform projects will be 
informed, framed by, and substantially directed towards fulfilling the procedural 
and  substantive  aspects  of  the  associated  rights.  In  essence,  this  converts 
development  goals  and  objectives  into  rights,  entitlements,  responsibility  and 
accountability’.
30  
     It  is  also  important  to  mention  that  there  is  a  trend  among  multi-  and  bilateral 
development actors, including United Nations specialized Agencies to adopt a rights-
based  approach  to  development  or  to  tie  their  programmatic  work  to  human  rights 
standards.  This  followed  their  agreement  in  2003  embodied  in  a  ‘Common 
Understanding’ of how to apply a human rights-based approach to their work.
31 Thus the 
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP has explicitly adopted a general human 
rights-based approach to development, while others such as the United Nations Children 
                                                 
29 Note 3, ibid. 
30 F. Mackay, 2002, note 15, p.534. 
31 ‘The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding 
Among  United  Nations  Agencies’,  2003  available  at 
www.undp.org/governance/docs/HR_GuidesCommonUnderstanding.pdf.  accessed  18  March  2010.  
Significantly, bilateral agencies such as the Swedish Development Corporation Agency and DFID have 
also taken giant strides in this respect; M. Robinson, 2005, ‘What Rights Can Add to Good Development 
Practice’,  P.  Alston  and  M.  Robinson,  eds.  Human  Rights  and  Development:  Towards  Mutual 
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Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have 
tied their programmatic work to human rights conventions related to their mandates.
32  
Perhaps it was in order to align with this new conception of development that the World 
Bank in 1999 adopted the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)  which looks 
at development from a holistic perspective. As the then President of the Bank, Paul 
Wolfensohn put it:  
The Comprehensive Development Framework I am proposing highlights a more 
inclusive  picture  of  development.  We  cannot  adopt  a  system  in  which  the 
macroeconomic and financial is considered apart from the structural, social and 
human aspects, and vice versa. Integration of each of these subjects is imperative 
at the national level and among the global players’.
33  
Against this background, it becomes important to ascertain how international economic 
institutions  have  responded  to  this  increasing  recognition  of  the  intimate  relationship 
between development and human rights. 
      Since the approach adopted by each of these institutions will be examined in some 
detail in the next subsection, it suffices to state here that they have generally shaken off 
their  initial  reluctance  on  this  subject  and,  in  varying  degrees,  broadened  the 
interpretation  of  their  mandates  by  restructuring  and  refocusing  their  policies  and 
programmes, and become ardent advocates of the imperative of good governance and 
human rights in their relationship with member states. 
     It is my contention that the existing hegemonic order has been challenged to some 
extent  by  counter-hegemonic  drives,  as  envisaged  by  Gramsci  in  his  study  of 
hegemony.
34 First, the new approach to human rights did not emerge simply as a measure 
of  the  broad interpretation of the ir mandates, but in the words of Rajagopal, as a 
‘complex dialectic’ of the relations between these institutions and human rights and social 
movements which had become increasingly more vocal since the 1980s.
35 Reference can 
                                                 
32 Namely; Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, respectively; F. Mackay, 2002, note 15, pp.533-534.  
33 J.D.  Wolfensohn,  1999,  A  Proposal  for  a  Comprehensive  Development  Framework.  Available  at 
www.worldbank.org/WRVPP4RV7 accessed 28 March 2010. 
34 A. Gramsci, 1971, note 4, pp.238-239, where he refers to the transition from the ‘war of manoeuvre’ to 
the ‘war of position’. 
35 B. Rajagopal, 2004, International Law from Below:  Development, Social Movements and Third World 
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be made to the various anti-SAP riots and demonstrations in several African countries in 
the 1980s and early 1990s which were instrumental to the change of approach by these 
international economic institutions. Indeed, those were periods when such riots were 
regular occurrences in African cities resulting in the death of several persons and the loss 
of millions of dollars in damaged and looted properties.
36 As ably documented by Mark 
Ellis-Jones, the series of protests and civil unrests in developing countries during this 
period were directed against the policies championed by the IMF and the World Bank and 
African countries such as Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique Nigeria, South 
Africa, and Zambia witnessed various forms of protest against the adoption of the 
economic policies of these institutions.
37  
     Second, the rejection of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998 also 
showed the tremendous impact of counter -hegemonic forces and social movements in 
generating change. The draft MAI, which was being negotiated by the twenty -nine 
member countries of the Organization for Economic Co -operation and Development 
(OECD), contained far-reaching enforceable provisions on the promotion and protection 
of foreign direct investment. The countries of the developing world were to be pressured 
to adopt this range of protections for foreign investments in their  countries. However, 
further negotiations on it were stalled and eventually halted by the coordinated action of 
several NGOs against it using the Internet.
38   
     Third, equally significant in this respect although with limited substantive success, are 
the  yearly  demonstrations  (started  in  1999  with  the  protest  at  the  WTO  Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle) against the WTO, the Bretton Woods institutions and the Davos 
World Economic Forum Summits, as well as the demonstrations against the Free Trade 
Area  of  the  Americas  (FTAA).The  significant  work  of  the  World  Social  Forum  in 
galvanizing and sustaining these measures is worthy of mention. It is today one of the 
pillars of the global movement questioning neo-liberal globalization through forging links 
                                                 
36 D. Green, 2008, From Poverty to Power: How active citizens and effective States can change the World, 
Oxford: Oxfam International, p. 296. 
37 M. Ellis-Jones, 2002, States of Unrest II: Resistance to IMF and World Bank Policies in Poor Countries, 
London:  World Development Movement, p.4. 
38D. Schneiderman, 2008, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s 
Promise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.201-203. Admittedly, there were also other factors, 
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between  local,  national  and  global  social  movements  and  non -governmental 
organizations involved in the counter-hegemonic struggles.
39  These developments have 
ensured that the human rights discourse has become not only the language of progressive 
politics  world-wide,  but  also  that  of  governance  shaping  policies  in  diverse  areas  of 
institutional reform, economic and social policy, and political reform. 
     The international economic institutions have consequently announced that they would 
adopt  new, broader approaches  to  development and human rights.  The impact  of the 
counter-hegemonic critique on the neo-liberal hegemony of these institutions, however, 
has to be assessed empirically. Indeed, a doubt is raised: is the adoption of the human 
rights language by these institutions a genuine embracement of the counter-hegemonic 
‘passive-revolution’  or  is  it  not,  rather,  an  attempt  to  contain  the  demands  of  mass 
movements while guaranteeing the sustenance of the neo-liberal economic policies?  
To  contextualize  these  issues  and  ascertain  how  human  rights  came  to  permeate  the 
policies and programmes of the World Bank, IMF and WTO, it is proposed to examine 
the institutions separately, beginning with the World Bank. 
4.3  The World Bank 40 
The World Bank was established in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, together 
with the IMF. As envisioned, its primary duty was to assist in the reconstruction efforts 
after the devastation of the Second World War and play a major role in the economic 
development of developing states. Specifically, it is stated in Article 1(iii) of the Articles 
of Agreement that one of the purposes of the Bank is:  
 [T]o  promote  the  long-range  balanced  growth  of  international  trade  and  the 
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international 
investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby 
assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in 
their territories.  
                                                 
39 B. de Sousa Santos, 2006, The Rise of the Global South: The World Social Forum and Beyond, London: 
Zed Books Ltd, p. x.   
40The World Bank group consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
the  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  International  Development  Association  (IDA),  the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). In this work, except where any specific institution within the group is 
mentioned, reference to World Bank includes the Group. 
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It  is  clear  that  this  and  the  other  provisions  specifying  the  Bank’s  purposes  place 
enormous responsibility on the institution and the attendant mandate broad enough for the 
Bank  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  economic  development  of  states.  However,  as 
would be shown shortly, in relation to human rights, the mandate was not initially looked 
at from this broad perspective.  
4.3.1   Normative Framework 
It  is  noteworthy  that  from  its  existence,  the  World  Bank  had  always  faced  the 
predicament of dealing with two contrasting interpretations of its mandate: one sees the 
Bank as a technocratic agency with a narrow economic purpose; the other sees it as the 
international institution that can bring about progressive social goals.
41  These approaches 
which resonate from the prevailing views at the time of its establishment have conti nued 
to have its hold on the Bank. While the first school of thought favours a restrictive 
interpretation  of  its  Articles  of  Agreement ,  the  liberal  view  accepts  a   broader 
interpretation.  On this score, it is important to assess how these debates inform the  
behaviour of the World Bank with respect to human rights. Two provisions of the Bank’s 
Articles of Agreement that have given rise to these differing interpretations of the Bank’s 
mandate in relation to human rights are Articles III S.5 (b) and Article IV S.10. Article III 
S.5 (b) provides as follows: 
The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are 
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency without regard to political or other 
non-economic influences or considerations 
On its part, Article IV S.10 provides that: 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order 
to achieve the purposes stated in Article 1. 
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Although these provisions do not expressly mention human rights, their interpretation 
by the Bank has raised a number of issues relating to the relevance of human rights in its 
operations. Relying on these provisions, the narrow functionalist school contends that the 
Bank is essentially a technical, non-political institution, and that political issues that 
include human rights should be the concern of institutions such as the United Nations and 
its  agencies  concerned  with  similar  matters.  In  the  first  few  decades  of  t he  Bank’s 
existence,  this  viewpoint  prevailed  and  its  mandate  was  interpreted  in  a  manner  that 
excluded other social and political considerations. It was in reliance on this technocratic 
and functionalist view of its mandate that the Bank in the 1960s rejected calls for it to 
refuse  to  approve  loans  to  South  Africa  and  Portugal  because  of  their  apartheid  and 
colonial policies respectively.
42  
  At best, the Bank rejected an interpretation of its mandate that encompasses all human 
rights, but accepted a restrictive approach that excluded civil and political rights from its 
purview  in  preference  for  social  and  economic  rights.
43 Setting  the  tone  for  a n 
interpretation  of  the  Bank’s  mandate  that  advocates  the  selective  inclusion  of  some 
human rights in the Bank’s operations and the exclusion of others, Ibrahim Shihata, the 
former General Counsel of the Bank made the following formulation: 
For any international financial institution, such as the World Bank, the question 
becomes, not whether human rights are relevant to development, but whether the 
mandate of any institution, as defined and limited by its Articles of Agreement, 
can cover the promotion and protection of all human rights, or is limited to the 
rights  which  have  an  economic  or  social  character  as  opposed  to  a  political 
character.’
44   
     In  answering  this  question,  Shihata  maintained  that  a  textual  and  teleological 
interpretation of the language of the Articles especially Article IV S.10 precludes the 
Bank’s attention to a broad range of human rights issues. According to him, the Bank’s 
Articles  exclude  political  considerations  and  prohibit  it  from  taking  non-economic 
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considerations into account. Although he admitted that in reality it may be difficult to 
isolate ‘economic considerations’ from political considerations, especially in policy-based 
lending, he nevertheless made a distinction between economic, social and cultural rights 
and civil and political rights. As he put it:  
…while there are limits on the possible extent to which the World Bank can 
become involved with human rights, especially those of civil and political nature, 
the Bank certainly can play, and has played, within the limits of its mandate, a 
very significant role in promoting various economic and social rights.
45   
Putting it more directly in relation to civil and political rights, he submits that: 
…the Bank cannot, in my view, use its operations as a reward for the countries, 
which respect political rights or a punishment for those, which do not. Such a 
criterion is not only alien to the Articles of Agreement; it runs counter to the 
above-quoted  provisions  of  these  Articles  which  enjoin  the  Bank  from 
interference in the political affairs of its members.
46 
It is however, significant that Shihata acknowledges two exceptions to his formulation. 
The  first  one  concerns  the  participation  of  affected  people  in  the  design  and 
implementation of projects. According to him, for such participation and consultation to 
be useful, a reasonable measure of free expression and assembly is required and the Bank 
would be acting within proper limits if it insisted that such freedom be insured for the 
purpose of the project. 
     The second exception relates to a situation where there is ‘an extensive violation of 
political rights which takes [such] pervasive proportions [that it] could impose itself as an 
issue in the Bank’s decisions. This would be the case if the violation had significant 
economic effects’.
47 From this formulation, the violation of civil and political rights must 
directly jeopardize the economic objectives of the Bank in order to become an ‘economic 
consideration’ within the meaning of Article IV S.10. 
48   




48 Ibid,  pp.  32 -33;  also,  I.F.I.  Shihata,  1 997,  ‘Democracy  and  Development’,  46  International  and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, pp.635-643 at 640.   166 
The  fact  that  these  formulations  by  Shihata  have  informed  the  Bank’s  policies  and 
practices  over  the  years  makes  its  subjection  to  scrutiny  imperative.  In  fact,  several 
aspects of Shihata’s views raise criticism. 
     First, on  the prohibition against interference in the ‘political affairs’ of any member 
state, it can be mentioned that it is now increasingly accepted in international law that 
‘political  affairs’  refer  only  to  those  issues  that  are  not  subjects  of  concern  for  the 
international community as a whole. It is now well established that this does not include 
violations  of  fundamental  human  rights,  which  transcend  a  state’s  autonomous 
jurisdiction. Such rights represent obligations of an individual state to the international 
community as a whole and are therefore not the subject of its ‘political affairs’.
49   
     Second, the distinction presented by Shihata between the duties of the Bank in relation 
to economic, social and cultural rights on the one hand,  and civil and political rights on 
the other hand, in the Bank’s operations, ignores the concept of the indivisibility and 
interdependence  of  human  rights,  and  the  corresponding  international  obligations  for 
their concurrent enforcement.  It is  in  fact  generally  accepted in  the doctrine, as also 
enunciated in the United Nations declarations that because of their interconnected nature 
human rights cannot be so divided.
 50  
     Third,  the  determination  of  whether  an  issue  raises  political  considerations  and 
consequently to be ruled outside the mandate of the Bank is itself ‘political’. This is 
because it invariably entails making value judgments, since the links between human 
rights  violations,  political  stability  and  economic  development  are  not  clear-cut.  For 
example, many civil conflicts affecting African countries, though apparently political, are 
also  intricately  driven  by  economic  considerations.
51 The difficulty with determining 
what constitutes ‘political affairs’ is further buttressed by the fact that the Bank itself has 
throughout  time  re-defined  ‘corruption’  from  a  political  issue  to  an  economic  one.
52     
                                                 
49 G. Brodnig, 2001, note 41, p.19. 
50 See the Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, 1993, paragraph 5. 
51 The Sudanese conflict between the North and the now independent Southern Sudan illustrates this point. 
D.H. Johnson, 2003, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, pp.61-64; Human Rights Watch, 2003, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights, New York: Human Rights 
Watch, pp.137-157. 
52 This re-definition and re-classification was done in 1996 during the tenure of James Wolfensohn as 
President of  the Bank. M. A.  Thomas, 2007,  ‘The  Governance  Bank’,  83(4)  International  Affairs, 
pp.729-745 at 741-742; I.F.I.  Shihata, 1997, ‘Corruption – A General Review with an Emphasis on the   167 
Furthermore, although Shihata argues that the Bank should not advocate through its 
operations any particular political system or form of government, it is obvious that the 
Bank’s good governance agenda 
53 is largely driven by the ideals of a liberal democracy 
and the value systems of the leading shareholders of the Bank.
54 It is also obvious that 
issues of governance include accountability, transparency and rule of law, all of which 
have direct bearing on civil and political rights. Under this umbrella, the Bank has had to 
support activities such as judicial reform, strengthening the press, and even refo rm of 
government institutions. What could be more political than these? This belies the Bank’s 
purported non-involvement in issues of a political nature because when found convenient, 
it has unabashedly been involved in such matters. In trying to depoliticize its role the 
World Bank seeks to deflect responsibility or culpability away from itself for the dramatic 
growth of poverty and social inequality across the globe and even the gradual erosion of 
social  safety  nets  where  these  exists,  especially  in  relation  to  states  that  adopt  its 
economic prescriptions.
55 This it does by casting itself in the robe of a technocratic, non-
political institution and seeking thereby to sustain the confidence of its borrowers. Yet the 
political role and influence is hardly disguisable. 
     In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that there is now a shift in emphasis from 
the Shihata interpretative model as evidenced in the opinion of the new General Counsel 
of the Bank, Roberto Danino.
56 After stating that it is consistent with the Bank’s Articles 
of  Agreement  for  the  decision-making  processes  of  the  Bank  to  incorporate  social, 
political  and  other  factors  that  may  have  an  impact  on  its  economic  decisions,  he 
continued: 
This same line of analysis applies to the discussion of which human rights are 
relevant for the making of economic decisions. Some assert that only economic 
rights are relevant, not political rights. In my view there is no stark distinction 
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between  economic  and  political  considerations:  there  is  an  interconnection 
among  economic,  social,  and  cultural  rights  on  the  one  hand,  and  civil  and 
political rights on the other. Indeed, it is generally accepted at the political level 
that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. 
Also from a financial point of view I believe the Bank cannot and should not 
make a distinction between different types of human rights. It needs to take all 
these considerations into account’
57  
 One can therefore say that drawing from a holistic approach to development, it is not out 
of  place  for  the  Bank  to  take  on  board  all  issues  of  human  rights  since  these  are 
intricately related to the developmental challenges that nations face. 
     However, advocacy for a broad interpretation of the Bank’s Articles to incorporate all 
human rights is not an endorsement of unbridled interpretation to bring within its purview 
other issues that impinge on the sovereignty of states. Indeed, it can be said that, in a way, 
this is already happening in a number of states in Africa as the economic institutions now 
play a crucial role in economic policy formulation, public service reforms, and judicial 
reforms  in  these  countries.
58 There is therefore the need to strike a delicate balance 
between adopting a broad enough interpretati on that brings within its purview human 
rights considerations, and taking over the basic policy functions of borrower governments. 
4.3.2   World Bank’s policies and practices in relation to human rights 
Within  the  scope  of  its  mandate,  the  Bank  has  adopted  a  number  of  policies  and 
programmes  in  its  determination  to  promote  economic  development  of  its  members 
which have some connection with human rights. One such policy adopted by the Bank to 
meet the changing needs of its members is the concept of ‘good governance’.  
4.3.2.1  Good Governance  
 From a theoretical point of view, ‘good governance’ is an essentially contested term with 
several  meanings.
59 In  general,  it  can  be  said  that  good  governance  ‘refers  to  the 
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ensemble of policies, discourses, initiatives and institutions that seek to transform the 
practices of development in the Third World’.
60 It was formulated essentially to deal with 
the  assumed  lack  of  governance  in  developing  countries  that  had  rendered  previous 
development efforts in these countries ineffective. Its articulated package includes liberal 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, free market economy, and the principles derived 
from these concepts. The Bank began to focus on borrower ‘good governance’ as a key 
component  of  its  relationship  with  developing  countries  in  the  early  1990s.
61 This 
resulted in a dramatic shift of emphasis from what has been described as ‘bricks and 
mortar  infrastructure’
62 to  large-scale  inclusion  of  human  development,  institutional 
reform,  and  social  development.  It  meant  moving  away  from  ‘hard  lending’  to  ‘soft 
lending’,  or,  simply  put,  from  project  to  policy-based  lending.  Indeed,  the  Bank’s 
conception of ‘good governance’ is one that incorporates transparency, accountability, 
and a predictable legal framework. According to the Bank:  
Good  governance  is  epitomized  by  predictable,  open,  and  enlightened  policy 
making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional 
ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong 
civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of 
law’.
63   
     The Bank accordingly places great reliance on good governance as a condition for 
development and a critical factor in its assistance to member countries. It has made the 
disbursement  of  loans  conditional  on  improvements  to  the  quality  of  governance  in 
borrower states. In particular, the lending arm of the Bank, International Development 
Association (IDA) has explicitly introduced governance conditionality and made good 
governance an allocation criterion for IDA resources, which represent the majority of 
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loans to least-developed countries.
64  Not surprisingly, it has been said that the Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development has become the ‘Bank for Good Governance’.
65  
Although  it  has  also  been  argued  that  the  Bank’s  insistence  on  this  concept  is  a 
replication  of  the  ‘civilizing  mission’,
66the  fact  that  it  is  annexed  to  the  neo-liberal 
economic  policies  predicated  on  the  ‘Washington  Consensus’
67  makes  it  highly 
questionable as a mechanism that can promote genuine development in African countries. 
While reserving appraisal of the concept for later discussion, it is pertinent to mention 
here that this advocacy of good governance and latter-day embrace of human rights by 
the Bank has also raised another problematic. This relates to the interpretation to be given 
to such policy shift and its intended objective(s), since the advocacy is capable of at least 
three plausible interpretations.  
      First, it may be seen as a genuine self-realization by the Bank of the need to promote 
development  and  the  protection  of  human  rights  world-wide.  This  represents  the 
conventional,  non-committal  interpretation  of  the  new  approach.  Second,  it  could  be 
regarded as a classic case of appropriation of the language of rights by the Bank with the 
hidden objective of promoting the economic interests of Western capitalist states through 
strengthening governments in developing countries to guarantee political and economic 
stability. This reading is driven by the belief that the hegemonic forces understand the 
immense emancipatory  capacity of law and the universal  appeal  of the human rights 
language, and are intent to deploy it to achieve their particular economic objectives. A 
third reading of this change is to see it as a response by the Bank and its twin institution, 
the IMF, to the increased human rights activism that had deplored their operational modus 
and demanded more democratic, accountable and humane relationships with the affected 
states. The possibility of these different readings of the good governance mantra by the 
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Bank derives from the malleability of the human rights corpus as a tool that can be used 
to actualize either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes.
68 As mentioned earlier, 
there is always the possibility of governments, institutions and even NGOs appropriating 
the language of rights to achieve particular objectives after they have been integrated into 
their operational structures.  
     Furthermore, the Bank has also demonstrated its involvement with the promotion and 
protection  of  human  rights  through  development.  Thus,  in  1998,  at  the  fiftieth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Bank published 
a Manual entitled, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank,
69 which 
emphasized the important contributions of the organization in securing and promoting 
economic, social and cultural rights and the impact of its governance lending on building 
a favourable environment for a broader range of human rights. 
     The document also contains a number of far-reaching statements and declarations by 
the Bank concerning its perception of the relationship between development and human 
rights. Thus it emphasizes the Bank’s belief that creating the conditions for the attainment 
of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development,
70 and that sustainable 
development  is  ‘impossible without human rights’.
71 Moreover, it states  that  it is  the 
manner in which economic reform lending programs are implemented that is crucial to 
secure the needs of the poor’.
72 It also stresses the Bank’s belief that human rights cannot 
be  guaranteed without a strong, accessible  and  independent  judiciary’.
73 Furthermore, 
according to the Bank, ‘the world now accepts that sustainable development is impossible 
without human rights. What has been missing is the recognition that the advancement of 
an interconnected set of human rights is impossible without development’.
74  
These statements are further buttressed and concretized by the Bank’s Comprehensive 
Development Framework which ‘takes a holistic approach to development. It seeks a 
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better balance in policy making by highlighting the interdependence of all elements of 
development  -  social,  structural,  human,  governance,  environmental,  economi c,  and 
financial, and goes further to acknowledge that ‘without the protection of human and 
property rights, and a comprehensive framework of laws, no equitable development is 
possible’.
75 
     Taken  together,  these  statements  and  policy  formulations  clearly  show  the  Bank’s 
recognition of the mutual relationship between development and human rights and its 
important role in ensuring their realization through its various programmes. However, in 
order  to  demonstrate  the  extent  to  which  human  rights  norms  have  impacted  on  the 
operations of the World Bank and look beyond the hortatory statements, it is necessary to 
examine the Bank’s policies in relation to two important aspects of its activity, namely; 
projects  affecting  Indigenous  Peoples  and  the  Involuntary  Resettlement  of  Displaced 
Persons arising from Bank-funded projects.  
4.3.2.2  Case Studies 
1.  Projects affecting Indigenous Peoples 
One area where the impact of human rights is evident in the operations of the Bank is in 
its approach to projects relating to indigenous peoples. In 2001 the Bank formulated an 
operational  document  known  as  OP  4.10,  which  details  its  policies  and  expectations 
concerning the execution of projects relating to indigenous peoples. The significance of 
this Operational Policy for the present purpose, lies in the fact that it is the only Policy 
document where the Bank expressly used the term ‘human rights’. 
The adoption of this Operational Policy is traceable to 1981 when the Bank began to give 
consideration to the need to avoid encroachment on the territories used or occupied by 
tribal groups in the implementation of its supported projects. This led to the adoption of 
an Operational Manual Statement OMS 2.34 dealing with Tribal People Bank-Financed 
Projects.
76 Subsequent reviews eventually led to the adoption of the current 4.10 in 2001, as 
revised in 2005. 
     The  Policy  proclaims  the  Bank’s  commitment  to  ‘ensuring  that  the  development 
process fully respects the dignity, human rights, economies, and cultures of Indigenous 
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Peoples’  as  a  way  of  contributing  ‘to  the  Bank’s  mission  of  poverty  reduction  and 
sustainable development’.
77 Furthermore, it states that for all projects that are proposed 
for Bank financing which affect indigenous peoples, the Borrower is  ‘to engage in a 
process of free, prior, and informed consultation’ in order to ensure broad community 
support for the project by the affected indigenous peoples.
 78  The Policy enshrines the 
Bank’s recognition that:  
…the identities and cultures of Indigenous Peoples are inextricably linked to the 
lands on which they live and the natural resources on which they depend. These 
distinct circumstances expose Indigenous Peoples to different types of risks and 
levels of impact from development projects, including loss of identity, culture, 
and customary livelihoods, as well as exposure to disease.
79 
     Several key aspects of the Policy contain provisions designed to enhance the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Thus any project requiring the financing of the Bank must have a 
Social Assessment by the borrower state, an Indigenous Peoples Plan, and Indigenous 
Peoples  Planning  Framework.  More  importantly,  such  a  project  must  go  through  ‘a 
process of free, prior, and informed consultation with the affected Indigenous Peoples’ 
communities at each stage of the project, and particularly during project preparation, to 
fully identify their views and ascertain their broad community support for the project’.
80  
     In view of the complex issues involved in relocation, the Bank requires a borrower 
state to explore alternative project designs to avoid physical relocation of indigenous 
peoples. However, ‘when it is not feasible to avoid relocation, the borrower will not carry 
out such relocation without obtaining broad support for it from the affected indigenous 
peoples communities as part of the free, prior, and informed consultation process’.
81 This 
is  to  ensure that  the rights  of the indigenous  peoples to  freedom  of information  and 
participation in matters concerning their well-being are protected. Such participation also 
has the potential of resulting in the adoption of measures that minimally disrupt the social, 
economic and cultural life of the people. To make participation of indigenous peoples 
meaningful in this circumstance, the borrower will be required to prepare a resettlement 
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plan in accordance with the requirements of OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement which 
is next considered. 
 
2.  Projects resulting in Involuntary  Resettlement  OP 4.12 
Closely related to the Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples is the Bank’s Policy 
document on  Involuntary Resettlement  of persons  affected by projects  funded by the 
Bank.  This  Policy  is  informed  by  the  understanding  that  if  not  properly  managed, 
involuntary  resettlement  could  have  severe  economic,  social,  and  environmental 
challenges  for  the  affected  peoples.  For  example,  it  could  lead  to  loss of  sources  of 
income  and  consequent  impoverishment  of  the  affected  people,  the  weakening  of 
community institutions and social networks, dispersal of kin groups, adjustment problems 
in  new  environment,  diminution  of  established  traditional  authority  and  cultural 
identity.
82 It is in consideration of these likely consequences that the central objective is 
to ensure that where feasible, involuntary resettlement for the purpose of executing a 
project is avoided, or minimized, or indeed alternative project designs explored. However, 
where this is not possible, resettlement activities should be conceived and executed in a 
manner that enables the displaced persons to share in the benefits of the project.
83  
     More importantly, displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should 
have opportunities to participate in the planning and implementation of resettlement 
programs.
84 The Policy also requires that:  
…displaced  persons  should  be  assisted  in  their  efforts  to  improve  their 
livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore them, in real terms, to 
pre-displacement  levels  or  to  levels  prevailing  prior  to  the  beginning  of  the 
project implementation, whichever is higher.
85  
The  policy  covers  direct  economic  and  social  impacts  that  result  from  Bank-assisted 
investment projects caused either by the involuntary taking of land or the involuntary 
restriction of access to the particular area as a result of the project. In order to deal with 
the impacts arising from such involuntary resettlement, the Policy requires the borrower 
state to prepare a resettlement plan or resettlement policy framework specifying measures 
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that are designed to ensure that the displaced persons are informed about their op tions 
and  rights  pertaining  to  resettlement,  that  they  are  consulted  and  provided  with 
technically and economically feasible resettlement alternatives, and provided prompt and 
effective compensation  for losses attributable to the project.
86  
      These are no doubt far-reaching policy measures designed to stem the human rights 
abuses most often cited in connection with development projects funded by the Bank. 
The  policy  changes  evidence  recognition  that  large -scale  development  projects , 
especially in rural areas, may either lead to the displacement of people or adversely affect 
their natural environment and livelihood, hence the emphasis on respecting the human 
rights of such people.  
     However, well-crafted policies are meaningless in the absence of effective compliance 
with their stipulations and implementation of required measures. Sadly, this appears to be 
the case with these World Bank Operational Policies, as a wide gulf exists between their 
stipulations and the actual implementation  on the ground. Two examples are the Sardar 
Sarovar project in India, and recently, the Chad/Cameroon project. In the case of the 
former  project,  the  report  of  the  Independent  Review  Panel  noted  a  number  of 
inadequacies and human rights abuses on the part of both the Bank   and the Indian 
government,  bordering  on  non -compliance  with  the  policy  stipulations  and  lack  of 
consultation with the people affected by the project.
87  The Chad/Cameroon project partly 
funded by the Bank has fared no better. In particular, the genuine com plaints of the 
people affected by the project in both Chad and Cameroon were not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Bank, just as it ignored flagrant violations of the agreement by the 
Chadian government noted for its poor human rights record.
88  
     Recognizing these challenges, the Bank has also taken some other measures designed 
to  enhance  the  promotion  and  protection  of  human  rights.  These  include  the 
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establishment, in 1993, of the Independent Panel, which investigates projects funded by 
the  Bank  to  determine  whether  they  are  complying  with  the  Bank’s  policies  and 
procedures, and provides a forum for people who believe that their rights and concerns 
may  be  affected  by  Bank-financed  operations  to  bring  such  concerns  to  the  highest 
decision-making  levels  of the World  Bank.
89 The Bank also established a justice and 
human rights Trust Fund  in 2006  to further the mainstreaming of human rights  in its 
policies and programmes,  through  research and training  of Bank staff on the mutual 
connection between human rights and the mission and work of the Bank.
90 
 Perhaps it is in consideration of the foregoing that the Bank could declare , in 2006, that 
its work:  
…substantially contributes to the realization of rights of people in a number of 
areas,  such  as  health,  education,  gender,  participation,  accountability, 
environment, and institutional reform activities, and, above all, the fight against 
poverty itself as a fundamental denial of human rights. Other Bank activities also 
contribute to the realization of human rights: these include fighting corruption, 
increasing transparency in governance’.
91  
The  extent  to  which  it  is  justified  in  this  self-praise  would  be  considered  later  after 
examining the approach of the other two institutions, the IMF, and WTO beginning with 
the former. 
4.4  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Established in 1944 to deal primarily with balance of payment difficulties of states, the 
IMF has over the years played an important role in international financial management. 
Though it has increasingly come under the criticism of Third World countries because of 
the debilitating social and economic impact of its policies in these countries, the Fund has 
remained an important reference point in international financial matters.  In contrast to 
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the World Bank which is more involved with microeconomic issues, the primary concern 
of the IMF is with implementing macroeconomic policies. This frame of operations 
coupled with the shorter period of its intervention to correct the balance of payments 
deficits of members have conspired to shelter the Fund from greater involvement with 
human rights issues.
92  
4.4.1  IMF and Human Rights: The initial position  
It must be recognized that the IMF was originally designed as a monetary institution with 
a mandate to ensure the short-term stabilization of the economies of member states with 
balance  of  payments  problems.  This  was  to  ensure  that  members  do  not  engage  in 
measures that would be destructive of the international economy.
93 In furtherance of this 
objective it adopted a restrictive and technocratic approach that excluded human rights 
concerns, relying on Article 1 of its Articles of Agreement, which states that one of the 
purposes of the IMF is:  
To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.’ 
Similarly, Article V S.3 (a) provides that:  
The  Fund  shall  adopt  policies  on  the  use  of  its  general  resources,  including 
policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for 
special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve their 
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this 
agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of 
the general resources.
94 
     In the performance of this function, the IMF provides short-term financial assistance 
to  member  countries  with  balance  of  payments  deficits  on  the  condition  that  such 
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countries agree to implement a number of measures aimed at reducing the deficits.
95 The 
inclusion of these measures that have come to be known as conditionalities 
96 has been 
one of the main sources of criticism of the Fund. Not only have the measures become 
standardized,  they  are  usually  prescribed  irrespective  of  the  peculiar  economic 
circumstances  of  borrower  states.  The  conditionalities  usually  include  reduction  in 
government spending, withdrawal of welfare services, removal of subsidies on basic food 
and public services, privatization, deregulation, etc. Not surprisingly, the implementation 
of such prescriptions had often led to protests, strikes and demonstrations i n several 
African countries because of their negative social and economic impacts, not least of 
which are human rights violations. 
      It is in response to this widespread criticism that the IMF has now re -invented itself 
by making its resources available for longer periods with lower conditionalities. This has 
resulted in a radical change in its character from that of a short-term monetary institution 
to a medium- and long-term financial institution.
97  
     The second approach adopted by the Fund in refusing to play a role in the promotion 
of human rights, is its reluctance, at least, theoretically, to be involved in political matters 
deemed prohibited by its Articles. Although there is no express prohibition in the IMF 
Articles prohibiting it from considering ‘political factors’ in its decisions and policies (as 
opposed to  the World Bank  Articles of Agreement), several  articles  arguably  contain 
implicit prohibitions. For instance, Article IV S.3 (b) states that in exercising surveillance 
over exchange arrangements, the IMF’s principles ‘shall respect the domestic social and 
political policies of members’.
98 It is in reliance on this provision that the IMF has been 
reluctant to allow its policies and programmes to be filtered by the human rights lens.
99    
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4.4.2  Change in Policy Direction 
 However,  the  turning  point  occurred  when,  under  pressure  by  international  public 
opinion, the IMF began to accept responsibility to address the ‘social dimensions’ of the 
macroeconomic policies it prescribes for member states.
100 This admission compelled it 
to  become  involved  in  dealing  with  the  structural  causes  of  balance  of  payments 
problems, as well as the social implications of its adjustment programmes. Naturally, not 
only are such issues concerned with long-term development, they also invariably entail 
consideration of human rights matters. According to Margot Salomon this new approach 
led to greater collaboration between the Fund and the World Bank and invited ‘greater 
visibility for human rights’.
101  
     In effect, development is more and more redefined as a process incorporating material 
and non-material needs including human rights, and the latter are now being increasingly 
integrated into national and international development strategies.
102 Moreover, as argued 
earlier, its relationship agreement with the UN as an agency of the world body puts it 
under obligation to fulfil the human rights purposes set forth in Article 55 of the UN 
Charter.  
      Accordingly, since 1999 the Fund has adopted a more direct and focused recognition 
of human rights imperatives through its acceptance of a role in poverty reduction. Thus it 
replaced its discredited Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). In general, loans under the PRGF are provided 
to the world’s poorest countries and are based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) which articulate each borrowing country’s  strategy  for poverty reduction and 
integrate macroeconomic, structural, and social policies into one document.
103  
The IMF’s adoption of PRSP – a holistic approach to poverty reduction - provides a 
useful window for the Fund to effectively give greater attention to human rights issues. It 
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provides borrowing countries with the opportunity to both assess their human rig hts 
situations and to design and implement strategies for improving domestic human rights 
protections. One fundamental aspect of human rights norms embedded in this strategy is 
popular participation; as the principal object of PRSP is to ensure that local  populations 
are involved in development programmes affecting their communities. It can thus be said 
that the IMF has used the instrument of the PRSP to integrate this important aspect of 
human  rights  in  its  work.  This  participatory  process  that  underpins  the  strategy  is 
designed to reinforce voice and empowerment by incorporating the views of the relevant 
stakeholders in its formulation. These include relevant government officials, civil society 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, women’s groups and other 
private sector bodies. This wide spectrum of stakeholders is required to be involved in the 
three stages of design, implementation, and monitoring of the PRSP process.  
     The  emphasis  on  participation  ensures  the  promotion  of  such  key  human  rights 
principles as freedom of expression, of association, the right to self-determination as well 
as transparency and accountability of government.
104 An example can be found in the PRSP 
of Burkina Faso which was adopted in May 2000.  This broad-based poverty reduction 
strategy focuses on economic, health, environmental, food, and individual and political 
security. It gives prominence to local governance through decentralization in order to 
guarantee  citizen  participation  in  the  formulation  and  choice  of  projects,  and  their 
execution.
105 The PRSP also stipulates the drawing up of an Action Plan to foster 
participation in the process of poverty assessment through the involvement of community 
representatives and other components of civil society.
106 It  is on this score that this 
particular PRSP has been said to exemplify  a strategy that ‘places a high priority on 
human rights in its development and structural adjustment efforts’.
107 
     It  is  significant  that  some  other  countries  have  also  followed  this  Burkina  Faso’s 
approach by taking advantage of the mutual relationship between economic development 
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in terms of poverty reduction and the advancement of human rights.
108 However, even 
‘participation’ that is hailed as the most significant innovation of the PRSP process has 
been found to be faulty in important respects, thus putting into question the capacity of 
the  process  as  currently  being  implemented  to  deliver  on  its  acclaimed  promises.  A 
crucial flaw relates to what may be described as a ‘participation gap’. In the first place, it 
has been observed from the preponderance of the practice in several countries involved in 
the process that key stakeholders such as trade union representatives, women’s groups, 
and civil society organizations based outside the capital or main urban areas have been 
systematically excluded from the discussions.
109 Yet, the reality is that in several poor 
countries a large proportion of the extremely poor live in the rural areas, and the ir 
representatives are thus excluded from participation in the PRSP processes designed to 
address their situation.  
     Second, the extent to which those groups usually  included in the discussions can be 
said to be true representatives  even of the urban  poor  has been brought to serious 
question. This is because the participants are often those whose views and positions  are 
favourable to the government, since they are usually nominated by government officials  
while critical organizations and groups are bypassed in the process.
110Above all, the 
PRSP predicated as it does on neo -liberal economic principles can hardly enhance the 
promotion and protection of human rights in the affected countries ,  considering the 
inherent negative impacts of implementation of the neo -liberal economic policies on 
African countries.
111 
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4.4.3  Human Rights Enabling Provisions 
Having examined aspects of IMF’s policies and programmes that have been impacted 
upon by the growing recognition of human rights, it is appropriate to also highlight areas 
through which the Fund can further deepen this integration of human rights. 
     Three mechanisms within its procedures as provided for in the Articles of Agreement 
create avenues through which the Fund can play a more active role in the promotion and 
protection  of  human  rights.  These  are  the  provisions  relating  to  consultation,  and 
conditionality and the use of surveillance powers. These provisions in Article IV Section 
3(a) and (b) enable the Fund to carry out periodic consultation with its borrower members 
as  well  as  surveillance  over  their  performance  and  implementation  of  agreed 
conditionalities. The IMF can demand information from such member countries on their 
human rights situation and even insist that it be included as part of its conditionalities. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  effective  use  of  these  avenues  will  greatly  enhance  the 
integration of human rights in the operations of the Fund even as it carries out its primary 
function of assisting members with balance of payments difficulties.
112   
     Moreover, as an agency of the United Nations, it is imperative for the Fund to play an 
important role in the promotion and protection of human rights through its policies and 
programmes and through this contribute to the attainment of the human rights objectives 
of the United Nations. It is apparent, from the above analysis, that the impact of human 
rights on the IMF has not been as visible as the impact on  the World Bank. This is 
attributable to the Fund’s late acceptance of a role in reducing poverty which has been 
identified as one of the key consequences of its intervention in the balance of payment 
difficulties of states.    
4.5  World Trade Organization (WTO) 
The  Organization  which  came  into  being  in  1994  as  a  successor  of  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) can be said to have been born at a time when 
scepticism among Third World countries, about the usefulness of international institutions 
as then constituted was at its highest.
113 The GATT had shown its inability to deal with 
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the overbearing role of Western capitalist states in its operations and had, within Third 
World circles, been consigned to the same category as the IMF and the World Bank. 
     While there is no express provision in the GATT specifically mentioning human rights, 
understandably due to the circumstances of its adoption in  1947, the same explanation 
cannot  be  given  concerning  the  WTO  which  was  established  by  the  Marrakesh 
Agreement in 1994, by which time the centrality of human rights in the development 
process had become sufficiently recognized. It would seem that the delegates were more 
concerned with formulating trade rules without adequate consideration of the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between trade and other social, economic and political values, 
such as human rights. To some extent, this is not totally surprisin g, since many trade 
experts do not see any connection between trade and human rights.
114  
     The implication of this is that like the other two institutions discussed, the WTO has 
had to reshape some of its policies and programmes in response to the growin g salience 
of human rights.  In this connection, the crucial task is to examine how the organization 
has been able to use its institutional architecture to assure the promotion and protection of 
human  rights  while  advancing  free  trade.  This  is  because  as  the  UN  Committee  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  pointed  out,  trade  liberalization  ‘must  be 
understood as a means, not an end. The end which trade liberalization should serve is the 
objective of human well-being to which the international human rights instruments give 
legal expression’.
115   
4.5.1   WTO and Human Rights  
Although  the  primary  function  of  the  WTO  is  to  promote  free  trade  and  eliminate 
discriminatory trade practices by states, a fundamental issue has been raised as to the 
degree of compatibility between this agenda and the need for the protection of human 
rights.  While  there  is  some  measure  of  agreement  on  the  correlation  between 
advancement  of  trade  rules  and  the  realization  of  human  rights,  it  is  problematic  to 
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establish the extent to which human rights can beneficially be integrated into trade rules 
without being undermined in the process. In this respect, reference may be ma de to the 
proposal  by  Ernst-Ulrich  Petersmann  for  a  United  Nations  ‘Global  Compact’  for 
integrating human rights law into WTO and other international economic institutions.
116 
The author contends that ‘citizen-driven market integration can provide strong incentives 
for  transforming  market  freedoms  into  fundamental  rights  which…can  reinforce  and 
extend the protection of basic human rights’
117 Petersmann consequently advocates for a 
right to free trade.
118 However, Petersmann’s model has received scathing criticism from 
international  human  rights  specialists.
119  In  a  remarkably  strong  opposition  to 
Petersmann’s approach, Professor Philip Alston has argued that it is one that 
 …is at best difficult to reconcile with international human rights law and at 
worst it would undermine it dramatically. In essence, the result of following the 
approach set out would be to hijack…international human rights law in a way 
which  would  fundamentally  redefine  its  contours  and  make  it  subject  to  the 
libertarian principles….’
120 
     Yet  it  can  be  said  that,  shorn  of  the  methodological  problems,  high  levels  of 
abstraction and the underpinning neo-liberal slant that characterize Petersmann’s proposal, 
it is possible to fashion a beneficial relationship between human rights and trade law in a 
manner capable of promoting social and economic development. This would be possible 
if  trade  law  were  appropriately  recognized  only  as  instrumental  to  the  attainment  of 
human  rights  among  other  social  and  economic  values,  rather  than  any  clamour  for 
constitutionalization of an assumed right to free trade and the quest for its recognition as 
a human right. Moreover, a sufficient integration of human rights norms within the WTO 
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system may well provide the necessary key to strengthen the Organization’s institutional 
legitimacy and serve the greater interest of humankind.
121 
Notwithstanding these theoretical disputations, the reality is that the practice of the WTO 
seems to have recognized the salience of human rights in  some areas of its operations, 
and it is to those areas that I now turn. 
4.5.1.1  Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
One aspect of human rights that has received significant recognition under the WTO 
regime and impacted its operations is intellectual property rights. This stems from the 
understanding that the protection of this right is essential for the advancement of trade. 
This  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995. However, the high protection given this right has been 
a source of controversy in recent  years as developing countries view it as skewed in 
favour of the interests of powerful industrial entities in the advanced countries.
122   Their 
fear is that high levels of intellectual property protection would not be appropriate to 
technology transfer and other social objectives such as the affordability and availability 
of essential medicines.
123 This is because many of the provisions of TRIPs reflect the 
views and demands of countries with powerful industrial lobbies for high levels of 
intellectual property protection.
124 It is arguably upon recognition of the validity of these 
views  that  the  WTO  General  Council  in  2002  approved  a  waiver  under  the  TRIPS 
Agreement exempting least developed countries from the obligation to provide exclusive 
marketing rights for any new drugs until 2016 with the opportunity for such countries to 
seek for additional extensions thereafter.
125 This waiver was granted to ensure that the 
protection of intellectual property right does not infringe on the right to health through 
impeding access to medication in developing countries especially with the prevalence of 
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the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
126 It equally brings to the fore the crucial question of dealing 
with a conflict between the exercise of intellectual property right and the right to health, a 
situation that took centre stage in South Africa and generated public outcry.
127   
     However, this interim waiver stands the risk of being undermined by the adoption of 
bilateral trade agreements where some of the developing countries are being pressured to 
enforce the intellectual property protection regimes earlier than the stipulated time under 
the WTO.
128 While the controversy over the beneficial or harmful effects of the global 
harmonization  of  intellectual  property  rights  for  developing  countries  rages, 
129 the 
fundamental nature of the right to health must be recognized and intellectual prope rty 
right made subservient to this higher human value. It is therefore important to strike a 
balance between the protection of intellectual property rights and the consequential right 
of access to medicines or even the need to promote economic development. 
4.5.1.2  WTO, Transparency and Participation 
One of the problems identified with the GATT was its extreme secrecy and the non-
participation  of  NGOs  and  other  interests  in  its  operations.  Accordingly,  in  order  to 
address this deficiency and enhance broader participation, the WTO Agreement gives 
some prominence to the participation of NGOs in its operations. Article V (2) of the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides that ‘the General Council 
may  make  appropriate  arrangements  for  consultation  with  non-governmental 
organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’.
130The Organization 
has thus initiated a number of reform measures designed to embed transparency
131 and 
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enhance NGO participation in its activities. The result has been a dramatic increase in the 
number of NGOs that normally participate in the organizations meetings. In this respect, 
the  Doha  Development  Agenda  adopted  at  the  Fourth  Ministerial  Conference  in 
November 2001 marked a watershed in the policy direction of the WTO.  It was at this 
conference that the WTO accepted the imperative of a policy change and re-focused its 
work on the situation of the world’s poorest nations and people. According to Christiana 
Ochoa, ‘…there is ample evidence that as a result of the Doha Development Agenda the 
WTO is undergoing a significant shift in its orientation and openness to human rights 
concerns and the welfare of the individuals affected by its work’.
132   
     Even though it can be said that with the Doha Development Agenda, the WTO is now 
more open and transparent in its operations, a number of concerns still remain in relation 
to the integration of human rights in its policies and programmes. In particular, three 
theoretical problems may be raised concerning the issue of inclusion and exclusion within 
the WTO system. In the first place, inclusion of NGOs alone is insufficient to guarantee 
adequate protection of human rights, since some of such organizations are either set up 
directly  or  funded  by  multinational  entities  to  serve  particular  economic  interests.
133 
Secondly,  only  those  civil  society  organizations  that  share  the  neo -liberal  values 
underpinning the activities of the WTO are generally accredited in furtherance of the 
provisions of the Agreement which mentions NGOs working in th e same area. The 
implication  of  this  is  that  such  organizations  will  readily  support  policies  and 
programmes designed to further the hegemonic version o f human rights. This would 
invariably entail the exclusion of NGOs that are opposed to the neo -liberal economic 
policies of the WTO. It raises the critical issue of a binary inclusion/exclusion which 
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eventually  impacts  on  the  legitimacy  of  the  organization.
134 Thirdly,  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  there  could  be  a  critical  issue  of  exclusion  even  within  a  supposedly 
inclusive framework. Thus an NGO may be included in the WTO system, but excluded 
from entering the ‘green room’ where actual negotiations take place. Similarly, some vital 
documents  may  be  classified  and  thus  outside  the  reach  of  NGOs  even  when  they 
participate at such deliberations. The enormity of these problems are underscored by the 
fact  that  even  among  states,  most  developing  and  less  developed  states  are  usually 
excluded  from  the  ‘green  room’  negotiations  thus  magnifying  the  lack  of  internal 
transparency  and the democratic deficit of the  organization. Worse still, in  a manner 
symptomatic of classic co-optation, a few of the developing countries, notably India, and 
Brazil have now been incorporated into the green room process, thus diluting the power 
of the developing countries to effectively challenge the process. As Rahul Singh points 
out, 
Ironically, countries that earlier used to mount a strong, vocal critique against the 
‘green – room’ process seem to have embraced the idea when they themselves 
are in a relatively advantageous position….In their new-found role of leaders of 
developing countries, India and Brazil meet with the US and EU and set the 
agenda for any potential agreement on the text for Doha round.
135  
These developments underscore the imperative of a more inclusive mechanism, which 
will  enhance  transparency  in  the  decision-making  process  through  the  effective 
involvement of NGOs in WTO activities as well as providing level playing ground for the 
member states. 
4.5.2  Human Rights Enabling Provision 
Although the text of the GATT does not explicitly list human rights as grounds for the 
exclusion of products, it nevertheless contains provisions which could be used by states 
to protect and promote human rights through trade by taking certain measures against 
other states that violate human rights.
136 An important provision in the GATT through 
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which the WTO can use the human rights filter over free trade rules is Article XX. The 
Article contains a wide range of exceptions which can be deployed by member states of 
WTO without violating the GATT. It provides inter alia that nothing in the GATT: 
Shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures… necessary to protect public morals… human, animal or plant 
life or health, [or] relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resource 
measures… essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or 
local short supply [and]… relating to the products of prison labour’ 
This provision indicates a clear recognition of the need to have trade rules subject to a 
range  of  human  interests  and  basic  values,  providing  a  useful  avenue  for  substantial 
integration of human rights within the framework of the WTO.
137 It must be acknowledged 
however, that under GATT, this Article was given a restrictive interpretation that did not reflect 
this understanding.
138 With the creation of the WTO and the growing salience of human 
rights it is hoped that the Dispute Settlement Body would find itself able to re-interpret 
Article  XX  in  a  manner  that  incorporates  human  rights  as  one  of  the  exceptions 
mentioned in the Article. 
4.6  Appraising the impact of human rights on international 
economic   institutions  
The international economic institutions studied above have, to a greater or lesser extent, 
accepted  the  imperative  of  integrating  human  rights  in  their  policies  and  practices. 
Consequently, this study proposes to assess the kind of human rights that has been so 
adopted. As mentioned earlier, the malleability and global acclaim of the human rights 
corpus makes it susceptible to be appropriated and deployed to serve particular purposes. 
To be sure, the manner in which the institutions have deployed concepts such as ‘good 
governance’, and ‘rule of law’, both of which include human rights principles, indicate 
that they have only adopted the hegemonic version of human rights. Indeed, in some 
                                                 
137 Ibid, p.10; S.A. Aaronson, 2007, ‘Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are Penetrating the 
WTO’, 6(3) World Trade Review, pp.413-447 at 427-445. Contrast however, the position by Tatjana 
Eres who argues that ‘the WTO is not an appropriate forum for enforcing human rights law, and 
Article XX is not a legal back door’, T. Eres, 2004, ‘The Limits of GATT Article XX: A Back Door 
for Human Rights? 35   Georgetown Journal of International Law, pp.597-635, at -.      
138 In the Thai Cigarette (Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report 
of the Panel, (1990)37 BISD200, and the Tuna Dolphin Cases. (United States-Restrictions on Imports 
of Tuna(1991)30 I.L.M 1594; United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, (1994) 33 I.L.M 936.      190 
instances, they have merely used the vocabulary of human rights  in order to provide 
legitimacy to their actions.  Antony Anghie points out that under these circumstances: 
 …  the  principal  danger  is  that  important  economic  actors  who  are  primarily 
concerned  with  profit  and  promotion  of  a  problematic  form  of  economic 
development are increasingly appropriating and distorting the language of rights 
to justify and legitimize their own actions. These actions often produce results 
completely  contrary  to  the  human  rights  goals  of  preserving  and  protecting 
human  dignity.  Consequently,  any  alliance  between  human  rights  and 
globalization could result in the assimilation of human rights and its ideals by the 
formidable forces of globalization’.
139  
 The  significance  of  this  point  stems  from  the  fact  that  these  international  economic 
institutions  are  fundamentally  committed  to  the  neo-liberal  economic  policies  of 
liberalization,  deregulation  and  privatization  as  a  means  of  achieving  development  – 
policies  that  privilege  the  interest  of  hegemonic  forces  and  global  capital,  and  have 
proven  inadequate  to  deal  with  the  monumental  problems  of  underdevelopment 
confronting African countries.
140  In a remarkable empirical study, Rodwan Abouharb and 
David Cingranelli have found that rather than enhance economic development and the 
human rights of Africans, structural adjustment programmes actually have the opposite 
effect. After examining 131 developing countries over the period 1981-2004 including 
several African countries, using the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), they came to 
the following conclusion.  
The findings presented indicate that the consequences of the World Bank and 
IMF structural adjustment agreements lowered levels of government respect for 
economic and social rights, contributing to a deterioration in the situation for the 
mass of the population in these countries. The impacts of these agreements have 
been detrimental to those countries entering into them, even accounting for the 
selection effects of these institutions. In the debate over how best to promote the 
Millennium Development Goals, the path undertaken by the World Bank and 
IMF  of  neo-liberal  rapid  economic  liberalization  appears  to  be  having  the 
opposite of the intended effect. Instead of promoting high-quality or equitable 
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economic  growth  that  lifts  the  poor  out  of  poverty  and  social  misery,  the 
consequences of these programs have been to perpetuate these conditions.
141 
They however found that the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in 
these countries had improved procedural democracy in the countries where it was applied. 
According  to  them,  ‘Prolonged  exposure  to  structural  adjustment  has  led  to  greater 
respect for a variety of important procedural democratic rights.’
142 This positive impact in 
relation to procedural democratic rights is not surprising and can be explained from two 
main perspectives. In the first place, the institutions have recently been deeply involved 
in the promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law. This promotion of 
human rights is also one of the pillars (even though a faulty one) of the US foreign policy 
which  enjoins  it  to  support  the  grant  of  financial  assistance  to  countries  that  respect 
human rights, later interpreted to mean democracy promotion. Secondly, as will be shown 
shortly, the kind of democratic rights promoted by these measures are those that focus on 
the minimal elements emblematic of representative democracy such as regular elections, 
freedom  to  vote,  the  presence  of  political  parties  that  take  part  in  elections.  These 
measures neither insist on, nor do they result in a maximalist conception of human rights 
embodied in participatory democracy.
143 
     Accordingly, the marketization of human rights embedded in the neo-liberal paradigm 
needs to be reappraised and the historical conception of human rights as a liberating force 
for the protection of human dignity and social justice recovered and restored.
144 From this 
perspective, it is fitting to draw attention to the attendant danger in the neo-liberal human 
rights paradigm as highlighted by Professor Upendra Baxi who maintains that:
145 
I believe that the paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
being  steadily  supplanted  by  a  trade-related,  market-friendly,  human  rights 
paradigm. This new paradigm reverses the notion that universal human rights are 
designed for the dignity and well-being of human beings and insists, instead, 
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upon the promotion and protection of the collective rights of global capital in 
ways that ‘justify’ corporate well-being and dignity over that of human persons’.  
However, while there is some justification for this alarm raised by Baxi, his position 
unduly  venerates  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  whereas  the  Universal 
Declaration  paradigm  itself  was  formulated,  laced  and  coloured  by  the  political  and 
economic  philosophy  of  liberalism.  The  current  neo-liberal  globalization  process  has 
merely brought into sharper focus the elemental aspects of the hegemonic conception of 
human rights embedded in that paradigm. 
     In relation to ‘good governance’, it is pertinent to mention that the World Bank uses 
the doctrine as a justification for seeking to shape the political and legal institutions of a 
borrower  country,  its  argument  being  that  proper  implementation  of  Bank-formulated 
development  programmes  can  only  be  achieved  by  accountable,  transparent,  and 
democratic government. In a sense, such advocacy of good governance complements the 
commitment  of  human  rights  law  for  more  democratic  and  accountable  governments 
world-wide. However, predicating their promotion of good governance on neo-liberal 
economic principles has, ironically, often resulted in significant violations, rather than 
protection, of human rights in Africa.
146 
     Furthermore, although the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO have been vocal in 
advocating the virtues of good governance, democracy, accountability, and rule of law, a 
study of their governanc e structure and operations show   that they are fundamentally 
undemocratic institutions.
147 For instance, in relation to the World Bank, any question 
relating  to  the  interpretation  of  its  Articles  of  Agreement  is  usually  handled  by  the 
Executive Directors.
148  Thus an essentially legal question is decided by a non-legal body, 
which is a fundamental departure from  the ‘rule of law’ requiring that executive actions 
be subject to review by an independent judicial process. Moreover, the decision-making 
structures of these institutions are heavily weighted in favour of the advanced capitalist 
                                                 
146 A. Anghie, 2004, note 59, p.260. Contrast this position with the view of Sergio Leite who argues, in the 
case of the IMF, that ‘the work of the IMF should not be seen as a threat to human rights, but as a key 
contribution’ to its realization. Leite, 2001, note 107, ibid. 
147 A. Anghie, 2000, note 2, p.270. 
148 By virtue of Article IX(a) and (b).Similarly, Article XXIX(a) and (b) of the Articles of Agreement of 
IMF provides that any question of interpretation of  the provisions of the Agreement arising between 
any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive 
Board for decision, and where a member is dissatisfied with the decision, the matter shall be referred to 
the Board of Governors whose decision shall be final.    193 
states, which happen to be their majority shareholders. As Duncan Green has pithily 
remarked, while in general, the United Nations system largely works on a ‘one country, 
one vote’ principle, ‘decisions at the IMF and World Bank are taken on the basis of ‘one 
dollar, one vote’ thus guaranteeing the dominance of the USA and other major donors.
149  
Not surprisingly, their decisions very often reflect the underlying economic and political 
views of these countries. 
     Additionally, the tenor and content of the good governance mantra renders invisible 
the responsibility of these international economic institutions for the problems sought to 
be addressed;  yet  the institutions  were, in  some significant  respects,  complicit  in  the 
woeful economic conditions of these African countries where they imposed the now-
discredited Structural Adjustment Programmes. The point is that it was the adoption of 
the prescriptions of these institutions by the borrower African countries in the first place 
that brought most of these countries to their present economic predicament. For instance, 
as Michel Chossudovsky has pointed out, it was the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment  Programmes  (SAPs)  in  Somalia  and  Rwanda  that  partly  led  to  the 
intensification of social and ethnic conflicts in these states.
150  
     Next,  from  the human rights perspective, the PRSP adopted by the IMF and the 
attempt to enhance participation within the structures of the WTO suffer f rom the 
problem of lack of sufficient substantive content, and reinforce selective implementation 
mechanisms that exclude a large proportion of those that should be the main beneficiaries 
of the programmes. This is underpinned  by the current transparency,  democracy, and 
participation deficits and gaps plaguing these institutions and the increasing calls for their 
restructuring.
151  
     In consideration of the foregoing problems and challenges, one is constrained to agree 
with the sentiment that has been so aptly put: 
                                                 
149 D. Green, 2008, note 36, pp.296-297; J. Glenn, 2008, ‘Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit: 
Stifling the Voice of the South’, 29(2) Third World Quarterly, pp.217-238 at 218-220. 
150 M. Chossudovsky, 1998,  The  Globalization of  Poverty: Impacts  of  IMF and  World  Bank  Reforms, 
London: Zed Books Ltd, pp.101-120. 
151 Notable voices in this direction include: N. Woods, 2008, From Intervention to Cooperation: Reforming 
the IMF and the World Bank, London: Progressive Governance, pp.4-9; J.E. Stiglitz, 2008, ‘The Future 
of  Global  Governance’,  N.  Serra,  and  J.E.  Stiglitz,  eds.  The  Washington  Consensus  Reconsidered: 
Towards a New Global Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.309-323 at 319-322.   194 
Humanity has reached the limits of an era of centralized institutional power and 
control. The global corporation, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank are 
structured to concentrate power in the hands of the ruling elites shielded from 
public accountability. They represent an outmoded, undemocratic, inefficient and 
ultimately destructive way of organizing human affairs that is out of step with the 
needs and values of healthy, sustainable democratic societies as the institution of 
monarchy’.
152  
4.7  Conclusion 
 The contemporary embrace and deployment of the language of rights by international 
economic  institutions  through  the  use  of  such  concepts  and  programmes  as  good 
governance,  poverty  reduction,  and  increased  transparency  in  their  operational 
mechanisms, represents an incremental change and welcome acceptance of the relevance 
of human rights by these institutions. Starting from an initial position of discomfort with 
the  language  and  practice  of  human  rights,  this  new  approach  must  be  seen  as 
representing modest harvests in the efforts to integrate human rights in the policies and 
programmes of the institutions. Springing from an increased understanding of the broad 
nature of their mandates – as institutions involved in accelerating the social and economic 
development  of states  under the existing neo-liberal  paradigm  – the institutions  have 
found refuge in  the hegemonic version of human rights  with  its  emphasis  on formal 
provisions and structures.  
     This  acceptance  provides  a  useful  platform,  and  indeed,  poses  a  fundamental 
challenge  for  human  rights  theorists  and  activists  to  insist  on  the  deployment  of  the 
counter-hegemonic conception of human rights by these institutions to midwife a more 
democratic  and  equitable  globalization  process.  This  entails  recuperating  the 
emancipatory potential of human rights as the touchstone for their operations. Since we 
are in an ‘age of rights’,
153 the human rights corpus should provide a powerful framework 
                                                 
152  International  Forum  on  Globalization,  A  Better  World  is  Possible!  Alternatives  to  Economic 
Globalization;  cited  from  A.B.  Zampetti,  2003,  ‘Democratic  Legitimacy  in  the  World  Trade 
Organization: The Justice Dimension’ 37(1) Journal of World Trade, pp.105-126, at 105. 
153  L. Henkin, 1990, The Age of Rights, New York: Columbia University Press, p.xvii. This proclamation is 
reflective of the general acceptance of human rights, though this acceptance is often rhetorical, as the 
touchstone underpinning social and economic development.   195 
guiding the operations of international economic institutions in their bid to advance the 
economic development of African States, among others. 
     This  will  ensure  that  human  rights  norms  do  not  merely  adjust  the  outcomes  of 
globalization, in  a manner reflected in  such phrases  as  ‘civilizing  globalization’
154 or 
‘humanising globalization’,
155 but that human rights itself determine the manner in which 
globalization occurs in the first place. The fact that the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO (back then in its embryonic form as GATT) were created over 60 years ago with 
different  economic  and  political  philosophies  which  had  no  consideration  for  human 
rights, and are now being called upon to perform functions and internalize principles and 
values that were never contemplated at the time of their founding, makes it imperative for 
the institutions to be fundamentally restructured with the human rights filter to build on 
the modest harvests recorded, and meet the increasing demands of  a changing world 
society. The succeeding chapters will examine how some selected African States have 
responded to the growing salience of human rights in the development process within the 
context of globalization. 
                                                 
154   D.  Kinley,  2009,  Civilizing  Globalization:  Human  Rights  and  the  Global  Economy,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.1.  
155 M. Camdessus, 2004, ‘The IMF at the start of the twenty-first century: what has been learned? On which 
values can we establish a humanised globalisation? D. Vines and C.L. Gilbert, The IMF and its Critics: 




Selected African Case Studies 
 
This part of the thesis examines the practice in three selected African states to test the 
validity of the argument. It highlights the interaction between globalization and human 
rights in these countries through the response of groups and human rights organizations 
to the processes of globalization. The selected countries, namely, South Africa, Nigeria, 
and Kenya are not only strategic in their various regions but play important roles in Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole. While South Africa is an important state in Southern Africa, 
Nigeria plays a crucial role in West Africa, as the most populous African state. Kenya, on 
its part, is a key state in Eastern Africa and is generally regarded as the most stable and 
industrialised country in that region. It can therefore be said that apart from minor local 
variations between countries, which are inevitable, the developments in these states can 
be taken to be representative of the general trend in sub-Saharan Africa.  
     The  case  studies  amply  support  my  contention  that  a  mutual  relationship  exists 
between globalization and human rights, a connection that has the potential of enhancing 














   197 
Chapter 5:   Globalization and Human Rights in Africa: 
Perspectives on South Africa 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to examine the relationship between globalization and human rights in 
Africa with particular reference to South Africa. The central purpose is to demonstrate that 
even within national systems the relationship is not a linear one, but is reflective of a two-
way  traffic,  with  human  rights  norms  impacting  on  key  elements  that  underpin  the 
globalization process, in the same way that the latter has been instrumental to the adoption of, 
and the nature of, human rights principles applied in states. 
     In  the  specific  case  of  South  Africa,  the  nature  of  the  mutual  relationship  between 
globalization  and  human  rights  has  additionally  been  defined  and  intertwined  with  the 
country’s recent history of social and economic inequality which was the hallmark of the 
apartheid policy previously practised in the country. This historical element has played a 
fundamental role in shaping the constitutional framework, the kind of laws and policies now 
in place in South Africa, and the country’s response to the globalization process. While the 
extent to which the Constitution and the derivative laws and policies contribute to the social 
and economic transformation of the country are issues of continuing debate,
1 the focus of this 
chapter is on how the human rights norms informing those laws and policies have interacted, 
and continues to interact, with the globalization process in the country. In significant ways 
therefore, the Republic of South Africa provides a veritable platform for examining how 
African states have used human rights norms at tentive to their historical circumstances in 
grappling  with  the  developmental  challenges.  For  one  thing,  and  with  minor  national 
variations,  the  social  and  economic  challenges  confronting  the  country  epitomize  the 
situation in other African countries after several years of political independence. For another, 
the African National Congress (ANC)-led South Africa is a leading voice in the continent 
advocating the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies dictated by contemporary economic 
                                                 
1 P. Langa, 2006, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’, 17(3) Stellenbosch Law Review, pp.351-360 at 355-
359, where the Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa outlined the transformative challenges 
facing the country and the role that legal mechanisms can play in their resolution.   198 
globalization as the only path to the development of the continent.
2 This makes it more fitting 
to examine the interaction between components of the globalization process and human 
rights in the country. It is proposed to carry out this task through examining some specific 
provisions  of  the  S outh  African  Constitution,  the  b road-based  Black  Economic 
Empowerment Scheme, and bilateral investment treaties between South Africa and other 
countries.   
     As the fundamental law of the country, the  South African  Constitution is not only the 
starting point in this analysis, but also provides the background for the exploration of the 
other themes of this chapter. Indeed, it will be shown that the Constitution itself is a classic 
manifestation of the mutual impact between globalization an d human rights as some of the 
provisions therein  sought  to accommodate the mutual interests of capital driven by the 
requirements of economic globalization, and human rights. Furthermore, I will demonstrate 
that using the provisions on social and economic  rights in the South African Constitution, 
human rights NGOs and other social movements have catalyzed  remarkable policy changes 
that impact on the  globalization process in the country ,  thus indicating the potential of 
counter-hegemonic forces in that society.  
     Though operating within the framework of the neo -liberal economic paradigm, and thus 
with limited  progressive effects, the South African government has also used the equality 
provisions in the Constitution as a basis for adopting some economic empowerment measures 
that mediate the relationship between globalization and human rights. On the other hand, and 
indicative of the impact of globalization, the government has also concluded several bilateral 
investment  agreements  with  other  s tates  that  give  priority  to  economic  considerations, 
namely, the promotion of foreign investment over the human rights of South Africans. Yet 
even within this compass some stipulations of these treaties have been made subject to the 
human rights provisions of the Constitution.  
     Drawing from the South African situation, I conclude the chapter by positing that in light 
of the demonstrable mutual relationship between globalization and human rights, a proper 
                                                 
2 This position is evident in its adoption of neo-liberal economic policies such as Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) and its support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a 
manifestly  neo-liberal  development  framework  as  we  saw  in  chapter  3.  Though  hugely  ironic  and 
disappointing, considering the radical position of the ANC before assumption of political power, such 
volte face’ have been identified as the trademark of nationalist movements once in power. M. Hardt, and 
A.  Negri,  2001,  Empire,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  p.133.  The  African 
National Congress shall hereinafter be referred to simply as ‘ANC’.     199 
utilization of the latter especially the counter-hegemonic version, can enable African states to 
effectively deal with the continent’s developmental challenges, even within the context of 
contemporary globalization. 
 
5.2  Globalization, Human Rights and the South African 
Constitution 
The adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996 with the advent of majority rule was 
a significant milestone in the country’s history. Not only did it signal the end of apartheid and 
its discriminatory policies, it also marked the incorporation of South Africa into the new 
phase of global capitalism that was spreading after the end of the Cold War.
3 The South 
African Constitution was therefore largely shaped by the political, economic and social 
struggles that took place in the country in the period preceding its adoption coloured by 
developments in the international scene. This is manifest in the constitutional framework that 
eventually emerged, the elaborate provisions in the Bill of Rights and specifically, the 
provisions relating to property rights, equality and the application of international law in the 
country.   
     The Constitution sets the tone for the radical transformation of South African society by 
stating in the preamble that its objective is to: 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person…’
4 
 This transformative vision is further buttressed by the fact that the Constitution applies to all 
spheres of life, and is not limited to the relation between the state and citizens. In other words, 
                                                 
3 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 were momentous events 
that signalled the end of the ideological war between East and West and the emergence of a single 
hegemon, the United States of America spreading the gospel of capitalism worldwide. M.R. Ishay, 2008, 
The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, pp.246-247. 
4 As Marius Pieterse puts it, ‘the Constitution expressly strives towards the egalitarian transformation of 
society and the achievement of social justice…’, M. Pieterse, 2004, ‘Coming to terms  with judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights’, 20(3) South African Journal on Human Rights, pp.383-417 at 
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it stipulates the vertical and horizontal application of human rights in the country, a provision 
that holds the promise for revolutionary constitutionalism.
5 
Another important point in relation to the Constitution which has salience for the place of 
human rights in South Africa and the present inquiry is the pre-eminent position occupied by 
the Constitutional Court in the country’s legal system. Not only is it the final appeal court in 
relation to constitutional matters,
6 but also, and largely because of this, its judgments have  
played a significant role in the social transformation of the country. Jackie Dugard and 
Theunis Roux underscore this point when they assert that:
 7   
The Constitutional Court is … today the most powerful court in South Africa, 
and one that has expressly committed itself to overseeing the transformation of 
the South African legal system so as to reflect the needs, values and aspirations 
of the country’s predominantly poor black majority.
  
Although the normative underpinning and practical effect of its decisions on the enforcement 
of social and economic rights have some sour points, as will be shown later in this work, it 
can  be  said  that  in  general,  its  judgments  have  given  hope  for  more  purposeful  and 
accountable government policies designed to ensure the social and economic transformation 
of the country.
8 
     In  using  the  South  African  Constitution  as  a  window  for  examining  the  mutual 
relationship between globalization and human rights in the country, the focal point of my 
analysis will be on social and economic rights, and property rights and compensation under 
the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
5 J. W.G. Van der Walt, 2005, Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law, London: 
Birkbeck Law Press, pp33-53; J.W.G. Van der Walt, 2003, ‘The Horizontal Application of Fundamental 
Rights and the Threshold of the Law in view of the Carmichele Saga’, 19(4) South African Journal on 
Human Rights, pp.517-540 at 535-536. 
6 S.167 (3) (a) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa provides that the Constitutional Court ‘is the 
highest court in all constitutional matters’. 
7 J. Dugard, and T. Roux, 2006, ‘The Record of the South African Constitutional Court in providing an 
institutional voice for the poor: 1995-2004’, R. Gargarella, et al (eds.), Courts and Social Transformation 
in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor?, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. pp.107-
125  at  108.  The  jurisprudential  underpinnings  of  the  transformative  agenda  are  explored  in  S. 
Liebenberg, 2006, ‘Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights’, 17(1) Stellenbosch 
Law Review, pp.5-36 at 33-36. 
8 R.J. Goldstone, 2006, ‘A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights’, 13(2) Human Rights 
Brief, pp.4-7 at 7; D. Moseneke, 2002, ‘The Fourth Brian Fischer Memorial Lecture: Transformative 
Adjudication’, 18(3) South African Journal on Human Rights, pp.309-319 at 313-319.   201 
5.2.1  Social and Economic Rights under the South African Constitution 
 
5.2.1.1   Background and Normative Framework  
Since the end of the Cold War there has been increased recognition of the salience of social 
and  economic  rights.  It  should  be  recalled  that  during  that  period  the  ideological  battle 
between East and West epitomized in socialism and capitalism respectively, ensured that each 
ideological  orientation  gave  prominence  to  its  preferred  set  of  rights.  Western  capitalist 
countries extolled civil and political rights, while the then Soviet Union and its allies gave 
prominence (even if rhetorically), to social and economic rights. For Western countries, this 
meant  that social  and economic  rights  were treated as  ‘untouchables’ during this  period, 
although the welfare ethos in these countries precluded an open backlash against the non-
enforceability  of  such  rights.
9   It can therefore be said that  though often disguised, the 
discourse  of  socia l  and  economic  rights  today  and  their  level  of  accep tability  and 
enforceability in states is one that carries a lot of ideological baggage. 
     However, the tide has considerably changed with the near global ascendancy of neo -
liberal orthodoxy and increasingly, Western states, prodded by academic writers, are now 
more prepared to concede to the justiciability of social and economic rights.
10 The growing 
international recognition of such rights is reflected in the voluminous normative outpourings 
by the United Nations treaty bodies, notably the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
on this subject in recent times. In particular, it has elaborated the concept of minimum core 
aspects of social and economic rights that must be given attention by states. For example, in 
General Comment 3 (1990) the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights stated that: 
[It] is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at 
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every  State  party.  Thus,  for  example,  a  State  party  in  which  any  significant 
                                                 
9  Realizing  the  manifest  inequality  and  poverty  precipitated  by  capitalism,  a  number  of  welfare 
programmes were put in place in industrialized capitalist states. These include unemployment benefits, 
free health care programmes and selective free education schemes. However, symptomatic of the crisis of 
capitalism,  these  are  now  increasingly  been  dismantled  or  seriously  threatened  in  response  to  the 
demands of economic globalization. 
10 However, voices of opposition (admittedly limited) to the enforceability of social and economic rights 
can still be heard; such as A. Neier, 2006, ‘Social and Economic Rights: A Critique’, 13(2)  Human 
Rights Brief, pp.1-3.   202 
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary 
health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education, 
is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligation under the Covenant. In order for 
a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort 
has been made to use all resources that are at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as 
a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.
11 
This prevailing global notion about the desirability of making social and economic rights 
justiciable  found  expression  in  the  new  South  African  Constitution  which  specifically 
provides  for  the  enforceability  of  such  rights,  together  with  civil  and  political  rights.  In 
several respects therefore, and in terms of Professor Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ eminent 
categorization, this development can be regarded as a case of localized globalism, where 
global acceptability of a particular norm has been localized in the national sphere.
12  
     Equally signal is the fact that the South African Constitution enjoins the courts to  have 
recourse to international law in interpreting constitutional rights,
13 a provision that enables 
South African law to conform to international standards of human rights jurisprudence. 
Moreover, the Constitution builds upon, and elaborates the indivisibility and enforceability of 
both civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights contained in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
14 It is relevant here to bear in mind that the 
African Charter does not discriminate between both categories of rights in terms of their 
enforceability. The South African Constitution thus gives further flesh and impetus to the 
provisions  of  the  African  Charter  in  this  regard.  To  be  sure,  the  social  and  economic 
conditions of South Africa, as in other African countries, make it even more imperative for 
                                                 
11 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.3: The Nature of States 
Parties Obligations (Art.2, para.1 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990), at para.10. Recently, 
on  10  December  2008  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  adopted  the  Optional  Protocol  to  the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
12 B. de Sousa Santos, 2002, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation, 
2
nd  ed.  London:  Butterworths  LexisNexis,  p.179.  Roland  Robertson  on  his  part  refers  to  such 
developments  as  the  ‘particularization  of  universalism’.  R.  Robertson,  1992,  Globalization:  Social 
Theory and Global Culture, London: Sage, p.102.  
13 S.39(1) (b) of the Constitution. 
14 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, reprinted in 21  International Legal Materials (1982) 59. It entered 
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these rights to be justiciable. As the President of the South African Constitutional Court, 
Chaskalson, P. pointed out in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal: 
15  
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of 
people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high 
level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access 
to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed 
when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to 
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and 
equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these 
conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.
16 
     If anything, these conditions necessitate the adoption of counter-hegemonic pressures in 
order to catalyze both national and international actions to improve the conditions of the 
masses in African countries. The entrenchment of social and economic rights in the South 
African Constitution is therefore recognition of such concerns and provides a useful platform 
for  advocacy  for  their  realization.  The  Constitutional  Court  recently  acknowledged  the 
emancipatory potential of social and economic rights when it declared in Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg
17 that: ‘Social and economic rights empower citizens to demand of the State 
that it act reasonably and progressively to ensure that all enjoy the basic necessities of life. In 
so doing, the social and economic rights enable citizens to hold government to account for 
the manner in which it seeks to pursue the achievement of social and economic rights’.
18 
 
5.2.1.2  Social and Economic Rights and the Challenge to Power  
Drawing inspiration from the relevance of social and economic rights, human rights NGOs and 
social  movements  in  South  Africa  have  commendably  confronted  power  relations  in  a 
country steeped in the neo-liberal economic paradigm. This position was brought to sharp 
                                                 
15 1998 (1) SA 765. 
16 1998 (1) SA 765, 770-771. 
17 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
18 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at p.20. To be effective however, rights -based strategies for social change must be 
adopted within the broader framework of progressive social movements; A. Hunt, 1990, ‘Rights and 
Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies’, 17(3) Journal of Law and Society, pp.309-328 at 
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focus in the case of Minister of Health and Others (No.2) Vs. Treatment Action Campaign 
and Others 
19 
     The  Treatment  Action  Campaign  (TAC)  and  other  civil  society  groups  working  on 
HIV/AIDS  instituted  this  action  against  the  national  Minister  of  Health  and  the  various 
Provincial  authorities  challenging  the  decision  of  the  government  to  restrict  access  to  a 
particular drug to designated health institutions. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a major public 
health problem in South Africa and one of the most common methods of transmission of HIV 
in children is from mother to child at and around birth. The Medicines Control Council 
having found Nevirapine suitable for reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV registered it for use for this purpose. 
     In July 2000 the manufacturers of Nevirapine offered to make it available to the South 
African government free of charge for a period of five years, for the purposes of reducing the 
risk  of  mother-to-child  transmission  of  HIV.  The  government  however  decided  to  make 
Nevirapine available only at a limited number of pilot sites, which number two per province 
with the result that those doctors in the public sector, who do not work at any of the pilot 
sites, could not prescribe this drug for their patients, even though it has been offered to the 
government for free. 
     The applicants contended that this conduct of the government was irrational, in breach of 
the  Bill  of  Rights,  and  contrary  to  the  values  and  principles  prescribed  for  public 
administration in section 195 of the Constitution and in breach of its international obligations. 
The Constitutional Court in adumbrating its approach to the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights stated that under the South African Constitution:  
The state is obliged to take reasonable measures progressively to eliminate or 
reduce the large areas of severe deprivation that afflict our society. The courts 
will  guarantee  that  the  democratic  processes  are  protected  so  as  to  ensure 
accountability,  responsiveness  and  openness,  as  the  Constitution  requires  in 
section  1.  As  the  Bill  of  Rights  indicates, their  function  in  respect  of  socio-
economic rights is directed towards ensuring that legislative and other measures 
taken by the state are reasonable. 
                                                 
19 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).For a critical assessment of this case, see, S. Friedman, and S. Mottiar, 2005, ‘A 
Rewarding Engagement? The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of HIV/AIDS’, 33(4) Politics 
and  Society,  pp.511-565;  H.  Klug,  2008,  ‘Law,  Politics,  and  Access  to  Essential  Medicines  in 
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The Court held that the action of the state in this regard was not reasonable and it ordered the 
government to remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from being made available for 
the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV at public hospitals 
and clinics that are not research and training sites, and permit and facilitate the use of the 
drug for that purpose by making it available at hospitals and clinics where it is medically 
indicated. 
     In this particular instance, the Treatment Action Campaign was able to combine legal and 
political modes of action in carrying out its campaign of affordable treatment for people 
living  with  HIV/AIDS  and  pregnant  women  in  order  to  reduce  the  mother -to-child 
transmission of the disease.
20 The activities of TAC and other NGOs can thus be described as 
a challenge from ‘below’ to the dominant forms of state power which was able in this case to 
constrain the conduct of a state steeped in the dictates of the neo-liberal paradigm. As Heinz 
Klug points out, ‘the court’s decision to require the government to extend the provision of 
Nevirapine throughout the public health system represented a major success for civil society 
and legal strategies to enforce socio-economic rights’.
21  
     The case of Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others vs. Grootboom and 
Others 
22 also  provided  an  opportunity  for  deploying  the  enforceability  of  social  and 
economic rights to constrain the action of the government in relation to the provision of 
housing. Irene Grootboom and most other respondents (390 adults and 510 children) lived in 
a squatter settlement called Wallacedene. Their living conditions were ‘lamentable’: very low 
income  population,  overcrowded  shacks  (95%  of  which  lacked  electricity),  no  water  or 
sewage or refuse removal services, the area partly waterlogged and dangerously close to a 
                                                 
20 R. Greenstein, 2004, ‘Socio-economic Rights, Radical Democracy, and Power: South Africa as a Case 
Study’, N. Gordon, ed. From the Margins of Globalization: Critical Perspectives on Human Rights, 
Oxford:  Lexington  Books,  pp.87-126  at  115.  Significantly,  even  after  the  judgment,  the  TAC  also 
mobilized several other groups and volunteers to embark on a ‘disobedience campaign’ in order to force 
the government to comply with the court ruling and stop using delaying tactics to avoid putting in place a 
treatment plan’. R. Greenstein, 2004, p.119. 
21 H. Klug, 2005, ‘Campaigning for Life: Building a new transnational solidarity in the face of HIV/AIDS 
and TRIPS’, B. de Sousa Santos, and C.A. Rodriguez-Garavito, eds. Law and Globalization from Below: 
Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.118-139 at 123. On the 
potential  of  social  movements  to  deploy  the  constitutional  provisions  and  the  social  and  economic 
conditions in South Africa to promote social progress, see T. Madlingozi, 2007, Post-Apartheid Social 
Movements and the Quest for the Elusive ‘New’ South Africa’, 34(1) Journal of Law and Society, pp.77-
98 at 91-96.  
22 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers, 2005 (1) SA 217.    206 
main thoroughfare. Many inhabitants who had applied for subsidized low-cost housing from 
the municipality had been on the waiting list up to seven years. 
     Facing the prospect of indefinitely long intolerable conditions, respondents began to move 
out of Wallacedene in September 1998, putting up shacks on va cant privately owned land 
(named ‘New Rust’) that was earmarked for eventual low-cost housing. Court proceedings 
brought  by  the  owner  resulted  in  an  order  of  May  1999  instructing  the  sheriff  to  evict 
respondents  and  dismantle  their  shacks.  The  magistrate  also  ordered  the  parties  and 
municipality to identify alternative land for permanent or temporary occupation by the New 
Rust  residents.  No  mediation  occurred,  and  the  respondents  were  evicted,  their  houses 
bulldozed and possessions destroyed. They then took shelter on the Wallacedene sports fields 
under such temporary structures as were feasible, at the time when winter rains began. 
     The respondents’ court-appointed attorney then applied to the Cape of Good Hope High 
Court for an order requiring the government to provide them with adequate basic housing 
until they obtained permanent accommodation. The High Court ordered the appellants to 
provide the respondents who were children and their parents with shelter. The appellants, 
representing  all  spheres  of  government  responsible  for  housing  (central  government, 
province of the Western Cape, and Municipality), brought the present appeal to challenge that 
order. It is important to mention that S.26 of the South African Constitution provides as 
follows: 
‘1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
2)  The  state  must  take  reasonable  legislative  and  other  measures,  within  its  available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions’. 
     The Constitutional Court, held that since S.7 (2) of the Constitution requires the state ‘to 
respect,  protect,  promote  and  fulfil  the  rights  in  the  Bill  of  Rights’  the  courts  are 
constitutionally bound to ensure that they are protected and fulfilled. According to the Court, 
‘the  question  is  therefore  not  whether  socio-economic  rights  are  justiciable  under  our 
Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case’. It further held that since S.26 (2) of 
the Constitution requires the state to devise and implement within its available resources a   207 
comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to 
adequate housing, any programme so developed must include reasonable measures to provide 
relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in 
intolerable conditions or crisis situations, and that the programme adopted by the authorities 
in this particular case fell short of the obligations imposed in that it failed to make reasonable 
provision within its available resources for people in the situation of the Respondents.  
     Similarly, in the recent case of Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others
23 
the Constitutional Court reiterated its approach to the enforceability of social and economic 
rights under the South African Constitution. The applicants, residents of Phiri in Soweto, one 
of the poorer areas of the first respondent city, challenged the constitutionality of the city’s 
decision to supply 6 kilolitres of free water per month to every account-holder in the city on 
the  ground  that  the  policy  was  in  conflict  with  S.27  (1)  (b)  of  the  Constitution,  which 
provides that everyone has the right to access to sufficient water. The applicants also argued 
that the city’s installation of prepaid water meters for certain households was unlawful. The 
central question that arose for determination was the scope of the city’s obligations as an 
organ of state in guaranteeing access to sufficient water.  
     It  was  held  that the  citizens’ constitutional  right  of access  to  sufficient  water did  not 
require the state upon demand to provide every person with sufficient water without more; 
rather, it required the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures progressively to 
realise the achievement of the right of access to sufficient water, within available resources. 
Furthermore, that the obligation of progressive realisation imposed a duty on the state to 
continually review its policies to ensure that the achievement of the right is progressively 
realised even though on the strength of the evidence before it, it could not be said that the 
provision of 6 kilolitres of free water per household per month was unreasonable in the 
circumstance. 
     While to some extent, these decisions seem progressive,
24 the Court’s  rejection of the 
minimum core obligation in relation to the enforcement of social and economic rights has left 
                                                 
23 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). On the implications of this case for the enforcement of socio-economic rights in 
South  Africa,  see  M.  Wesson,  2011,  ‘Reasonableness  in  Retreat? The  Judgment  of  the  South  African 
Constitutional Court in Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg’, 11(2) Human Rights Law Review pp.390-405 
at pp.404-405. 
24 The decisions have received favourable comments both nationally and internationally. D. M. Davis, 
2008,  ‘Socio-economic  rights:  Do  they  deliver  the  goods?’,  6(3-4)  International  Journal  of   208 
a big scar on their relevance as transformative agents in South Africa. It may be mentioned 
that in the  Mazibuko case,
25 the Court relied on its earlier decisions in  Treatment Action 
Campaign 
26 and Grootboom 
27 and went further to reiterate its rejection of the minimum 
core obligation formula. It said: ‘In  Grootboom this court rejected the argument that the 
social and economic rights in our Constitution contain a minimum core which the State is 
obliged to furnish, the content of which should be determined by the courts’.
28 Adopting the 
reasoning in the earlier case the court declared: 
‘It  is  not  possible  to  determine  the  minimum  threshold  for  the  progressive 
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing without first identifying the 
needs  and  opportunities  for  the  enjoyment  of  such  a  right.  These  will  vary 
according  to  factors  such  as  income,  unemployment,  availability  of  land  and 
poverty. The differences between city and rural communities will also determine 
the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately 
depend on the economic and social history and circumstances of a country. All 
this  illustrates  the  complexity  of  the  task  of  determining  a  minimum  core 
obligation  for  the  progressive  realisation  of  the  right  of  access  to  adequate 
housing without having the requisite information on the needs and opportunities 
for the enjoyment of this right’.
29  
     This interpretation of the enforceability of social and economic rights under the South 
African Constitution invariably diminishes the utility of the constitutional provisions. It is my 
contention that for the enforcement of these constitutional rights to be meaningful, the courts 
must be able to determine in any particular case whether the measures taken by the state meet 
some  minimum  core  standards  that  define  the  relevance  and  existence  of  such  rights. 
Contrary to the court’s argument, it is even factors such as the income of applicants, their 
employment status, and level of poverty and similar indices that should be the basis for a 
court’s assessment as to whether the measures adopted by the state meet the minimum core 
for the category of persons affected. The courts are already familiar with the deployment of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Constitutional Law, pp.687-711 at 710; T. Roux, 2009, ‘Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa’, 7(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law, pp.106-138 at 124-125. 
25 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
26 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
27 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
28 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC), at p.18. 
29 Note 28, p.18.   209 
subjective  indices  in  the  determination  of  an  objective  standard  of  treatment  and  this 
approach can usefully be applied here.
30 Deriving from the constitutional commitment to the 
improvement of the quality of life of all South Africans and the promotion of equality, it is 
only proper that a minimum core obliga tion be required of the s tate in the progressive 
realization of enforceable social and economic rights. This is the only way to give teeth and 
relevance to these constitutional provisions.
31 
     The above criticism of the Constitutional Court’s approach notwithstanding, it can be said 
that the South African constitutional framework provides a useful model for other African 
states for the deployment of social and economic rights as instruments for constraining the 
globalization  process.  This  is  more  relevant  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  constitutions  of 
virtually all other African countries do not make social and economic rights enforceable.
32 
Provisions  relating  to  social  and  economic  rights  entitlements  are  merely  stated  as 
fundamental  objectives  and  directive  princ iples  of  s tate  policy  to  be  followed  by  the 
government and these are invariably not adhered to by African governments. It may however 
be questioned whether social and economic rights can provide the required purchase to 
constrain the globalization process only when they are made justiciable in constitutional 
instruments.  While  conscious  of  the  paradox  attendant  with  constitutionalization  or 
institutionalization of rights,
33 it is important to underline the fact that the inclusion of 
enforceable constitutional rights facilitates social activism for the realization of such rights as 
the South African situ ation amply demonstrates. I n countries  where these rights are not 
                                                 
30 It is trite for example, that in the determination of tortious liability and the standard of reasonableness in 
criminal law, the courts usually adopt the standard of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant 
– a mixture of subjectivity within a supposedly objective framework. It has also been suggested that the 
requirements  of  the  minimum  core  obligations  can  be  achieved  if  the  courts  exercise  supervisory 
jurisdiction by evaluating the measures outlined by the state as appropriate in giving effect to the affected 
rights. M. Wesson, 2004, ‘Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court’, 20(2) South African Journal on Human Rights’, pp.284-308 at 307. 
31 D. Bilchitz, 2002, ‘Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The minimum core and its importance’, 119 
South African Law Journal, pp.484-501 at 501; D. Bilchitz, 2007, Poverty and fundamental rights: The 
justification and enforcement of social and economic rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
32 It is however refreshing that the recent Kenyan Constitution adopted in August 2010, to a large extent, 
follows the South African model by making these rights enforc eable, though subject to the progressive 
realization formula; see S.43(1) and S.20(5) respectively of the Constitution. 
33 These are extensively examined in N. Stammers, 2009,  Human Rights and Social Movements, New 
York:  Pluto  Press,  pp.110-130.  In  particular,  Stammers  makes  the  point  at  p.104  that  ‘in  their 
institutionalised form, human rights stand in a complex and ambiguous relation to power.’ The problems 
of constitutionalization of rights are magnified within the framework of a neo-liberal economic order. 
G.W. Anderson, 2004, ‘Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism’, 17(1) Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, pp.31-59 at 39-41.   210 
justiciable,  even  decisions  from  regional  and  other  international  tribunals  may  not  be 
sufficiently  enforced.  In  this  connection,  reference  may  be  made  to  the  challenges  and 
problems of enforcement of decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. For instance, after over eight (8) years of its decision in the Social and Economic 
Rights Case,
34 the Nigerian government is yet to fully implement the recommendations of the 
Commission concerning the cleaning-up of Ogoniland devastated by the activities of Shell 
Petroleum  Oil  Company  with  the  active  support  and  encouragement  of  the  Nigerian 
government. 
     This emphasizes the need for constitutional provisions in African countries that make 
social and economic rights enforceable on the South African model. Only then can such 
rights play a more useful role in  confronting and  constraining power relations and the 
globalization process. 
 
5.2.1.3  Property Rights and Compensation under the Constitution 
Although  there  is  no  specific  mention  of  the  right  to  property  in  the  South  African 
Constitution, a number of provisions therein protect rights in property.
35 It may be mentioned 
that over the years the prominence given to property rights in constitutional documents had 
considerably waned, while some constitutions do not even mention it  expressly at all. This 
indicates the changing vagaries of the constitutional right to property which was previously 
extolled as the classic human right that required state protection through constitutional means.  
Nevertheless, concomitant with this trend and emphasizing the contradictory nature of the 
globalization process, there is also an emerging emphasis on the protection of property rights 
as a defining feature of economic globalization ,  and this mantra is being promoted by 
international economic institutions through their good governance advocacy. 
36 In order to 
balance these conflicting perspectives, the South African Constitution adopted a compromise 
position of not expressly guaranteeing the right , but making provision for the payment of 
                                                 
34 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR)  v.  Nigeria,  Communication  155/96,  (2001)  AHRLR60  (ACHPR2001)  (15
th Annual  Activity 
Report). 
35 S.25 of the Constitution provides that ‘no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’.  
36 The rhetoric of the good governance mantra by these institutions has been examined in some detail  in 
section 4.3.2.1 of chapter 4.   211 
compensation  in  the  event  of  interference  with  private  property.
37 The  provision  also 
represents a compromise between the initially ra dical position of the ANC on property 
through its advocacy for widespread nationalization, which would have required complete 
exclusion of a property clause in the Constitution, and the demands for strict protection of 
property through guaranteeing market  value compensation in the event of any interference 
with property.
38 The  compromise  is  also  attentive  to  South  Africa’s  particular  history  of 
dispossession and the need to ensure that redistributive rules and policies relating to property 
do not generate social disharmony.  
     In examining the interaction between the constitutional provisions on property rights and 
forces that underpin the globalization  process;  my focus  will be on rules relating to  the 
payment of compensation for interference with property, and efforts to constrain the exercise 
of patent rights in favour of the right to health. As discussed in chapter 3, the international 
standard for the payment of compensation in the event of interference with property rights 
has been a controversial issue in international law. While Western countries insist on the Hull 
formula  which  requires  that  the  payment  should  be  ‘prompt,  adequate  and  effective’, 
developing countries advocated a less demanding standard. On this score, United Nations 
General  Assembly  Resolutions  1803(XVII)
39  and  3281(XXIX)
40  embrace  the  position 
advocated by developing countries by specifying that compensation should be reasonable and 
subject  to  the laws  of  the host  s tate.  However,  as  a  form  of  legal  globalization,  and 
considering the unequal relations that exist in the international system, developing countries 
seem to have acquiesced or accepted the Western position embodying the Hull formula which 
is now the standard format contained in bilateral investment treaties. The debilitating effects 
of complying with its requirements are obvious for developing countries that do not have the 
resources to pay promptly the equivalent value of the property in question in the event of 
nationalization  or  other  forms  of  in terference  with  property.  Su ch  states  are  therefore 
                                                 
37 See S.25 of the 1996 Constitution. 
38 H. Klug, 2000,  Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.136. 
39 Entitled Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, the resolution was adopted on 14 December 
1962. 
40 This resolution entitled, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted on 12 December 
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precluded from exercising their sovereign powers under international law and instruments.
41  
In the case of South Africa, adhering to the formula could even be more pr oblematic  
considering the level of inequality in the country and  the need for the government to take 
measures that promote redistribution of material resources, an action that necessarily entails 
interference with the property rights of some South Africans and foreign investors alike. This 
makes it more critical to exam ine how the constitutional provisions on property rights 
interact with this globalized rule on the payment of compensation. First, the Constitution 
provides in S.25 that: 
‘25 (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application – 
                (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
                        (b)  subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of   
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court. 
   (3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be 
just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and 
the  interests  of  those  affected,  having  regard  to  all  relevant  circumstances, 
including – 
           (a) the current use of the property; 
           (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
           (c) the market value of the property; 
                                            (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and   
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
           (e) the purpose of the expropriation.’ 
These  provisions  signal  a  departure  from  the  international  standard  on  payment  of 
compensation as embodied in the Hull formula and in South Africa’s bilateral investment 
treaties. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal had cause to rule on the amount of 
compensation payable in the event of expropriation of property in the case of Minister of 
Transport v. Du Toit. 
42 Pursuant to a notice under the National Roads Act of 1971, the South 
                                                 
41 For instance, the powers conferred on states under Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States.  
42 2005 (1) SA 16.   213 
African Roads Board temporarily took the right to use a portion of the respondent’s land, for 
the purpose of certain road works in the area. The exercise of the temporary right to use the 
land included the permanent removal of gravel, which was utilized by the Board for road 
construction. The respondent sought compensation for his loss in terms of the Expropriation 
Act,  63  of  1975,  or  in  the  alternative  on  the  right  to  just  and  equitable  compensation 
enshrined  in  S.25(3)  of  the  Constitution.  The  trial  court  held  that  since  no  open  market 
existed for the right taken by the Board, it was appropriate to fix the amount of compensation 
due to the respondent by relying on proviso (b) to S.12(1) of the Expropriation Act which 
was an enhanced amount. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that since Du Toit 
failed to prove that he suffered any actual financial loss as a result of the taking of the right to 
use his land, the amount offered by the Minister which represented the market value of the 
portion of the land, was a fair and equitable compensation for what was taken and satisfied 
the requirements of S.25 (3) of the Constitution. 
     The  second  area  where  property  rights  and  the  interests  of  global  capital  have  been 
impacted upon by human rights activism  in South Africa is in the campaign against the 
insistence of pharmaceutical companies on their patent rights.  In this respect, the struggle 
over  access  to  affordable  medicines  in  furtherance  of  the  right  to  health  provided  the 
opportunity for human rights NGOs and other social movements to demand for a reasonable 
balance between social needs and claims based on the assertion of property rights.
43  
     To place this development in context, it may be mentioned that the international regime of 
intellectual property protection under the TRIPS agreement makes provision, among others, 
for an extended period  of protection to  twenty  years and provides  limits  on compulsory 
licensing even though the brand-name industry is still striving for what is now referred to as 
TRIPS-plus which includes a complete ban on compulsory licensing and parallel imports 
among others.
44 Moreover, notwithstanding this special transitional provision for developing 
countries and in order to affirm its position as a bastion of free trade and neo -liberalism, 
South  Africa  in  signi ng  the  treaty  creating  the  WTO  in   1994  accepted  immediate 
implementation of the agreement including TRIPS.
45 It was against this background that the 
South African government’s enactment of the Medicines and Related Substances Control 
                                                 
43 H. Klug, 2005, note 21, p.121. 
44 Ibid., p.120. 
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Amendment Act in December 1997
46 in order to bring down the cost of medicines and  
promote the use of generic drugs through the availability of affordable drugs especially those 
relating to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, generated intense controversy. 
     The Act empowers the Minister of Health among others, ‘to prescribe conditions for the 
supply  of  more  affordable  medicines…so  as  to  protect  the  health  of  the  public… 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Patents Act’’, and to ‘prescribe the conditions 
on which any medicine which is identical in composition, meets the same quality standard 
and  is  intended  to  have  the  same  proprietary  name  as  that  of  another  medicine  already 
registered in the Republic…may be imported’.
 47 The effect of these provisions would have 
been to allow the parallel importation of medicines, generic substitution without the consent 
of the prescriber and even compulsory licensing.
48  
     This enactment was seen by the international pharmaceutical industry and the United 
States as violating patent r ights. During the parliamentary hearing s, the US government 
through its Ambassador in South Africa expressed her opposition to the amendment Bill and 
subsequently threatened to impose sanctions on th e South African government unless it 
repealed the Amendment Act.  
     Opposition to this Act and the activism i t generated can be examined at   two  levels, 
national and international. At the national level, the opposition to the Medicines Act was led 
by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa, which filed a suit on 
behalf  of  forty-two  parties,  including  local  companies,  subsidiaries  of  transnational 
corporations, and the multinational corporations themselves, challenging the constitutionality 
of the 1997 amendment of the Medicines Act.
49 They argued that the provisions of the Act 
which empower the government to determine the extent to which rights granted under a 
patent in South Africa shall apply, and which allow the Minister of Health to prescribe 
conditions for the supply of more affordable generic medicines, together deprived owners of 
                                                 
46 Act 90 of 1997. 
47 S.15C of the Act.  This Act has now been further amended by the Medicines and Related Substances Act, 
No.72 of 2008. 
48 H. Klug, 2005, note 21, p.125. 
49 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of South Africa: Re Ex Parte President of RSA 2000(2) SA 674 (CC) 
paragraph  44.  For  further  analysis  of  this  contest  between  the  pharmaceutical  companies,  the  South 
African Government, and TAC see, J.C. Nwobike, 2006, Pharmaceutical Corporations and access to 
drugs in developing countries: The way forward’, 4 Sur International Journal on Human Rights, pp.127-
143 at 130-132.    215 
intellectual  property  in  the  affected  phar maceutical  products  and  violated   their 
constitutionally protected property rights.
50 It was also contended that in addition to violating 
their patent rights, the Act was contrary to South Africa’s legally incorporated international 
obligations under TRIPS.  
     On the other hand, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), together with other local and 
international organisations, including the World Health Organization, Oxfam, and Medicins 
Sans Frontieres, campaigned in support of the Act and the government on this occasion. TAC 
sought  and  was  granted  the  status  of  amicus  curiae  despite  the  stiff  opposition  of  the 
pharmaceutical  industry.  The  TAC  argued  that  the  pharmaceutical  industry  was  blocking 
attempts to reduce the prices of medicines needed to save the lives of those infected with HIV.  
This challenge eventually forced the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association to withdraw 
the case considering the adverse effect of the TAC position and campaign on their corporate 
image in a country where millions are infected with HIV. Remarkably, the outcome of the 
case  subsequently  led  to  massive  discounts  in  the  prices  of  AIDS  drugs  in  the  country, 
making them much more accessible to the public.
51  
     Internationally,  the  struggle  over  access  to  affordable  medicines  because  of  the 
devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub -Saharan Africa also provided the 
impetus for solidarity among a range of activists and policy -oriented organizations not only 
in other African countries, but also in the US and Europe.
52 These interventions coupled with 
Representative  Jesse  Jackson,  Jr’s  ‘Hope  for  Africa  Bill’  in  February  1999  and  the 
demonstrations  in  its  support  in  Washington  by  several  NGOs  calling  for  compulsory 
licensing  for  HIV/AIDS  drugs,  eventually  forced  the  US  to  withdraw  its  opposition  to 
parallel importation or compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical drugs in South Africa. At the 
WTO level, the concerted efforts of African and other developing countries at the TRIPS 
Council ensured that developing countries were granted a waiver in relation to the parallel 
importation of essential drugs in the interest of public health until 2016. The TRIPS Council 
issued  a  declaration  on  TRIPS  and  public  health,  wherein  it  clarified  that  the  TRIPS 
agreement ‘does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
                                                 
50 H. Klug, 2005, note 21, p.127. 
51 R. Greenstein, 2004, note 20, p.119. 
52 These included organizations such as  Act-Up, and Consumer Project on Technology in the US, MSF, 
Oxfam and the South Centre in Europe; and the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa.   216 
health…  [and]  that  the  agreement  can  and  should  be  interpreted  and  implemented  in  a 
manner supportive of WTO members’ rights to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all’.
53In particular, this Declaration expressly recognized the 
public  health  problems  facing  developing  countries  ‘especially  those  resulting  from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and other epidemics’. Obviously, the inclusion of the 
phrase ‘other epidemics,’ ensures that the use of the exceptional provision is not limited to 
the listed epidemics.
54  
     These are,  no doubt, crucial  concessions which entailed reco gnition of the  right of 
member states to grant compulsory licenses, determine what constitutes a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, and the right of each member to establish its own 
regime for the exhaustion of intellectual property rights. Mor e importantly, the extension of 
the initial transition period for pharmaceutical products in these countries  to January 2016 
was  a  significant   concession.  This  achiev ement  underscores  the  potential   of  concerted 
national and transnational activism to constrain global rules and make them more hospitable 
to human rights norms. Outcomes such as this also show that states can, in exercise of their 
sovereign rights and human rights obligations , adopt policy measures that constrain their 
international economic commitments and the pressures of economic globalization.
55 This 
makes it necessary to examine the extent to which the South African government has been 
able to use its sovereign powers and human rights obligations to engender social and 
economic change through the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment programme in 
this era of globalization.  
 
5.3  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Scheme 
One of the pressing challenges that confronted the new ANC-led South African government 
upon its assumption of power in 1994 was how to redress the legacy of apartheid which 
limited access to social and economic amenities by the majority black population. Dealing 
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with this challenge required the adoption of a policy of redistribution of material resources to 
enhance equality and promote social transformation of the country. Although the negotiated 
settlement of 1994 translated into what has been described as ‘black control of politics and 
white control of the economy’,
56 there was soon recognition of the importance of control of 
the economy in ensuring social justice and economic development. It was generally thought 
that social transformation would follow the political demise of apartheid, a view probably 
informed by Kwame Nkrumah’s celebrated philosophy of seeking first the political kingdom, 
and every other thing will be added to it.
57It was also assumed  that the state would play a 
major role in the redistribution efforts to redress the legacy of apartheid. This assumption was 
not totally misplaced as the new government adopted a  number of programmes designed to 
promote  redistribution  and  economic  justice.  Starting  from  its  Reconstruction  and 
Development  Programme  (RDP),  through  the  Growth,  Employment  and  Redistribution 
(GEAR) strategy in 1997, the government’s objective in this regard was clear enough. The 
GEAR itself was expressly declared to be predicated on the operation of market processes, a 
development that demonstrated the neo-liberal direction of the government. 
     However, the most far-reaching of the measures designed to facilitate redistribution while 
promoting  economic  growth  was  the  Broad-based  Black  Economic  Empowerment 
Programme  (BEE).
58 The enactment of the Broad -based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act
59 was in response to the pressure for more visible economic transfo rmation as previous 
efforts in this regard had not produced the desired results.
 60 It was also informed by the 
government’s  conviction  that  social  stability  and  sustainable  economic  development 
depended on the emergence of a broad-based development of black capital-owning classes.
  
The Act requires corporate entities in South Africa to adopt Sector Empowerment Charters 
(SECs) to guide their efforts towards achieving black economic empowerment.  
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Section 1 of the Act defines BEE to mean:  
      the economic  empowerment of all black people including women, workers, 
youth,  people  with  disabilities  and  people  living  in  rural  areas  through 
diverse  but  integrated  socio-economic  strategies  that  include,  but  are  not 
limited to - 
              a)  increasing  the  number  of  black  people  that  manage,  own  and  control   
enterprises and productive assets; 
              b)  facilitating  ownership  and  management  of  enterprises  and  productive 
assets  by  communities,  workers,  cooperatives  and  other  collective 
enterprises; 
       c)  human resource and skills development; 
                          (d)  achieving  equitable  representation  in  all  occupational  categories  and  
levels in the workplace; 
                          (e) preferential procurement; and 
                          (f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people’. 
Section 9 of the Act defines a ‘black-owned company’ as an enterprise that is 50.1 per cent 
economically  owned  by  black  people  along  with  substantial  management  control  of  the 
company as well. A ‘black-empowered company’ must be 25.1 per cent owned by black 
interests  exercising  substantial  management  control  in  terms  of  non-executive  directors. 
Section 9 also defines a ‘black woman-owned enterprise’ as a business with 25.5 per cent 
representation of black women at equity and management levels. Considering the multi-racial 
composition of the country, the Act defines ‘black people’ as referring to African, Coloured 
and Indians who could claim (or whose parents could claim) South African citizenship as at 
April 1994.  
     Moreover, S.10 of the Act requires  ‘every organ of the state and public entity’ to take 
BEE measurements into account in granting procurement contracts, licenses, concessions, the 
sale of state-owned enterprise, and in entering into private sector partnerships. The broad 
scope of this provision ensures that it also applies to all suppliers falling within the scope of 
the Act and subcontractors of those companies, making it to impact on every sector of the 
economy through a bandwagon or cascading effect.
61   
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One  fundamental  aspect  of  this  wealth  redistribution  programme  is  the  introduction  of 
‘Sector  Empowerment  Charters’  (SECs)  which  requires  private  investors  to  turn  over 
ownership of 25-50 per cent of the economy to these ‘historically disadvantaged individuals’ 
(HDIs) and bring a number of them into management ranks by 2014. 
     Within  the  context  of  the  multi-racial  nature  of  the  South  African  society  and  the 
entrenched economic interests of the white minority, the BEE was therefore bound to be a 
highly  contested  policy  from  the  outset  whose  success  depended  on  the  ability  of  the 
government to demonstrate that it was indeed for the overall benefit of all South Africans. It 
was  initially  seen  by  some  corporate  players  as  a  business  or  investment  risk  requiring 
opposition, but over the years this perception has changed and rather than confrontation, 
there has been ‘a race to comply with BEE’ by various business enterprises in every sector of 
the  South  African  economy.
62 Given  that there are powerful corporations in the country 
which could have adopted the exit option by moving to other countries in search for more 
competitive business environment in this era of globalization, the race by these companies to 
comply with the BEE requirements is interesting, and merits some comments. 
     First, it has been suggested that the attitude of corporate capital in South Africa towards 
BEE was greatly influenced by what can be described as ‘the ghost of Zimbabwe’, where the 
extreme land reform measures of President Robert Mugabe led to the forceful taking over of 
several lands owned by the white minority and the continuing discontent in the country.
63 The 
possibility that South Africa could degenerate into another Zimbabwe therefore led to  the 
generation of a centripetal force that ensured the mutual acceptance of mild BEE measures 
by both the government and private investors. On the one hand, it made the government  – 
already committed to the tenets of neo-liberal economic policies – to frame the BEE in such a 
manner as to offend foreign and South African investors as little as possible.
64 On the other 
hand, the economic survivalist instinct compelled private investors to comply with the 
requirements of BEE for fear that opposition to it may precipitate more radical expropriatory 
measures from the government in response to public demands. Indeed, a realization of the 
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possible  adverse  consequences  of  such  a  move  made  it  easier  for  South  African  white 
investors to accept the mild BEE measures. 
     Second,  the  debilitating  impact  of  globalization  is  also  fingered  as  a  critical   factor 
compelling the companies to comply with the BEE requirements. As Okechukwu Iheduru 
puts it: 
[W]hile globalization clearly constrains or weakens state regulation of markets 
and implementation of redistributive policies by subjecting states to competition 
with other states for economic goods available from capital, global integration 
equally exerts tremendous pressures on capital to accept some state intervention, 
especially if such action advances the pecuniary interests of capital as well.
65 
He argues further that this ‘mutual vulnerability of both actors to globalization pressures 
compels them to cooperate, or strike a ‘‘fateful compromise’’ resulting in ‘‘bargained state 
autonomy’’ to implement policies that would otherwise be opposed by capital’.
66  
     Within the context of this work, it is my contention that the compliance of corporate 
entities in South Africa to this wealth redistribution policy underscores the fact that even 
within  the  framework  of  economic  globalization,  African  states  can  still  exercise  their 
sovereign rights of regulating economic activities in their territories to meet their social and 
economic  objectives  and  human  rights  obligations.
67  In  addition  to  the  rights  un der 
international instruments, states can, in exercise of constitutional powers and responsibilities, 
embark on policy measures that advance the human rights of their citizens even where such 
measures are detrimental to the interests of  global capital. Indeed, notwithstanding its often 
exaggerated constraining powers on the sovereignty of states, globalization has not rendered 
the state completely powerless, as it even needs a powerful state to provide an environment 
conducive for its advancement. As Santos has ably demonstrated, the weak state consensus 
informing the contrary assertion is one of the ideological misconceptions underpinning 
hegemonic globalization.
68 
     In order to appreciate the role of  the  BEE programme in catalyzing Sou th  Africa’s 
response  to  the  globalization  process,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  its  application  in  some 
spheres of state activity. 
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5.3.1  BEE and South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 The dismantling of apartheid and the introduction of majority rule in South Africa in 1994 
was immediately followed by the desire of other states to have economic ties or formalize 
existing relations with the new leadership of the country. Significantly, only five months 
thereafter, the United Kingdom entered into a bilateral  investment agreement with South 
Africa.
69 As a form of legal globalization, this BIT served as a model for subsequent 
investment treaties in South Africa, as the country signed bilateral investment treaties with 
countries such as Italy, France, Germany, Lux embourg, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland 
as part of a wider policy of opening the country to greater foreign investment.
70 These 
treaties  contained  some   provisions  that  reinforce  the  prevalent  economic  orthodoxy 
concerning the relationship between states in this era of globalization. 
     South Africa’s bilateral investment treaties can be divided between those that were entered 
into between 1994 and the adoption of the final Constitution in 1996, and those adopted after 
the 1996 Constitution. The relevance of this categorization for the present analysis stems 
from  the  fact  that  compliance  with  the  1996  Constitution  required  the  South  African 
government to ensure the consistency of its international commitments with the provisions of 
the Constitution. Thus while the first group of treaties significantly incapacitate the state in 
exercising its sovereign powers in relation to nationalization and balancing these with the 
needs of its people, the second category contain stipulations expressly subjecting them to the 
provisions  of  the  Constitution.  In  relation  to  the  first  category  of  treaties,  there  were 
provisions in the treaties that considerably incapacitate the state in exercising its sovereign 
powers. These include provisions  precluding the state from  nationalizing the property of 
foreign investors except for public purpose and upon the payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.  
     The tension between the exercise of sovereign powers and the pressures of global capital 
came to the fore when the South African government, in furtherance of its BEE programme, 
and in order to ensure greater control of the economy enacted the Minerals and Petroleum 
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Development Act (MPRDA)
71 This law, which entered into force in May 2004, declares that 
the  state  is  th e  custodian  of  mineral  and  petroleum  resources  on  behalf  of  all  South 
Africans.
72 Owners of existing mining rights are required under the Act t o convert to ‘new 
order  rights’  in  which  successful  conversion  is  dependent  upon  compliance  with  BEE 
objectives. This means that they are to have 15 per cent BEE compliance by 2009 and 25 per 
cent by 2014.  
      This  law  and  its  BEE  component  however  provoked  a  legal  challenge  and  the  first 
transnational investment dispute against South Africa. The suit in Piero Foresti and 10 others 
v Republic of South Africa 
73was instituted by Italian investors in Marlin and Red Graniti 
corporations  which  controls  much  of  South  Africa’s  granite  industry,  and  those  from 
Luxembourg.  Instituted in January 2007 at the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the case raised very fundamental questions relating, among 
others, to the expansive interpretation of expropriation, and the impact of the Act on the 
existing  mining  rights  of  the  claimants.  It  was  predicated  on  South  Africa’s  bilateral 
investment treaties with the governments of Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium which protect 
the rights of investors from those countries operating in South Africa. The claimants argued 
that  by  virtue  of  the  BITs  between  South  Africa  and  Italy  and  Luxembourg,  they  were 
protected  from  i)  direct  expropriation,  ii)  indirect  expropriation,  iii)  measures  having  an 
effect  equivalent  to  expropriation,  and  iv)  measures  limiting,  whether  permanently  or 
temporarily,  investors’  rights  of  ownership,  possession,  control  or  enjoyment  of  the 
investments.  
     The claimants argued that their shares in the operating companies have been expropriated 
by operation of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) equity divesture requirements 
established by the twin operation of the Mining Charter and the MPRDA. The claimants 
noted  that  the  Mining  Charters  requires  foreign  investors  to  sell  26%  of  their  shares  in 
relevant  mining  companies  to  historically  disadvantaged  South  Africans  (HDSAs).  They 
argued that this equity divesture scheme constitutes a direct and/or indirect and /or partial 
expropriation of their shares in the operating companies. They also argued that the host state 
must pay immediate, ‘full and effective compensation’ as stipulated in the BIT with Italy or 
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‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ in terms of the BIT with Luxembourg and 
therefore claimed 260 million Euro in compensation for alleged discrimination against it in 
favour of HDSAs. 
     On its part, the Respondent State contended that the alleged expropriation of the old order 
mineral  rights  and  shares  in  the  operating  companies  were  undertaken  for  multiple  and 
important public purposes which included ameliorating the disenfranchisement of HDSAs 
and other negative social effects caused by apartheid in general and the 1991 Mineral Rights 
Act  in  particular, reducing the economically harmful  concentration of mineral  rights  and 
promoting the optimal exploitation of mineral resources. In particular, the Respondent argued 
that the 1991 Mineral Rights Act which was repealed by the MPRDA was an instrument that 
entrenched white privilege in the minerals sector which could not withstand the coming to 
power of a democratically elected government. It is pertinent to mention here that the BITs 
between Italy and Belgium are based on the South African-UK model and do not have an 
equality  exception  clause  as  in  other  subsequent  BITs  between  South  Africa  and  other 
countries. 
     However, the matter was eventually settled by the parties and the action was discontinued 
in July 2010 by the claimants. Nevertheless, this dispute raises the fundamental issue of how 
this claim would have been treated by the South African Constitutional Court particularly in 
balancing the claims of the plaintiffs with the equality provisions of the Constitution.
74  
     Significantly, for the second category of BITs, human rights norms especially the equality 
provisions of the South African Constitution have been deployed to limit the scope of their 
coverage  in  relation  to  the rights  of  foreign  investors. W ith  the adoption  of  the final 
Constitution in 1996,  subsequent bilateral investment treaties entered into by the South 
African  government  had  to  be  structured  so  as  to  make  them  consistent  with  the 
government’s constitutional obligations and accommodate policy measures such as the BEE. 
Accordingly, although its treaties with China, Iran, Russia, and the Czech Republic, among 
others, contain the requirements of national treatment, most favoured nation (MFN), and fair 
and equitable treatment for foreign investors, these are made subject to laws and measures, 
‘taken pursuant to Article 9 of the Constitution… the purpose of which is to promote the 
                                                 
74 The arbitration clause in the treaty ensured that the matter was taken to ICSID rather than the South 
African Constitutional Court.   224 
achievement of equality in its territory, or designed to protect the advance of pe rsons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’.
75  
That the South African government was able to insert this exception provision in this second 
category of BITs is testament to the fact that even in the face of the pervading effects of 
economic globalization or the need to conform to its requirements, a state could still assert its 
sovereign powers.   
     This victory for state sovereignty in an era of globalization is, however, a limited one. 
This is because the equality exception does not extend to measures that might be considered 
equivalent  to  expropriation  or  nationalization.  Thus  the  problems  identified  earlier  with 
bilateral investment treaties in relation to these subjects are still operative in South Africa. It 
would seem then that in the case of South Africa, and deriving from the supremacy of the 
Constitution,  bilateral  investment  treaties  must  defer  to  the  government’s  constitutional 
commitment of equality. This is the only way government measures and enactments such as 
BEE  can  spread  economic  wealth  to  those  economically  and  socially  disadvantaged  by 
apartheid  and  promote  social  and  economic  justice.  This  leads  to  an  examination  of  the 
possible  tension  between  the  BEE  programme  and  the  equality  provisions  of  the  South 
African Constitution. 
 
5.3.2  BEE and Equality provisions in the Constitution 
Although the general interpretation of the concept of equality emphasizes the equal treatment 
of all in  any  given set  of circumstances,  the peculiar  challenges  presented by the South 
African  situation  necessitated  standing  this  principle  on  its  head.  The  apartheid  regime 
generated so much inequality and discrimination that it was necessary to adopt normatively 
unequal  measures  to  promote  and  achieve  equality.  Yet,  it  is  a  truism  that  very  often 
measures designed to achieve equality in an unequal environment end up generating another 
set  of  unequal  relations.  As  Amartya  Sen  has  cogently  pointed  out:  ‘The  demands  of 
substantive equality can be particularly exacting and complex when there is a good deal of 
antecedent  inequality  to  counter’.
76 It  is  therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  to  strive  for 
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equilibrium in the quest for attainment of equality and social justice. This is even more 
apposite in the South African situation. 
     It is from this  perspective that the South African BEE initiated in furtherance of  the 
constitutional commitment to the promotion of equality in the country must be assessed. It 
may be mentioned that the Constitution requires that ‘legislative and other measures designed 
to  protect  or  advance  persons,  or  categories  of  persons,  disadvantaged  by  unfair 
discrimination may be taken’.
77Drawing inspiration from this, the preamble to the BEE Act 
expressly declares that the bill is intended to ‘promote the achievement of the constitutional 
right to equality’. In a state that had just emerged from the throes of extreme inequality 
engendered  by  the  apartheid  policy,  such  constitutional  provisions  require  the  state  to 
perform  a  variety  of  redistributive  functions  to  guarantee  equal  access  to  property,  land, 
adequate housing, health care, education and social security.
78  
     However, one of the downsides of the implementation of the BEE programme  in South 
Africa has been the emergence, as beneficiaries, of a small privileged group of fo rmer ANC 
activists, a development that has led to widespread criticism of the programme as steeped in 
corruption and cronyism, and questions being asked  whether the revolution that led to the 
emergence of the ANC -led government has not ,  in fact,  been betrayed.
79This negative 
consequence seems not to have been remedied or minimized, as the next sub-section shows.  
 
5.3.3  Appraisal of BEE 
The BEE is one of the high profile policies adopted by the South African government to 
redress  decades  of  enforced  social  and  economic  inequality  in  the  country.  In  trying  to 
achieve this objective the government has had to contend with the requirements of economic 
globalization.  Deriving  from  its  acceptance  of  the  alluring  promises  of  economic  neo-
liberalism, the government framed the BEE policy in such a way as to sustain the existing 
paradigm and offend private investors as little as possible. However, the human rights norms 
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that inform the policy, notably, the equality provisions of the South African Constitution have 
also been deployed to constrain some aspects of the economic globalization process.  
     One of the fundamental problems with the BEE programme is that it is predicated on neo-
liberal economic principles, and does not require the government to take effective control of 
sectors  of  the  economy  to  enhance  empowerment  and  redistributive  measures.  Instead, 
private companies are allowed to comply with the measures as they desire, except that non-
compliance is an important factor in assessing such entities for contract awar ds, supplies, 
licensing and related activities. On this score, it is obvious  that one of the pitfalls of the 
scheme is its heavy emphasis on voluntarism and reliance on the ideas of soft regulation and 
good governance or a ‘third way’ approach.
80  
     More importantly, the BEE seems to have failed in its primary goal of promoting equality 
through economic empowerment of the black population. It is hugely depressing that though 
well-intentioned,  the  scheme  has  not  had  a  significant  impact  in  redressing  the  grave 
inequality between the white capitalists and the black majority in terms of business and other 
economic  opportunities  in  the  country.  Indeed,  rather  than  ensuring  the  redistribution  of 
wealth and positions to the black majority, the BEE has led to the emergence of few black 
beneficiaries, while the majority of black South Africans remain poor and marginalized. This 
makes the words of Albie Sachs in 1993 about the prospects of a post-apartheid South Africa 
hugely prophetic. According to him:
81 
The danger exists in our country as in any other that a new elite will emerge 
which will use its official position to accumulate wealth, power and status for 
itself.  The  poor  will  remain  poor  and  the  oppressed,  oppressed.  The  only 
difference will be that the poor and powerless will no longer be disenfranchised, 
that they will only be poor and powerless and that instead of a racial oppression 
we will have non-racial oppression. 
It is on this score that even the current President of the country, Jacob Zuma, has admitted 
that BEE has failed, as it has benefited only a few blacks and widened the gap between the 
rich  and  the  poor  in  the  country.
82 This verdict does not come as a surprise to radical 
commentators since the programme itself is predicated on a delicate neo-liberal compromise 
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of attempting to promote social and economic justice through the framework of economic 
globalization. It can therefore be said that for the BEE to achieve the desired objectives, the 
South  African  government  must  demonstrate  the  required  pol itical  will  and  exercise  its 
sovereign rights to rework and reformulate the programme and play a more direct role in key 
sectors of the economy to effectively empower the black majority in the country, for the 
overall benefit of all South Africans.  
 
5.4  Conclusion 
Using South Africa as a case study, this chapter has shown that social and economic rights 
have played an important role in the interaction between globalization and human rights in 
Africa. The strategic position of South Africa in the continent, and its peculiar historical 
circumstances,  has  made  it  even  more  apposite  for  examining  the  relationship  between 
globalization and human rights. Drawing inspiration from the constitutional provisions that 
make social and economic rights enforceable in the country, human rights activists and social 
movements  have  successfully  deployed  these  rights  in  the  quest  to  ensure  social  and 
economic justice in the country and constrain economic globalization manifested through the 
activities of international capitalists.  
     Although working within the ambit of the neo-liberal economic order, the South African 
government has also latched onto its constitutional obligations and adopted policy measures 
that privilege human rights norms over international economic interests. This embrace of 
neo-liberal economic policies as the driving force of its activities has militated against the 
government’s realization of the goals of its programmes. Such challenges underscore the 
imperative  of  the  adoption  of  counter-hegemonic  conceptions  of  human  rights  and 
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Chapter 6:  Resisting Globalization 
and Marginalization of Human 
Rights: A Reformist Approach in 
Nigeria? 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to examine how the marginalization of human rights, especially social 
and economic rights, through processes of globalization has been challenged in Nigeria 
and its broader implications for the relationship between globalization and human rights. 
Although the most populous country in Africa, and notwithstanding its enormous natural 
resource endowment, Nigeria has over the  years tottered on the path to political and 
economic development.
1 It has adopted and implemented neo -liberal economic policies 
and programmes that have had deleterious effects on the promotion and protection of 
human rights in the country. For instance, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
implemented by the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s based on th e prescriptions 
of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank had a tremendous impact on human 
rights in the country with reverberating effects that are still visible today.
2   
     Moreover, in furtherance of its embrace of such economic policies under the rubric of 
economic globalization, the Nigerian government has given primacy to the promotion of 
foreign investment and supported the operations of transnational corporations in the 
country even when such operations engendered massive human rights violations. Indeed, 
transnational corporations in Nigeria have been known to be complicit in human rights 
violations either directly through their operations or indirectly through active support for 
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giant’. E.E. Osaghae, 1998, Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence, London: Hurst & Company; or 
‘the giant as Lilliput’, W. Adebanwi, and E. Obadare, 2010, ‘Introducing Nigeria at fifty: the nation in 
narration’, 28(4) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, pp.379-405 at 379. 
2 The pains and costs of structural adjustment in Nigeria are captured in J.O. Ihonvbere, 1993, ‘Economic 
Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria’, 21(1)  World Development, pp.141-153 at 
145-148; while an appraisal of the political economy of the country during this period is examined in P. 
Lewis, 1996, ‘From prebendalism to predation: The political economy of decline in Nigeria’, 34 Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 79-103.   229 
public security officers often deployed to their facilities.
3 To be sure, the negative impacts 
on  human  rights  of  the  activities  of  such  corporations  driven  by  the  processes  of 
globalization are monumental and well -documented.
4 What has not received adequate 
attention however, is whether, and if so, the extent to w hich, human rights norms have 
also impacted on such processes relative to the country. It is therefore intended to show 
that the deployment of legal actions and mass movement protests have been instrumental 
in challenging and shaping the contours and conte xts of processes of globalization in 
relation  to  Nigeria.  In  this  connection,  the  legal  challenge  by  a  non -governmental 
organization, Social and Economic Rights Accountability Project (SERAC) of the actions 
of the Nigerian government in collaboration with  a transnational corporation, Shell 
Petroleum Development Company Limited, for violating the social and economic rights 
of Nigerians as graphically illustrated in the Economic and Social Rights Case
5 before the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights will be discussed. Similarly, the 
recent decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of 
Justice on the enforceability of the right to education in Nigeria
6 under the rubric of the 
African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  will  be  used  to  demonstrate  the 
interaction between national, sub-regional and regional mechanisms and activism for the 
protection of social and economic rights in Africa. 
     In addition to exploring these legal approaches, I will also examine the impacts of 
social  or  mass  movement  actions  and  protests,  notably,  that  of  the  Nigerian  Labour 
Congress (NLC) against the deregulation policy of the government featuring removal of 
subsidy  on  petroleum  products  and  the  consequent  increases  in  the  prices  of  such 
                                                 
3 Human Rights Watch, 1999, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in 
Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities, pp.78-92. 
4 The following may be taken as representative of recent writings on the human rights obligations of 
transnational corporations including instances of their v iolations, D. Kinley, ed., 2009,  Human Rights 
and Corporations, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd; P. Alston, ed., 2005, Non-State Actors and Human 
Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press; A. Clapham, 2006, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. In relation to Nigeria, see for example, I. Okonta, and O. 
Douglas, 2003, Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta, London: Verso. 
5 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR2001) (15
th Annual Activity 
Report). 
6 Registered  Trustees  of  the  Socio-Economic  Rights  and  Accountability  Project  (SERAP  V.  Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, ruling 
of 27 October 2009.   230 
products – one of the neo-liberal economic policies of the Nigerian government acting 
under the pressure of IMF and the World Bank. 
     I  conclude  the  chapter  by  arguing  that  relative  to  Nigeria,  these  progressive 
movements,  though  largely  reformist,  must  be  seen  as  incipient  counter-hegemonic 
strategies to reshape and restructure contemporary economic globalization and guarantee 
the  promotion  of  human  rights  norms  as  one  of  the  central  goals  of  development 
initiatives in the country. 
 
6.2  Foreign investment, transnational corporations and human 
rights in Nigeria  
6.2.1  Normative Framework 
Two underlying considerations inform my focus on foreign investment as an index of the 
globalization process and to examine its relationship with human rights in Nigeria. First, 
the  promotion  of  foreign  investment  is  one  of  the  central  components  of  neo-liberal 
economic  globalization  and  is  touted  as  an  important  strategy  for  the  economic 
development of states.
7 In order to support the continuance of such investments, states 
have taken some policy measures and actions which have proven to be manifestly 
inimical  to  the  protection  o f  human  rights.  Second,  the  foreign  investments  of 
transnational corporations in Nigeria supported by the government whose activities are 
inimical to the protection of human rights are increasingly being challenged by human 
rights NGOs and other elements of civil society in the country.  
     To begin with, it must be stated that although foreign direct investment is an important 
force in the international economy, the extent of its impact on human rights has not been 
without some controversy.
8 While some writers have argued that it impacts positively on 
human rights, others hold the view that it is inherently inimical to human rights.
9 
                                                 
7 This is the cardinal creed of the classical theory on foreign investment, a position that is however severely 
challenged  by  the  dependency  theory.  M.  Sornarajah,  2004,  The  International  Law  on  Foreign 
Investment, 2
nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.52-59. 
8 This controversy has arisen because in addition to their relationship with the host state, foreign investors 
also come in contact with the local populations while their activities usually impact on the environment. 
9 On the positive impact, see, W.H. Meyer, 1996, ‘Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative 
Analysis’, 18 Human Rights Quarterly, pp.368-397. D.L. Richards, et al, 2001, ‘Money with a Mean 
Steak?  Foreign  Economic  Penetration  and  Government  Respect  for  Human  Rights  in  Developing 
Countries’, 45(2) International Studies Quarterly, pp.219-239. For the negative impact, see, J. Smith, et   231 
According to Debora Spar, foreign investment tends to ‘improve the condition of human 
rights in developing countries either as a direct result of a firm’s activity or as the indirect 
result of improved conditions created by these investments’.
10 In her view, this is because 
in the course of seeking higher returns, multinationals also advance the cause of human 
rights.
11  She  however  qualifies  this  general  assertion  by  admitting  that  when  the 
investment is driven by a search for raw materials, its deleterious effects are more 
obvious than where the motive is for commercial and similar kinds of investment. Her 
contention is that in the case of natural resources, the investor needs to forge relations 
with the state to enable her to obtain concessions, secure a lease and arrange terms of 
ownership and taxation. Under such circumstances, the local people usually see little 
benefit from the investment and may be subjected to abuse by the state with the active 
support of the transnational corporation.
12 On the other hand, according to her, when the 
motive is essentially for markets in order to increase sales, the activities of multinational 
corporations would have a positive impact on human rights.
13  
     A  contrary  view, however, is that  in this era of globalization, foreign investment 
whether of the first or second kind, has been impacting negatively on human rights in 
developing countries.
14 The argument is  that, in order to facilitate exploitation of the 
natural resources in  a  developing country or explore such   markets, foreign investors 
invariably collaborate with the ruling elite and deploy the repressive mechanisms of the 
host state to perpetrate human rights violations.
15 This alignment is underpinned by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
al, 1999, ‘Human Rights and the Global Economy: A Response to Meyer’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly, 
pp.207-219;  B.  Stephens,  2002,  ‘The  Amorality  of  Profit:  Transnational  Corporations  and  Human 
Rights’, 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law, pp.49-90. 
10 Debora Spar, 1999, ‘Foreign Investment and Human Rights’, 42(1) Challenge, pp.55-80 at 57. The same 
argument is advanced in her earlier article, D. L. Spar, 1998, ‘The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How 
Multinationals Export Human Rights’, 77(2) Foreign Affairs, pp.7-12. 
11 D. Spar, 1999, note 10 , p.75. She also st ates  that  the  ‘Spotlight  phenomenon’  has  equally  been 
instrumental  in  ensuring  that  multinational  corporations  respect  human  rights  norms  in  their  host 
countries as they now find it increasingly difficult to sustain the previous attitude of indifference to 
human rights violations by their foreign subcontractors. 
12 D. Spar, 1999, note 10, pp.60-61. 
13 Ibid., p.67. 
14  See  for  example,  E.A.  Duruigbo,  2003,  Multinational  Corporations  and  International  Law: 
Accountability and Compliance Issues in the Petroleum Industry, New York Transnational Publishers, 
p.xviii, describing transnational corporations as ‘hydra-headed monsters’. P. Muchlinski, 2009, ‘Social 
and  human  rights  implications  of  TNC  activities  in  the  extractive  industries’,  18(1)  Transnational 
Corporations, pp.125-136, at 125-127. 
15 This contention resonates with Vladimir Lenin’s early analysis on this subject matter. Lenin argues that 
imperial expansion and the exploitation of foreign markets was a necessary stage in the development of   232 
mutuality of interest between the transnational corporation and the ruling elite; the former 
desiring access to the exploitation of the natural resources or markets, while the  ruling 
clique  in  the  developing  country  needs  the  royalties  and  other  benefits  from  the 
investments to bolster and line their pockets.
16This position is validated  by the role of 
foreign investment in Nigeria as evident in the collaboration between Shell Petroleum 
Development Company Limited and the Nigerian government for the violation of the 
human rights of Nigerians as revealed in the Ogoni case. The Nigerian ruli ng elite have 
appropriated the instrumentality of the state to enact laws and make policy decisions that 
essentially  serve  the  interests  of  the  capitalist  class,  both  foreign  and  domestic, 
notwithstanding the negative effects of such policies and activities on human rights.
17   
     A major consequence of this capture of state apparatus in Nigeria has been the 
liberalization of the legal regime governing foreign investment and enhancement of the 
environment for transnational corporations to be involved in ma ssive human rights 
abuses in the country. On this score, two fundamental legal provisions governing foreign 
investment in Nigeria deserve mention. First, the ‘open-door’ economic policy of the 
Nigerian government under the direction of international economic institutions such as 
IMF and World Bank was formalized with the enactment of the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion  Commission  Act.
18  This  Act,  which  is  today  the  principal  legislation 
regulating  foreign  investment  in  the  country ,  was  enacted  with  the  central   aim  of 
stimulating foreign investments.
19 This is evident  from  the fact that it opened up all 
                                                                                                                                                 
advanced capitalism which will ultimately widen the bifurcation between the capitalists and the exploited 
classes  and  lead  to  human  rights  abuses.  V.  I.  Lenin,  1948,  Imperialism:  The  Highest  Stage  of 
Capitalism, A popular Outline, London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, pp.148-151.  
16 L. Wenar, 2008, ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’, 36(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs, pp.2-32 
at 3-6. 
17 This will also be shown in relation to the enactment of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
Act. 
18 Cap N117 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. It was initially enacted as Decree No. 15 of 1995 and 
amended in 1998. It repealed the Industrial Development Co -ordination Committee Decree No. 36 of 
1988 and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972, as amended in 1977 and 1989 , which 
imposed equity participation restrictions on foreign investment.  
19 K.U.K. Ekwueme,  2005, ‘Nigeria’s principal investment laws in the context of international law and 
practice’, 49(2) Journal of African Law, pp.177-206. It has thus been described as ‘a turning point in 
foreign investment regulation in Nigeria’ since it adopts a ‘promotional’ rather than ‘control’ approach to 
foreign  investment  regulation.  O.  Obayomi,  1997,  ‘Nigeria’s  New  Investment  Laws’,  Journal  of 
Business Law, pp.593-604 at 595; see also T.I. Ogowewo, 1995, ‘The Shift to the classical theory of 
foreign investment: Opening up the Nigerian market’, 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
pp.915-926 stating at 926 that with the liberalization of the legal regime governing foreign investment, 
‘the government has now adopted a more sensible and realistic policy towards foreign investment’.    233 
sectors of the Nigerian economy to foreign investment by removing the conditions on the 
ownership  of  shares  in  Nigerian  enterprises  by  foreigners  imposed  by  previous 
investment laws in the country.
20 S.17 of the Act permits foreign investors to own 100% 
equity participation in Nigerian enterprises and to carry out business activities in any 
enterprise in Nigeria subject to the provisions of S.18 that previously excluded petroleum 
activities from the ambit of the enactment.
 21 This liberalization was not accompanied by 
any corresponding regulation or restriction on how such corporations are to operate in 
relation  to  human  rights.  Consequently,  the  corporations  have  continued  to  operate 
without due regard to the human rights of people in their host communities.  
     Second, the NIPC Act makes elaborate provisions on the protection of foreign and 
local  investors from  the risks  of expropriation and nationalization and in  the process 
emasculates the exercise of sovereign rights by the Nigerian State. Accordingly, Section 
25(1) provides that: 
Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section 
a)  no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any Government of the Federation; 
and 
b)  no person who owns whether wholly or in part, the capital of any enterprise shall be 
compelled by law to surrender his interest in the capital to any other person. 
2) There shall be no acquisition of an enterprise to which this Decree applies by the Federal 
Government unless this acquisition is in the national interest or for a public purpose and 
under a law which makes provision for: 
a) payment of fair and adequate compensation; and 
b) a right of access to the courts for the determination of the investor’s interest or right and 
the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. 
3)  Any  compensation  payable under  this section  shall be  paid  without  undue  delay,  and 
authorization for its repatriation in convertible currency shall, where applicable, be issued.   
In precluding the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments, except under 
the  mentioned  circumstances,  and  codifying  the  Hull  formula  on  payment  of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20 K.U.K. Ekwueme, 2005, note 19, p.179. 
21 It may be mentioned that S.18 of the Act was amended in 1998 to remove the exclusion of petroleum  
enterprises from the scope of the NIPC Act’. In addition, section 21 of the NIPC Act allows foreign 
enterprises  to  purchase,  in  convertible  currency,  the  shares  of  Nigerian  enterprises  without  any 
restrictions provided the sale is carried out through the Nigerian Stock Exchange (‘NSE’).   234 
compensation,
22 the legal regime on foreign investment has not only inhibited the f ull 
exercise of sovereign powers by the Nigerian State in relation to the right to development 
but correspondingly, strengthened transnational corporations in their operations in ways 
that have been deployed to violate human rights.  
     Apart  from  the  fa ct  that  these  measures  have  not  led  to  any  major  positive 
transformation of the investment environment in Nigeria,
23 some of the investments in 
the form of transnational corporations either brought into the country, or strengthened by 
the new legal regime h ave actually had deleterious consequences on the protection of 
human rights as the next section seeks to demonstrate.  
6.2.2  Transnational corporations and human rights in Nigeria 
A transnational corporation may be described as a corporate entity registered under the 
municipal  laws  of  a  particular  country  but  whose  network  of  operations  transcends 
national  boundaries.
24 Usually, such corporations adopt operational models involving 
multiple corporate entities, spread across and within countries. They have come to b e 
recognized as the most visible embodiments of globalization in contemporary society. As 
Henry Steiner et al point out: ‘Globalization has contributed to, and in part been driven by, 
the increasing central role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the international and 
domestic  economic  orders’.
25  Accordingly,  their  importance  in  the  economic 
development efforts of states can hardly be over-emphasized, as they not only determine 
                                                 
22 The implications of the Hull formula for African states have been discussed in chapter 3 of this work. It 
is also pertinent to mention that S.24 of the Act guarantees investors ‘unconditional transferability’ of 
their dividends or profits from investments in the country, a provision similar to that contained in S.15 
(4) of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous ) Provisions Decree No.16 of 1995. 
23 After examining the available data on foreign direct investment  inflow into Nigeria between 1995 and 
2004, Khruschev Ekwueme comes to the conclusion that the enactment of the Act has been unable to 
significantly spur high volumes of foreign investment in the country, meaning that the liberalization of 
the legal regime of foreign investment is not the ‘silver bullet’ needed to attract high levels of foreign 
investment. K.U.K Ekwueme, 2005, note 19, p.204. 
24 Article 20 of the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights states that the term transnational corporation  ‘‘refers to an 
economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or 
more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and 
whether  taken  individually  or  collectively’’;  (2003)E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12.  For  an  analysis  of  other 
definitions  of  transnational  corporations, see  C.D. Wallace,  2002,  The  Multinational Enterprise  and 
Legal  Control:  Host  State  Sovereignty  in  an  era  of  Economic  Globalization,  2
nd  ed.,  The  Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp.101-158.  In this work, the term ‘corporations’ and ‘companies’ will be 
used interchangeably where necessary. 
25 H.J. Steiner, et al, 2008, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 3
rd ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p.1387.   235 
directly or indirectly, the level and direction of such strategies, but their activities usually 
have far-reaching effects on a country’s overall development. In the enduring words of 
Professor Michael Ajomo:  
Transnational corporations in a capitalist setting rule the world; they constitute today 
a major factor in international economic relations by virtue of their resources, size 
and methods of operation. They control directly capital, the most important of the 
three  main  factors  of  production,  and  indirectly,  labour.  They  can  re-order  the 
priorities of nations and hold such nations to ransom. … In a Third World country, 
therefore, the scenario is complete; the transnationals are the originator and executor 
of  economic  development  which,  undoubtedly,  is  the  key  to  the  survival  of  any 
nation.
26  
The impacts are usually more pronounced when the transnational corporations operate in 
developing  countries  which  largely  depend  on  them  for  the  exploitation,  and  even, 
utilization of the natural resources in their territories. It is obvious that in the exploitation 
of these resources, several socio-economic and environmental issues come into play. One 
of the key issues often generated from such activities is the nature and extent of human 
rights violations involving these corporations in the host countries. Such issues assume 
greater prominence and visibility in countries with weak governance structures and a 
poor human rights record. The fact that Nigeria sadly falls into this category
27 makes it 
even more apposite to examine the human rights implications of the operations of 
transnational corporations in the country. To be sure, in recent times there has been 
considerable attention on the activities of transnational corporations in the country, 
especially  those in  the  oil  and  gas  industry,  for  their culpability  either directly  or 
indirectly, in massive human rights violations in the country in the course of their 
operations.
28 In addition to their direct involvement in external human rights violations 
                                                 
26 M.A.  Ajomo,  1984,  Of  Order  and  Disorder:  The  Relevance  of  International  Law,  Lagos:  Lagos 
University Press, p.22; S. Joseph, 1999, ‘Taming the Leviathans: Multinational Enterprises and Human 
Rights’, 46(2) Netherlands International Law Review, pp.171-203 at 172.  According to Beth Stephens, 
‘the enormous power of multinational corporations enables them to inflict greater harms, while their 
economic and political clout renders them difficult to regulate’. B. Stephens, 2002, note 9,  p.46. 
27 At present, Nigeria occupies the unenviable position of 14 among the failed states in the world. See, The 
Fund for Peace,  2011  Failed  States  Index,  Washington,  D.C.:  The  Fund  for  Peace.  Available  at: 
www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011 accessed 8 July 2011. 
28 National and international NGOs have been in the forefront of this campaign. Notable amo ng them is 
Amnesty International’s reports on human rights abuses in the country exemplified by the following, 
among others. Nigeria: Are Human Rights in the Pipelines? Amnesty International Report A1 Index:   236 
such  as  destruction  of  religious  and  cultural  sites,  disruption  of  community  lives, 
environmental rights,
29 and labour rights, there is also overwhelming evidence of their 
indirect involvement in these and other violations through the activities of state security 
forces who provide surveillance over their facilities. Since the human rights abuses by 
these  security  forces  are  usually  carried  out  within  the sphere  of influence  of the 
transnational corporations, with their knowledge, and for their benefit, the corporations 
are deemed to be complicit in such abuses. Indeed, complicity in human rights abuses has 
been defined as follows:
30  
Corporate complicity in human rights abuses means that a company is participating 
in or facilitating human rights abuses committed by others, whether it is a state, a 
rebel group, another company or an individual. A company is complicit in human 
rights abuses if it authorizes, tolerates, or knowingly ignores human rights abuses 
committed by an entity associated with it, or if the company knowingly provides 
practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration 
of human rights abuse. The participation of the company need not actually cause the 
abuse. Rather, the company’s assistance or encouragement has to be to a degree that, 
without such participation, the abuses most probably would not have occurred to the 
same extent or in the same way. 
Drawing from the above definition, it can be said that the following factors are important 
in determining a company’s risk of being complicit in human rights violations: i) the 
company’s proximity to, knowledge of, and the duration of the violation; ii) the benefit 
                                                                                                                                                 
AFR44/020/2004, 9 November 2004; Nigeria Ten Years On: Injustice and Violence haunt the Oil Delta 
AFR44/022/2005;  Nigeria:  Odioma  –  One  Year  After:  fears  of  continuing  human  rights  violations 
AFR44/005/2006 of 19 February 2006. 
29 A major part of the struggle of the Ogonis was the devastation of their environment by the activities of 
Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited. 
30 This is the description of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, see,  Global 
Compact:  Embedding  human  rights  in  business  practices,  available: 
www.unglobalcompact.org/content/newsdocs/ehrbb.pdf accessed 8 July 2010. According to Irene Khan, 
companies risk being complicit in human rights abuses in the following instances; armed conflict, slavery 
and forced labour, child labour, trade union rights, making surveillance technology available to states for 
use in tracking down dissidents, and acquiescing with discriminatory policies of states. I. Khan, 2005, 
Understanding  corporate  complicity:  Extending  the  notion  beyond  existing  laws,  London:  Amnesty 
International  Index:  POL34/001/2006;  A.  Clapham  and  S.  Jerbi,  2001,  ‘Categories  of  Corporate 
Complicity  in  Human  Rights  Abuses’,  24(3)  Hastings  International  and  Comparative  Law  Review, 
pp.339-350 at 342-349 classifying corporate complicity for human rights abuses into three categories; 
direct, indirect and silent complicity.   237 
gained by the company from the violation; iii) the nature of the company’s relationship 
with the perpetrator; and, iv) the company’s intent with regard to the violation.
31  
The operations of oil companies in Nigeria and the nature of their relationship with public 
security forces lend credence to their complicity in human rights abuses. In particular, 
these  companies  are  known  to  give  financial  assistance  to  public  security  officers 
guarding their installations, provide logistical support in the form of transportation to and 
from  their  locations,  and  make  sundry  welfare  provisions.  Ordinarily,  these  are 
responsibilities  which  ought  to  have  been  borne  by  the  Nigerian  Government,  but 
because of the high level of corruption, and lack of transparency and accountability in 
governance,
32 public security forces are not adequately catered for by the government. 
These companies have thus been compelled to provide such logistical support to public 
security forces in order to facilitate their business operations and effectively secure their 
facilities.  
     The oil companies’ closeness with public security forces also makes them complicit in 
human  rights  violations  committed  by  the  latter  in  their  locations  during  community 
protests and demonstrations. In this respect, three examples may be given to show how 
this robust relationship with public security forces lead to massive violations of human 
rights in the country.  
     First, on 30 and 31 October 1990, youths from Umuechem community east of Port-
Harcourt, Rivers State protested at Shell Petroleum Development Company’s (SPDC’s) 
facility in the community demanding for the provision of electricity, water, roads, and 
other compensation for oil pollution of crops and water supplies. The response of the 
police at the behest of the company to this demonstration was the killing of some eighty 
unarmed demonstrators and the complete destruction or extensive damage of 495 houses. 
Indeed, on October 29, 1990, the divisional manager of SPDC’s eastern division had 
                                                 
31 Although this is not a criminal matter, the formulation of the requirements in this manner is similar to the 
criminal law analysis of complicity in the commission of an offence. A. Ashworth, 2006, Principles of 
Criminal Law, 5
th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.410-443.   
32 For a recent exposition on the challenges of corruption and good governance  in Nigeria, see C.A. 
Odinkalu, 2010, ‘Corruption and Governance in Africa: How do we break the cycle in Nigeria?’ CLEEN 
Foundation,  in  Corruption  and  Governance  Challenges  in  Nigeria:  Conference  Proceedings,  Lagos: 
CLEEN Foundation Monograph Series no.7, pp.14-42. Although there have been recent measures to deal 
with the menace of corruption in Nigeria, these have, sadly, not yielded any significant results. N. S. 
Okogbule, 2006, ‘An appraisal of the legal and institutional framework  for combating corruption in 
Nigeria’, 13(1) Journal of Financial Crime, pp.92-106 at 101-102.   238 
written to the Rivers State commissioner of police to request ‘security protection’, with a 
preference for the paramilitary Mobile Police, in anticipation of an ‘impending attack’ on 
SPDC’s facilities in Umuechem allegedly planned for the following morning. Following 
peaceful  protests  by  village  youths  on  the  company’s  premises  on  October  30,  the 
company again made a written report to the Governor of Rivers State, a copy of which 
was sent to the Commissioner of Police. Consequently, on October 31, the Mobile Police 
team attacked the peaceful demonstrators with teargas and gunfire. They returned at 5.am 
the next day, shooting indiscriminately, in a purported attempt to locate three of their 
numbers  who  had  not  returned  the  previous  evening.  It  was  in  the  course  of  this 
indiscriminate shooting that the killings and destructions were carried out. Although a 
judicial commission of inquiry established by the government found no evidence of a 
threat by the villagers and concluded that the Mobile Police had displayed ‘a reckless 
disregard for lives and property’, yet the perpetrators were never brought to justice. 
33 
     Second,  in  the  well-known  Ogoni  Case, 
34 a Communication brought before the 
African Commission on Human and P eoples’  Rights,  the  public  security  forces  that 
perpetrated the human rights violations in Ogoniland under the umbrella of military Joint 
Task  Force  were  aided,  funded  and  mobilized  by  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Co. 
Ltd.
35 The scale of destruction and deva station of Ogoniland by the activities of these 
security forces remain unprecedented in the country.  
     Finally, the confrontation between Chevron Nigeria and Ugborodo community in the 
Niger Delta also highlights the use of disproportionate force by pub lic security forces 
providing surveillance over the facilities and locations of oil companies in response to 
lawful demands for the provision of social amenities by host communities. On 4 February 
2005,  soldiers  from  the  Nigerian  Joint  Task  Force  (JTF)  fir ed  at  protesters  from 
                                                 
33 A fuller analysis of this incident and its human rights implications are examined in, A. Nsirimovu, 1994, 
The  Massacre  of  an  Oil  Producing  Community:  The  Umuechem  Tragedy  Revisited,  Port-Harcourt: 
Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. 
34 Social and Economic Rights Action Center(SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR2001) (15
th Annual Activity 
Report). The facts of this case have been detailed earlier in this work. For an analysis of other incidents 
of government security brutality at the invitation of oil companies in Nigeria, see, B. Manby, 1999, ‘The 
Role and Responsibility of Oil Multinationals in Nigeria’, 53(1) Journal of International Affairs, pp.281-
301 at 292-298. 
35 Although the company tried to deny this, there was abundant evidence of her role in this connection. See, 
I. Okonta, and O. Douglas, 2003, note 4, pp.126-143.   239 
Ugborodo, a small community of the Itsekiri ethnic group, who had entered Chevron 
Nigeria’s Escravos oil terminal on the Delta State coast. One demonstrator was shot and 
later died from his injuries, and at least 30 others were injured, some of them seriously, 
by  blows  from  rifle  butts  and  other  weapons.  Chevron  Nigeria,  which  operates  the 
terminal, said that 11 employees and security officers received minor injuries. The protest 
was  over  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  signed  between  Ugborodo  community 
representatives and Chevron Nigeria in 2002. The protesters said that Chevron Nigeria 
had not provided the jobs and development projects they were promised. The company 
denied involvement in this confrontation stating that responsibility for the protection of 
its facilities rests with the state security forces whose actions it could not control in any 
way. It admitted however, that like other oil companies operating in Nigeria, it provides 
the state security forces with allowances in line with the industry practice, and interacts 
regularly with the JTF.
36  
     These are by no means isolated cases of brutality of public security forces acting on 
behalf of transnational corporations on defenceless unarmed community indigenes, but 
they have rather become the price paid by oil-bearing communities in Nigeria which host 
oil prospecting companies.
37 It is a measure of the low value that these corporations 
accord to human rights in Nigeria that they ignore international best practices in respect 
of human rights in their relationship with host communities in the country. With this 
baggage of direct involvement or complicity in human rights abuses in their quest to 
exploit the investment opportunities in Nigeria, can the very recent approaches of these 
corporations in relation to human rights signal the turning of  a new leaf? This is 
discussed in the next subsection.  
 
                                                 
36It is this apparent government support structure that makes oil companies in Nigeria indistinguishable 
from the instruments of the State in the eyes of ordinary Nigerians. This is buttressed by the fact that 
state officials only visit some communities when oil companies’ workers are either held hostage or there 
is disagreement between the companies and host communities. 
37 Human Rights Watch, 1999, note 3, pp.78 -92  which chronicles some of the travails of oil -bearing 
communities in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Indeed, this seems to be part of the ‘resource curse’ that has 
become a symptomatic feature of Nigeria as an oil producing country which can perhaps be reversed if 
the rules relating to property rights and the exercise of such rights are changed in favour of the people as 
a collectivity. L. Wenar, 2008, note 16,  pp.16-32.   240 
6.2.3  Transnational Corporations as human rights advocates in Nigeria? 
 
The  events  that  took  place  in  Ogoniland  involving  Nigerian  security  forces  in 
collaboration with Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd which culminated in the 
unlawful  execution  of  the  minority  rights  activist,  Ken  Saro-Wiwa  on  10  November 
1995,
38 did not only internationalize the grave human rights abuses in Nigeria, it grea tly 
put the transnational corporations in the spotlight in respect of human rights violations in 
the  country.
39  In  response  to  this  international  outcry  and  scrutiny,  transnational 
corporations in Nigeria have recently adopted a number of measures to  clean-up their 
image and demonstrate their commitment and respect for human rights. The corporations, 
especially those in the oil and gas industry, have taken steps to integrate human rights 
awareness and practices in their operations, while some of them have also become parties 
to other voluntary mechanisms designed to actualize that commitment.
 40 
     It is on this score that the Shell Group
41 signed up to the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) in 2000. The Voluntary Principles ,  which is a 
security initiative adopted by a group of governments, extractive companies and human 
rights NGOs, provides practical guidance to companies on how to maintain the safety and 
security of their operations with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms of the 
people in surrounding communities.
42 The company also organized a workshop on the 
Voluntary Principles for senior government security officers and is currently taking steps 
to engage the National Human Rights Commission for the Nigerian government to adopt 
                                                 
38 He  was  convicted  along  with  eight  others  by  a  hastily  constituted  Special  Tribunal  under  the  Civil 
Disturbances Decree which had no provision for a right of appeal. The procedures of the Special Tribunal 
blatantly violated international standards of due process as noted in a Report of a fact-finding team 
appointed by the United Nations Secretary General. See Annex to UN Document A/50/960.  
39 For an analysis of the various dimensions of the Ogoni confrontation, see, S. Cayford, 1996, ‘The Ogoni 
Uprising: Oil, human rights, and a democratic alternative in Nigeria’, 43(2) Africa Today, pp. 183-199; 
E.E. Osaghae, 1995, ‘The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian 
State’, 94(376) African Affairs, pp.325-344; C. E. Welch, Jr., 1995, ‘The Ogoni and Self Determination: 
Increasing Violence in Nigeria’, 33(4) Journal of Modern African Studies, pp.635-650; C.I. Obi, 1997, 
‘Globalisation and Local Resistance: The case of the Ogoni versus Shell’, 2(1) New Political Economy, 
pp.137-149. 
40 The  transnational  corporations  in  the  oil  and  gas  industry  include  Shell  Petroleum  Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited and its sister Shell companies in Nigeria, Chevron, Total Fina Elf, NAOC, 
Exxon-Mobil, Conoil, Pan Ocean Oil Corporation. 
41 Shell  Worldwide,  of  which  Shell  Petroleum  Development  Company  Ltd   is  one  of  its  subsidiary 
companies. 
42 Preamble to the Voluntary Principles available at www.voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/introduction 
accessed 28 June 2011.   241 
and ratify the Voluntary Principles and make it a binding instrument. In 2006, it trained 
over 500 of its employees on basic principles of human rights and conflict resolution and 
created a crop of staff known as ‘Human Rights Champions’ whose duty inter alia is to 
carry on with the crusade for embedding human rights in the operations of the company.
43  
     On  its  part,  Chevron  Nigeria  commenced  training  of  its  Senior  Managers  and 
Supervisors on human rights through the use of internal and external  expertise. About 
1,200 of its employees have already been trained and the training is scheduled to continue 
for the next three years.
44 It is significant to observe that like Shell, Chevron is also a 
signatory to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Hu man Rights. It has, however, 
gone further by  adopting the Global Sullivan Principles 
45 which is another mechanism 
that seeks to guide the way companies work with communities. One commendable aspect 
of Chevron’s approach to this matter is that it has included the Voluntary Principles as 
part of the materials given to local business units having a contractual relationship with it 
and they are made accountable for implementing the Principles in accordance with local 
laws and conditions.
46 Exxon-Mobil is also a signatory to the Voluntary Principles and it 
has equally taken some steps to create awareness of human rights among its staff.  
      These measures however invite some critical comments. First, it is depressing that of 
all the transnational companies operating in Nigeria, only three have so far adopted the 
Voluntary Principles.
47 This emphasizes the fundamental defect of voluntary mechanisms 
for the protection of human rights as the companies are free to decide whether, and when 
to adopt such codes.
48 It also accounts for the extremely low level of adherence to the 
Voluntary Principles by the oil companies operating in Nigeria since it is not a mandatory 
                                                 
43 Shell Sustainability Report, 2009, p. 21. Over 1600 of its staff have been trained between 2007 and 2008 
and the programme is still on-going. It has even gone further by creating the position of Human Rights 
Advisor as a demonstration of its commitment to the promotion of human rights, and this writer was the 
inaugural occupant of that position between June 2007 and September 2008. 
44 In late 2009 the company expressly adopted a Human Rights Policy which became operational in 2010 
and it hopes to achieve full implementation in 2013 as indicated in the newsletter 
www.chevron.com/globalissues/humanrights/ accessed 22 July 2010. 
45 The Global Sullivan Principles which were unveiled in 1999 by Rev. Sullivan and the then Secretary 
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, seeks to increase the active participation of corporations in 
the advancement of human rights and social justice. 
46 See note 44 above. 
47 These are Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd, Chevron, and Exxon-Mobil Nigeria Ltd. 
48 These and other inadequacies of the Voluntary Principles and similar codes for the regulation of 
transnational corporations are examined in G. Mantilla, 2009, ‘Emerging International Human Rights 
Norms for Transnational Corporations’, 15 Global Governance, pp.279-298 at 283-285.   242 
requirement.  Second,  while  awareness  training  for  staff  of  oil  companies  may  be  an 
important  starting  point,  ensuring  the  integration  of  human  rights  norms  in  all  their 
production and operational processes ought to have been the main focus of such measures. 
Additionally,  their  recent  measures  do  not  embody  human  rights  impact  assessment 
mechanisms to monitor the degree of compliance with identified human rights standards 
in their operational processes, nor do they emphasize the involvement of indigenes of 
their host communities in  the formulation, choice, monitoring  and implementation  of 
development projects earmarked for such communities in line with the requirements of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
49  
     Above all, as presently framed, these image-cleaning measures can hardly make any 
meaningful impact in addressing the enormous human rights challenges thrown up by the 
operations of transnational corporations in Nigeria. This is because the measures are 
merely focused on the liberal, hegemonic conception of human rights, trying to educate 
their staff on how such rights can   be accommodated within the framework of their 
operations.  They  have ,  sadly,  not  paid  any  attention  to  the  ways  and  means  of 
contributing to the realization of social and economic rights, which are the rights that 
have immediate resonance and relevance to  the ordinary Nigerian, but correspondingly, 
those frequently violated by these corporations.  
     In the end, the approach buttresses our earlier argument that hegemonic forces often 
appropriate  the  language  and  practice  of  human  rights  as  a  legitimacy -conferring 
mechanism in support of their policies and actions. In this particular case, the human 
rights training is tailored to showcase the companies’ adherence to human rights norms in 
their operations while ignoring the crucial issues relating to social and economic rights of 
people in their host communities. This is why the underlying economic values driving 
such policies and practices have to be challenged; and human rights NGOs and other 
progressive forces in Nigeria have taken some steps in this direction. 
 
                                                 
49 See Articles 18 and 23 of the Declaration. The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly on 13 
November 2007 at the 107
th Plenary Meeting of the Assembly. The involvement of indigenes of host 
communities apart from exhibiting a bottom-up approach to community development, rather than the 
top-down approach, would minimize the spate of protests and conflicts between these corporations and 
their host communities.   243 
6.3  Challenging economic globalization through human rights 
activism in Nigeria 
6.3.1  Theoretical Framework 
It  must  be  mentioned  that  at  the  theoretical  level  the  extent  to  which  rights-based 
strategies  can  contribute  to  the  struggle  for  social  change  has  been  questioned.  This 
critique which is anchored on what has been described as the ‘myth of rights’ argues 
against the linkage of litigation, rights, and remedies with social change.
50 An important 
component of this critique questions the utility of constituti onal instruments and treaties 
containing human rights provisions. Some writers have criticized the constitutionalization 
or institutionalization of human rights as measures that do not necessarily translate to the 
advancement  of  such  rights,  especially  soc io-economic  rights.
51 It  has  also  been 
contended that legal activism is an elitist top -down project because most of the actions 
are initiated and controlled by elites who hardly have any enduring relationship with the 
victimized groups and often lack genuine  commitment to those causes and ideologies 
beyond rhetorical posturing.
52  
     Accepting the cogency of these criticisms equally impels us to fashi on new strategies 
embracing more inclusive and effective constitutional  mechanisms that can be used  in 
challenging the relations of power which u ndermine the realization of human   rights. 
Whether the solution can be found in the construction of ‘a new rights regime’ which 
takes cognizance of the critical importance of developmental issues that have meaning to 
the vast majority of the people in the Global South,
53 or the adoption of ‘strategies of 
rupture’ to resist the existing order of capital domination,
54 the point remains that rights-
based strategies are crucial mechanisms (though not exclusive) for realizing the goals of 
progressive social movements. Such legal strategies and actions will be more effective as 
                                                 
50 For an analysis of the debate on the ‘myth of rights’, see A. Hunt, 1990, ‘Rights and Social Movements: 
Counter-Hegemonic Strategies’, 17(3) Journal of Law and Society, pp.309-328, at 309. 
51 According to Ran Hirschl, ‘the constitutionalization of rights has proven virtually futile in mitigating, let 
alone  reversing,  wide-ranging  social  and  economic  processes  of  deregulation,  privatization,  reduced 
social spending, and the removal of ‘‘market rigidities.’’ R. Hirschl, 2004, Towards Juristocracy: The 
Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.151. 
52 I.G. Shivji, 1999, ‘Constructing a New Rights Regime: Promises, Problems and Prospects’, 8(2) Social 
and Legal Studies, pp.253-276, at 273. 
53 Ibid., pp.266-271; G.W. Anderson, 2011, ‘Human Rights and the Global South: Transformation from 
Below?  T.  Campbell,  et  al,  eds.  The  Legal  Protection  of  Human  Rights:  Sceptical  Essays,  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp.347-364 at 363-364. 
54 E. Christodoulidis, 2009, ‘Strategies of Rupture’, 20(1) Law and Critique, pp.3-26 at 22-25.   244 
emancipatory  tools  when  combined  with  cosmopolitan  struggles  involving  a  broader 
segment of the society, including the oppressed and marginalized.
55 This will ensure that 
the legal actions are not limited to the victim/perpetrator relationship but seek to address 
systemic harm within the broader context of the underlying social and economic values.  
     Broadening the scope of legal actions in this manner bri ngs into focus the role of 
social mass movements in catalyzing change in the global and local contexts. By serving 
as the mouthpiece and platform of resistance to the policies and actions of government 
and global capital inimical to the protection of socia l and economic rights, social mass 
movements can be very useful vessels for challenging economic globalization.
56 In such 
struggles, adequate recognition and attention must be given to the class -based political 
economy often used by hegemonic forces to undermine the effectiveness of the struggles. 
In the context of Nigeria therefore, the point has been made that:  
Popular  resistance  to  the  current  gridlock  will  succeed  only  if  the 
dominated  classes  come  to  terms  with  the  class -based  political 
economy…and  radicalise  the  struggle  for  political  democracy  and  the 
construction  of  an  autochthonous  Nigerian  state.  The  theoretical 
framework is constituted by a combination of structure and agency.
57 
The extent to which the two approaches outlined above, namely; legal actions predicated 
on  human  rights  and  social  movement  protests  have  been  deployed  and  their 
effectiveness, if any, in challenging the dynamics of globalization in Nigeria will be 
examined in the following sub-sections. 
 
                                                 
55 This encompasses what has been described as ‘uncivil civil society’, B. de Sousa Santos, 2002, Toward a 
new  Legal  Common  Sense:  Law,  Globalization,  and  Emancipation,  2
nd  ed.,  London:  Butterworths 
LexisNexis, p.469. 
56 D. Hubbard, 2008, ‘Re-imagining Workers Human Rights: Transformative Organizing for a Socially 
Aware Global Economy’, 5 Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal, pp.1-56 at 3 outlining a ‘strategy to 
re-imagine workers’ rights activism to foster systemic transformation of the global political economy’, so 
that economic human rights discourse can be reclaimed by workers and communities through grass roots 
struggles for agency and power. 
57 A.  Amuwo,  2010,  ‘Between  elite  protectionism  and  popular  resistance:  The  political  economy  of 
Nigeria’s fractured state since juridical independence’, 28(4) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 
pp.423-442 at 425.   245 
6.3.2  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: An enabling 
instrument for legal actions 
 
One prominent avenue through which economic globalization has been challenged in 
Nigeria is through human rights activism on the enforcement of social and economic 
rights. Although the country’s 1999 Constitution does not contain any express provision 
on the enforceability of social and economic rights,
58 human rights NGOs sought to use 
such  rights  as  a  banner  for  challenging  the  policies  and  actions  of  the  Nigerian 
government and transnational corporations. This was achieved through recourse to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which has been adopted into Nigerian law 
by  virtue  of  the  African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  (Ratification  and 
Enforcement)  Act.
 59 It  must  be  mentioned  that  state  parties  to  the  African  Charter 
recognize all the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and undertake to 
‘adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them’,
60 while the Charter makes no 
distinction between civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights.  
     However, for the Charter to be deployed to actualize this goal, one major obstacle had 
to be cleared; namely, the status of the Charter within the Nigerian legal system. Indeed, 
this was the central question in the case of General Sani Abacha & 3 Others vs. Chief 
Gani Fawehinmi.
61The Respondent, a Legal Practitioner, author, publisher, human rights 
activist,  pro-democracy  campaigner  and  the  National  Co -ordinator  of  the  National 
Conscience Party was arrested on 30 January 1996 at about 5.15am by a horde of Police 
and State Security Officers of the appellants who were armed with guns. He was taken 
away to the Lagos State office of the State Security Service where he was detained for 
                                                 
58 Indeed, S.6 (6) (c) of the Constitution stipulates that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Constitution on 
the Fundamental objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy enunciating social, economic and 
cultural rights are not justiciable in any court of law. 
59 The enabling enactment was effected in 1983and is now contained in Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 2004. It was made pursuant to the provisions of S.12  of the Constitution which states that for 
any treaty entered into by Nigeria to have the  force of law in the country it must have been enacted into 
law by an Act of the National Assembly. 
60 Article 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, S. Ibe, 2010, ‘Implementing economic, 
social  and  cultural  rights  in  Nigeria:  Challenges  and  opportunities’,  10  African  Human  Rights  Law 
Journal, pp.197-211 at 199. 
61 [2000] 6 NWLR Pt 660, p.228. This case has had a significant impact on the struggle for the protection 
of human rights in Nigeria as subsequent cases have relied heavily on it, especially as the Supreme Court 
is the highest court in the country’s judicial system.   246 
about a week and denied access to anybody. Thereafter, he was secretly transferred to 
Bauchi Prison and detained thereat. 
In an application for the enforcement of his rights, the Respondent sought a declaration 
that his arrest constituted a violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under sections 
31, 32 and 38 of the 1979 Constitution and Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap 10 Laws of the 
Federation  of  Nigeria,  1990  and  therefore  illegal  and  unconstitutional.  The  central 
question  for  determination  was  the  extent  of  applicability  of  the  African  Charter  on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria especially in light of other decrees by the military 
government that curtailed the human rights of Nigerians. 
     The Supreme Court of Nigeria held that where an international treaty entered into by 
the country is enacted into law by the  National Assembly, as  was  the  case with  the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which is incorporated into the Nigerian 
domestic law by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act, it becomes binding and Nigerian courts must give effect to it like all 
other laws falling within the judicial powers of the courts. In the course of his judgement, 
Uwaifo, Justice of the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observation:
62 
It seems to me that where we have a treaty like the African Charter on Human 
and  Peoples’  Rights  and  similar  treaties  applicable  to  Nigeria,  we  must  be 
prepared to stand on the side of civilized societies the world over in the way we 
consider and apply them, particularly when we have adopted them as part of our 
laws. To my mind, this remains a valid attitude whether in military or civilian 
government. This will necessarily extract from the judiciary, so much so in a 
military regime, its will and resourcefulness to play its role in the defence of 
liberty and justice. The judiciary must not be seen as assisting those who step on 
liberty and justice to effectively press them down. 
Justice Uwaifo went further to state that Nigerian courts cannot afford to be immune from 
the progressive movement world-wide according treaties a special place in the domestic 
laws of states and that the prevailing attitude is to give special consideration to treaties 
adopted  by  any  state  as  part  of  its  domestic  laws  vis-à-vis  other  domestic  laws.
63 
                                                 
62 Note 61, p.342. 
63 Ibid, pp.342-343.    247 
Moreover,  the  court  underscored  the  point  that  the  individual  rights  contained  in  the 
articles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are justiciable in Nigerian 
courts and that individuals can seek to protect such rights from being violated, and if 
violated, to seek appropriate remedies in the national courts.
64  
     It must be acknowledged that the position taken by the court on the e nforceability of 
the African Charter in the municipal realm was made relatively easier because of two 
factors. First, the African Charter had not only been assented to by Nigeria, but it had 
actually  been  enacted  into  law  by  the  National  Assembly  as  earlie r  mentioned  in 
compliance with the provisions of S.12 (1) of the 1979 Constitution. Indeed, S.1 of the 
Act provides that ‘the provisions of the Charter shall have force of law in Nigeria and 
shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons 
exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria’. Having thus been enacted 
into law by the National Assembly, the central question became the status of the treaty, 
now  a  Nigerian  law,  vis-à-vis  other  statutes  in  the  country.
65  It  leaves  open  the 
problematic of what the attitude of the courts would have been if the Charter had not been 
so enacted into Nigerian law even after being signed by the Nigerian authorities.  
     The dictum of Justice Uwaifo on the need for Nig eria to comply with international 
norms and standards would suggest that under these circumstances, the courts could still 
go ahead and apply the provisions of the treaty. It is arguable that the court could still 
have had recourse to the Charter as an ind ication of the concretisation of customary 
international law applicable to the African continent.
66 Moreover, it is a trite principle of 
international law that a state cannot rely on the inadequacy of its domestic law as a 
                                                 
64 See also the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Ogugu vs. The State, [1994] 9NWLR 
Pt.366, p.1 at 26-27 where Bello, Chief  Justice of Nigeria had observed in relation to the enforcement of 
the African Charter within the domestic realm as follows: 
Since the Charter has become part of our domestic laws, the enforcement of its provisions 
like all our other laws fall within the judicial powers of the courts as provided by the 
Constitution and all other laws relating thereto… It is apparent… that the human and 
peoples’  rights  of  the  African  Charter  are  enforceable  by  the  several  High  Courts 
depending on the circumstances of each case and in accordance with the rules, practice 
and procedure of each court’. 
65 In this particular case, the statute in question was the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree. 
66 See for instance,  Ibidapo  v.  Lufthansa  Airlines  [1997]  4  NWLR  Pt  498,  p.124;  Trendtex  Trading 
Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 2WLR 356. E. Egede, 2007, ‘Bringing Human Rights 
Home: An Examination of the Domestication of Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria’, 51(2) Journal of 
African Law, pp.249-284 at 276-278.   248 
justification for failure to fulfil the provisions of a treaty.
67 It could thus be argued that 
since the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights had been signed by Nigeria and 
is then in force, the fact that Nigeria has not taken the necessary action to domesticate the 
same in its national jurisdiction would not prevent the country from its obligations under 
the treaty. 
     Secondly, the rights enforced in this case under the Charter were also rights embodied 
in Chapter 4 of the 1979 Constitution as amended.
68 Again, it would have been interesting 
to see the position of the Supreme Court if such rights were the social and economic 
rights such as right to health and right to education which are said to be non -justiciable 
under the Nigerian Constitution.  
     Nonetheless, this decision acknowledging the enforceability of the African Charter 
within the Nigerian legal system opened  a vista of opportunities for human rights 
activism in the country, with far -reaching implications for the African human rights 
system. It was thus deployed to great use in the Economic and Social Rights case
69 where 
the  African  Commission  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  held  that  the  Nigerian 
government was in breach of its obligations under the African Charter by aligning with 
Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd to violate the social and economic rights of the 
Ogoni people. This ruling which remains an important reference point in human rights 
activism in the country demonstrates how the interaction between national and regional 
mechanisms for human rights protection can be deployed to challenge the role of the state 
and  transnational  corporations  in  the  globalization  process  and  prevent  the 
marginalization of social and economic rights.  
     Similarly, in SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education 
Commission,
70 the interaction between national, sub -regional and regional mechanisms 
for human rights protection was manifested when the ECOWAS Court of Justice held that 
                                                 
67 See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
68 This point was also alluded to by Ogundare, JSC when he stated at p.289 as follows: ‘The Charter gives 
to citizens of member states of the Organisation of African Unity [now AU] rights and obligations, which 
rights and obligations are to be enforced by our courts, if they must have any meaning. It is interesting to 
note that the rights and obligations contained in the Charter are not new to Nigeria as most of these 
rights and obligations are already enshrined in our Constitution. See Chapter IV of the 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions’. (Emphasis added). 
69 Note 5. 
70 Note 6.   249 
the right to education is an enforceable one against the Nigerian government under the 
African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights.  The  plaintiff,  a  non-governmental 
organization registered under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, had filed an 
application against the defendants alleging violation of the right to quality education, 
right to dignity, the right of peoples to their wealth and natural resources and the right of 
peoples to social and economic development guaranteed by Articles 1, 2, 17, 21, and 22 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Before the Court could go into the 
merits of the application, the second defendant filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction 
of  the  court  to  entertain  the  action.  They  contended  inter  alia  that  the  educational 
objective of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as provided for under Section 18(1) and (3) 
of Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution is non-justiciable, and so cannot be determined by 
the Court. The Court held that by virtue of the Supplementary Protocol of ECOWAS 
establishing the Court it clearly has jurisdiction to adjudicate on applications concerning 
the violation of human rights that occur in Member States of ECOWAS.
71 The court went 
further to hold that it has subject matter jurisdiction over human rights violations in so far 
as these are recognized by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is 
adopted by Article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, and since the Plaintiff’s 
claim is premised on Articles 1, 2, 17, 21 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, it had jurisdiction over the matter. On whether the right to education is 
justiciable, and thus sustainable in the present action, the Court held as follows: 
‘It is trite law that this Court is empowered to apply the provisions of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 17 thereof guarantees the 
right to education. It is well established that the rights guaranteed by the African 
Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  are  justiciable  before  this  Court. 
Therefore, since the plaintiff’s application was in pursuance of a right guaranteed 
by the provisions of the African Charter, the contention of second defendant that 
the right to education is not justiciable as it falls within the directive principles of 
state policy cannot hold’.
72 
                                                 
71 It  specifically  referred  to  Article  9(4)  of  the  Protocol  which  stipulates  in  part  that  ‘the  Court  has 
jurisdiction to determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any Member State’. Member 
States of ECOWAS include, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Republic of Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
72 Note 6, paragraph 19.   250 
The Court also re-emphasised its position on the justiciability of the right to education in 
Nigeria through the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its final judgment 
in the matter.
73 Taken together, these decisions not only have far-reaching implications on 
the enforcement of social and economic rights in Nigeria, but demonstrate lucidly how 
the  interaction  between  national,  sub -regional  and  regional  mechanisms  can  be  an 
effective  instrument  in  the  quest  to  challenge  processes  of  economic  globalization 
inimical to human rights,  especially when deployed in conjunction with other social 
movement actions.  
 
6.4  Challenge through social movement actions 
6.4.1  Nigerian Labour Congress-inspired struggles 
6.4.1.1  Background 
A number of social movement actions have been undertaken in Nigeria over the years to 
challenge  government  policies  premised  on  the  demands  of  economic  globalization 
which entail the marginalization of social and economic rights. One of these struggles 
was the mass protests and demonstrations organized by the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC) against the increases in the pump price of petroleum products in Nigeria. 
74 It may 
be mentioned that the down-turn in the economic fortunes of Nigeria in the 1980s led to 
the implementation of an IMF -dictated structural adjustment programme which had 
devastating consequences for the great majority of Nigerians.
75 The implementation of 
this programme continued till the late 1990s, and it was in furtherance of such policies 
                                                 
73 The  Registered  Trustees  of  the  Socio-Economic  Rights  and  Accountability  Project  (SERAP)  v.  The 
Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria  and  another,  Judgment  No.  ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10  delivered  on  30
th 
November 2010. Para.27. An analysis of the role of the Court in the determination of human rights issues 
in the sub-region is contained in S.T. Ebobrah, 2010, ‘Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the 
ECOWAS Court of Justice’, 54(1) Journal of African Law, pp.1-25. 
74 O.C. Okafor, 2009, ‘Irrigating the famished fields: The impact of the labour-led struggle on policy and 
action in Nigeria (1999-2007)’, 27(2) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, pp.159-175, at 160. The 
Nigerian Labour Congress shall hereinafter be referred to simply as ‘NLC’ except where it is deemed 
necessary to still use the full appellation. 
75 J.O. Ihonvbere, 1993, note 2, pp.145-148. Although strong opposition to the full implementation of this 
package by the Nigerian labour movement and othe r progressive forces led to a revised version of the 
programme christened ‘home-grown’ SAP, the main components of the programme such as privatization, 
liberalization of imports etc. remained the same. See, A.O. Olukoshi, 1993, ‘General Introduction: From 
Crisis to Adjustment in Nigeria’, A.O. Olukoshi, ed. The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, 
London: James Currey Ltd, pp.1-15 at 8.   251 
that the Olusegun Obasanjo government which came to power in May 1999 made several 
attempts  during  its  tenure  to  impose  significant  increases  in  the  prices  of  petroleum 
products. Each of these attempts was stoutly resisted by the labour movement and other 
progressive forces with some measure of success.
76 The government was compelled to 
embark on these price increases because of the persistent pressure on it by the duo of IMF 
and World Bank insisting on the removal of government subsidy on these products as part 
of the deregulation and liberalization of the economy.
77These measures were part of the 
tenets of economic globalization as formulated within the ‘Washington Consensus’ which 
attracted a global response from marginalized groups in several countries. The response 
of  the  Nigerian  Labour  Congress  can  thus  be  located  within  this  global  matrix  of 
challenge to the dictates of economic globalization. 
     The NLC’s involvement in the struggles to oppose these fuel price increases can be 
located within the context of its constitutional mandate which requires it, among others, 
to ‘promote and defend trade union and human rights, the rule of law and democratic 
governance’.
78 This explains the central role of the labour movement in human rights 
activism  over  the  years,  particularly  the  struggle  for  the  restoration  of  democracy  in 
Nigeria  during  the  dark  days  of  the  military  governments.
79 Given that the NLC is 
essentially an organization embracing workers in the junior and intermediate cadres of 
the Nigerian workforce and the added fact that majority of Nigerians are poor and fall 
within this category, it is not surprising that the actions of NLC are easily seen as 
measures to prevent further deterioration of the basic living standards of the already 
impoverished Nigerians.
80 Consequently, the NLC has come to be seen as ‘the voice of 
                                                 
76 O.C. Okafor, 2009, note 74, pp.165-166. 
77 This was one of the major components of deregulation contained in the   recommended structural 
adjustment programme. 
78 See Article 3 of the revised NLC Constitution, 1999. 
79 Indeed, labour leaders such as the fiery Adams Oshiomhole and Frank Kokori were among those who 
suffered frequent arrests and detentions during the struggle for the actualization of the mandate of Chief 
M.K.O. Abiola in the aftermath of the annulled 1993 elections in the country. The involvement of labour 
in such struggles is however not surprising since the labour movement had always played a crucial role in 
the social, economic and political development of Nigeria.  J.O. Ihonvbere, 1997, ‘Organized Labor and 
the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria’, 40(3) African Studies Review, pp.77-110 at 80. 
80 It has been estimated that over 70% of Nigerians live below t he poverty line of less than $1 a day. See, 
O.A.  Orifowomo,  2011,  ‘The  quest  for  poverty  alleviation  in  Nigeria:  The  need  for  a  rights-based 
approach’, 17(1) East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights, pp.147-172 at 152-153.    252 
the oppressed people’, 
81and an important agent of the struggle for the realization of the 
social and economic rights of Nigerians. Moreover, the participation of its 40 affiliate 
member unions and human rights NGOs such as Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), 
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) and Campaign for Democracy 
(CD) in the strikes adds to its populist orientation, a feature that was instrumental for its 
success in the struggle against fuel price increases. Additionally, the central role of these 
petroleum products such as kerosene, diesel and petrol in the domestic and daily lives of 
ordinary Nigerians either for household cooking or powering automobiles means that any 
increase in their prices would have adverse effects on the availability of these products to 
the masses, and their standard of living.
82These factors also play an important role in 
compelling the government to alter its policies and actions on fuel prices.
83 
 
6.4.1.2  Nature and impact of the Struggles 
The NLC’s protests over fuel price increases usually took the form of ‘general strikes’ 
and often involved all of its affiliate trade unions, and other groups as such as traders, 
transporters, human rights organizations, and students unions. It entailed ‘stay-at-home’ 
strikes or street demonstrations and protests, and because of the large number of groups 
involved, it often had the effect of crippling economic activities in the country. Using as a 
reference point, the period since the return of democracy from May 1999 to 2011, the 
first strike took place between 1-8 June 2000 consequent upon the announcement of a 
50% increase in the price of petroleum products by the Managing Director of Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) the previous day.
84 The NLC in response, called 
a nation-wide general strike which paralysed economic activities in the country for nine 
days. It involved public sector workers, oil workers, transport workers and resulted in the 
disruption of domestic and international flights. The second strike action embarked upon 
from 30 June  to 8 July 2003 to protest the government’s refusal to rescind its latest 55% 
                                                 
81 History of the Nigerian Labour Congress, available at:  www.nlcng.org/history.php accessed 4 July 2011. 
82 G.O. Arishe, 2006, ‘Price Adjustment of Petroleum Products and the Law: 1999-2003’, 9(1) University 
of Benin Law Journal, pp.38-50 at 38-39. 
83 O.C. Okafor, 2009, note 74, p.160. 
84 On the legality of this announcement not having been made by the Minister of Petroleum who is the sole 
officer authorized to do so under the Petroleum Act, see G.O. Arishe, 2006, note 82, at pp.41-45.    253 
fuel price hike equally had a devastating effect on the economy as it lasted eight days. 
The third mass action organized by the movement in September 2005 also lasted eight 
days. Finally, the mass action embarked upon by the NLC soon after the assumption of 
office by Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar Adua in May 2007 was no less devastating. 
     These  strikes  had  a  tremendous  impact  and  succeeded  either  in  preventing  the 
government from implementing proposed increases in the prices of petroleum products or 
in making far-reaching concessions on such proposed increases. In some of these cases 
the government had to back down on the proposed increases and arrived at a negotiated 
settlement  with  the  NLC.  Thus  in  relation  to  the  first  strike  on  1
st  June  2000  the 
government was compelled to reduce the price increase from N30 to N22 per litre, while 
in respect of the June 2003 strike it was forced to announce a partial rescission of that 
increase  thus  enabling  the  movement  to  call  off  the  strike.
85The 55% increase was 
eventually reduced to 31% that is N34 per litre.  The September 2005 strike action led to 
a major concession from the government in the form of a 14-month freeze in the price of 
fuel from 1 October 2005 to 31 December 2006 with the President declaring that the 
moratorium would be on during this period whatever happens in the international oil 
market.
86 Finally, in respect of the June 2007 strike consequent upon the 15% increase in 
fuel prices announced by the departing government of Olusegun Obasanjo, the new 
government of Musa Yar Adua was forced to announce significant reductions in the 
prices. It reduced the increase from 15 to 7% and announced yet another freeze in the 
price of fuel for the period between 23 June 2007 and 22 June 2008.
87 
     Indeed, it is in consideration of the likely impact of an NLC -engineered strike action 
on the contentious minimum wage issue that the present government of Dr Goodluck 
Jonathan had to negotiate and arrive at a compromise with the movement to stave off the 
contemplated  mass  action  on  the  issue.  While  the  Labour  Congress  demanded  a 
minimum monthly wage of N52, 000 (about £208), a steep rise from the present N7, 500 
(£30), as a result of intense negotiations, a compromise figure of N18, 000 (£72) has now 
                                                 
85 O.C. Okafor, 2009, note 74, p.165. 
86 Ibid., p.166. 
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been agreed upon and the President on 23 March 2011 assented to the Bill on this as 
passed by the National Assembly.
88  
However, the strike actions that were embarked upon in January 2002 and October 2004  
did not result in any significant concessions from the government as the government 
obtained an injunction against the first which had to be suspended, while the strike action 
in October 2004 was declared illegal by a federal high court in Abuja.
89 
     It  can therefore be said that the strike actions of the Nigerian Labour Congress 
succeeded in constraining to a significant extent, the actions of the government propelled 
by the pressures of powerful global economic forces represented by IMF and World Bank 
through  insistence  on  removal  of  government  subsidy  on  petroleum  products.  The 
movement’s struggles thus ensured that the increases in the price of petroleum products 
were, in the words of Obiora Okafor, ‘administered in markedly smaller doses’, 
90 which 
prevented much of an escalation in the depreciation of the living standards of ordinary 
Nigerians. The success of these protests and demonstrations should therefore be seen in 
the broader context of the struggle for the realization of social and economic rights in 
Nigeria, and the continuing challenge of hegemonic forces averse to the advancement of 
these rights. 
     However, the fact that the actions were usually suspended or called off after some 
concessions had been made by the government following negotiations, coupled with their 
limited transnational connections, emphasize the limited achievements of the struggles, 
giving rise to the view that they are merely reformist measures within the existing neo-
liberal economic framework. 
 
 
                                                 
88 National Minimum Wage Act, 2011. The issue of implementation is however generating some discontent 
as the various state governments are unwilling to commence payment unless a new revenue sharing 
formula is put in place. They have now tied implementation to the removal of subsidy on petroleum 
products, an issue that is certainly very explosive in the country, and has already generated widespread 
condemnation of the Governors as a result of which they have now backpedaled. See The Nation, Sunday 
17 July 2011with the caption ‘Minimum Wage: Governors bow to Labour’s demand’.  
89 O.C. Okafor, 2009, note 74, p.166. An analysis of the legal tango that led to the scuttling of these strike 
actions through the injunctions obtained by the government is contained in O.C. Okafor, 2010, ‘Between 
Elite  Interests  and  Pro-Poor  Resistance:  The  Nigerian  Courts  and  Labour-Led  Anti-Fuel  Price  Hike 
Struggles (1999-2007)’, 54(1) Journal of African Law, pp.95-118.  
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6.4.2  Women’s Protests against oil corporations in Nigeria  
6.4.2.1  Background and Nature of Protests 
The wave of protests by women from the oil bearing
91 Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
against the operations of two transnational oil corporations, Chevron/Texaco, and Shell 
Petroleum Development Company provides another instance of local resistance to the 
marginalization of social and economic rights by the activities of global capital working 
within the framework of neo- liberal globalization. The protests also demonstrate how the 
activities of social movements from below can have strategic global impact on the nature 
and form of other protest movements’ world-wide. I highlight four of such protest actions 
carried out between July 2002 and July 2003. 
     First, on 8 July 2002 some 600 women occupied the Escravos export oil terminal and 
tank yard belonging to United States multinational oil giant, Chevron/Texaco after the 
company ignored their earlier correspondence outlining their grievances. One of their 
main complaints was that the operations of transnational oil corporations had reduced 
their once-rich subsistence economy to a polluted wasteland, and they could no longer 
carry on their traditional activities of farming and fishing. They therefore demanded a 
meeting with the government and the oil companies in order to establish a tripartite body 
(multinationals, state, and women) for the resolution of problems related to oil operations 
in the area. On the socio-economic condition of their community, they raised issues such 
as lack of employment opportunities for their husbands and children, lack of small scale 
income generating activities, basic health care facilities and educational institutions, the 
absence of potable drinking water and electricity in the Ugborodo communities, even 
though ChevronTexaco had been in operation in the area for about 30 years.
92  
     This  ten-day  takeover  of  the  terminal  by  the  Itsekiri  women  was  particularly 
significant because the women decided to demonstrate the seriousness of their action by 
carrying out the protest half-naked in public, an action that has far -reaching social and 
                                                 
91 There has been some misconception in the use of terminology relating to oil-bearing communities in 
Nigeria,  as  they  are  frequently  referred  to  as  ‘oil-producing’  communities.  However,  since  these 
communities do not ‘produce’ the oil, the proper terminology ought to be ‘oil-bearing’ communities, a 
phrase that is preferred and used in this work. 
92 C. Ukeje, 2004,  ‘From Aba to Ugborodo: Gender identity and alternative discourse of social protest 
among women in the oil Delta of Nigeria’, 32(4) Oxford Development Studies, pp.605-617, at 613. It is 
reported that the only Ugborodo community with electricity is Ogidigben, because the offices of the 
company are located there. The Punch, Lagos, 10 July 2002, p.9.   256 
traditional implications in the country. They exposed their naked bodies especially their 
genitals to impose a curse on those involved in the operations of the companies; a curse 
widely believed to lead to unpleasant consequences.
93   
     The action of the women forced the company to invoke a  force majeure clause in its 
contracts with exporters and also led to heavy losses in revenue for the company and the 
Nigerian government.
94  It is recognition of the enormity of the losses that  prompted the 
company  to  seek   a  quick  resolution  of  the  impasse,  which  eventually  came  after 
negotiation with the women in the form of a Memorandum of U nderstanding signed by 
the parties. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) committed Chevron/Texaco to 
upgrading 15 members of the communities who are contract staff to permanent staff 
status; the employment of one person from each of the five Ugborodo villages every year; 
the building of one house each for their traditional rulers, provision of vital infrastructure; 
and the establishment of income generating schemes, among others.
95  
     The second protest, also in July and obviously inspired by the action of the Ugborodo 
(Itsekiri) women, took place even while the l atter protest was still on. Over 1000 Ijaw 
women from Gbaramatu and Egbema Kingdoms organized similar actions, resulting in 
the  forcible  occupation  of  four  Chevron/Texaco  flow  stations  located  at  Abiteye, 
Makaraba-Otunana, Dibi and Olera Creeks. This action lasted 11 days and was concluded 
after the company representatives negotiated with the women and signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with them.
96 The third protest, on 8 August 2002 by over 4000 
Warri women did not involve physical occupation of oi l installations but the women 
gathered peacefully at the entrance to the Shell Western divisional office complex, sang 
protest songs and danced to prevent personnel and vehicular movements in and out of the 
premises. It later degenerated into violence when  regular and mobile policemen used 
                                                 
93 T.E. Turner, and L.S. Brownhill, 2004, ‘Why Women are at War with Chevron: Nigerian Subsistence 
Struggles against the International Oil Industry’, 39(1-2) Journal of Asian and African Studies, pp.63-93, 
at 67. As they put it: ‘In much of Africa, women throw off their clothes in an ultimate protest to say ‘this 
is where life comes from. I hereby revoke your life’’. Nakedness by elderly women, in particular, is used 
in extreme and life-threatening situations… Many men subjected to this ‘‘social exclusion’’ believe they 
will actually die when exposed to such a serious threat’. p.71.   
94 C. Ukeje, 2004, note 92, p.612. Although there is conflict as to the actual monetary cost of the ten day 
closure of the Escravos loading facility, the daily loss by the Nigerian government is sai d to be in the 
region of $7.8million while the company’s loss was around $2.5million.  
95 T.E. Turner, and L.S. Brownhill, 2004, note 93, p.67; I. Wamala, 2002, ‘Nigerian Women Take on the 
Oil Companies’, 56/57 Women and Environments International Magazine, pp.38-39 at 38. 
96 C. Ukeje, 2004, note 92, p. 606.   257 
teargas and batons to disperse the women as a result of which several of them were 
injured and hospitalized.
97  
     Finally, on July 10, 2003, the day before the then President of the United States 
George Bush’s arrival in Nigeria, women took over many petroleum companies’ facilities 
in the Niger Delta including Amukpe, Sapele West, and Imogu-Rumuekpe. In the case of 
Amukpe flow station, some 80 unarmed peasant women, ranging in age between 25 to 60, 
drove oil workers out of the station, took possession of all vehicles, changed the facility’s 
locks, installed their cooking equipment, made their infants and toddlers comfortable, and 
began ‘running shifts’ of several dozen women each. The women activists demanded that 
Shell  keep  promises  made  earlier,  employ  local  people,  provide  domestic  amenities 
including  water  and  electricity,  and  remove  a  recently  installed  chain-link  fence  that 
impeded their agricultural product processing.
98 Similar strategies were employed in the 
Sapele  West  and  Imogu-Rumuekpe  demonstrations  which  were  all  called  off  after 
reaching some agreement with the oil companies involved. 
 
6.4.2.2  Impacts of the Protests  
In addition to inspiring these subsequent protests in Nigeria, the action of the Ugborodo 
women provoked women outside of the country to also deploy the power and curse of 
nakedness  in  the  global  anti-war  mobilization  –  a  form  of  globalized  localism.  This 
resulted in the multiplication of such nude protests around the world, including those 
against the Bush administration’s then imminent attack on Iraq.
99 According to Terisa 
Turner and Leigh Brownhill:    
 By  November  12,  2002,  the  movement  against  corporate  globalization  had 
expanded  dramatically  to  oppose  the  impending  U.S  military  attack  on  Iraq. 
Women in California were explicitly inspired by how the Nigerian women who 
captured Escravos had used the curse of nakedness to shame the men and win 
their cause. They introduced a new anti-war tactic … With their naked bodies 
they wrote gigantic letters to spell ‘Peace’, photographs of which circulated the 
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globe  via  the  internet  and  print  media  to  instigate  still  more  nude 
demonstrators…’
100  
The protest actions by the women is a classic form of globalization from below as the 
hitherto voiceless, subordinate and marginalized group, the Niger Delta women, rose up 
to challenge the actions of powerful transnational corporations backed by the Nigerian 
government. It has thus been said that the action of the women represents a ‘much more 
fertile  form  of  anti-imperial,  transformational  ‘‘globalization  from  below’’  in  that  in 
defending their subsistence life economy, they were able to deny strategic crude oil to 
globally dominate capital’.
101 Although the demands of the women essentially focused on 
subsistence matters or ‘bread and butter’ issues, the manner of their protests and the 
national  and  international  impact  they  generated  greatly  constrained  the  activities  of 
transnational corporations from continuing to marginalize the social and economic rights 
of the people. The protests must thus be located within the broader context of the growing 
struggles by social movements in the country to challenge the dehumanizing activities 
and  impact  of  international  capital  working  in  collaboration  with  the  Nigerian 
government. As Cyril Obi has aptly noted in relation to the Ogoni crisis, these protests 
and conflicts are critical manifestations of the interaction between globalization and local 
resistance.
102 In other words, they represent the clash between globalization from above 
and globalization from below.
103  
     Finally, an important historical parallel between the Ugborodo women’s protest and 
the dehumanization carried out during the slave trade era may be mentioned here. The 
site of the multi-million dollar oil terminal was named ‘Escravos’ by the Portuguese, not 
the  natives,  and  used  to  be  the  final  ‘loading’  point  for  slaves  destined  for  the 
Americas.
104 Accordingly, as Charles Ukeje has pithily observed, ‘if Escravos represented 
slave  capitalism  in  the  early  colonial  epoch,  today  it  represents  an  infrastructure  of 
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104C. Ukeje, 2004, note 92, p.613. Significantly, the  protesting women resisted being referred to as 
Escravos women but preferred Ugborodo which is their community’s ancestral Benin name.   259 
exploitation by the alliance between oil multinationals and the Nigerian State’.
105 The 
action of the women was therefore to challenge this exploitation and marginalization. 
 However, the long-term impact and effectiveness of protest movements such as those 
under  consideration  here  has  been  questioned,  especially  when  they  only  result  in 
agreements  with  transnational  corporations  in  Nigeria  notorious  for  not  adhering  to 
agreed terms with oil bearing communities. On this score, it may be recalled that the non-
implementation of the 2002 MOU between Chevron/Texaco and Ugborodo women was 
the subject of the subsequent demonstration by the community in 2005 earlier mentioned 
in this work.
106 This suggests the need for more radical counter-hegemonic pressures on 
these  global  economic  forces,  a  task  which  the  misguided  Movement  for  the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) sought, but sadly failed to accomplish, through 
their  indiscriminate  kidnappings  and  attacks  which  alienated  the  peo ple  from  their 
struggle. 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to contextualize the impact of human rights 
norms  on  economic  globalization  within  the  Nigerian  environment  through  the 
deployment of legal actions and protest movements for the actualization of social and 
economic rights. The country’s engagement with the globalization process has entailed 
her adoption of the tenets of neo-liberal economic policies of liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation,  and  the  ‘opening-up’  of  the  economic  space  by  offering  incentives  to 
foreign investors to invest in the country. The government thus  enacted the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission Act containing far-reaching provisions designed to 
achieve this objective, including the Hull formula on payment of compensation in cases 
of nationalization or expropriation. The inclusion of such provisions in the NIPC Act 
ostensibly in deference to the demands of economic globalization and the race to attract 
foreign investment, has facilitated the activities of transnational corporations which have 
relied on them to continue to violate human rights in the country. This stems from the fact 
that  the  economic  liberalization  measures  were  not  accompanied  by  corresponding 
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regulations for transnational corporations on the respect for, and protection of human 
rights.  
     Notwithstanding such deep commitment to the neo-liberal economic project by the 
Nigerian government, committed human rights NGOs and other social movements have 
increasingly deployed legal  actions and mass protests as a means of constraining the 
deleterious  effects  of  economic  globalization  on  human  rights  in  the  country.  In  this 
connection,  cases such as  Economic and Social Rights Case,
107 and SERAP v. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria & another
108 open up new spaces and possibilities for a counter-
hegemonic response to the neo-liberal economic policies of the Nigerian government. 
The protests by the Nigerian Labour Congress against persistent fuel price increases in 
the  country  and  the  concessions  made  by  the  government  during  such  protests  also 
demonstrate  the  vitality  of  social  mass  movements  in  challenging  and  constraining 
governments’  economic  policies  derived  from  the  tenets  of  neo-liberal  economic 
globalization. Similarly, the wave of protests by women from the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria against the marginalization of their social and economic rights by  transnational 
oil  corporations  in  the  country  and  the  national  and  international  impacts  these  had, 
equally  epitomizes  the challenge of ‘globalization from  above’ through ‘globalization 
from below’. Although their outcomes are largely reformist in nature, these measures 
must  be  seen  as  incipient  strategies  of  a  counter-hegemonic  challenge  to  neo-liberal 
economic globalization with tremendous potential to alter the nature and context of the 
traditional  relationship  between  globalization  and  human  rights  in  Africa.  The  next 
chapter will seek to explore the prospects of these incipient counter-hegemonic pressures 
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7  Chapter 7: Globalization and human rights in Africa: 
Focus on Kenya 
 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter seeks to further the inquiry pursued in the last two chapters on the case 
studies of the mutual impact between globalization and human rights in Africa with a 
focus on Kenya. The central and strategic position of Kenya as the largest and most 
dynamic  economy  in  East  Africa,  a  position  predicated  on  her  relative  political  and 
economic  stability  over  the  years,  makes  the  country  a  suitable  testing  ground  for 
appraising the relationship between globalization and human rights in Africa. Although 
this stability seemed to have concealed its sharp ethnic and political cleavages as well as 
long-standing structural problems, developments in the country naturally have a domino 
effect on other countries in the sub-region.
1  
      Against this background, it is intended to advance and buttress in this chapter, three 
key arguments that have relevance to the relationship between globalization and human 
rights. First, I will argue that the provisions in the new 2010 Kenyan Constitution making 
social and economic rights enforceab le in the country are not only  remarkable, but 
evidence the impact of globalization in facilitating the migration of constitutional ideas 
relating to human rights.
2 Second, it will be shown that the challenge by the Endorois 
people of the action of the Kenyan government in displacing them from their traditional 
homeland  in  order  to  make  way  for  a  Game  Reserve,  a  tourism -inspired  project, 
represents the deployment of the right of indigenous peoples to constrain state actions 
and measures informed by the requirements of globalization. Finally, using the struggle 
for workers’ rights and their human rights at Del Monte Kenya Limited, a transnational 
corporation as a case study, it will be demonstrated how the violations of these rights 
exacerbated by the processes of economic globalization, were effectively challenged by a 
                                                 
1 Thus the 2007 post-election violence in the country seriously affected its neighbouring East and Central 
African  countries  such  as  Uganda,  Tanzania,  Ethiopia,  Southern  Sudan,  Rwanda,  Burundi,  and 
Democratic Republic of Congo as their routes for vital supplies such as oil, essential commodities and 
access to communications were disrupted. 
2 S. Choudhry, 2006, ‘Migration as a new metaphor in comparative constitutional law’, S. Choudhry, ed. 
The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-35 at 20-22.   262 
coalition of national and international activism leading to significant concessions and 
enhanced recognition of these rights by the corporation. 
I conclude the chapter by positing that the Kenyan situation further buttresses the 
mutual impact between globalization and human rights, and provides a useful platform 
for progressive forces to build and sustain  the pressure on hegemonic forces intent on 
maintaining the neo-liberal economic policies that continue to marginalize the human 
rights of people in Africa. 
 
7.2  Globalization and the constitutionalization of human rights in 
Kenya 
The constitutionalization of human rights, in particular social and economic rights, under 
the Kenyan Constitution, 2010 amply demonstrates the impact of political globalization 
on human rights. It may be mentioned that one of the major fall-outs of the 2007 post-
election crisis in the country was the eventual adoption of a new constitution in August 
2010.
3 This constitution in several respects epitomizes the growing realization of the 
imperative of having adequate constitutional safeguards for human rights. It is informed 
by the understanding that when certain rights and freedoms are included in written 
constitutions, they are invariably given a higher legal status and become central to the 
political discourse in that society.
4 Although it must be admitted that mere constitutional 
guarantees of human rights cannot successfully ensure the protection of such rights, the 
constitutional entrenchment gives visibility and prominence to the affected rights thus 
facilitating activism for their enforcement. It is recognition of this prevailing opinion that 
propelled the drafters of the 2010 Constitution to make specific provisions for the 
enforceability of social and economic rights. They did not have to search far as the South 
                                                 
3 The post-election violence led to the death of over 1,100 persons and the displacement of about 350,000 
others. It was eventually resolved with the adoption of a power-sharing arrangement between the two 
combatants, incumbent President Mwai Kibaki, and Raila Odinga, who now occupies the position of 
Prime Minister. The arrangement was given legal backing with the enactment of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act, 2008. M. Rutten and S. Owuor, 2009, ‘Weapons of mass destruction: Land, ethnicity 
and the 2007 elections in Kenya’, 27(3) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, pp.305-324 at 305. 
4 C.R.  Kumar,  2003,  ‘Moving  Beyond  Constitutionalization  and  Judicial  Protection  of  Human  Rights: 
Building  on  the  Hong  Kong  Experience  of  Civil  Society  Empowerment’,  26  Loyola  Los  Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review, pp.281-314 at 285.   263 
African Constitution, 1996 provided a ready inspirational source for them.
5 The imprint 
of the South African Constitution is thus manifest in the Kenyan Constitution.
6 According 
to Howard Varney, the similarities between the constitutions of Kenya and South Africa 
stem from the fact that both constitutions were adopted after  many years of turbulence 
and through processes that were largely consultative and participatory.
7 Whilst this is not 
a comparative study, and limiting ourselves to the provisions on social and economic 
rights, the similarities between the two constitutions are so striking that it is necessary to 
highlight a few of them to underscore the impact of globalization in facilitating the 
inclusion  and  ad option  of  those  provisions.  For  example,  the  Kenyan  Constitution 
provides in Article 43 (1) that: 
 Every person has the right – 
a)  to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to 
health care services, including reproductive health care; 
b)  to  accessible  and  adequate  housing,  and  to  reasonable  standards  of 
sanitation; 
c)  to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; 
d)  to clean and safe water in adequate quantities; 
e)  to social security; and  
f)  to education. 
                                                 
5 The South African Constitution was in turn strongly influenced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms  with liberal borrowings  from Germany and United States of  America. D.M. Davis, 2003, 
‘Constitutional  borrowing:  The  influence  of  legal  culture  and  local  history  in  the  reconstitution  of 
comparative influence: The South African experience’, 1(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
pp.181-195 at 187. 
6 It must be acknowledged, however, that the Kenyan Constitution also contains some provisions attentive 
to the peculiar circumstances of the country, especially in trying to deal with the long -standing issues of 
land and ethnic imbalance. For instance, Article 40(1) provides for the right to acquire and own property 
of any description and  ‘in any part of Kenya’, a provision that seeks to address the denial of access to 
land in some areas based on ethnic considerations. On the centrality of land issues in Kenya and its role 
in the post-election crisis, see, P. Kameri-Mbote and K. Kindiki, 2008, ‘Trouble in Eden: How and Why 
Unresolved Land Issues Landed ‘‘Peace-full Kenya’’ in Trouble in 2008’, 35 Forum for Development 
Studies, pp.169-193; M. Rutten and S. Owuor, 2009, note 3, at pp.306-315. 
7 H. Varney, 2011, ‘Breathing life into the new Constitution: A new constitutional approach to law and 
policy in Kenya; lessons from South Africa’, ICTJ Briefing, February, p.4. Two other important points of 
similarities may also be mentioned here. First, Chapter 4 of the Constitution  devoted to the protection of 
human rights has the title ‘The Bill of Rights’ similar to Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution. 
Second, Article59(1) of the Kenyan Constitution 2010 provides for the establishment of the Kenyan 
National Human Rights and Equality Commission specifically mandated inter alia; to promote respect 
for  human  rights  and  develop  a  culture  of  human  rights  in  the  country.  This  also  parallels  the 
Commission for Gender Equality and the Human Rights Commission of South Africa.   264 
(2) A person shall not be denied emergency medical treatment. 
(3) The State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants.
8 
It hardly needs to be mentioned that these provisions are almost verbatim with the 
equivalent provisions of the South African Constitution which formed the basis of 
decisions such as Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal,
9 Minister of Health 
and Others (No.2) v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others,
10 and Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom 
11 discussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, 
the challenges  that arose from  the decisions  in  the above cases  were  also  taken into 
account in formulating the approach the courts should adopt in enforcing these social and 
economic rights. This explains the provision in Article 20 (5) of the Constitution that: ‘In 
applying any right under Article 43, if the State claims that it does not have the resources 
to  implement  the  right,  a  court,  tribunal  or  other  authority  shall  be  guided  by  the 
following principles – 
a)  it is the responsibility of the State to show that the resources are not available; 
b)  in allocating resources, the State shall give priority to ensuring the widest possible 
enjoyment  of  the  right  or  fundamental  freedom  having  regard  to  prevailing 
circumstances, including the vulnerability of particular groups or individuals; and 
c)  the court, or tribunal or other authority may not interfere with a decision by a 
State organ concerning the allocation of available resources, solely on the basis 
that it would have reached a different conclusion’. 
Finally, the provisions relating to the implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms 
under  the  Constitution  also  parallel  the  South  African  provisions.  Article  21  of  the 
Constitution provides as follows:  
‘(1) It is a fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, respect, protect 
and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights. 
(2) The State shall take legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting of 
standards, to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights guaranteed under Article 43. 
                                                 
8 Article 43(1) and (2) of the Constitution; contrast with S.26 and S.27 (3) of the South African 
Constitution. 
9 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
10 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
11 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).   265 
(3)  All  State  organs  and  all  public  officers  have  the  duty  to  address  the  needs  of 
vulnerable groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons 
with disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalized communities, and 
members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities. 
(4) The State shall enact and implement legislation to fulfil its international obligations in 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 
     The significance and novelty of the Bill of Rights in the new Kenyan Constitution can 
be seen from two main standpoints. First, the previous constitutions of the country since 
independence in December 1963 did not contain provisions on socio-economic rights 
thus neglecting the material welfare of the individual which is crucial to human life and 
dignity.  Indeed, those rights  were not  even mentioned as  directive principles of state 
policy.
12 The previous Constitutions  essentially guaranteed only  traditional civil and 
political  rights.
  13 Second,  the  new  Constitution  not  only  provides  for  these  socio-
economic  rights  but  expressly  makes  them  justiciable.  Not  surprisingly,  the  new 
Constitution has been described as ‘one of the most progressive constitutions in the world 
today’.
14  
     While the constitutional provisions signal a new beginning for Kenya in terms of the 
enhanced  recognition  of  human  rights,  especially  social  and  economic  rights,  it  is 
important  to  underscore  the  fact  that  the  provisions  need  to  be  given  flesh  through 
progressive  and  people-centred  interpretation  and  application  to  make  these  rights 
meaningful. As Howard Varney put it: 
If respected, the Constitution, and the measures taken to implement it, will form 
an historic bridge between an iniquitous, oppressive past and a future based on 
social  justice  and  economic  development.  It  will  lay  the  foundations  for  a 
democratic and open society in which every person is equally protected by the 
                                                 
12 A.W. Munene, 2002, ‘The bill of rights and constitutional order: A  Kenyan perspective’, 2  African 
Human Rights Law Journal, pp.135-159 at 152. 
13 Under the previous constitution, the bill of rights was contained in Chapter V of the Constitution of 
Kenya,  Act  5  of  1969,  and  was  entitled  ‘Protection  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  Freedoms  of  the 
Individual’. For a historical analysis of the Kenyan bill of rights under the previous constitution and its 
ineffectiveness in dealing with issues of human rights violations, see, Y. Ghai, 1999, ‘The Kenya Bill of 
Rights:  Theory  and  Practice’,  P.  Alston,  ed.  Promoting  Human  Rights  Through  Bills  of  Rights: 
Comparative Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.187-240 at 236-240. 
14 H. Varney, 2011, note 7, p.9.   266 
law.  The  new  Constitution  ought  to  free  the  potential  of  each  and  every 
Kenyan.
15  
Moreover, the fact that the constitutional provisions on social and economic rights are 
progressive and forward-looking like the South African Constitution raises an important 
issue  concerning  the  possibility  of  those  provisions  being  deployed  to  constrain  the 
activities of the government and transnational capital within the framework of economic 
globalization. In other words, taking a cue from the South African situation of enhanced 
human rights activism, can these constitutional provisions be deployed by human rights 
NGOs and other social movements in Kenya to serve emancipatory purposes?  The fact 
that  Kenya  has  a  virile  civil  society  and  high  level  of  social  movement  activism 
notwithstanding the sometimes hostile operational environment,
 16 gives hope that these 
provisions will be utilized by progressive NGOs to actualize an emancipatory project. 
This is more so when it is realized that the Constitution underscores the centrality of the 
protection of human rights as one of the core values of the new constitutionalism in the 
country.  
     Finally, on the possibilities of the emergence of counter-hegemonic challenges, it may 
be  said  that  the  sudden  eruption  of  protests  and  subsequent  violence  following  
announcement of the election results in late December 2007 is indicative of  resistance 
from below, though evidently an unlawful way of showing their disappointment with, and 
resentment  of,  the  manipulated  electoral  process.
17 However,  in  the  peculiar 
circumstances of Kenya, this grassroots resistance was manipulated by political jingoists 
and given the ethnic colouration that it manifested. Yet, such protests must be placed 
within the broader context of the growing awareness of the need for the respect of, and 
protection of, the civil and political rights of citizens which , if properly channelled and 
                                                 
15 Ibid. p.1. This is an important assignment that Kenyans must confront in the years ahead. J. M.  Klopp, 
2009, ‘Kenya’s Unfinished Agendas’, 62(2) Journal of International Affairs, pp.143-158. 
16 On the challenges and operational constraints of human rights and other NGOs in Kenya, see P. Kameri -
Mbote, 2000, The Operational Environment and Constraints for NGOs in Kenya: Strategies for Good 
Policy and Practice, Geneva: International Environmental Law Research Centre, Working Paper No.2, 
pp.6-17; B.K. Murungi, 2009, ‘To Whom, for What, and About What? The Legitimacy of Human Rights 
NGOs in Kenya’, M. Mutua, ed. Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions, 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp.37-49. 
17 The elections were expected to usher in a new democratic dispensation in the country following the 
inability of the Mwai Kibaki government to effectively address some of the long-standing key issues of 
ethnic domination, land-grabbing, and corruption.     267 
organized, can be an important bulwark against electoral malpractices in subsequent 
elections in the country and Africa in general.
18   
 
7.3  Globalization, and the Struggle for Land, Environmental and 
Cultural Rights in Kenya  
One  crucial  area  where  the  interaction  between  globalization  and  human  rights  is 
manifest in Kenya is in relation to the exercise of cultural rights by indigenous peoples 
contesting the activities of the government driven by the forces of globalization. In this 
particular  situation,  the  globalization  factor  propelling  the  government’s  action  is  the 
tourism industry. It may be mentioned that tourism is an important foreign exchange 
earner in Kenya as the country is a favourite destination for foreign tourists because of its 
favourable weather conditions.
19 In examining the connection between globalization and 
the resistance of people to it in Kenya, I will focus on the struggle of the Endorois people 
for the assertion of their land, cultural and environmental rights in response to the action 
of the government in displacing them from their ancestral homes in order to construct a 
Game Reserve without their consultation. When it is realized that ‘indigenous land rights 
serve the purpose of protecting indigenous identity as defined by the cultural and spiritual 
attachment of the community to its traditional lands’,
20 then it becomes obvious why the 
Endorois  persisted  in  this  struggle  which  lasted  almost  40  years.  This  becomes  very 
critical when such rights are inseparable from the cultural life of the people.  
     This long struggle by the Endorois people for their rights against the actions of the 
government driven by the forces of globalization was eventually pursued through legal 
action at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the case of Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf 
                                                 
18 D. Branch and N. Cheeseman, 2009, ‘Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons 
from  Kenya’,  108(430)  African  Affairs,  pp.1-26,  at  23-26;  S.  D.  Mueller,  ‘Dying  to  win:  Elections, 
political violence, and institutional decay in Kenya’, 29(1) Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 
pp.99-117, at 102-106. As is now obvious, the protests eventually led to the adoption of a power-sharing 
arrangement and the adoption of a new Constitution for the country in August 2010.  
 
19 It is in fact the second largest source of foreign exchange in the country, and there are several notable 
parks and tourist attractions in the country. 
20 G. Pentassuglia, 2011, ‘Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights’, 22(1) 
European Journal of International Law, pp.165-202 at 167.   268 
of Endorois Welfare Council vs. Republic of Kenya. 
21 In order to underscore the extent of 
marginalization of the Endorois people and the scope of the struggles to assert their rights, 
the facts of the case will be stated in extenso.  
     The  complainants  in  the  Communication  alleged  violations  resulting  from  the 
displacement of the Endorois community, an indigenous community, from their ancestral 
lands;  the  failure  to  adequately  compensate  them  for  the  loss  of  their  property;  the 
disruption of the community’s pastoral enterprise and violations of the right to practise 
their religion and culture; as well as the overall process of development of the Endorois 
people. It alleged that the Government of Kenya forcibly removed the Endorois from 
their  ancestral  lands  around  the  Lake  Bogoria  area  of  the  Baringo  and  Koibatek 
Administrative Districts, as well as in the Nakuru and Laikipia Administrative Districts 
within the Rift Valley Province in Kenya, without proper prior consultations, adequate 
and effective compensation. 
     According  to  the  Complainants,  the  Endorois  are  a  community  of  approximately 
60,000 people who, for centuries, have lived in the Lake Bogoria area. It is claimed that 
prior  to  the  dispossession  of  the  Endorois  land  through  the  creation  of  the  Lake 
Hannington Game Reserve in 1973, and a subsequent re-gazetting of the Lake Bogoria 
Game Reserve in 1978 by the Government of Kenya, the Endorois had established, and, 
for centuries, practised a sustainable way of life which was inextricably linked to their 
ancestral land, but that since 1978 they have been denied access to their land. They stated 
that the Endorois customary rights over the Lake Bogoria region were not challenged 
until  the  1973  gazetting  of  the  land  by  the  Government  of  Kenya,  an  action  which 
dispossessed them of their land.  
     The Complainants also stated that the area surrounding Lake Bogoria is fertile land, 
providing green pasture and medicinal salt licks, which help raise healthy cattle and that 
Lake Bogoria is central to the Endorois religious and traditional practices. This is because 
the community’s historical prayer sites, places for circumcision rituals, and other cultural 
ceremonies are around Lake Bogoria. These sites were used on a weekly or monthly basis 
for smaller local ceremonies, and on an annual basis for cultural festivities involving 
                                                 
21 Communication 276/2003.The decision was given during the 46
th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held from 11-25 November 2009 and was adopted by the 
African Union in February 2010.   269 
Endorois from the whole region. It is further  claimed that the Endorois believe that the 
spirits of all Endorois, no matter where they are buried, live on in the Lake, with annual 
festivals  taking  place  at  the  Lake,  while  the  Monchongoi  forest  is  considered  the 
birthplace of the Endorois and the settlement of the first Endorois community. 
The Complainants further alleged that parts of their ancestral land have been demarcated 
and sold by the Respondent State to third parties. In particular, the Complainants alleged 
that concessions for ruby mining on Endorois traditional land were granted in 2002 to a 
private company. This included the construction of a road in order to facilitate access for 
heavy mining machinery. According to the Complainants, these activities incur a high 
risk of polluting the waterways  used by the Endorois community, both for their own 
personal consumption and for use by their livestock. 
     The Complainants claimed that land for the Endorois is held in very high esteem, 
since tribal land, in addition to securing subsistence and livelih ood, is seen as sacred, 
being inextricably linked to the cultural integrity of the community and its traditional way 
of life. It was also their contention  that the Endorois’ health, livelihood, religion and 
culture are all intimately connected with their traditional land, as grazing lands, sacred 
religious sites and plants used for traditional medicine are all situated around the shores 
of  Lake  Bogoria.  The  Complainants  further  stated  that  the  Government’s  decision  to 
include  Endorois traditional land in the official Gazette as a Game Reserve, which in 
turn denied them access to the area, has jeopardized the community’s pastoral enterprise 
and imperilled its cultural integrity. 
     In order to reclaim their ancestral land and safeguard their pastoral way of life, the 
Endorois had made several efforts and representations to the Kenyan government on the 
matter. These representations and actions eventually led to the institution of a civil action 
which was dismissed by the High Court on 19 April 2002. The Court held inter alia that 
it could not address the issue of the community’s collective right to property, and that it 
was unnecessary for Kenyan law to address any special protection to a people’s land 
based on historical occupation and cultural rights. This prompted the present complaint 
before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
     Under  these  circumstances,  the  Complainants  contended  that  the  actions  of  the 
Kenyan Government violated Articles 8, 14, 17, 21 and 22 of the African Charter on   270 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, and sought for restitution of their land and compensation for 
the loss suffered through loss of their property, and natural resources, and the freedom to 
practise their religion and culture. 
     On its part, the Kenyan government argued that the Applicants had not exhausted local 
remedies  regarding  the  alleged  violations  and  that  the  applicants  should  be  asked  to 
exhaust local remedies before approaching the African Commission. The Respondent also 
contended that the allegations that the Kenyan legal system has no adequate remedies to 
address the case of the Endorois are untrue and unsubstantiated. They contended that in 
matters of human rights the Kenyan High Court has been willing to apply international 
human  rights  instruments  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  individual.  Moreover,  that  the 
Kenyan  legal  system  has  a  very  comprehensive  description  of  property  rights,  and 
provides  for  the  protection  of  all  forms  of  property  in  the  Constitution.  Finally,  it 
contended that the complainants’ land falls under the Trust Lands which are established 
under the Constitution of Kenya and administered under an Act of Parliament. 
     After refusing to reopen its earlier decision on the admissibility of the Communication 
as requested by the Kenyan Government,
22 the Commission in its determination of the 
matter on the merits, came to the conclusion that the Kenyan Government was in 
violation of Articles 1, 8, 14, 17, 21 and 22 of the African Charter and recommended that 
the Respondent State a) recogni se rights of ownership to the Endorois and restitute 
Endorois ancestral land; 
b) Ensure that the Endorois community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and 
surrounding sites for religious and cultural rites and for grazing their cattle. 
c) Pay adequate compensation to the community for all the loss suffered.  
The Commission elaborated a number of principles relating to the rights of indigenous 
peoples and how such rights ought to be respected and protected even in the process of 
development.  In this con nection,  it  stated  that  for  ‘any  development  or  investment 
                                                 
22 It was the tardiness and un-cooperative attitude of the Respondent’s officials that precluded them from 
presenting their argument against admissibility of the Communication in the first place. See paragraphs 
57 and 60 of Report. It would perhaps have been tidier if the Commission had delivered a considered 
ruling on the preliminary issue of admissibility since the Kenyan High Court is not the highest court in 
the country. From the Commission’s jurisprudence, however, the outcome would, arguably, not have 
been different as the local remedy could hardly be said to be ‘available, effective and sufficient’ to deal 
with the complaints of the Petitioners. See, Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, Communications 147/95 
and 149/96.      271 
projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois territory, the State has a duty 
not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed 
consent, according to their customs and traditions’.
23 Accordingly, it declared that in this 
particular case, it was  ‘convinced that the Respondent  State did  not obtain the prior, 
informed consent of all the Endorois before designating their land as a Game Reserve and 
commencing their eviction. The Respondent State did not impress upon the Endorois any 
understanding  that  they  would  be  denied  all  rights  of  return  to  their  land,  including 
unfettered access to grazing land and the medicinal salt licks of their cattle’.
24 
     On  the  violation  of  the  cultural  rights  of  the  Endorois  people,  the  Commission 
declared that by ‘forcing the community to live on semi-arid lands without access to 
medicinal  salt  licks  and  other  vital  resources  for  the  health  of  their  livestock,  the 
Respondent State have created a major threat to the Endorois pastoralist way of life. It is 
of  the  view  that  the  very  essence  of  the  Endorois  right  to  culture  has  been  denied, 
rendering the right, to all intents and purposes, illusory. Accordingly, the Respondent 
State is found to have violated Article 17(2) and (3) of the Charter’.
25  
     Similarly, the Commission declared that the Kenyan government violated the land 
rights of the Endorois people by her actions. According to the Commission:  
‘In the present Communication, the African Commission holds the view that in 
the pursuit of creating a Game Reserve, the Respondent State has unlawfully 
evicted the Endorois from their ancestral land and destroyed their possessions. It 
is of the view that the upheaval and displacement of the Endorois from the land 
they call home and the denial of their property rights over their ancestral land is 
disproportionate to any public need served by the Game Reserve’.
26    
Finally, on the implications of the government’s action on the land rights of the Endorois 
people and the attempt to justify same on the ground of public need, the Commission held 
as follows: 
‘The African Commission agrees that the Respondent State has not only 
denied  the  Endorois  community  all  legal  rights  in  their  ancestral  land, 
                                                 
23 Ibid., Para. 291. This is a clear reference to Article 32(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, 2007. 
24 Ibid., Para.290. 
25 Ibid., Para. 251. 
26 Ibid., Para.214.     272 
rendering their property rights  essentially illusory, but  in  the name of 
creating a Game Reserve and the subsequent eviction of the Endorois 
community from their own land, the Respondent State has violated the 
very essence of the right itself, and cannot justify such an interference 
with reference to ‘‘the general interest of the community’’ or a ‘‘public 
need’’.
27   
This decision of the African Commission has been hailed as a powerful statement on the 
need for states to respect and protect the rights of indigenous peoples even as they strive 
to promote economic development of their countries.
28 
     For present purposes, this sustained and successful struggle by the Endorois people 
underscores four central issues relevant to the relationship b etween globalization and 
human rights. First, it shows that the assertion of a people’s rights through struggles and 
resistance to globalization do not necessarily have to take the form of modern struggles of 
civil  society  organizations  such as  trade unions  or NGOs, but  these can spring from 
traditional  forms  and  structures.  The  sustained  resistance  of  the  people  through  the 
Endorois Welfare Council was what gave the struggle the visibility that prompted the two 
NGOs to support them in the challenge. This shows that constructed bipolarities such as 
the distinction between ‘civil society’ and ‘traditional’ society in the dominant discourse 
inhibits our understanding of the forms and ideologies of resistance of people to various 
forces that impinge on their lives and livelihoods and the emancipatory potential of such 
‘traditional’ forms or ‘pockets of resistance’.
29  
     Second, the building of viable alliances between such ‘traditional’ protest movements 
or struggles with ‘modern’ non-governmental organizations can be a very healthy and 
fruitful engagement. The combined efforts of the Endorois Welfare Council with those of 
                                                 
27 Ibid., Para.215. 
28 For instance, the Minority Rights Group International has described the decision as a ‘landmark’ which 
‘creates a major legal precedent by recognizing, for the first time in Africa, indigenous peoples’ rights 
over  traditionally  owned  land  and  their  right  to  development’.  Available  at:  
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the Centre for Minority Rights Development in Kenya and the Minority Rights Group 
International  in  the  United  Kingdom  proved  to  be  very  effe ctive  in  the  sustained 
campaigns and the litigation process at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. Third, the fact that the impact of globalization is not a one-sided phenomenon but 
diverse and affecting many aspects of people’s lives, also enables people to defend and 
resist it in various organisational forms and through various ideological prisms.
30 
     Finally, the legal approach has proven to be an important mechanism for giving formal 
recognition to the rights of marginalized groups in  societies such as indigenous peoples 
which had been the campaign by some human rights NGOs and social movements over 
the years. 
     A  parallel  can  be  drawn  between  the  struggle  of  the  Endorois  people  for  the 
recognition and protection of their land and cultural rights and the struggle of the Maasai 
earlier on in their resistance to the action of the British in displacing them from their 
lands and giving same to settler populations during the colonization of the present day 
Kenya.
 31Moreover,  the  travails  and  struggles  of  the  Endorois  people  are  in  several 
respects akin to those of the Barabaig and the Maasai in Tanzania whose lands were also 
taken by agencies of the government supposedly for development projects without due 
consultation with the people. For instance, in the case of the Maasai, they were moved 
from  their  traditional  homeland  to  the  Ngorongoro  plains  by  the  Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area Authority in order to make way for the Seregeti National Park in the 
1950s. According to Professor Issa Shivji, since then ‘the Maasai have been resisting and 
fighting for their land rights and other human rights, their rights to participate in making 
conservation policies and generally for their rights to be part of the governance structures 
directly affecting them’.
32 When these challenges are taken alongside similar problems of 
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54(4) Buffalo Law Review, pp.1013-1066 at 1043-1054. 
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indigenous minority groups such as the Ogoni in Nigeria, and Bakassi in Cameroon, it 
becomes obvious that the actions of African  governments  have consistently been to 
marginalize such groups under the guise of development. This is because very often the 
exploitation of natural resources found in lands belonging to indigenous people yields 
profits for transnational corporations and local elites, mostly from the majority groups, 
but  rarely  ‘trickles  down’  to  the  indigenous  people.  On  the  contrary,  such  ‘projects’ 
exacerbate their marginalization and poverty in addition to compromising their cultural 
integrity and security, thus prompting the following pertinent comment by Erica-Irene 
Daes,  a  member  of  the  United  Nations  Working  Group  on  Indigenous  Populations. 
According to her:  
To attract foreign investment and trade, many developing countries have opened 
to extractive industries, such as mining and logging, hitherto isolated parts of 
their territories which are often the last refuges of indigenous peoples and their 
cultural diversity. By such means, indigenous peoples are collectively sacrificed 
in  order  to  increase  the  income  of  other  citizens.  Racism  against  indigenous 
peoples makes it relatively easy for national political and business leaders to 
contemplate such measures and to mobilize wider public support for them. If 
indigenous  communities  resist  dispossession,  racism  makes  it  easier  for 
politicians to justify the use of violence to crush the protesters’.
33  
     The Endorois decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
should  serve  as  an  important  catalyst  to  spur  such  marginalized  groups  to  take  their 
complaints  to  the  Commission  for  determination  and  legitimize  their  resistance  to 
predatory  state  actions  propelled  by  processes  of  globalization.  This  leads  to  an 
examination of another form of resistance to the marginalization of the rights of workers 
by transnational corporations in the process of globalization. 
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7.4  Globalization, Marginalization of Workers’ Rights and 
Resistance 
7.4.1  Theoretical Framework 
It  may  be  mentioned  that  one  of  the  most  pressing  challenges  in  this  period  of 
globalization is the violation of workers’ rights. Such violations are present not only in 
states and institutional agencies, but also in transnational corporations. Indeed, due to the 
diverse and transnational nature of their operations, transnational corporations have been 
the  most  culpable  in  the  violation  of  workers’  rights.  This  is  because  the  logic  of 
maximizing  profits  and  minimizing  losses  exacerbated  by  neo-liberal  economic 
globalization  has  compelled  transnational  corporations  to  implement  policies  and 
practices inimical to the rights of workers and their human rights.  
According to Charles Sabel, et al,
34  
The present wave of globalization has given rise to widespread abuses, including 
child  labour,  punishingly  long  work  days,  harsh  discipline,  hazardous  work 
conditions, sexual predation, and suppression of the freedom to associate and 
organize. These forms of servitude recall outright slavery in some instances, and 
provoke moral outrage the world over whenever they come to light. There is 
broad  agreement  among  the  world’s  publics  that  labour  markets  must  be 
reregulated to curb these abuses. 
One of such abuses is the use and exploitation of cheap labour in developing countries in 
what has been described as the ‘race to the bottom’.
35 The challenges posed by these 
developments have led to the emergence of two approaches in dealing with the issue of 
sweatshops.  According  to  Raul  Pangalangan,  the  first  approach  ‘calls  for  the 
incorporation of social clauses into international trade agreements, making it possible to 
resist or halt the importation or preferential importation of products from ‘‘low-standard’’ 
countries’, while the second ‘bypasses state-based mechanisms altogether in favour of the 
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Continuous  Improvement  in  the  Global  Workplace,  (2000),  available  at 
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35 R.C.  Pangalangan,  2001,  ‘Sweatshops  and  the  International  Labor  Standards:  Globalizing  Markets, 
Localizing Norms’, A. Brysk, ed., Globalization and Human Rights, California: University of California 
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market, operating, for example, through social labelling, voluntary corporate codes of 
conduct, and NGO-led boycotts of ‘‘tainted’’ goods, thus enabling consumers to vote their 
consciences with their pocketbooks’.
36  
     While these normative versus non-normative approaches differ on the best ways of 
dealing  with  the  problem,  they  agree  on  the  inadequacy  of  existing  national  and 
international labour regulations and standards to sufficiently grapple with the challenges 
thrown up in this area by globalization.
37 Recourse has thus been had to the human rights 
framework to provide the necessary additional international standards for the protection 
of the rights of workers.
38 Accordingly, where domestic regulatory mechanisms are weak 
or have been deliberately compromised in order to attract or retain foreign investment, as 
is often the case in most developing countries, an objective set of internationally accepted 
human  rights laws can be deployed to fill the gaps. However, this takes us to the 
continuing problematic of determining whether labour rights are human rights, and the 
extent to which human rights rules can be of assistance in the protection of workers’ 
rights, considering the enforcement challenges and the malleability of the human rights 
corpus itself.
39 
     Such theoretical arguments notwithstanding, labour activists and human rights NGOs 
have increasingly deployed human rights norms in advancing the rights o f workers 
especially in responding to the dominant and marginalizing role of global capital.
40 
Paradoxically, the domination of global capital has not only brought devastation to the 
overwhelming mass of humanity, and crucially, the working class, but it ha s in turn 
precipitated the emergence of a new mass movement across the world in resistance.
41 
This  brings  into  focus  the  contradictory  nature  of  globalization,  because  as  it  is 
marginalizing the rights of workers, it is also building resistance to its dictates. As Barry 
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Gills  points  out,  ‘the  paradox  of  neo-liberal  economic  globalization  is  that  it  both 
weakens  and  simultaneously  activates  social  forces  of  resistance’.
42  The  fact  that 
globalization adversely affects the rights of people also makes it possible for people to 
think of alternative ways of reacting or responding to it. Indeed, it also carries with it 
some of the instruments that have been used against it. One of these instruments is the 
Internet which has facilitated networking by human rights activists the world over. Part of 
the  strategies  of  resistance  to  economic  globalization  has  been  through  forging 
international solidarity among human rights NGOs and other social movements.
43 In the 
specific context of Kenya, it is intended to show how a coali tion of national and 
international NGOs and civil society organizations effectively deployed human rights 
norms in mobilizing resistance against marginalization of the rights of workers by a 
transnational corporation, Del Monte Kenya Limited.
44 
 
7.4.2  Campaign against marginalization of workers’ rights at Del Monte 
Kenya Limited 
7.4.2.1 – Background and Basis for the Campaign 
Del Monte Kenya Limited is based in Thika, one of Kenya’s industrial towns with a 
population of over 200,000. The company has been in the region for over 35 years and 
employs about 5,500 workers in permanent, seasonal, and temporary positions.
45 It is a 
subsidiary of the transnational giant, Del Monte Corporation with branches in several 
countries and a strong presence in Italy.
46 It is essentially a fruits and vegetables company. 
The company owns a large pineapple plantation in Thika, Kenya covering an area of 
about 5,000 hectares (about seven square kilometres) patrolled by a large corps of 
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security guards. The farm labourers who work on the plantations take turns in a variety of 
jobs  in  order  to  guarantee  a  steady  production  the  whole  year  round  and  women 
constitute sixty  per cent  of the work force.
 47 About  300,000  tons  of  pineapples  are 
harvested  every  year,  and  sent  to  the  canning  factory  situated  at  the  centre  of  the 
plantation. Here, the pineapples are washed, skinned, cored, canned and most of these are 
shipped to Europe, America, and Japan through the Mombasa Port.
48 On arrival, the cans 
are sent directly to the supermarket warehouses becau se the transformation process is 
already complete. Besides pineapple slices, the Thika factory also produce the juice 
obtained from squeezing the skin and the core of the pineapples and a significant 
percentage of these are also eventually sent to European and American markets.
49 
     In order to obtain increased yield and secure maximum profits, vast quantities of 
pesticides  and  fertilizers  are  used.
50These  include  different  kinds  of  weed  killers, 
insecticides  and  fungicides.  Although  some  of  these  chemicals   contain  substances 
injurious to health, Del Monte does not educate her workers on the dangerous nature of 
such pesticides nor are the workers provided suitable protective clothing.
51 The company 
also engages in the payment of exploitative wages to its workers; no member of the three 
categories of workers receives wages sufficient to sustain the basic necessities of family 
life.
52 For instance, the casual workers are paid 12 Kenyan shillings an hour (US15 cents), 
while the seasonal factory workers receive 34 Kenya shillings an hour (about US50 cents) 
and the seasonal plantation workers are paid 14 Kenya shillings for the same period.
53  It 
would seem that the payment of what has been described in another context as ‘poverty 
wages’ is a depressing feature of Kenya’s liberalization policies in order to attract and 
retain foreign investment.
54  
                                                 
47 W. Mutunga, et al, 2002, note 44,  p. 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, p.14. 
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Finally,  on  wages,  there  is  enormous  disparity  in  the  wages  and  benefits  structure 
between Kenyan workers and foreigners on equivalent positions in the company; a case 
of manifest discrimination against Kenyan workers.
55 
     There were also other serious violations of the workers’ rights at the plantations and 
factory  implicating  their  social  and  economic  rights,  such  as  the  miserable  working 
conditions,  especially  for  the  casual  and  seasonal  workers,  deplorable  housing 
arrangements for the Kenyan staff, and lack of proper medical facilities for the seasonal 
and  casual  workers.
56 The company was also demoting workers from permanent to 
seasonal status and from seasonal to tempora ry status, in order to minimize personnel 
costs and maximize profits, a strategy that signifies its concern for profits over the 
welfare of workers.
57  
     It was against this background that a human rights NGO, Kenya Human Rights 
Commission mobilized a coalition of several civil society organizations to challenge this 
marginalization of workers’ rights by the company. The coalition which came to be called 
the  Solidarity  Committee  consisted  of  ten  other  NGOs  working  in  various  areas 
connected with human rights, environmental rights, and women’s rights and they gave 
support to the leadership of Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied Workers at Del 
Monte  Kenya  Limited  in  the  fight  for  their  rights.
  58 The  Kenyan  Human  Rights 
Commission  also  secured the involvement of  an activist  Italian NGO,  Centro Nuovo 
Modello  di Sviluppo, in the struggle.
 59 The CNMS is an influential  Italian NGO for 
ethically-minded consumers, committed to the promotion of ethical consumption in the 
North which had worked on similar campaigns in Asia and other parts of the world.
60 
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After an assessment of the working conditions at the company and the measure(s) most 
likely to produce the desired changes, the coalition agreed on a boycott campaign of Del 
Monte’s products in Italy and the European markets to force the company to improve the 
conditions of workers in its factory and plantations.
61 This shows that it was the non -
normative approach to dealing with the issue of violation of  workers’ rights outlined 
above that was adopted in this struggle. 
 
7.4.2.2  Nature and Dimensions of the Campaign 
The  campaign  was  a  two-pronged  affair:  one  was  directed  towards  Del  Monte 
Corporation as the entity directly responsible for the working conditions at their Thika 
factory and plantations, and the other towards COOP Italia, an Italian supermarket chain 
which  sold  pineapples  from  the  Thika  plantation  using  their  own  COOP  Italia 
trademark.
62 It was crucial to target COOP Italia in the campaign because, in addition to 
being an important customer of Del Monte, it had ob tained the Social Accountability 
8000  certification  which  is  a  social  quality  certification  granted  to  companies 
demonstrating respect for the fundamental rights of their workers and demanding the 
same respect from their suppliers.
63  
     The campaign was planned to start in Italy and then move to ot her parts of Europe.
64 
Over  100,000  copies  of  campaign  postcards  were  printed  and  distributed  and  the 
campaign commenced on 1 November 1999 with the help of the media and other groups 
that distributed the material to sensitive consumer groups all over Italy. A letter was also 
caused to be written by the consumers to the owner of the majority shares at Del Monte, 
Cingranotti, demanding immediate improvement in the areas of wages, freedom of trade 
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union activity, housing, training and the provision of protective devices for the plantation 
workers.
65  
In  the  same  vein,  a  postcard  was  sent  to  COOP  Italia  expressing  the  concern  of 
consumers to the conditions under which its pineapples were being  produced. The 
postcard states inter alia: 
As  a  responsible  consumer  I  was  shocked  to  hear  the  terrible  conditions  of 
exploitation and pollution under which pineapples are produced in Kenya. Given 
that COOP [Italia] sells, under its own brand name, pineapples supplied by Del 
Monte I would ask you to exert pressure on this multinational to stop the abuses 
and to support the requests put forward by this campaign… I believe the above to 
be in line with the SA8000 certificate which COOP [Italia] has recently obtained. 
I look forward to hearing from you.
66  
The initial reaction of Del Monte was to deny these accusations levelled against it. 
COOP  Italia  in  its  own  response  requested  an  investigation  of  the  allegations,  and 
consequently  engaged  the  services  of  an  independent  certification  company  Bureau 
Veritas Quality International (BVQI) to carry out the assignment. On its part, CNMS also 
engaged another certification firm, Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS) for a parallel 
investigation.
67 Both exercises were carried out at the same time and this entailed visits to 
the factory and plantations of Del Monte in Kenya. By mid-December 1999 both reports 
were ready and they found abuses and violations by Del Monte Kenya Limited. The 
reports found, inter alia, that the company had not established a healthy and safe place of 
work and did not supply proper measures to prevent accidents and health damages, and 
that it makes or supports discriminatory actions in the employment of women subjecting 
them to a pregnancy test.
68 
     On the strength of this report, COOP Italia formally requested Del Monte to rectify 
those violations that did not adhere to SA 8000 standards. Consequently, on December 27, 
1999 Del Monte Italia eventually admitted that the issues raised in the campaign were 
true and confirmed that they were committed to discussing remedial measures with the 
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parties involved in the campaign.
69 This admission did not, however, lead to immediate 
remedial actions at Del Monte Kenya and so the Solidarity Committee intensified its 
mobilization of the workers and public rallies and press conferences were held in Kenya 
in September 2000, which caused further panic within the leadership of the company.
70  
     It is important to mention that this campaign for the protection of  workers’ rights at 
Del  Monte  Kenya  also  entailed  invocation  of  relevant  articles  of  the  International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
71 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights
72 as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
73 
These included articles guaranteeing the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work,  national  and  international  freedom  of  association,  the  right  of  everyone  to  an 
adequate standard of living, the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, 
and the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health.
74 The accountability requirements of the Social Accountability 8000 as 
well as the ILO Convention standards especially the ‘core labour standards’ were also 
invoked.
75 
According to Willy Mutunga, et al: 
‘The invocation of the human rights discourse, the international labour and other 
standards clearly placed the campaign against Del Monte Kenya Limited on a 
high moral ground. The invocation coupled with evidence of clear violations of 
not only the collective bargaining agreements but of these rights and standards 
placed  the  campaigners,  the  workers  at  Del  Monte  Kenya  Limited  and  their 
supporters from the civil society, at an advantage’. 
76 
The human rights corpus thus provided the framework for advancement of the workers’ 
rights  against  their  marginalization  by  the  transnational  corporation.  It  broadened  the 
perimeters of the struggle and put more force into it. This is against the backdrop of an 
emerging culture of human rights sensitivity on the part of transnational corporations, 
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7.4.3  Impacts of the Campaign and its implications for counter-
hegemonic struggles 
The campaign had significant impact on the company and its subsequent approach to 
issues of workers’ rights in the company. First, the boycott campaign cost Del Monte 
significant loss of profits.
78 Second, the company was compelled to effect a change in the 
management  and  policies of  its  Kenyan  subsidiary  leading  to  the dismissal  of  the 
Managing  Director  and  the  appointment  of  a  new  one  who  immediately  sought 
rapprochement with the Solidarity Committee. Several meetings were consequently held 
on the required improvements at the workplace and in relation to the rights of the workers. 
Accordingly on 21  December 2000 with the agreement of the parties, the boycott 
campaign was suspended to pave way for discussions on the required improvements at 
Del Monte Kenya Limited.
79 The meetings culminated in the signing of an improvement 
plan agreed to by all the campaign parties on 3 March 2001.  
     According to Willy Mutunga, et al, key concessions by Del Monte included the 
transformation of casual workers into seasonal ones; t he building of new houses for the 
workers; training on the fundamental aspects of the workers’ environment was to take 
place; the enjoyment of workers’ rights was emphasised including the right to organise; 
increase of wages to meet the basic needs of workers was put on sound footing; and very 
important structures put in place to monitor the implementation of the agreement by the 
workers.
80   
     Considering  the  previous  status  of  the  workers’  rights  in  the  company,  these 
concessions and agreements can be said to be hugely significant. It is a classic illustration 
of the tremendous benefits  that can be derived through international  solidarity in  the 
resistance against global capital. In particular, it demonstrates that effective results can be 
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achieved when consumers in the Global North and workers in the Global South become 
allies in the fight against the human rights violations by transnational corporations.
81 On 
this score, constructed binaries such as the North-South divides become irrelevant when 




7.5  Conclusion 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to examine the mutual relationship between 
globalization and human rights from the Kenyan perspective. It has been shown that the 
special position of Kenya in East Africa places the responsibility on her to be a leading 
light in terms of respect for human rights in the region, but arising from its structural 
problems, it has been unable to live up to this billing. However, the 2007 post-election 
crisis  necessitated  a  reappraisal  of  this  situation  resulting  in  the  deployment  of 
progressive constitutional ideas and norms from other jurisdictions to include, for the first 
time in the country’s constitutional history, enforceable social and economic rights in the 
Constitution. The impact of human rights on processes of globalization as evidenced in 
the  government’s  preference  for  Game  Reserve  against  the  rights  of  its  people  was 
effectively  challenged  by  the  Endorois  community  with  the  support  of  national  and 
international  human  rights  NGOs  through  the  African  Commission  on  Human  and 
Peoples’ Rights. A coalition of national and international human rights NGOs and civil 
society  organizations  also  effectively  deployed  human  rights  norms  to  challenge  the 
marginalization of the rights of workers by a multinational corporation, Del Monte Kenya 
Limited. 
     The  success  of  the  struggles  in  these  two  case  studies  demonstrate  the  crucial 
importance of alliances between national and international NGOs and social movements 
for effective counter-hegemonic challenge of globalization in order to place human rights 
and human welfare at the centre of development initiatives world-wide.  
                                                 
81 Ibid, p.2. For a historical dimension of the consumer-worker alliances in boycott campaigns and its class-
structured dimensions, see, D. Frank, 2003, ‘Where are the Workers in Consumer-Worker Alliances? 
Class Dynamics and the History of Consumer-Labor Campaigns’, 31(3) Politics and Society, pp.363-
379. 
82 A. Bendana, 2006, NGOs and Social Movements: A North/South Divide? Geneva: United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, pp.14-17.   285 
This case study has demonstrated the mutual impact between globalization and human 
rights as the assertion of the affected rights greatly constrained the full operation of the 
tenets of economic globalization and the further marginalization of human rights. Thus, 
human rights norms were not only used in an instrumental manner to actualize changes in 
the social and economic conditions, but also to advance  particular human rights. The 
cumulative effect of this was to constrain some of the features of economic globalization 
and the recognition and enforcement of the affected rights. 
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Conclusion 
 
‘Globalization’  and  ‘human  rights’  have  become  two  of  the  most  contested  terms  in 
contemporary academic and general discourse. Their salience, in their various ways, as 
organizing  principles  of  social  and  economic  relations  in  contemporary  society  has 
necessitated  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  them.  However,  in 
discussing that relationship, current scholarship on the subject has concentrated almost 
exclusively  on  the  impact  of  globalization  on  human  rights,  and  a  growing  body  of 
literature seems to be developing in this area.
1 It is based on this perspective that some 
writers have argued that the impact of globalization on human rights is positive while 
others contend that it is havin g a deleterious effect on human rights. A third category 
argues that whether the impact of globalization on human rights will be positive or 
negative depends on the context under consideration.
2  
     This thesis has sought to demonstrate that these positi ons represent a uni-directional 
mode of analysis, and has rather argued for a focus on the mutual relationship between 
globalization and human rights. My contention is that we need to escape the prison of this 
uni-directional mode of thinking in this area and enter into a new realm that looks at the 
mutual impact as the defining moment of the relationship between globalization and 
human rights. This suggested mode of analysis has the merit of enabling us to assess, first, 
the  nature  of  the  mutual  relationsh ip,  before  determining  whether  the  impact  of 
globalization on human rights or that of human rights on globalization is positive or 
negative. Second, it will also enable us to interrogate the underlying values and interests 
that influence the relationship between them. All too often, analyses of the relationship 
between globalization and human rights have ignored the ideological, cultural, economic 
                                                 
1 The following can be said to be indicative of this trend.  R. McCorquodale and R. Fairbrother, 1999, 
‘Globalization and Human Rights’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly, pp.735-766; A. Polis, ‘Human rights and 
globalization’, 3(3) Journal of Human Rights, pp.343-358; E.L. Ngugi, 2007, ‘The impact of Globalisation 
on the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa’, 1 Malawi Law Journal, pp.154-178; J. Oloka-
Onyango and D. Udagama, ‘The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its 
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, Preliminary Report Submitted to the Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 15 June 2000, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13; J. Oloka-Onyango 
and  D.  Udagama,  ‘Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights:  Globalization  and  its  impact  on  the  full 
enjoyment of human rights’, Progress Report Submitted to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, 2 August 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10.  
2 These positions have been critically examined in sub-section 1.5 of chapter 1.    287 
and other values that underpin the relationship. Adopting this mutual impact approach 
invariably brings into focus the centrality of these values and interests. For instance, 
globalization is often cast as an economic, non -political, non-ideological phenomenon 
while human rights are seen as universal, non-political values. But a consideration of the 
mutual impact approach enables us to use these values and interests to interrogate the 
impact of the one on the other. 
     I have argued in this thesis that not only is globalization impacting on human ri ghts 
(as  is  generally  accepted),  but  that  human  rights  norms  are  a lso  impacting  on  the 
globalization process. In support of this argument, I have shown that human rights norms 
which were initially ignored by international economic institutions such as IM F, World 
Bank,  and  WTO,  are  now  being  adopted,  and  even  promoted ,  by  these  institutions. 
However, this new approach by the institutions does not merit full celebration since these 
institutions have merely adopted the hegemonic version of human rights which focuses 
on formal constitutional provisions and not the counter-hegemonic form. My contention 
is that the international economic institutions studied have appropriated the language and 
practice of human rights to legitimize and justify their policies and programmes.  
     Considering that Africa is the central focus of this research, a further inquiry into the 
mutual impact between globalization and human rights and the possibility of adopting 
counter-hegemonic forms of human rights to challenge and make a more positive impact 
upon the globalization process have taken me to examine contemporary developments in 
a number of African states on this subject. This has revealed an emerging ensemble of 
practices embodying human rights norms and values challenging neo -liberal economic 
globalization. These practices have taken the form of legal actions, protests, campaigns 
and  other  forms  of  resistance  either  against  government  actions  and  programmes 
predicated on neo-liberal globalization, or against the activities of transnational capital 
represented by transnational corporations.  
     In South Africa, for instance, it was shown that the litigation on social and economic 
rights made justiciable in the South African Constitution has the potential to vitally 
challenge the neo-liberal economic order in force in the country acting within the dictates 
of economic globalization. This litigation has been promoted by human rights NGOs and 
other social  movements  in  the country.  In the case of Nigeria, the same process  of   288 
litigation using the social and economic rights provisions of the Africa n Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has sought to achieve similar results. However, I have also 
argued that for such litigation to be effective and bear positive results, they must be part 
of a broader project involving the active role of social mass movements embracing a 
large segment of the downtrodden masses in the society. On this score, I examined the 
impact of the struggles by Nigerian workers against the government’s persistent increases 
in  the  prices  of  petroleum  products  in  the  country  in  order  to  conform  with  the 
prescriptions of international economic institutions through what Stephen Gill has aptly 
described  as  ‘market  civilization’.
3  These  mass  actions  or  general  strikes  greatly 
constrained the actions of the Nigerian government steeped in the neo-liberal economic 
order to make concessions on the fuel price issue. Similarly, the wave of protests by 
Nigerian women in the Niger Delta against the operations of transnational corporations in 
their  area  demonstrates  the  vitality  of  actions  from  underprivileged  and  marginalized 
groups in society to challenge the neo-liberal economic order.  
     Although I have argued that the results of these actions are essentially reformist (in the 
one case, resulting in concessions and price reductions from government; and the other, 
an  MOU  committing  the  companies  to  carry  out  some  welfare  programmes),  they 
nevertheless indicate the emergence of counter-hegemonic movements with capacity to 
challenge neo-liberal economic globalization. In the same vein, in Kenya, the almost 40 
years struggle by the Endorois people against their displacement by the government in 
order to make way for the construction of a Game Reserve is indicative of the actions of 
people from below challenging the actions of the Kenyan government engineered by the 
forces of economic globalization from above. Additionally, the campaign of a coalition of 
national  and  international  civil  society  organizations  compelled  a  transnational 
corporation, Del Monte Kenya Limited to take positive actions on the human rights of its 
workers.  
     On  the  whole,  these  developments  buttress  my  argument  that  not  only  has 
globalization  been  impacting  on  human  rights,  but  that  human  rights  norms  are  also 
having some impact on the globalization process. The point has also been made that the 
                                                 
3 S. Gill, 2003, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.117-
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impact  of  human  rights  on  the  globalization  process  can  be  more  pronounced  and 
beneficial if the counter-hegemonic version of human rights is deployed for this purpose 
rather  than  the  hegemonic  version  which  has  been  appropriated  by  i nternational 
economic institutions and governmental agencies. The counter-hegemonic version will 
spring from the struggles and realities of the ordinary masses predicated on their lived 
experiences and resistance to oppression and marginalization. This is  one effective way 
of ensuring that human rights respond to the immense challenges posed by contemporary 
globalization and that international economic rules are predicated on social justice as the 
overarching goal. 
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